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The Teaching of Latin in Later Medieval England

BROTHER BONAVENTURE, F.S.C.

THE history of education in later medieval England has attracted few historians. This is especially true of the training at pre-university, or grammar school level. The few studies devoted to this subject have concentrated on a later period, such as the influence of the Renaissance on Eton College or the refounding of St Paul's School by John Colet. But the nature of the school programme as it was found up and down the country before the advent of humanism has remaind relatively unknown.

It is not surprising that such is the case. The greatest single contribution to the history of education in medieval England was made by A. F. Leach. In 1915 he published a summary of a near-lifetime of research in his book, *The Schools of Medieval England.* In his review of the book, A. G. Little remarked that the author devoted most of his attention "to giving evidence of the foundation, continued existence, and numbers of the schools at various periods between the mission of St. Augustine and the death of Henry VIII."[1] In other words, intent as he was on the institutional side of his subject, Leach made no attempt to explore the nature of the programme provided for in these same schools. Although the reviewer expressed the hope that the author would subsequently furnish his readers with some details of the internal life of the medieval school, Leach later described his book as an attempt "to condense all that is known" of England's schools, and this was an accurate statement of both the scope and limitations of his research. Although some historians since Leach's day have been impressed with the necessity of explaining the apparently increasing number of people familiar with Latin in the later middle ages, the impression has prevailed that the material was not at hand to provide any knowledge of the teaching and learning of Latin.

The aim of the present study, therefore, is to summarise what can be learned of the Latin programme taught in the educational institutions of later medieval England. The educational history of the fifteenth century is commonly associated with the reforms brought about in the schools of Italy under the impact of the classical revival, or the new spirit infused into the educational life of northern Europe by the Brethren of the Common Life. The humanist revival came to England comparatively late, and the Latin programme summarised below stops short of the reforms instituted by John Standbridge, master of the newly founded Magdalen College School, in the last decade of the fifteenth century.

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[1] A. G. Little, "The Schools of Medieval England," *English Historical Review,* XXX (1915), 529.

At first glance the prospects are not very reassuring. We do not possess a first hand account like that of John of Salisbury affording us an insight into the daily life of the classroom. Nor do we possess any treatise on educational theory. Most of the sources which do yield information are scattered and of unequal value: these include foundation charters, apointments of grammar masters, as well as a few book lists of school libraries. Occasionally these are of some help but they often raise as many questions as they answer.

There are extant, however, a number of grammatical manuscripts which contain a good deal of relevant material. These are distributed among several libraries throughout the country and some of them have not been properly catalogued. A brief inspection of them is sufficient to show that many of these manuscripts were compiled to facilitate the teaching and learning of Latin. It is with this source material that the present study will be concerned.

Some twenty-five manuscripts have accordingly been selected as fairly representative of this body of material. Twelve of these have been examined in full, while the contents of the others have been adequately described in their respective catalogues. Those examined in detail are mainly drawn from the British Museum, the colleges of the University of Cambridge and the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and they have been selected on three grounds: that they are concerned with formal instruction in Latin, that they are unmistakably of English provenance, and that they were in use sometime during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The ultimate aim, then, is to determine what is common to all or most of these manuscripts, and, in particular, to discover whether or not there were specific "texts" in general use among the teachers of Latin.

It will be helpful at the outset to provide a brief description and to indicate the provenance of the MSS as follows:

Trin. 0.5.4.[2]	Vellum, fols 294, small beautiful cursive hand, text space 20 cm × 33 cm; Battlefield College, n. Shrewsbury, c. 1409. This very fine MS is artistically decorated throughout.
Add. 37,075[3]	Paper, 410 leaves, various hands, varies 8.9 cm × 12.7 cm to

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[2] Described by M. R. James, *The Western Manuscripts in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, A Descriptive Catalogue* (C.U.P., 1902), III, 301-308; provenance also in N.R. Ker, *Medieval Libraries of Great Britain*, Royal Hist. Soc. (London, 1941), 5, 134.

[3] Described in *Catalogue of Additions to the British Museum in the years 1900-1905* (London, 1907), 344-349.

	12.7 × 19.2; London, possibly St Anthony's School, late 15th cent.
Harl. 1002	Paper, fols 203, legible cursive, several hands, 10.9 cm × 16 cm to 12.7 × 17.8; possibly west of England n. Welsh border; nothing more definite; a teacher's lesson plan.
Harl. 1587[4]	Paper, fols 214, several hands, 7 cm × 8.3 cm to 10.9 × 17.2; owner Dom William Ingram of Christ Church, Canterbury, last quarter of 15th cent.
Add. 17,724	Vellum, fols 112, single legible hand, 10.9 cm × 16 cm; possibly a Cistercian community, late 14th c. or early 15th c.
Auct. F. 3.9.[5]	Paper, fols 226, single legible cursive hand, 15.3 cm × 22.9 cm; Coventry Cathedral, younger monks and/or almonry boys, 15th cent. first half.
Caius 383[6]	Paper, fols 108, two principal hands, very irregularly written; Oxford, probably for clerks proceeding to orders, later 14th, or early 15th cent.
Lincoln 88[7]	Vellum, fols 173, several legible hands, 5.1 cm × 21 cm to 7.6 × 23.5; Oxford grammar master, early 15th cent.
Add. 32,452	Vellum, fols 94, 40 fols missing at beginning, single legible cursive hand, 12.7 cm × 9 cm; provenance unknown.
Edinburgh 136[8]	Vellum, fols 220, various court hands; the compositions of John Seward, London schoolmaster, early 15th cent., in the possession of the Austin Canons of St Osyth in Essex.
Harl. 5751	Paper, fols 329, single ill-formed hand, 13.5 cm × 9 cm; for young clerks proceeding to orders, 15th cent.
Peterhouse 83[9]	Vellum, fols 214, single ill-formed hand, 28 cm × 17.2 cm; the possession of John Warkeworth, master of Peterhouse, late 15th cent.

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[4] Discussed by F. A. Gasquet, *The old English Bible and Other Essays* (2nd ed., London, 1908), 235-245; Dom Ingram was responsible for education of almonry boys; G. H. Rooke, "Dom William Ingram and his Account Book, 1504-1533," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, VII, no. 1 (April, 1956), 30-44, *passim.*

[5] Briefly described in F. Madan, H. H. E. E. Craster, N. Denholm-Young, *A Summary Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford*, vol. II, part II (Oxford, 1937), 689-690.

[6] Described by M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Gonville and Caius College* (C.U.P., 1907-1908), II, 435-437, but he despairs of any attempt at collation.

[7] Briefly described in R. M. Woolley, *Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Lincoln Cathedral Chapter Library* (Oxford, U.P., 1927), 48-50.

[8] Described by Miss Catherine Borland, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Western Medieval Manuscripts in Edinburgh University Library* (Edinburgh U.P., 1916), 213-215, and the subject of a study by V. H. Galbraith, "John Seward and his Circle," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1 (London, 1941), 85-104.

[9] Described by M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Peterhouse* (C.U.P., 1899), 99-100.

Grammar, within the context of these manuscripts, comprises four principal parts, namely, orthography, prosody, etymology and syntax. Orthography teaches the beginner how to spell and write Latin words, prosody to read aloud correctly, while syntax includes both the rules and their application in the construction of sentences. The term *ethimologia*, however, has a much wider application than it normally has today and comprised what we would call morphology. The position of prosody — immediately after orthography — contrasts with the order adopted by the author of the *Catholicon* who begins his book by dividing grammar into orthography, etymology, syntax and prosody.[10]

Tracts on orthography are included in five MSS but only one appears to have been a text, that beginning with the sentence, *Apud Latinos viginti sunt litere.*

There is considerable attention paid to prosody which treats of metre and accentuation. Tracts on this subject, accounting for some twenty items, are included in two-thirds of the MSS. John Seward's book contains four separate tracts on prosody, one of them intended for children. Only two of these tracts, however, appear to have circulated as texts: one dealing with quantities, beginning *Que non ponuntur hic omnia corripiuntur*, is in MS *Trin. 0.5.4.* and also in MSS *St John's 163*, *Digby 100* and *Rawl. G.60*, while the other, consisting of verses on the different kinds of metre and beginning *Celi gemma bona*, is included in MSS *Harl. 1002* and *Digby 100.*

Etymology includes everything to be learned about the parts of speech considered by themselves as opposed to their relation with each other in sentences. The tracts on this subject range from elementary to advanced treatments, and although their basic source is the *Ars Minor* of Donatus[11] no two tracts are identical. Of special interest is the work of John of Cornwall in that he was the first master to use English instead of French in the teaching of Latin. Cornwall taught grammar at Oxford from 1344 to 1349, and in 1346 he wrote a treatise entitled *Speculum Grammaticale* which includes a tract on the teaching of the parts of speech.[12]

There is an abundance of material relating to the construction of Latin sentences. In addition to the *Doctrinale*[13] and tracts containing the rules of construction, there are several exercises designed to facilitate written expression, including Latin circumlocutions as well as proverbs in both Latin and English. For the most part, the illustrative sentences are either moral exhortations, quotations from Scripture, or references to contemporary events. At least three tracts can be singled out as texts. One of these is mainly in English and of an elementary nature: it begins with the question, "In how many maners schalt thou bygynne to make Latyn?" It is found in MSS *Trin. 0.5.4.* and *Peniarth 356.*[14] The second consists of a selection of easy Latin sentences, each sentence followed by a discussion in English of each of its parts. This tract begins with the sentence, *Ego sum creatura Dei*, and is found in MSS *Harl. 1002*, *Add. 37, 075* and *Corpus Christi 233.* The third tract, of a more advanced nature, is entirely in Latin and its opening sentence is: *Iesus Christus, filius beate Marie, iuvet et expediat Laurencium* (*or Johannem*) *de Londoniis*: it is included in MSS *Harl. 1002* and *Peniarth 356.* Mention should also be made of a *questio* that is found in MSS *Harl. 1587*, *Peniarth 356* and *Add. 12195.* This begins with the question, *Es tu clericus?* followed by the reply, *Non sum clericus sed sum aliqualiter litteratus.* The *questio* then continues to develop the definition of *clericus* and appears to be as much an exercise in Latin composition as in elementary disputation.

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[10] Several 15th century printed editions of the *Catholicon* are listed in L. Hain, *Repertorium Bibliographicum*, 4 vols (Milan, 1948), I, nos. 2251-2269 ; John of Genoa, a Dominican friar, composed this work before 1286, J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship* (3rd ed., Cambridge, 1921), I, 606.

[11] Printed and translated by Wayland Johnson Chase, *The Ars Minor of Donatus* (University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History, no. 11, 1926).

[12] *MS Auct. F.* 3.9., pp. 1-180 ; details of John Cornwall's career in A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols (Oxford, 1957-1959), I, 490.

Figures of speech are a form of irregular syntax, and tracts on this subject are included in five of the MSS. No two of these tracts are alike, but some of the material is derived from the *Catholicon* and the *Doctrinale*, and this suggests a wider use of these works for figures of speech than the manuscript evidence directly vouches for. The examples given in the tracts are taken mainly from Scripture.

Treatises on *dictamen*, that is, the composition of letters according to standard forms, are included in one-third of the MSS. No single treatise predominates as a basic text. Yet it would be misleading to infer from this evidence that teachers were left entirely to their own devices. Among this small collection there are three treatises based on the "use" of the Roman Curia, the Cistercian Order and the University of Oxford respectively.[15] A fourth treatise is primarily concerned with the composition of business letters and is entitled *usus modernus.*[16] The "Cistercian" method is characterised by the employment of Scriptural proverbs to set the tone of the letter. The exclusive use of Latin throughout these works on dictamen implies a comparatively advanced stage of instruction among the students.

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[13] Edited by D. Reichling, *Das Doctrinale des Alexander de Villa-Dei* (Berlin, 1893).

[14] This tract is printed by S. B. Meech in "An Early Treatise in English Concerning Latin Grammar", *University of Michigan Publications in Language and Literature*, XIII (Ann, Arbor, 1935), 81-125.

[15] MSS *Add.* 17, 724, *Auct. F. 3.9.*

[16] MS *Caius 383.*

The theory of grammar, that is, the consideration of Latin grammar as a speculative science instead of a language to be learned, does not, strictly speaking, come within the framework of the programme under examination. Nonetheless, it would be misleading to ignore it since it is included in four of the MSS and sometimes arises so naturally, especially from a study of the parts of speech, that one is left with the impression that some teachers found it impossible to avoid.

The treatise entitled *Donatus in Magno* by a John of Montpellier[17] and the *Speculum Grammaticale* of John Cornwall are evidently for advanced students. The method employed, however, is also at work in MS *Add. 32,452*, an unidentified and interesting little book on the parts of speech containing a wealth of illustrative sentences. The author cannot refrain from going off into logical analysis and philosophical concepts of grammar. Finally, even John Seward, whose main preoccupation is prosody, begins his work with a commentary on the nature of grammar. There is no question, therefore, of looking for specific texts in this subject, even though it might have formed part of the Latin training for advanced students. The search for accurate definitions of terms appears to have caused this interest in the more speculative side of the subject on the part of some of the grammar masters.

As might be expected, numerous vocabularies are found throughout the MSS. They can be classified into at least five different groups. Those called *nominale* consist of nouns arranged according to topics; most of these begin with terms relating to God but no two of them are identical. The *verbale* is a list of verbs arranged to facilitate the learning of each conjugation; verbs of the first conjugation, for example, appear alphabetically, beginning with those in which the letter "b" precedes the "o," followed by those with "c" and "d" similarly preceding the letter "o." A third kind of vocabulary is miscellaneous in character, includes different parts of speech and is arranged in alphabetical order. A fourth consists of a list of synonyms; there are several groups of these synonyms but there is no similarity among them either in the words selected or in the order of appearance. Finally, there are the vocabularies in verse. This classification comprises a diverse group of word-lists and to some extent overlaps the first four groups mentioned above. It is only among these verse vocabularies that specific texts can be discerned. One begins with the parts of the human body: Os, facies, mentum.[18] A second text is called *Liber Caballus*, or *Bursa Latini*, and begins with the words: Equus, caballus, pullus.[19] A third metrical vocabulary is that entitled *Distigius* and its opening sentence is: Cespitat in phaleris.[20]

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[17] MS *Lincoln 88*.

[18] Printed in Thomas Wright, ed., *A Volume of Vocabularies* (London, 1857), I, 183-184.

[19] *Ibid.*, 177-182.

Probably none of these metrical vocabularies enjoyed a wider circulation than the *Synonyma* which begins: Ad mare ne videar latices. This tract on synonyms is contained in nine of the MSS.[21] Closely associated with the *Synonyma* and often found with it is the *Equivoca*, of which the first words are: Augustus, ti, to, Cesar vel mensis habeto: this opening line illustrates its use as a vocabulary exercise.[22] Finally, there is the poem commencing, *Deus nichil fecerat frustra*, which describes the occupations associated with each class of society and in doing so includes the terms proper to each social activity. It is found in three MSS and in one of them is called *Liber Ricardini.* Two of the above vocabularies in verse, the *Distigius* and the *Synonyma*, are attributed to John of Garland.[23]

One of the most striking features of this grammatical material is the number of selections in verse evidently employed as reading material for students of Latin. *MS Trin. 0.5.4.*, the handsome book from Battlefield College in the early fifteenth century, contains most of these "readers" as follows:

Catonis Disticha, inc. Cum animadverterem
Liber Urbanitatis, inc. Stans puer ad mensam
Liber Cartule, inc. Cartula nostra tibi portat
Liber Penitencialis, inc. Peniteas cito
Facetus, inc. Est nichil utilius
Liber Parabolarum, inc. A phebo phebe lumen capit
Ecloga Theoduli, inc. Ethiopum terras.

MS Add. 37,075, associated with a London school of the late fifteenth century, contains all the above texts except the *Liber Cartule* and the *Liber Penitencialis.* For purposes of comparison, the reading selections included in other MSS are set out below in the order of their appearance:

Peniarth 356	*Rawl. G. 60*
Ecloga Theoduli	Liber Urbanitatis
Catonis Disticha	Catonis Disticha

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[20] *Ibid.*, 175-177.

[21] Printed in J. P. Migne, *PL* 150, cols 1579-1590.

[22] There is a printed edition, together with the *Synonyma*, by Richard Pinson's press (London, 1498), R. Proctor, *An Index to the Early Printed Books in the British Museum from the Invention of Printing to the Year MD* (London, 1898), 722; only the first nine lines are in Migne, *PL*, 150, cols 1589-1590.

[23] L. J. Paetow, ed. *Morale Scolarium of John of Garland*, Memoire of the University of California, IV, 2 (Berkeley, 1927), 134-137, discusses these attributions and accepts them provisionally.

Liber Urbanitatis
Liber Penitencialis
O Magnatum filii nostri commensales

Facetus
Liber Cartule
Liber Parabolarum
Liber Penitencialis

St John's 147
Liber Cartule
Facetus
Catonis Disticha
Liber Penitencialis
Liber Parabolarum

Corpus Christi 233
Facetus
Liber Penitencialis
Liber Parabolarum
Ecloga Theoduli

Cambridge Add. 2830
Facetus
Liber Parabolarum
Liber Penitencialis

Digby 100
Ecloga Theoduli
Virgilii Copa
Catonis Disticha
Horatii Epistolarum Lib. 1
Liber Penitencialis
Ovidii de mirabilibus mundi

Hatton 58
Liber Parabolarum
Liber Cartule
Catonis Disticha

Caius 417
Liber Urbanitatis
Catonis Disticha

St John's 163
Catonis Disticha
Liber Parabolarum

Bodl. 837
Liber Urbanitatis

Caius 203
Liber Penitencialis

Shrewsbury School IV
Aesop's Fables
Eclogues of Vergil (extracts)

As these lists show, the consistency in the choice of selections is striking. The only exceptions to the usual pattern are *MS Shrewsbury School IV* and *MS Digby 100* with their classical content. Particular interest attaches to the three readers in *MS Cambridge Add. 2830*, for this book belonged to Master John Drury and was compiled around 1431 while he was teaching in the grammar school at Beccles in Suffolk. Drury uses *Facetus* and *Liber Parabolarum* to illustrate grammatical rules in the form of textual commentaries, while *Liber Penitencialis* has an interlinear gloss.[24]

The *Distichs of Cato*, included in nine of the above collections, is also found in *MS Harl. 1002* and thus enjoys a high frequency among these Latin readers.

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[24] S. B. Meech, "John Drury and his English Writings," *Speculum* IX, (1934), 70-83.

This work is expressly didactic in character and sets the tone for most of the other selections. The complete text, consisting of a prologue in prose with some 57 brief *sententie*, together with four books of distichs, is found in only one-third of the MSS. In some cases only the distichs are included, while in others there is an abbreviated form comprising only the prologue and *sententie* and usually called *Liber Parvi Catonis*.[25]

Liber Urbanitatis, included in seven of the MSS, is concerned with rules of politeness; it is attributed to Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln from 1235 to 1253.[26]

Liber Cartule, a series of reflections on the vanity of this earthly life, has often been attributed to St Bernard or John of Garland but its authorship is still in doubt.[27] It is included in four MSS.

Liber Penitencialis, more often referred to from the opening sentence as *Peniteas cito*, summarises in verse the doctrine of the sacrament of penance. This poem seems to have enjoyed a wide circulation as a school text, is included in seven MSS, and is frequently, but mistakenly, attributed to John of Garland.[28]

Facetus, or *Liber Facetie*, is a didactic poem of some 290 verses instructing youth in Christian living. Appearing in six MSS, its authorship has not been established.[29]

Liber Parabolarum, included in seven MSS, is a relatively long didactic poem of some 642 hexameters. Commonly attributed to the twelfth century Cistercian poet, Alanus de Insulis, it is also called *Proverbia* or *Doctrinale minus*.[30]

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[25] There is a printed edition of *Parvus et magnus Cato* from William Caxton's second press (Bruges, 1480); a recent critical edition is *Catonis, Disticha*, M. Boas, H. J. Botschuyer (Amsterdam, 1952).

[26] Printed in *The Babees Book*, part II, ed. F. J. Furnivall, Early English Text Society (London, 1868), 30, 32. S. Harrison Thomson accepts the attribution to Grosseteste in *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste* (C.U.P., 1940), 149-150.

[27] Printed in Migne, *PL* 184, cols 1307-1314. The authorship is discussed in G. L. Hamilton, "Theodulus: A Medieval Textbook," *Modern Philology*, VII (1909), 171-172.

[28] Printed in Migne, *PL*, 207, cols 1153-1156. John of Garland's authorship was accepted by Paetow, *Morale Scolarium*, 138, but this is no longer tenable since Father Hugh Mackinnon, S.J., in an unpublished thesis on William de Montibus (Oxford D. Phil. 1959), has shown that the *Liber Penitencialis* was known to William (d. 1213), for whom see Emden, *Biographical Register*, II, 1298.

[29] The printed editions are listed in Hans Walther, *Initia Carminum ac Versuum Medii Aevi Posterioris Latinorum* (Göttingen, 1959), nos. 3692 and 5777; critical edition by J. Morawski, *Le Facet En Francoys*, Société Scientifique de Poznan, tome II, fasc. I (1923).

[30] Printed in Migne, *PL* 210, cols 581-594. Alanus' authorship has been questioned recently by G. Raynaud de Lage, *Alain de Lille, Poète du XII Siècle*, Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales (Montreal, 1951), 16-17.

The Eclogue of Theodulus, comprising 352 lines of verse and included in five MSS, consists of a pastoral disputation between an Athenian shepherd and a Hebrew shepherdess. The poem is designed to acquaint younger students with some of the principal persons and events in both classical and sacred history.[31]

Before concluding this brief description of the reading texts, mention should be made of another poem entitled, *O Magnatum filii nostri commensales.*[32] Comprising some 150 goliardic lines characterised throughout by an end rhyme, it is an essay on the good manners proper to noble households; in this respect it resembles *Liber Urbanitatis.* Although the poem appears in only two MSS, *Harl. 1587* and *Peniarth 356*, its use in such widely separated places as Christ Church, Canterbury and a school in Wales merits its inclusion with the preceding texts.

It will be helpful at this stage to recall those selections that have reason to be regarded as Latin texts in use in England during the later medieval period:

Prosody:
1. Que non ponuntur hic omnia corripiuntur
2. Celi gemma bona

Syntax:
1. In how many maners schalt thou bygynne to make Latyn?
2. Ego sum creatura Dei
3. Iesus Christus... iuvet et expediat Laurencium de Londoniis
4. Es tu clericus?

Vocabularies:
1. Os, facies, mentum
2. Liber Caballus
3. Distigius
4. Synonyma
5. Equivoca
6. Deus nichil fecerat frustra

Readers:
1. Catonis Disticha
2. Ecloga Theoduli
3. Facetus
4. Liber Cartule
5. Liber Penitencialis
6. Liber Urbanitatis
7. Liber Parabolarum
8. O Magnatum filii nostri commensales

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[31] J. Osternacher, ed., *Theoduli ecloga* (Linz,1902); see Hamilton, "Theodulus," *Modern Philology*, VII, 169-185. The *Eclogue* appears to be the work of a northern scholar of the ninth century, possibly Gottschalk (d. 869), pupil of Raban Maur, F. J. E. Raby, *A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols., 2nd ed., (Oxford, 1957), I, 228.

[32] This selection is the only reading text that is not yet printed. Unfortunately the author preferred to remain anonymous: Non vult qui composuit esse nominatus.

A cursory glance at the above list will immediately reveal two facts of importance. In the first place, there is almost nothing of classical antiquity. The "readers" include only two books which preserve anything of the culture of the ancient world — Cato and Theodulus. In regard to the first of these it is to be noted that a highly abbreviated edition circulated in its own right, and the morality expounded in the distichs is no longer pagan but has been Christianised. As for the Eclogue of Theodulus, it would provide the pupil with some knowledge of classical mythology, but only in comparison with a few of the more significant episodes in the history of the chosen people. In other words, whatever these two books contain of antiquity is made to subserve distinctively Christian purposes, and the classical element, as the basis of an educational programme, is almost totally absent.

The second fact to be observed is the didactic nature of the literature. It is predominantly moral in Cato, Facetus and the Parabole, religious and instructional in Theodulus, Cartula and the Liber Penitencialis, or primarily concerned with good manners, as in the Liber Urbanitatis and the O Magnatum filii. Considered from this point of view, these Latin readers constitute a broad educational programme that extends quite beyond any merely functional rôle in the learning of Latin.

With the compilation of the above list of Latin texts, one of the principal aims of this study has been completed. Yet there is reason to think that this summary description does not exhaust the common elements found among these grammatical collections. There are various tracts, in both prose and verse, which might well turn out to have common sources, but there has been no attempt at identification since the necessary preliminary work on them has not yet been done.

Even a first reading of this material allows one to see the main sources of most of it. The tracts generally contain so many quotations from authorities, both direct and indirect, that there is little difficulty in identifying those commonly referred to. The authors and their books can be listed chronologically as follows:

AUTHOR	TEXT
Donatus	Ars Minor
Priscian	Maior; Minor[33]
Isidore	Etymologia[34]

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[33] The complete work is entitled *Institutiones Grammaticae*, the *Maior* comprising books 1-13, the *Minor* 14-15; it is printed in *Grammatici Latini*, ed. H. Keil, vols II-III (Leipzig, 1855-1858).

[34] W. M. Lindsay, ed., *Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi Etymologiarum sive Originum Libri XX*, 2 vols (Oxford, 1911).

Bede	De arte metrica[35]
Papias	Elementarium[36]
Peter Helias	Summa[37]
Hugutio	Derivationes; De dubio accentu
Alexander de Villa Dei	Doctrinale
John of Garland	Accentarius[38]
Brito	Summa (Vocabularius Biblie)[39]
Ianuensis	Catholicon

These reference books can be divided into three classes: general grammars covering nearly every aspect of the subject; treatises on prosody and etymology; and specialised dictionaries. The majority belong to the first group, including the grammatical works of Donatus, Priscian, Isidore (books 1-10), Peter Helias, Alexander, John of Garland, and John of Genoa, commonly referred to in the manuscripts as Ianuensis. Bede's treatise and Hugutio's two books belong to the second group, and the dictionaries of Papias and Brito to the third.

From the pedagogical point of view, probably the most noticeable feature of these sources as a whole is the emphasis upon etymology. Most of the above-mentioned writers are called upon to provide information on this subject, especially Hugutio, Isidore and Brito. Although Hugutio's book is not named, it is evident that the grammar teachers are drawing upon his *Derivationes Magnae.*[40] The *Elementarium* of Papias is a partial exception, for though it does not entirely exclude the etymological explanations of words, its definitions are severely brief and its general format bears a close resemblance to our modern pocket dictionary for schools. Containing as it does a large number of geographical and historical names for quick reference, its popularity throughout the later medieval period is easily to be accounted for.

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[35] Printed in Migne, *PL*, 90, cols 149-175.

[36] There are no recent editions: 15th century editions are in Hain, *Repertorium*, IV, nos. 12378-12381. Papias, a Lombard, composed his dictionary c. 1053-1063, M. Manitius, *Geschichte der Lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, 3 vols (Munich, 1911-1931), II, 717-724.

[37] Vincent of Beauvais extracted from it Part II, 8-181 of his *Speculum Doctrinale*, for printed editions of which see W. A. Copinger, *Supplement to Hain's Repertorium Bibliographicum*, 2 parts (London, 1895-1902), part II, vol. II, nos. 6241-6244.

[38] John's active career spans most of the first half of the 13th century, Emden, *Biographical Register*, II, 743-744; the *Accentarius* is discussed in Paetow, *Morale Scolarium*, 122-124.

[39] *Vocabularius Biblie*, printed at Ulm c. 1473 and entered in Hain, *Repertorium*, III, no. 8396, under the name of Henricus de Hassia; William Brito composed his book c. 1248-1285, B. Hauréau, *Histoire littéraire de la France*, XXXIX (1885), 584-602, and *Studi e Testi*, vol 59 (1933), 311.

[40] For a description of Hugutio's *Libellus de dubio accentu* and *Derivationes* and the importance of etymology in medieval learning see R. W. Hunt, "Hugutio and Petrus Helias," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, II (London, 1950), 174-178. Hugutio of Pisa completed the *Derivationes* c. 1200, Manitius, *Geschichte der Lateinischen Literatur*, III, 191.

As the reference books above are listed in chronological order, it follows that learning Latin in later medieval England involved a dependence upon authors whose careers, taken together, span almost eight centuries, from Donatus who taught rhetoric in Rome around the middle of the fourth century, to William Brito and John of Genoa, Franciscan and Dominican writers respectively, in the second half of the thirteenth century. No less than five of the eleven authors — Alexander, Hugutio, John of Garland, as well as Brito and John of Genoa — produced their work within the period c. 1200-1275.[41] If we include Peter Helias, the sole representative from the twelfth century, we see at once that most of this grammatical material circulating in England in the later middle ages dates from a period roughly comprised between 1150 and 1275. Moreover, the manuscripts clearly show that much of the work of Donatus and Priscian is brought to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries through this later group of writers, with Helias serving as a bridge between them.

The second fact is no less interesting. Comparisons are often made in the manuscripts between the "ancient" and the "modern" authorities, and there is little doubt as to which are considered "modern." For the author of the early fifteenth century book of Battlefield College, for instance, "modern" works include John of Genoa's *Catholicon* and Alexander's *Doctrinale.* The authors of these modern reference books are either Italians or Frenchmen, and the one known exception — John of Garland, an Englishman — produced his works in France. In fine, it is not going too far to say that the educational influence at work in later medieval England has its source, for the most part, in the schools of thirteenth century France and Italy.

It now remains to consider what contribution, if any, was made by English grammar masters to this modern programme of Latin studies. At first sight it seems extraordinary that the teachers of Latin in fifteenth century England were dependent upon texts and works of reference written outside their own country some two centuries earlier. This fact calls for an explanation and it might prove helpful if the masters mentioned in the manuscripts were first brought together with their treatises as follows:

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[41] Alexander, a Norman, composed the *Doctrinale* c. 1199, L. J. Paetow, "The Arts Course at Medieval Universities with special reference to Grammar and Rhetoric," *Studies of the University of Illinois,* III (1910), 23-29, *passim.*

MASTER	TREATISE	DATE OF COMPOSITION
Richard of Hambury[42]	Tractatus de metrico	Late 13th cent.
John of Cornwall	Speculum grammaticale	1346
John Chalurys[43]	Flores accentus	Before 1414
John Leland[44]	Various tracts?	Early 15th cent.
John Seward	Tracts on prosody	c.1413-1422
John Drury	Various tracts	c.1434
John Boryngton[45]	Regimina; Communis versus	c.1438
John Harford[46]	Regule utiles	Late 14th cent?
Thomas Syltone[47]	Accentus	15th cent?

All those included in the above list are *Magistri* and three of them — Richard of Hambury, John Cornwall and John Leland — are comparatively well-known Oxford men.[48] It is evident, however, that no one master nor single grammatical treatise can lay claim to paramount authority among them. Some of Seward's tracts on prosody, for example, have been found in three different manuscripts, but outside of these there is no reference to him.[49] The one master who might be thought to have enjoyed a central position among the grammar teachers of later medieval Enlgand is John Leland. Seward apparently regarded him in this light,[50] and in the eyes of John Drury's scribe at Beccles he is *flos grammaticorum*.[51] Yet here again the total manuscript evidence lends no support; apart from the one manuscript in which his own work appears, there is no mention of him.

Nevertheless, one interesting point does emerge quite clearly from the above list. This is the predominance of Oxford men. In fact, Drury appears to be the only one who might have attended Cambridge.[52] This is significant, for it implies that the University of Oxford was not merely one centre among many but was probably the principal centre for grammatical studies even in this relatively late period.

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[42] Quoted as an authority in *MS Harl.* 1002, fols 92v, 102; Richard of Hambury was an Oxford grammar master of the late 13th century, Emden, *Biographical Register*, II, 861.

[43] Apart from the fact that he resided at Bridport, Dorset (*MS Lincoln* 88, fol 129v), nothing is known of Chalurys.

[44] Referred to in MSS *Edinburgh 134*, *Lincoln 88* and *Cambridge Add. 2830*. Leland taught at Peckwater Inn, Oxford, and died in 1429, Emden, *Biographical Register*, II, 1129.

[45] Assuming that he is the John Boryngton granted a licence to study at Oxford in 1438, Emden, *Biographical Register*, I, 223; his tracts are in *MS Caius 417*.

[46] John Harford has not been identified, unless he be the John de Herford who was to study at Oxford from 1388, for which see Emden, *Biographical Register*, II, 916.

[47] Syltone has not been identified; his tracts are in *MS St John's 163*.

[48] See Mary D. Lobel, "The Grammar Schools of the Medieval University," *V.C.H.* Oxfordshire, III (1954), 42-43.

[49] In addition to *MS Edinburgh* 136 there is a second Seward MS at Merton College described by Galbraith in his article, "John Seward", *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, I, no. 1, 85-104, and a third MS in the library of the Dean and Chapter of Exeter, known as *MS 3521*.

[50] Galbraith, "John Seward," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, I, no. 1, 90.

[51] *MS Cambridge Add.* 2830, fol. 27.

In his study of the vocabularies used by fifteenth century teachers, Thomas Wright was impressed with the differences they revealed "both in their general arrangement and in the words introduced under each head," and he concluded that "each schoolmaster compiled his own book."[53] The same observation would seem to hold for most of the Latin programme: there appear to be almost as many treatises as there are masters. The procedure appears to have been twofold: the grammar master copies out an authoritative tract, in whole or in part — or commissions a scribe to do so — and then adds a commentary on it or an interlinear gloss, and sometimes, tracts of his own devising. We are provided with an example of this in the case of a Thomas Hanneya. He began to compile a detailed list of chapter headings for a course in grammar during May, 1313, at Toulouse, and completed it the following December at Lewes, all "at the request of Master John of Chertsey," the rector of the schools in that town.[54] At Beccles, in 1434, the scribe, Hardgrave, states that some of the grammatical excerpts that he is copying out are the compositions of the local schoolmaster, John Drury, and it would appear that the other items not so designated are either Drury's own tracts or his adaptations of those of someone else.[55] This seems to be, in fact, the kind of procedure which has accounted for the compilation of most of the manuscripts under consideration.

It is now left to explain why these grammar masters of later medieval England followed the course that they did. In this connection the above list of "texts" proves to be especially relevant. The most pronounced feature of that list is the predominance of verse. In fact, all the selections are in verse with the exception of those on syntax. This is not without some significance, for it shows at once the task that confronted these English masters. They were the beneficiaries of a complete programme of Latin studies, didactic in tone and suited to "modern" conditions, a "new" programme as contrasted with those of antiquity, and one that had taken at least a century in the making. Preserved in Latin verse, it at once possessed brevity and universality of appeal, and had only to be memorised to be learned. There was no need to add anything substantial to this programme: it was a question first of absorbing it and then transmitting it to others.

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[52] Details in Meech, "John Drury," *Speculum,* IX, 70-83.

[53] Wright, *Vocabularies,* I, xiv.

[54] *MS Auct. F.* 3.9., p. 189.

[55] Meech, "John Drury," *Speculum,* IX, 70.

The manuscripts themselves illustrate very clearly how difficult this twofold task could be. Originating for the most part in France and Italy, this grammatical material required varying degrees of revision and adaptation before it could effectively be used in England. This explains the frequent English glosses that accompany the vocabularies in verse, as well as the commentaries and paraphrases employed to clarify standard texts or works of reference.

The masters' use of Alexander's *Doctrinale* is a case in point. One manuscript, *Trin. 0.5.4.*, has the complete text of this grammar, but it also contains a prose paraphrase dealing with the entire book. *MS Add. 37,075* contains the section of verse treating of figures of speech accompanied by a commentary in Latin. Finally, three manuscripts, *Caius 383*, *Harl. 1002* and *Add. 37,075*, include the verses dealing with the gender of nouns: in the first instance the text alone appears, in the second the text is accompanied by a commentary in Latin, and in the third by a prose commentary as well as the English meaning of the words. This goes to show that Alexander's text was used, but only indirectly and partially, that is, as the occasion demanded.

It has already been observed that the tracts on syntax are the only "texts" not in verse. The teaching of Latin to English youths through the medium of their native tongue required a different pedagogical method of syntax from that of the standard versified texts. It is not surprising, therefore, that the prose "texts" treating of this part of the grammar programme are the only ones which are quite unmistakably the work of English grammar masters.

Yet whatever be their suitability from a pedagogical point of view, these tracts on syntax reveal all too clearly the poverty of the Latin language in the fifteenth century. As was pointed out above in connection with the reading texts, almost nothing of classical antiquity remains in the later medieval programme of Latin studies in England. Pagan Latin literature has been superseded by a Christian literature, while earlier modes of thought and expression have given way to modern ones. All this is understandable, for as long as Latin was retained as a living universal language in western Europe, it had to be adapted to changing conditions and local differences.

One who surveys the educational scene of fifteenth century England, however, is forced to conclude that the price paid was very high. The liberties taken with Latin construction and the inconsistencies in the spelling render the language almost unrecognisable to a person brought up on classical Latin. The principal reason for this can be seen in the sentences employed in lessons on syntax: except for a number of scattered quotations from Scripture, they are divorced from any body of literature, and, therefore, from models of style. Sooner or later there would have to be a return to the sources, and this would necessarily entail an important change in the curriculum of England's grammar schools. That change did come about, but its history lies outside the scope of this present study.

Selected Texts

MS Auct. F.3.9. p. 9. From John Cornwall's *Speculum Grammaticale.*

Quot modi sunt in verbo ? Dicendum quod quinque, scilicet indicativus, imperativus, optativus, coniunctivus et infinitivus. Unde querendum est, quid facit indicativus. Dicendum quod semper demonstrat, ut amo I love, amas thou lovyst, amat he loveth, amamus we loven, sic discurrendo per omnia tempora indicativi modi omnium coniugacionum. Imperativus semper imperat et habet duo tempora, scilicet presens et futurum, ut ama vel amato love thou, amet vel amato love he, amemus love we, amate vel amatote love ye, ament amanto vel amentote love thei. Optativus vero desiderat, ut utinam amarem Wolde God I schulde love, amares thou schuldist love, amaret he schulde love, et cetera. Coniunctivus modus coniungit orationem orationi, ut si amem te, tu amabis me. Infinitivus vero caret numero et persona secundum quemdam tractatum id est sine discretione numeri et persone, ut amare anglice love, amavisse anglice hadde lovyd, amatum iri anglice go to love, vel amaturum esse other to be to love, et sic discurrendo per omnes coniugaciones. Item querendum est quot sunt tempora in verbo. Dicendum est quod quinque, presens the tyme that is now, ut doceo I teche, preteritum inperfectum the tyme that is litil agon, ut docebam I taughte, preteritum perfectum the tyme that is fulli agon, ut docui I have taught, preteritum plusquam perfectum the tyme that is longe agon, ut docueram I hadde taught, futurum the tyme that is to come, ut docebo I schal teche. Iste est modus informandi pueros per omnes coniugaciones.

MS Peterhouse 83, fol 93.

Vespere autem Sabbati que lucescit in prima sabbati... hoc 'Vespere' indeclinabile est hora inter diem et noctem; hoc relativum 'que' non refertur ad vespere set ad horam que intelligitur in vespere quia vespere hic ponitur adverbialiter et non retinet vim nominis. In prima Sabbati: id est in prima die septimane. 'Vespere autem Sabbati' id est diei festi. Magdalene hic breviatur et ubique breviatur quando est substantivum, sic dicendo Maria Magdalena breviatur sed quando est adiectivum longum et sic in ceteris obliquis. Secundum Hugutionem et Papiam, Magdalenum est quoddam castellum a quo Maria dicta est Magdalena. Et secundum hoc declinatur Magdalenus, a, um; est nomen possessivum cuius penultima acuenda est more barbarico. Versus:

> Annua Magdalene recoluntur festa Marie
> Cum possessivum tibi magdalenus habetur
> Gramatice norma penultima tunc acuetur
> Magdalenus nomen si barbaricum teneatur
> Est cognomentum tunc ultima longa legatur
> Dicitur et turris ut Papias memoratur.

MS Harl. 1002, fol 13.

Iesus Christus filius beate Marie iuvet et expediat Laurencium de Londoniis qui coram rege Anglie vel Anglicorum et archiepiscopo Cantuariensi dimicabit infra licias cum quodam homine de Beverlaco se falso proditore accusante.

Cuius casus 'beate Marie' in latinitate premissa ? Genitivi et regitur de ly filius ex vi possessoris vel possessionis. Quare ? Quia omnis diccio significans possessorem vel possessionem potest regere genitivum casum ex vi possessoris vel possessionis, ut rex Anglie, equus regis. Versus:

Possessor vel possessum substans quoque nomen
Post se constructum semper poscit[1] genitivum
Sum dominus ville sed equus regis fuit ille.

Cuius casus 'Londoniis' in latinitate premissa? Ablativi mediante ista preposicione 'de.' Quare? Quia per regulam, propria nomina non regunt genitivos sed ablativos mediante ista preposicione 'de', licet aliquando per appellativa subintellecta regunt, ut Katerina Laurencii, id est Katerina que est uxor Laurencii, unde in evangelio Maria Iacobi et Maria Salome emerunt aromata, et cetera; 'Maria Iacobi,' id est Maria que fuit mater Iacobi.

Cuius casus Anglie vel Anglicorum in latinitate premissa? Genitivi. Quare? Quia quando nomen dignitatis temporalis vel officii debet determinari per nomen loci tunc sumendum est genitivum proprii nominis loci vel genitivum pluralem sui possessivi, ut imperator Rome vel Romanorum, rex Anglie vel Anglicorum.

Cuius casus Cantuariensi in latinitate premissa? Ablativi. Quare? Quia per regulam, quando nomen officii vel dignitatis spiritualis debet determinari per nomen loci tunc in loco proprii nominis loci sumendum est possessivum proprii nominis loci ponendo illud in idemptitate[2] casuali cum nomine officii seu dignitatis spiritualis, ut papa Romanus, archiepiscopus Cantuariensis, archidiaconus Florentinus....

MS Harl. 1002, fol. 109v.

Paradigma accidit quando quis primo facit comparacionem et post assigna similitudinem, ut Exiit homo seminare semen suum in terram bonam, aliquid inter spinas et aliquid inter petras. Semen est verbum Dei, spina divicie, petra est mens arida, unde differencia est inter parabolam[3] et paradigma. Parabola est rerum genere dissimilium per se si non sequatur exposicio. Paradigma non est nisi quando est rerum genere dissimilium per se comparacio si sequatur exposicio et componitur a para quod est iuxta et digma sentencia quasi iuxta sententiam vel veritatem...

MS Harl. 1002, fols 111-112. *Liber Parvi Catonis in Rythmico*[4].

Cum nuper conspicerem homines errare
Plurimos in moribus cepi cogitare,

Qualiter erroribus possem obviare
Et eos in moribus bonis reformare.
Consulendum talibus credidi me fore
Ut vitam reducerent suam ab errore,

Cum animadverterem quam plurimos homines graviter errare in via morum existimavi fore succurendum et consulendum eorum opinioni maxime ut gloriose se viverent et honori contingerent.

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[1] MS *possit.*

[2] MS *edemptitate.*

[3] MS *parabola.*

[4] MS *liber pervi Catonis in Ruthmico.*

Maxime quod viverent illi gloriose Et honorem quererent sibi gloriose.	
Te fili karissime docebo quo pacto Tui mores animi componas in facto.	Nunc te fili karissime docebo quo pacto mores tui animi componas.
Igitur tu legito taliter precepta Quod tibi proficiat bene res incepta, Quia tua leccio dicitur neclecta Nisi per te plenius fiat intellecta.	Igitur mea precepta legito ut intelligas. Legere enim et von intelligere est neclegere.
Precibus humilibus Deo supplicabis Et parentes geminos tuos peramabis,	Itaque Deo supplica; parentes ama.
Cognatosque singulos bonos honorabis Data tibi munera bene conservabis.	Cognatos cole ; datum serva; cui des videto.
Si te forum adeas foro te parabis Cum bonis libencius viris ambulabis...	Foro te para; cum bonis ambula...

MS Harl. 1587, fols 118-120. *O Magnatum filii nostri commensales.*

In vestris operibus sitis curiales
Intrantes hospicium 'Deus hic' dicatis,
Et cum vos videritis, genua flectatis.
Nunc quod aptum fuerit verbum proferetis;
Nullus sedem capiat, seriatim stetis.
Nil supportet cubitum, postes non tangatis,
In loquentis faciem vultum dirigatis.
Huc aut illuc facies numquam moveatur,
Nulla res in domibus manu capiatur.
Vultus fiat stabilis caputque levetur,
Manus sine digitis nichil operetur.
Tibias textoribus non assimiletis;
Genu nobis flectite[5] quando respondetis.
Si maior advenerit locum datis ei,
Honor detur omnibus in honore Dei...

MS Auct. F. 3.9., p. 414.

Communem modum dictandi scire cupientes regulas respiciant subsequentes quas pro iuvenibus compositor in compendio[6] coligit et faciliori modo composuit volens magistrorum <dictis> parere et in nichilo in quantum obviare asserencium quod per faciliora habemus ingredi difficiliora cuius contrarium plures pueros et iuvenes [et] eorum studium[7] forsitan deserere faceret prout per eorum dicta plenius poterit apparere.

Unde primo sciendum est quod in littera plena et perfecta constant quinque clausule quarum prima est salutacio, secunda narracio, tercia peticio cum divisione, quarta conclusio, quinta subsalutacio, sed non semper tot clausule requiruntur unde apud quosdam quedam predictorum nomina commutantur et dicitur primum exordium, secundum narracio, tercium peticio cum divisione quartum confictacio sive confirmacio sequente conclusione, quintum subsalutacio aliquando descendens a conclusione.

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[5] MS *flectete.*

[6] MS *compedio.*

[7] MS *studio.*

MS Lincoln 88, fol 148v.

Qualiter differunt inter, intra, infra. 'Inter' ut dicit Papias significat spacium locale vel temporale medians duo extrema ut inter templum et altare, inter pascha et pentecosten. 'Intra' vero significat localem inclucionem cui opponitur 'extra' quod significat localem exclusionem ut cives habitant inter muros, scolares vero extra, sed 'infra' localem significat depressionem cui opponitur 'supra' quod significat localem supereminenciam ut sol currit supra lunam, luna vero infra solem. Nemo enim dicat 'sum infra muros civitatis' nisi sit subfossus in ipsis muris vel sit defossus sub ipsis ut dicit Hugutio. Versus:

Inter significat tempus spaciumve locale
Temporibusve locis propric stabit sociale
Nos aedes intra stamus vos luditis extra
Sol currit supra lunam que currit et infra.

MS Harl. 5751, fols 104-105, 134.

Lux: Lux ponitur quattuor modis: primo modo dicitur Christus ut ego sum lux mundi; secundo modo dicitur appostolus ut vos estis lux mundi; tercio modo dicitur vita ut lux orta est eis; quarto modo dicitur claritas ut lux perpetua luceat eis.

Ignis: Ignis ponitur tribus modis: primo modo dicitur ignis celestis;[8] secundo modo dicitur ignis infernalis; tercio modo dicitur ignis materialis. Ignis ceestis[8] est lucens et non ardens. Ignis infernalis est ardens et non lucens. lgnis lmaterialis est lucens et ardens.

MS Harl. 1587, fol 51.

Amen dico vobis quia multe mansiones in domo patris mei; si quo minus dixissem vobis vado parare vobis locum. Sic explicatur: dico vobis amen, id est verum vobis, quia multe mansiones in domo patris mei; minus pro non, si multe mansiones non fuissent in domo patris mei dixissem vobis; quo, id est aliquo modo vado parare vobis locum.

Quero an hec oracio sit congrua vel non: vado parare vobis locum. Sic. Contra quando actus concurrunt in oracione quorum prior significat mocionem ad locum tunc posterius erit primum suppinum sed hic non sic; ergo dico quod hoc est adpropriandum sacre scripture quia sacra scriptura est ita digna et ita nobilis in se quod non habet coartari per regulas grammaticales:

Utitur ecclesia contra vim grammaticorum
Dic alio, cape sal, dic multus murmur eorum.

MS Add. 32, 425, fol 81v.

Quid est proprium interieccionis? Mentis affectus, id est animi passio sub voce incondita, id est inperfecte[9] significare. Contra descripcionem interieccionis quam posuit Donatus arguitur sic: omnis pars oracionis ut dicit Priscianus significat mentis conceptum, sed mentis affectum secundum Donatum ergo interieccio non est pars oracionis. Ad istud dicendum est quod licet interieccio significat mentis affectum penes proferentem, significat tamen mentis conceptum penes audientem, audiens namque concipit quod animus proferentis afficitur, vel dolendo vel gaudendo vel metuendo vel admirando...

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[8] MS *celestus.*

[9] MS *inperfectam.*

Sealed Documents of the Mediaeval Archbishops at Amalfi

ROBERT BRENTANO

AN archival practical joke points up the significant peculiarity of a collection of documents preserved in the archives within the archbishop's palace at Amalfi.[1] From a 1477 document of Archbishop Giovanni Niccolini, the Florentine, hangs, securely fixed on a blue string (that looks as if it may have come from a local *pasticceria*), a *bulla*, a metal seal, of Pope Benedict XIV (1740-1758).[2] This document would look absurd in any collection. But it has passed without recorded notice at Amalfi, partly because at Amalfi archiepiscopal documents were regularly bulled with lead seals as late as 1490.

This late, tenacious use of a lead seal, with an unchanging obverse matrix, is one of a number of persistent, archaic qualities apparent in the products of the chancery of the mediaeval archbishops of Amalfi. These qualities show either a stubborn refusal or a lethargic reluctance in the Amalfitani to accept those regular, conventional forms that, in a long revolution stretching from the mid-eleventh to the early fourteenth century, shaped the products of the royal and episcopal chanceries of western-central Europe into a remarkable sameness.[3] Most non-papal Italian ecclesiastical chanceries showed some hesitancy in adopting the regularized high-Gothic letter form, but traditionalism, or formlessness, at Amalfi was particularly strong. Amalfi can be contrasted not only with the better known northern Italian episcopal chanceries, like those of Bologna and Milan, but also, in so far as they have been observed, even with those of the surrounding southern dioceses, like Salerno, Benevento, and Melfi.[4]

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[1] I should like to express my indebtedness to His Excellency Monsignor Angelo Rossini, the Archbishop of Amalfi, to his chancellor, Monsignor Gabriele Vissicchio, and assistant chancellor, Sacerdotale Ricardo Arpino, for their kindness to me in admitting me to their archives and their helpfulness to me in using them. I have tried to describe the archives as a whole in an article "The Archiepiscopal Archives at Amalfi," *Manuscripta* IV (1960), 98-105.

[2] The sealed documents at Amalfi are collected into a general category, *Pergamene Sigillate*; within it the documents sealed by the archbishops are collected and designated as those of the *Arcivescovi Amalfitani*; these documents are divided by century. The 1477 document is thus described as "P.S., Arciv. Amalf., sec. xv, no. 5.". Since this identification is so obvious it seems superfluous to footnote by archival description each reference to a document in the text, but an identifying list is appended to this article.

[3] Two convincing pictorial examples of the completed revolution are the little 1275 letters of Rudolf of Habsburg reproduced in Franz Steffens, *Lateinische Paläographie* (Freiburg, 1903), plate 77. The clearest, visually, local Italian revolution is to be seen in Cencetti's work on Bologna (see note 4, below). The peculiarity of Amalfi's conservatism is made to seem more extreme by contrasting it with the very different English royal chancery and the early disappearance of its diplomas.

It will not be a complete surprise to anyone at all familiar with Amalfi to find that the physical characteristics of the preserved documents of its archbishops look back to the past. From the moment of its first being really historically visible Amalfi has been a city of decay, finding its pride in its vestiges of an earlier glory, aware in every ruin of "some reverend history."[5] Gibbon wrote of eighteenth-century Amalfi that "the poverty of one thousand fishermen is yet dignified by the remains of an arsenal, a cathedral, and the palaces of royal merchants";[6] and Gibbon's tone is applicable to any century of recorded Amalfi history. But an examination of the details of Amalfi archiepiscopal diplomatic should make it clear that the archaicism is not just an accident of a substantial, glorious, decadent nostalgia but rather a clear expression of the structure of literate society in an unusual, notary-infested, old, mercantile city.

There survive at Amalfi twenty parchment documents that were issued under the archbishops' seal between 1274 and 1490. The end of this series is marked by the existence of two other documents. One of these was issued in 1488 by Archbishop Andrea de Cunto in connection with problems concerning presentation and institution to a church in Pogérola.[7] Its form is revolutionary: it is on paper; it is sealed *en placard* with red wax under a paper guard; the numerals of its year date are Arabic. The other of these two documents, issued in 1596 by Archbishop Giulio Rossini, initiates the post-Tridentine series of preserved *acta*. Its stylistic features are characteristic of that series and considerably different from those of the mediaeval documents.

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[4] A pleasant, direct guide to what must once have been fairly standardly held generalizations about southern Italian diplomatic can be found in Michele Russi, *Paleografia e diplomatica de' documenti delle province napolitane* (Naples, 1883). The basis for the revision or confirmation of these generalizations can be found in the editions of documents within southern archives, of which one of the most helpful, because of its precision, is Jole Mazzoleni, *Le Pergamene di Capua*, of which the first volume covering the period from 972 to 1265 was published in Naples in 1957. It includes *acta* of archbishops of Capua. Melfi documents are edited and described in Angelo Mercati, "Le Pergamene di Melfi all' Archivio Segreto Vaticano," *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati V*, Studi e Testi, 125 (Vatican City, 1946), 263-323. The most penetrating and helpful single exploration of southern Italian episcopal diplomatic with which I am familiar is Franco Bartolini, "Note di diplomatica vescovile beneventana," *Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei*, ser. 8 (1950), 425-449. For the north there are two outstanding works: Giacomo C. Bascapè, *Antichi diplomi degli arcivescovi di Milano e note di diplomatica episcopale* (*Fontes Ambrosiani*, XV: Florence, 1937) and Giorgio Cencetti, "Note di diplomatica vescovile bolognese dei secoli XI-XIII," in *Scritti di paleografia e diplomatica in onore di Vincenzo Federici* (Florence, 1944), 157-223. Most of the problems dealt with, here, fall within the general jurisdiction of Harry Bresslau, *Handbuch der Urkundenlehre für Deutschland und Italien* (the references here are to the edition Leipzig, 1912, 1915, 1931). Three English studies are particularly valuable for comparative purposes: C.R. Cheney, *English Bishops' Chanceries, 1100-1250* (Manchester, 1950); Avrom Saltman, *Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury* (London, 1956); Kathleen Major, *Acta Stephani Langton* (Canterbury and York Society, L: Oxford, 1950).

[5] This tone is nowhere more beautifully clear than in the excellent standard history of Amalfi: Matteo Camera, *Memorie storico-diplomatiche dell' antica città e ducato di Amalfi*, 2 vols. (Salerno, 1876-1881).

[6] In chapter 56 of the *Decline and Fall*.

Not only is the mediaeval series capped at its later end by divergent documents, it is also embedded within much larger groups of different sorts of contemporary documents. Some documents, considerably more than were sealed, were subscribed or meant to be subscribed by the reigning archbishop.[8] These document are very like normal notarial instruments with one particularly prominent witness, the archbishop. The are also very like the sealed documents, or like many of them, without the seal. Both the sealed and the subscribed documents are surrounded by a much larger group of documents, notarial instruments, connected with the business of the cathedral church and of the neighboring churches that contributed to its archives, which were neither signed nor sealed by the archbishop. Some of these documents, until 1347, were written, as some of the subscribed documents were and none of the surviving sealed documents was, in the deliberately illegible curial hand with which Amalfi notaries once tried to preserve their peculiar integrity in a literate society.[9] Something of the relative frequency of the occurrence of these three types of documents can be seen by comparing the number of each surviving from a sample period, January 1400 through December 1420: there is one sealed document; there are nine subscribed documents and six more that were designed to have been subscribed; there are forty-five notarial instruments designed neither to be sealed nor subscribed.

The twenty sealed mediaeval documents were issued by ten archbishops.[10] Although the documents show ample evidence of a controlling local tradition, individual archbishops were sometimes important to their construction and sometimes affected their stylistic features. The fact that Landolfo Caracciolo was a Franciscan seems to have affected the style that he used in his letters; so may have the fact that Nicola de Sora, another Franciscan, was provided by a pope of dubious legitimacy. The Maiori place date of one of Andrea de Cunto's documents is due to the fact that that archbishop, repulsive to some Amalfitani, was forced to live in Maiori during part of his pontificate. The biographical background of Roberto Brancia and of Giovanni Niccolini may have brought Surrentine and Florentine qualities to their *acta*. More importantly the general strength of the conservative diplomatic tradition at Amalfi is probably connected with the fact that through the middle ages a very high percentage of the archbishops were local men, from substantial, conventional, clerical families, who actually resided in their see. The first of the preserved sealed documents was issued by Archbishop Filippo Augustariccio, who is commemorated physically in Amalfi by the now pottery-topped tower for whose building he was responsible; Filippo had been archdeacon of Amalfi, and he was a member of a prominent, patrician Amalfi family. The last of the mediaeval documents was issued by Archbishop Andrea de Cunto; Andrea had been bishop of the suburban suffragan see of Minori, and he was a member of a prominent Amalfi notarial family. Of the intervening archbishops Pietro Capuano came from Amalfi's most distinguished noble-clerical family, Marino del Giudice from a very distinguished one, Roberto Brancia from a family important in and around Amalfi. Andrea Palearea was a patrician from Salerno, Nicola Miroballo from Naples; and Landolfo Caracciolo was from one of those phenomenal Neapolitan families whose greatness has persisted through many centuries and types of rule. These men as archbishops probably contributed to the continuation of a local tradition. Their names certainly add to the atmosphere of local continuity at Amalfi.

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[7] The paper document is not catalogued within the series of archiepiscopal documents; it is bound in codex no. 4.

[8] These documents are catalogued with ordinary public instruments at Amalfi, under the general category "A.P."

[9] The best discussions and descriptions of the Amalfi curial hand have been written by Riccardo Filangieri di Candida, particularly in his "I 'Curiales' di Amalfi," *Bolletino del Bibliofilo*, no. 11 (1920), 277-287, and in his *Codice diplomatico amalfitano*, 2 vols. (Naples, 1917-Trani, 1951), I, XXV-XXVIII.

[10] The best introduction to these archbishops is to be found in the recurring reference to them in Camera's *Memorie*, but there is, of course, a section devoted to them in Ferdinando Ughelli, *Italia Sacra*, vol. VII (Venice, 1721), cols. 223-245.

The twenty sealed documents are concerned, in Latin, with normal episcopal business. (None deals with anything specifically provincial.) In the first, from 1274, Archbishop Filippo Augustariccio appoints proctors to the Council of Lyons; in the last, 1490, document Archbishop Andrea de Cunto grants a license for the construction of an altar with a marble icon of the virgin (Santa Maria delle Grazie). There are regulations for the celebration of the feast of St. Andrew (1281) and for the payment of the stipends of the cathedral clergy (1292). In 1411 a cleric is created a canon of the cathedral church, a "cardinal" as he was still called. Licenses are granted for the foundations of chapels in and about the Paradiso cloister of the cathedral and for chapels and a church about the diocese. There are documents concerned with institution, collation, patronage, appropriation, a chaplaincy. A contract is rehearsed, a privilege confirmed. The most arresting instrument is that in which, in 1485, Archbishop Andrea de Cunto confirms permission granted to Gabriele Cinnamo to build his hermitage at the mountain retreat of the Avvocata. Cinnamo and the

Avvocata represent an interesting phase of late fifteenth-century eremitic mysticism.[11]

The physical appearance of the Amalfi documents is as abnormal as their business is normal. The most visually noticeable aspects of this abnormality, in addition to the continuing lead seals, are the documents' great size, their shape, their long lists of subscribed witnesses, their constant notarial characteristics which were never completely displaced by the conventionalizing pressure of waves of privileges and letters patent. Although three of the *acta* call themselves letters patent, only the 1411 document, the creation of the "cardinal," has an almost normal letter patent form.[12] Its seal does not survive, but it is described as the seal that the archbishop, Roberto Brancia, had used as archbishop of Sorrento, used here because his Amalfi seal was not yet ready. The peculiarities of this letter may be Surrentine, or they may be due to the nature of the document. Only in the 1411 document and two others (a 1362 license for a chapel and a 1461 inspeximus) does the breadth of the document exceed the length. Although the documents are regularly longer than they are broad, and although they are generally large, their size varies constantly and considerably. They show no consistent, chronological tendency to grow either larger or, as might be expected, smaller. The largest document, the 1485 license for Gabriele Cinnamo, is 71 cms. long and approximately 55 cms. broad; the 1281 regulation of the feast of St. Andrew is 66 ½ cms. by 59 cms.; a 1371 license for constructing a chapel is 63 ½ by 31 ½ cms. Smallest is the 1411 letter. It is just over 17 cms. long and 25 cms. broad. The 1274 instrument making proctors for Lyons is also relatively small, 29 ½ cms. by 23 ½ cms.; and so are documents from 1348, 1362, and 1439. The 1411 document has no subscriptions except the archbishop's; and there are none on the 1439 instrument conferring a chaplaincy. But in general the practice of having autograph witness crosses and subscriptions (or crosses and subscriptions elaborately pretending to be autograph), which is common to diploma-privileges and southern notarial instruments, is followed here. The 1281 feast of St. Andrew document is bedizened with the subscriptions of fifty-eight witnesses, the 1477 appropriation of a church with eighteen. The number is generally something between four and ten.

All the Amalfi documents clearly carry the marks of their notarial scribes. In this they present a peculiarly intense local variation of a common Italian phenomenon. The Amalfi documents were written by Amalfi notaries. There is a single exception. The 1477 document of the Florentine archbishop, Giovanni Niccolini, was written by the "Florentine" notary, Dando Dandi (or Dando di Dando) of San Gimignano.[13] The archiepiscopal *acta* do not survive in sufficient thickness to show us at any time the number of men who were selected as official archiepiscopal scribes from the general body of active notaries functioning in the city of Amalfi. Repetitions indicate a select body; and there was perhaps at times a single official redactor of archiepiscopal or even cathedral *acta*.

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[11] Camera, II, 514.

[12] The others are the 1461 and 1490 instruments. The 1490 very closely resembles the 1485 product of the same archbishop and the same notary which calls itself an "instrumentum publicum."

The first two surviving sealed archiepiscopal *acta* were redacted by Pietro Montincolli, who styled himself in 1273 "Petrus Montincoll' clericus et publicus ecclesie Amalfitan' notarius" and in 1281 "Abbas Petrus Montincolli diaconus et publicus ecclesie Amalfitan' notarius." Pietro's sign is a clear, signet-looking intertwining of the letters of his Christian name. The surviving notarial instruments of this period would indicate that Pietro was not a frequent notary for the documents of the cathedral church not designed to be sealed with the archbishops' seal. From 1292 survives a single sealed *acta* written by Giacomo (or Jacopo) Sabbatino who described himself as "publicus civitatis Amalfie notarius." Only three unsealed instruments certainly by Giacomo survive in the Amalfi archives, from the years 1293, 1295, and 1300. Giacomo's successor, an extremely interesting Amalfi notary and the apparent founder of an important family of Amalfi notaries, Benenato de Amoruczo (or Amoruzzo) has left a large number of unsealed documents, some in an Amalfi notarial and some in a conventional Gothic curial hand, forty instruments dating from the period between 1310 and 1366. There are four certain and one probable Benenato sealed *acta*, from 1333 (2), 1336, 1348, and probably, after another notary's work had begun, 1362. Benenato is the notary of all surviving Landolfo Caracciolo *acta*. Benenato styled himself "notarius publicus civitatis Amalfie et ubilibet per regnum Sicilie regia auctoritate notarius"; and consistently he introduced the regnal year to the dates of archiepiscopal *acta*.

The notary whose work interrupted Benenato's was Giovanni Cristono (or Cristhono) of Amalfi. A Giovanni document from 1370 reveals an important innovation in the style of these notaries employed for archiepiscopal business. Giovanni is here called "clericus puplicus ubilibet apostolica auctoritate notarius et curie nostre actorum notarius." And this new title, "curie nostre actorum notarius," institutionalizing or at least categorizing the notary acting as archiepiscopal scribe, appears on all subsequent surviving archiepiscopal sealed *acta*, except that of 1371, through 1439. In 1461 this precision was discarded. In the first two of his four documents, in 1359 and 1370, Giovanni called himself notary everywhere by papal authority; but in 1371 and 1374

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[13] It seems probable that Dando was a Niccolini family notary; see, Ginevra Niccolini di Camugliano, *The Chronicles of a Florentine Family, 1200-1470* (London, 1933), 182, 280.



Physical structure of a sealed document : Landolfo-Benenato (1333)



Physical structure of an unsealed, subscribed document : Marino-Benenato (1361) (under the same archbishop, Marino, as in 1370) Giovanni called himself notary by royal authority in the royal provinces. Thirteen of Giovanni's unsealed documents survive at Amalfi, the earliest from 1359, the latest from 1387. Giovanni was succeeded by Filippo de Oliva of Amalfi, a representative of another important family of Amalfi notaries, who wrote and notarized the *acta* of two archbishops in 1394 and 1411. Filippo has left twenty-two unsealed instruments in the Amalfi collection, from 1384 to 1431. Raffaello de Cunto, the next surviving *actorum notarius*, is the representative of another important family of Amalfi notaries, which appeared with Cunto de Cunto in the mid-fourteenth century and which eventually reached the archiepiscopate itself. Raffaello's nine unsealed documents stretch from 1417 to 1436. His one sealed document, from the year 1426, uses the novel self-description "laycum Amalphitanum," and in its subscript identifies Raffaello as a papal notary. The next two documents in the series, from 1439 and 1461, were both written by notaries from the Amalfi family of Pisanello, the first by Galiotto, the second by Andrea; each has four surviving unsealed documents at Amalfi: Galiotto from 1424 to 1431; Andrea from 1450 to 1461. In the sealed Andrea document the *actorum notarius* disappears and is replaced in the text by "nostro notario et scribe," in the subscript by "notarius et scriba," which would seem almost a deliberate archaicism. Dando Dandi, the Tuscan foreigner, identifies himself as a notary public "curieque causarum camere apostolicus." The last two documents in the series, from the episcopate of Andrea de Cunto, were both written by a member of still another Amalfi notarial family, the notary by both papal and royal authority,[14] Antonino de Campulo, of whose unsealed documents five (1471-1494) survive at Amalfi.

The pattern of all this is quite clear. The scribes, the quasi-chancellors of the archbishops of Amalfi, were chosen from the community of Amalfi notaries.[15] The production of sealed archiepiscopal *acta* was, at least from the early fourteenth through the late fifteenth century, only a part and quantitatively, at least, only a minor part of their professional activity, even of that part of their professional activity that was concerned with the business of the cathedral church. These notaries were often from important Amalfi notarial families, but they were not invariably chosen, generation after generation from the same notarial family. They were notaries sometimes by royal, sometimes by papal authority, sometimes by one and then the other, sometimes by both authorities together. Their office developed a name, the "notary of the *acta* of the archbishop's curia," at least from 1370 to 1439. The office had perhaps in the late thirteenth century been specifically designated by the title "publicus ecclesie Amalfitane notarius"; but this may have been only a casual descriptive phrase.[16]

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[14] See Bresslau, I, 627-628.

[15] The best introduction to this community is in Leopoldo Cassese, "I Notari nel Salernitano ed i loro protocolli dal 1362 alla fine del '700" (Rome, 1948): Estratto da *Notizie degli archivi di stato*.

Did these notaries really write their *acta* with their own hands? This is, of course, the sort of question that can never be answered with absolute certainty. But, I think, that with the exception of the document of Dando Dandi, who was a foreigner to Amalfi custom and for whom other documents do not survive at Amalfi, one can say, with as much assurance as is ever possible, that the notaries in the documents wrote the documents with their own hands, that they did not employ scribes. Certainly the same hands wrote the unsealed documents under their names. This is not a point that would be worth questioning were it not, in some contexts, peculiar to find, as one does at Amalfi, that ordinary notaries assumed the functions of the archiepiscopal chancellor, rather than that the chancellor employed notaries in his office.

The curious nature of the *acta* that these notaries issued is most easily comprehensible through the examination of some of their specific diplomatic characteristics: the style, and name, of the issuing archbishop; the *arenga* or harangue; and the date. But first it seems wise to consider the *acta's* most striking characteristic, the lead seal that carried its Byzantine icon of St. Andrew into the hands of the Renaissance spigurnels of the late fifteenth century.

No wax seal of the archbishops of Amalfi would seem to survive from before the 1488 red wax seal of Andrea de Cunto sealed *en placard*, on paper and under paper, and impressed with the arms of the de Cunto; but a wax seal surely had been used earlier.[17] The 1274 *procuratorium* of Filippo Augustariccio

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[16] See Bresslau, I, 587.

[17] Bartolini felt sure that the wax seal was more antique at Benevento. The earliest lead seal he found mentioned was from 988, the only surviving one from 1158. Its obverse has the haloed heads of the Virgin and St. Bartholomew; its reverse a bishop surrounded by the legend "HENRICVS BENEVENTANVS ARCHIEPISCOPVS": Bartolini, 431-432. Monsignor Balducci, in his list of Salerno documents does not indicate which of them say they have been sealed with lead seals, but 1252, 1260, and 1261 *acta* of the archbishops of Salerno, in fact, say they were sealed with a lead *typarium*: Antonio Balducci, *L'Archivio della curia arcivescovile di Salerno I: Regesto delle pergamene (945-1727)* (Salerno, 1945), 45, 47 (nos. 142, 151, 153). In 1230, 1239, 1241, 1242 Archbishop Giacomo of Capua used a lead seal: Mazzoleni, 117-118, 130-133, 145-148, 148-150 (nos. 56, 64, 71, 73). A 1221 wax seal of Archbishop Andrea of Bari survives: G. B. Nitto de Rossi and Francesco Nitti di Vito, *Codice diplomatico barese I: le pergamene del Duomo di Bari (952-1264)* (Bari, 1897), 165-166 (no. 88).

Poole said the metal seal "was a product of warm countries, in which an impression in wax would not retain its distinctness": Reginald L. Poole, "Seals and Documents," in *Studies in Chronology and History* (Oxford, 1934), 95. The warmth against which Amalfi seals defended themselves was primarily a distant one. The southern Italian lead seals are in their existence and in their detail an aspect of the Byzantine cultural and, once, political domination of the area: see particularly, Gustave Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Empire Byzantin* (Paris, 1884), 231-234; Arthur Engel, *Recherches sur la numismatique et la sigillographie des Normands* has lost its seal which is described in the document as "sigillo nostro pendenti"; but a single slit, 1 cm. wide, in the letter's fold must have held a parchment tag which surely carried wax not lead. That the seals of the 1281 and 1292 Filippo documents and the two 1333 Landolfo Caracciolo documents were lead there can be no doubt. The lead does not survive on the hempen cord that hangs from the 1281 Filippo document, nor does it survive on the second of the 1333 Landolfo *acta.* But the internal description is clear in both cases: "tipario nostro plumbeo"; "sigillo nostro tiparii plumbeo pendenti." The other *acta* still carry their lead seals.

The next doubt about the material of the seals comes with Landolfo's 1336 and 1348 *acta.* Their notary, Benenato de Amoruczo, returns in them to the phrase "sigillo nostro pendenti"; but the holes prepared for cords in their flaps are arranged almost exactly as are those in the preceding document which specifically described its lead seal. The 1359 Pietro Capuano is again obscure in description, and its flap is torn. The 1362 Marino del Giudice is mutilated to obscurity. But in 1370 a clear description, "sigillo nostro tiparii plumbeo pendenti," and a surviving seal, sealed with its white cords arranged as they would be on a papal bull, return together. The 1374, 1394, and 1411 *acta* have lost their seals and speak of "sigillo nostro pontificali" and "nostri pontificalis sigilli," but, again, the arrangement of the holes on the flaps of the first two of these is that normal to a lead sealing; in both cases they are 3½ cms. apart on a generous fold. The 1411 document is eccentric as it is in other ways. Its holes are large and diamond-shaped and close together (1½ cms. apart) on a short fold. The seal, moreover, is specifically described as being that which Archbishop Roberto had used in Sorrento. The use of pontificalis-pontificali seems to have been adopted by Giovanni Cristono in mid-career and then accepted and used by Filippo de Oliva, the notary of the 1394 and 1411 documents.

In 1426 a specifically described lead seal returns and survives on a gold ribbon. 1439 is obscure; 1461 survives. The 1477 document, now sealed with the Benedictine XIV bull, was, it says, once sealed with the archbishop's great seal, a description which implies the existence of another seal. The 1485 lead seal survives; the lost 1490 seal is described as "nostro sigillo tiparii."

There is a rather noticeable coincidence in all this between those documents that have lost their seals and those that do not describe their seals, so that it is possible that a number of these *acta* once carried pendent wax seals. It is probable that two of them, the 1274 and the 1411 documents, did. The use of both lead and wax seals was prevalent in some southern Italian ecclesiastical

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de Sicile et d'Italie (Paris, 1882), particularly plates III-V. See also, Anton Eitel, *Ueber Blei- und Goldbullen im Mittelalter* (Freiburg, 1912), 70-72; Bresslau, II, 588-613; Ludovico Muratori, *Antiquitates Italicae* III (Milan, 1740), "De sigillis medii aevi," cols. 135-140.

chanceries at a period up to about the beginning of the Amalfi series. But at Amalfi there is no surviving wax seal and no certain description of one. Certainly, at Amalfi, archbishops issued, contemporaneously for very similar sorts of business, documents sealed with the lead seal and documents with no seals but authenticated with archiepiscopal subscriptions, with the signatures of witnesses, and with notarial subscripts. These latter *acta* are, in fact, subscribed versions of elaborate, multi-witnessed southern notarial instruments. Again, the most generally interesting and specifically peculiar quality of these Amalfi documents emerges. The lead seal is the final archaic elaboration of authentication given to some of these elaborately and multiply authenticated documents in whose validation the archbishop cooperated. Thus, with some exceptions and chiefly that of Roberto Brancia's 1411 letter, the diplomatic of the archbishop's chancery does not offer an alternative to the notarial diplomatic prevalent in the Amalfi area. It does not for its purposes replace the notarial instrument with a diploma-privilege or a letter patent. It merely gilds, or plumbs, the already elaborate instrument with additional formality, additional witnesses, the archbishop's subscription, and sometimes the archbishop's seal. The archbishop's notary when he acts as an archiepiscopal chancellor does not, in general, give up his notarial style, he merely adds to it.

The obverse impression of the six surviving lead seals is approximately 2 ½ cms. in diameter, although the lead itself is in most cases almost 3 ½ cms. in diameter. The lead forms, as lead seals are constantly noted to do, an approximate circle. The obverse impression centers around the figure of St. Andrew. The reverse impressions are variations of names and styles of ssuing archbishops.

St. Andrew was, by the second quarter of the thirteenth century, clearly ithe dominant and central cult figure at Amalfi. St. Andrew's body, or a body that had long been accepted as his, was captured by a Roman cardinal, an Amalfi Capuano, from sacked Constantinople, and returned to Amalfi by him as the brilliant centerpiece of a rich hoard of sacred relics. St. Andrew's appropriate corporeal presence at Amalfi became the city's chief non-sacramental physical source of spiritual strength. The presence of his image on the lead seals of the archbishops' *acta*, thus, visually connected the *acta* with what was most peculiarly sacred about the archbishops' see. The Andrew of the seal touches the local cult as the *arenga* of the text touches the universal doctrine of the Church.[18]

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[18] See Cyril Mango, *The Brazen House* (Copenhagen, 1959), 137 and fig. 22, for a seal whose reverse points out the seal's inclusion in a sort of spiritual vision: "The Lord Himself is the most secure seal..."

The Andrew of the seal belongs to a general mid-Byzantine iconographical type common in twelfth-century Sicily.[19] The seal Andrew, bearded and haloed, holds a book in his right hand and a Greek cross on a staff in his left hand. The helf-length figure is flanked by the capped initials "S" and "A", all within an encircling rim. The general type of this Andrew is most familiar in the twelfth-century mosaics of northern Sicily where it varies slightly from instance to instance. The Andrew of Cefalù holds the Greek cross with staff in his left hand. He holds no book, but the stripes on his robe fall over his right shoulder, pass his right hand, and give almost the same visual effect. He is flanked by "*Ο ΑΓΙΟΣ ΑΝΔΡΕΑC*". This Andrew is exactly the same type as that in the nave-arm of the Martorana in Palermo, where the stripes of the robe again approximate a book in the right hand. The Andrew of the Palatine Chapel in the ex-palazzo reale in Palermo, however, at least as it now exists, holds the cross in his left hand and a book in his right, just as the Amalfi seal does. The Palatine Andrew has his name in Greek to his right and Latin to his left with the appropriate initial for saint in each language. At Monreale the Andrew of the mosaics holds his cross in his right hand and his book in his left, but the Andrew of the transept doors holds his cross in his left hand and has no book.

A sharper variety in Andrew iconography is emphasized at Cefalù where within sight of the mosaic a Baroque sculptured Andrew postures against the diagonal cross of the other prominent, and generally later, iconographical tradition. In Amalfi this diversity of Andrew iconography is also strikingly apparent. Diagonal crosses are everywhere. A graceful fish-bearing Andrew rests on his cross above the fountain in the piazza; Andrea dell' Asta's early eighteenth-century Andrews and their crosses glow from the ornate Duomo ceiling; the early seventeenth-century Naccherino bronze Andrew stands before his cross in the crypt; an eighteenth-century silver Andrew wearing the order of the Golden Fleece holds a rusticated version of his cross, and a Cavaliere bas-relief starts from his cross. A Baroque, painted, recumbent Andrew sprawls backward from his diagonal cross into the drawing-room of the arcivescovado. The cross is behind the Andrew of the late eighteenth-century Andrea de Blasio silver missal-cover, in the hands of the Andrew of the Pietà by lo Zingaro, in the hands of the Andrew of the panel madonna of the sacristy, and clasped before the Andrew of the bas-relief altar back (c. 1500) of the Paradiso. Amalfi, as it now exists, is a multiple monument to the triumph of the tradition of the diagonal cross.[20] But the great bronze doors,

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[19] For a discussion of the type with bibliography: Otto Demus, *The Mosaics of Norman Sicily* (London, 1950), 318-321. (The Cefalù Andrew can be seen in plates 1 and 4a; the Martorana Andrew in plate 52a).

[20] Much of all this can be seen in Pietro Pirri, *Il Duomo di Amalfi e il chiostro del Paradiso.*

Byzantine pre-1066, perpetuate another tradition, an iconographically noncommittal one, spurning attributes. Their Andrew holds neither cross.

The middle iconography, that of the seal and of the northern Sicilian mosaics, Greek cross and book, has one significant Amalfi monument besides the seal. It is the beautiful, sculptured sarcophagus of Pietro Capuano (c. 1630) now in the Paradiso. The sarcophagus, which is liberally sprinkled with Capuano arms, has St. Nicholas on its head and foot and on its sides niched apostles among whom is St. Andrew. This Andrew holds the staffed cross in his right hand and a double-hasped book in his left. He is bearded but has no halo. "S ANDREAS" is written beneath his niche, with A and N joined, in capitals characteristic of contemporary hands. This Andrew, seventy years later than the first surviving seal, carries the same attributes as the seal, but in mirror image, like some of the Sicilian Andrews, or like the matrix of the seal itself, from which, with a more modern or classical fluidity and naturalism of style, it may have been copied. By comparison with it the 1370 example of the unchanging seal obverse looks archaic. The last surviving obverse, from 1485, is not only stylistically but iconographically archaic; and it survives in an archaic material on an archaically formed document.

Each reverse of the six surviving Amalfi lead seals differs from the others. No two come from the chancery of the same archbishop. They show a general but not consistent elaboration and lengthening, but they are all variations of a single theme, the name and simple style of the archbishop. The lettering reflects the lettering of contemporary bookhands. The first (1292) and the last (1485) differ from the others in maintaining a correspondence between word break and line break. They are most easily observed in a simple list:

1292 : PH'S / ARCHIEP'S / AMALFIT'
1333 : FR / ATER LAN / DULFUS ARCHIEP / ISCOPUS / AMALFI / TANUS
1370 : MARINUS / ARCHIEPS A / MALFITAN'
1426 : + ANDR / EAS ARC / HIEPISCOPU / S(?) AMALFI / TANUS
1461 : + NICO / LAUS DE / MIRABAL / LIS ARCHI(?) / E(?)PS AM / ALF'
1485 : ANDREAS(?) / ARCHIEP'S / AMALFI'(?).

The 1333 reverse initiates the use of separating lines between the lines of lettering in addition to encircling dots. The separating lines were undoubtedly made desirable by the lengthening style's filling the seal face. This greater length may have been particularly stimulated by the friar Landolfo's inclusion of his "frater." Certainly there is a sharp change between 1292 and 1333. Superficially, at least, the most interesting development is the lengthened name on the 1461 reverse, a small but potent illustration of the renaissance personality.



The Capuano Andrew (c. 1360): the iconographical type of the Amalfi matrix

In the text of the sealed documents the archbishops' Christian names appear fully spelled but without further identification until the document of 1461 in which the surname of the issuing archbishop is added: "Nicolaus de Mirobalis."[21] Nicola Miroballo thus added his prominent Neapolitan name to both seal and text. In 1477 Giovanni Niccolini added to his Christian name and surname the fact that he was a Florentine: "Johannes de Nicolinis Florentinus." The documents of Andrea de Cunto drop the surname. It reappears in the 1596 document of Giulio Rossini. In some of the *acta*, seven of the twenty, the name of the issuing archbishop is placed prominently within the initial phrase of the text. It thus replaces, but in a minority of cases and inconsistently, the initial invocation of the notarial instrument and establishes the pattern of the conventional letter patent. The 1274 letter begins "Nos Philippus," the 1411 letter "Nos Robertus." The latter two Landulfus documents replace the invocation with "Frater Landulfus"; and the 1374 Marino del Giudice replaces it with "Marinus." Both Andrea Palearea *acta* begin with "Andreas," and in the 1426 document the letters of the name are heightened and slightly elaborated. The two documents that indicate that the mediaeval series has ended, the 1488 paper document and the 1596 document, begin with their archbishops' names. The 1596 "Julius" is in large capitals.

The style used by the archbishops of Amalfi did not become fixed until after 1500. This flexibility is one aspect of Amalfi conservatism. The changing styles occasionally suggest a specific archbishop's attitude towards himself and his source of authority. The changes, when they are significant, would seem to be due to the archbishops themselves rather than to their clerks. It is possible to generalize more easily about archiepiscopal styles in the archbishops' sealed documents than in their subscribed, unsealed documents. But the pattern in the sealed documents considered alone is probably deceptively easy, and, particularly because of this, the subscribed documents are a help in understanding the changes in archiepiscopal styles in the sealed documents.

The three sealed *acta* of Filippo Augustariccio use three different styles: "divina paciencia humilis Amalfitanus archiepiscopus" in 1274; "miseracione divina humilis Amalfitanus archiepiscopus" in 1281; "reverendus pater dominus Philippus Amalfitanus archiepiscopus" in the 1292 document which was in fact issued in the name of the witnessing judge, a Pietro Capuano, the notary Giacomo Sabbatino, and the witnesses, with an enclosing protocol. Filangieri has edited another sealed Filippo document from 1269 (a member of the Neapolitan collection now destroyed) that speaks of its pendent lead seal, its "typarius," and styles the archbishop "Philippus divina paciencia sancte sedis Amalfitane humilis archiepiscopus."[22] Except for the noticeable recurrence of *humilis* these documents suggest that a usual style had not been developed by Filippo's episcopate. The suggestion is strengthened by the styles used in unsealed documents and by occasional styles surviving from earlier sealed documents. Camera edited a document of Archbishop Dionysio, from 1181, written by the notary Fortunato and sealed with a leaden seal, which speaks of Dionysio as "Dei gratia humilis Amalfitanus archiepiscopus."[23] In a Cava document of 1210, Matteo Capuano, acting as a papal delegate, styles himself "miseracione divina ecclesie Amalfitane minister," but subscribes merely "Matheus Amalfitanus."[24]

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[21] In Milan this extension began in 1390: Bascapè, 129-131 (n° 56).

The four sealed *acta* of the Franciscan friar Landolfo Caracciolo, all the products of the clerk and notary public Benenato de Amoruczo, use the same archiepiscopal style: "Frater Landulfus Dei et apostolice sedis gratia archiepiscopus Amalfitanus." It is the regular style of the post-Tridentine archbishops, of the papal church, and a style connected with friar archbishops.[25]

The single document of Pietro Capuano, written by Giovanni Cristono in 1359, uses in the text "Petrus permissione divina archiepiscopus Amalfitanus," and in the subscript "Petrus archiepiscopus Amalfitanus." This, if anything, can be called the normal Amalfi pattern of styles. It is used in the four Marino del Giudice *acta* (1362[?]-1374), which were also written by Giovanni Cristono except for the first which was probably written by Benenato de Amoruczo. The single document of Archbishop Nicola de Sora (1394) uses the same subscript style but varies in the text to "miseracione divina archiepiscopus Amalfitanus." Nicola, a Franciscan, did not follow the preceding pattern, but neither did he follow the pattern of the Franciscan Landolfo. Nicola had been provided by the anti-pope Clement VII, and it is possible that he thought it impolitic verbally to tie his fortunes and the authenticity of his acts (or that the Marinos who were to benefit by this act did) to the very unstable fortunes, particularly locally, of his papal benefactor. After this second Franciscan the pattern returns to that of Pietro and Marino in Roberto Brancia's 1411 letter which was written, as Nicola's document had been, by the notary Filippo de Oliva. With Nicola Miroballo the pattern is broken. In his 1461 document, written by Andrea Pisanello, he is given the style "Dei et apostolice sedis gratia archiepiscopus Amalfitanus." The 1477 Giovanni Niccolini-Dando Dandi document uses the simple style "archiepiscopus Amalfitanus." Andrea de Cunto in his two parchment documents written by Antonino de Campulo, in 1485 and 1490, returned to the *permissione divina* style; the paper, 1488 document has "miseracione divina." The ensuing break in the succession of surviving sealed archiepiscopal *acta* extends through the period of reformation and counter-reformation. Giulio Rossini's 1596 document assumes the normal post-Tridentine style of "Dei et apostolicae sedis gratia archiepiscopus Amalfitanus."

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[22] Filangieri, *Codice diplomatico amalfitano*, II, 135-139 (nº 388).

[23] Camera, II, 230.

[24] Archivio della Badia di SS. Trinità, Cava, M, 7. Two Amalfi documents preserved in Salerno show a repeated early thirteenth-century use of "Dei gratia" — once with, once without "humilis: Giuseppe Paesano, *Memorie per servire alla storia della chiesa salernitana* (Naples, Salerno, 1846-1857), II, 304-306, 308-311; Carlo Carucci, *Codice diplomatico salernitano*, I (1208-1281), (Subiaco, 1931), 97-99, 114-117 (nos. 36, 48).

[25] In some sees it has been assumed that this style, "Dei et apostolice sedis gratia," became regular when papal provision to the episcopate became regular in the early fourteenth century: L. T. Belgrano, *Il secondo registro della curia arcivescovile di Genova* (Atti della società ligure di storia patria, XVIII: Genoa, 1887), 14. In Milan it is the usual style from 1267 through 1417: Bascapè, 85-134. At Salerno a similar change occurred between 1260 and 1314 (between Balducci's nos. 153 and 169).

A relatively simple pattern of change seems established. From initial, relatively free variation, after the first imposition of an eccentric Franciscan style of Landolfo, a normal *permissione divina* is generally used from the mid-fourteenth century. The pattern seems to be broken in the second half of the fifteenth century by the personally assertive Nicola Miroballo and again by the Florentine Giovanni Niccolini and his Tuscan notary. It is reasserted by Andrea de Cunto but has been abandoned for a new pattern by the end of the sixteenth century.

This pleasant clarity is somewhat darkened by the imposition of the pattern of the unsealed, subscribed documents. There are more unsealed documents, and they are differently dispersed. They start earlier. Ten of these documents come from the episcopate of Andrea d'Alagno for whom no sealed documents survive; fourteen are from the episcopate of Robert Brancia for whom one sealed document survives. Thus can be observed in greater and different detail documents upon whose creation less care was probably expended.

The impression of early variety is confirmed by the unsealed documents. A Dionysio document from 1177, edited by Filangieri, uses in its text the most extended of existing forms, "Dionisius divina favente clementia humilis Amalfitanorum archiepiscopus," but in its subscript the simple "Dionisius humilis Amalfit[anorum] archiepiscopus."[26] The oldest known subscribed document at Amalfi, an 1172 grant by Archbishop Robualdo, uses a simple "divina paciencia" form in the text and an even simpler "Robbaldus archiepiscopus" in the subscript.[27] A Dionysio grant of 1182 uses in its subscript the relatively elaborate textual "Dei gratia humilis Amalfitanorum archiepiscopus."[28] This difference may be due to the more elaborate taste of either Dionysio or his scribe Fortunato and the simpler taste of either Robualdo or his scribe Constantino. It is impossible to penetrate into the motives of these opaque proto-chanceries, but the impression of variety with a preference for the word *humilis* remains. It is an impression which continues through the period of Filippo Augustariccio. The Filippo subscribed documents are largely the work of Pietro de Felice; one of them gives Filippo the style "Dei gratia humilis."[29] Andrea d'Alagno's documents were prepared by a number of scribes, early by Pietro de Felice (four, last in 1312) and Pietro d'Oferia of Castellamare di Stabia, and later by Francesco d'Angelo and Benenato de Amoruczo (four, first in 1310).[30] Benenato wrote for a long time, for a number of archbishops, through a number of styles. Writing for Andrea he showed a continued variety; writing for Landolfo he maintained a relatively rigid consistency.

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[26] Filangieri, *Codice diplomatico amalfitano*, I, 375-376 (no. 198). The "divina favente clementia" without the "humilis" was a style still used occasionally by the thirteenth-century emperors; for a 1236 example see J. L. A. Huillard-Breholles, *Friderici secundi historia diplomatica*, IV, part II, 892.

[27] Archivio della curia arcivescovile di Amalfi, A.P., sec. XII, n°. 9.

Landolfo, for whom Filangieri preserves an "Amalfitanus electus confirmatus archiepiscopus" style from 1332, although not heavily represented in the unsealed subscribed documents at Amalfi (there are four), consistently maintains his papal style in their texts, although he sometimes simplifies the style of his subscripts with their characteristic and easily recognizable crosses manual.[31] Landolfo's scribe, Benenato, wrote various styles for Archbishop Pietro Capuano: in 1352 he used "permissione divina"; in 1355 "miseracione divina" in two documents; in 1356 he used the simple "archiepiscopus" style of his regular subscripts in the text.[32] The six subscribed documents (1361-1373) of Marino del Giudice, on the other hand, consistently use the style "permissione divina" in the text and the simple archiepiscopal style in the subscript, in spite of the fact that the first three were written by Benenato and the other three by three different notaries (one of whom was Giovanni Cristono).[33]

The single surviving document (1377) of the noble Neapolitan, Giovanni Acquaviva, reverts to the papal style of the Franciscan, and noble Neapolitan, Landolfo Caracciolo. It was written by Sergio Campanilis who had written one of Marino del Giudice's "permissione divina" documents. A document written by Filippo de Oliva in 1384 uses the style "miseracione divina" for Archbishop Sergio Grisone. This continuing slight variation is apparent in a 1407 document of Archbishop Bertrando d'Alagno (prepared for subscription but actually unsubscribed) that uses in its text "miseracione divina" and in two 1410 Roberto Brancia-Filippo de Oliva documents that use "Dei gratia." But in 1411 Filippo used "permissione divina" for Roberto; and of four surviving Roberto documents from 1416, all written by Matteo de Oliva, three use the style "permissione divina," the fourth "miseracione divina." (Of these four, all prepared for subscription, only one, the first, a "permissione divina," was in fact subscribed by the archbishop.)[34]

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[28] Archivio della curia arcivescovile di Amalfi, A.P., sec. XII, no. 13.

[29] Archivio della curia arcivescovile di Amalfi, A.P., sec. XIII, no. 52.

[30] Archivio della curia arcivescovile di Amalfi, A.P., sec. XIV, nos. 3, 6, 8, 9, 13, 15, 17, 23, 27, 42.

[31] Filangieri, *Codice diplomatico amalfitano*, II, 288 (no. 582).

[32] Archivio della curia arcivescovile di Amalfi, A.P., sec. XIV, nos. 80, 84, 85, 86.

[33] Archivio della curia arcivescovile di Amalfi, A.P., sec. XIV, nos. 99, 101, 107, 108, 129, 132.

Five documents survive from the episcopate of the Dominican Antonio Carlino. One, from 1451 and written by Salvatore de Cunto, and two from 1451 and 1457 and written by Francesco de Campulo, use the papal style, "Dei et apostolice sedis gratia," used by the other friar, Landolfo, in the fourteenth century. A fourth Antonio document, however, also written by Francesco de Campulo, in 1457, uses "permissione divina," the style with which this group of unsealed, subscribed documents closes in a 1487 Archbishop Andrea de Cunto document written by Francesco de Galifis.[35]

When the unsealed and the sealed documents are looked at together the dominant pattern of the "permissione divina" style does not disappear, but it is further blurred: variety, for instance, appears in the Pietro Capuano styles, although the consistency of the Marino del Giudice styles remains. Specific patterns change: the innovator Nicola Miroballo seems less a stylistic revolutionary when his Dominican predecessor is seen using the same papal style. Most important, it becomes increasingly clear, at least for the later period, that if someone changes stylistic usage it is the archbishop not his notary.

The *arenga*, in its most exalted form, is that part of a document's protocol that explicitly connects its individual action with the spiritual and literary tradition of the Christian church.[36] It quotes, echoes, paraphrases, and combines bits of Biblical text, pious sentiment, and learned commonplace that are pertinent enough to touch, at least obliquely, the action of the individual document, and yet general enough to remind the reader or hearer or writer of the controlling nature of the mystical body of which the act is a single expression. The *arenga* explains why, in spiritual, or at least intellectual terms, the action which the document records is being taken. It is the part of the document that demands the skills of rhetoric and so, of course, the part of the document in which the rhetorical art may be most flamboyantly displayed. The composition of these rhetorical statements in a group of documents from a specific writing office is an articulate but difficult key to the intellectual regimen of the office and to its relations with other similar offices. It is difficult for a number of reasons. Nowhere is the partial survival of mediaeval documents more tantalizing. The disappearance of bulk deprives the observer of the ability to distinguish between the conventional and the exceptional. Nothing could be more detrimental to our understanding the people who produced the documents. It is also difficult to tell when a specific pattern is being copied and when a new combination of phrases is being elaborated. Almost no one now constantly hears and recognizes the sounds of Piero della Vigna or even of the Vulgate. We as observers do not see what to the writers were obvious patterns even when the patterns survive and are actually available. But there are also patterns that are physically lost, letter books once constantly used in chanceries and now destroyed. Still, although almost every statement must be tentative, statements are worth making. If, for example, it can be said that the same *arenga* is used for similar actions in a writing office over some period of time, a sort of continuity in that office, an official memory, a use of records, is almost surely established. A slight doubt exists even in this obvious simplicity, because of the constantly repeated external stimuli, letters from greater chanceries that could be repeatedly copied rather than retained or remembered by smaller chanceries.[37] This action may well be suspected at a place like Amalfi physically close, as it was, to the powerful chanceries of pope and Sicilian emperor-king as well as to various prominent local ecclesiastical chanceries, but even this sort of copying would argue a sort of record-keeping organization.

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[34] Archivio della curia arcivescovile di Amalfi, A.P., sec. xiv, nos. 141, 149; sec. xv, nos. 10, 16, 17, 19, 33, 34, 35, 36.

[35] Archivio della curia arcivescovile di Amalfi, A.P., sec. xv, nos. 119, 138, 141, 142 144, 171.

[36] There are extended lists of harangues in: Saltman, 197-208; Maria Kopczynski, *Die Arengen der Papsturkunden nach ihrer Bedeutung und Verwendung bis zu Gregor VII* (Berlin, 1936), 104-119; Antonie Jost, *Der Kaisergedanke in den Arengen der Urkunden Friedrichs I* (Münster, 1930), 42-101; Gerhard Ladner, "Formularbehelfe in der Kanzlei Kaiser Friedrichs II und die 'Briefe des Petrus de Vinea'," 115-142 in *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung*, XII (1932). There are valuable discussions in: Cheney, 72-75; Major, xxviii-xxxiii; Bartolini, 435-436; Heinrich Fichtenau, *Arenga*, *MIÖG*, Supp, xviii (1957).

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[37] Cencetti, whose documents have articulately repetitive harangues, is particularly forceful in dealing with the influence of various chanceries upon each other. Interesting correspondences exist between harangues in episcopal documents regulating and stabilizing incomes of cathedral clergy in Amalfi and Salerno, and in Salerno, Giovinazzo, and Naples. A 1256 Salerno document regulating the stipends of the clergy of the lower church (Paesano, II, 401, note 1) uses "cum secundum apostolum qui altari servit vivere debet de altari" echoing even more directly than the 1292 Amalfi arenga examined below a pertinent passage from the Decretals, a letter of Innocent III (c. 16, X. iii. 5; Potthast, no. 71) — see also, for this Pauline commonplace, R. A. R. Hartridge, *A History of Vicarages in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1930), 36. Related "divinus cultus" harangues appear in Salerno in 1260 (Paesano, II, 391-401), Giovinazzo in 1266 (G. B. Nitto de Rossi and Francesco Nitti di Vito, *Codice diplomatico barese II: le pergamene del Duomo di Bari (1266-1309)* (Bari, 1899), i"Appendice: le pergamene di Giovinazzo, Canosa e Putignano," 206-207, no. 23), and Naples n 1317 (Luigi Parascandolo, *Memorie storiche-critiche-diplomatiche della chiesa di Napoli* Naples, 1847-1854), III, appendix I, 196-197, no. 34).

The use of the *arenga* in the sealed documents of the mediaeval archbishops of Amalfi is much what one would expect from other characteristics of those documents. In these irregular and archaically ornate documents the *arenga* is long preserved but rather irregularly used. On Archbishop Andrea de Cunto's 1490 license to construct an altar, the last act in the series, there is an appropriate *arenga*: *cum gloriosus in sanctis suis...* This same *arenga* had been used as early as 1426 by Archbishop Andrea Palearea for the foundation of the church of St. Catherine beyond the walls. It was embedded in Andrea de Cunto's 1485 license for the Avvocata. The earliest of these three documents was written by Raffaello de Cunto, the others by Antonino de Campulo. This show of regularity is not confirmed by the other Amalfi documents, but all of the three founding and constructing licenses of Archbishop Marino del Giudice (1362[?], 1370, 1371) combine in an *arenga*-publication clause a practical and a pious sentiment: *ad certitudinem presencium et memoriam futurorum...*; and *fidesque in augmentum diffunditur Christiana...* The first of these was written by Benenato de Amoruczo, the other two by Giovanni Cristono. The dual clause seems to be Marino's and not the notaries'. This impression is reenforced by Benenato's having used a different *arenga* (*quod si universa opera caritatis...*) in the two similar licenses issued by Landolfo Caracciolo in 1333. Certain types of documents, institutions, collations, the granting of a coadjutor, the confirmation of rights of patronage, the making of proctors for a general council, were evidently not generally thought to need an *arenga*, or perhaps none came naturally to the scribe's mind or from his formulary. The large and impressive 1281, feast of St. Andrew document is without *arenga*, as is the small 1411 letter creating a cardinal canon of Amalfi. A 1359 rehearsal by Pietro Capuano of an earlier but recent contract to which the chapter was a party seems to have needed none, but a 1461 inspeximus-confirmation, under the seal of Nicola Miroballo, of a privilege from the year 1232 does state the practical reason for its existence "quod privilegium vix poterat legi nimia vetustate consumptum et corrosum." The 1477 Giovanni Niccolini document that grants the disposal of the property of the church of St. Trofimena to the convent of Santa Maria Dominicarum uses a variant of the conventional European-wide *si pastores ovium*; and a 1348 Landolfo Caracciolo institution uses *illis est merito providendum...*

The texture of an *arenga*, the nature of its composition can be suggested only by the sight of one. The *arenga* of the 1292 statute of Filippo Augustariccio concerning the stipends of the cathedral clergy has an *arenga* relatively ornate for Amalfi. It is a medley of echoes built around two passages from the Gospel of St. Matthew (20:12 and 11:28) and a commonplace about men of the altar living of the altar distorted from St. Paul (1 Corinthians 9:13):

> Pii patris imitantes vestigia qui apertis visceribus caritatis in agricultura dominica laborantes agricolas quos portare inspexerat pondus diei et estus et ex labore nimio oneratos, ne in via divini officii deficerent jejunantes ad se pia miseratione vocavit dicens, venite ad me qui laboratis et onerati estis et ego reficiam vos, laborem enim manuum vestrarum manducabitis, cum qui altari servit vivere debeat de altari. Illius pes noster sequens vestigia, cuius viam solerti studio custodivit ab ea aliquatenus non declinans, qui nobis exemplum reliquit eatenus caritatis opera facere quemadmodum ipse fecit. Cum igitur...

The composer, or selector, of this *arenga* may have been neither scholar nor poet, but he was imaginative, at least, and his *arenga* is pertinent enough to remind reader or hearer of a connection between the cathedral clergy and the work of Christ. It gives an air of high seriousness to the document. It hardly suggests a composer who had been forced by constant demand to become an accomplished creator of a variety of polished harangues.

A shorter, less unwieldy sort of *arenga* persisted and was used, if irregularly, surprisingly late at Amalfi, as long, in fact, as the lead seal was used. The repetition of the same *arenga* on series of similar documents shows that the repeated, conservative actions of the Amalfi chancery were not always accidental, that there was at Amalfi something of an official memory, even if not a very extended one. The importance of the archbishop rather than the notary in controlling form is again suggested, as is the unusual orderliness of chancery procedure under Archbishop Marino del Giudice.

The Amalfi *acta* all carry both time and, with one exception, place dates.[38] (The date area of the 1362 document is illegible, and it is excluded from this discussion.) The dates are either in the initial protocol or the eschatacol. They move from one to the other throughout the whole period from which the *acta* survive. In the simple 1273 Filippo *procuratorium* the date is placed just before the notarial sign; but in the elaborate declaration concerning the celebration of the feast of St. Andrew, issued by the same archbishop and written by the same notary, Pietro Montincolli, the date is in the protocol. It appears in the protocol of the 1292 and both 1333 documents but drops to the eschatacol of the relatively simple 1336 document granting the coadjutor to a church in Vettica Maggiore. In 1348 it is in the eschatacol, in 1359 in the protocol. In the 1370 Marino del Giudice-Giovanni Cristono license for the foundation of a chapel in Agérola the date is in the eschatacol; in a 1371 license to construct a chapel in Tramonti, granted by the same archbishop and written by the same notary, the date is in the protocol. In 1374, 1394, 1411, 1426, and 1439 it is in the eschatacol. In 1461 in the unusually shaped document rehearsing another document written in 1232 and issued by Nicola Miroballo the date returns to the protocol; but in the 1477 Giovanni Niccolini document it drops again to the eschatacol. In the 1485 and 1490 Andrea de Cunto documents the date is again in the protocol. This is not entirely a picture of aimless variety. There is some tendency for the date to appear in the eschatacol in less elaborate documents, and in documents from the period between 1374 and 1439, almost exactly the period of the recurring notarial description "curie actorum notarius" and the "permissione divina" style. Still the inevitable impression of variety is not entirely, or even predominantly, one of planned variety.

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[38] The Amalfi notaries do not play the dating game of the notaries of Terlizzi near Bari where each succeeding notary used a different elaboration of the combination of invocation and formula introducing the Christian year date: see Francesco Carabellese, *Codice diplomatico barese III: le pergamene della Cattedrale di Terlizzi (971-1300)* (Bari, 1899), 36-283: formulae such as "In nomine Iesu Christi filii Dei vivi anno incarnationis..." or "In anno redemptionis generis humani incarnatione domini nostri Iesu Christi..." The general problems of southern Italian dating are attacked by Filangieri in "Appunti di cronografia per l'Italia meridionale," *Gli Archivi italiani* I (1914), 136-149. Filangieri particularly considers the problem of local change away from Byzantine dating.

The place date is expressed in two ways: either in the locative as in the 1273 "Actum Amalfie"; or in the accusative as in the four documents from 1281 through 1333 which use "aput Amalfiam." From 1336 it became regular to add some version of "in palacio nostro" to either form. In 1359 the spelling "apud" appears, and in 1426 the form "Dat' et Act'." The peculiarly constructed 1461 document does not have a normal place date; and the 1485 document is dated from Maiori. *Apud* with the accusative is used as late as 1371.

The 1273 document gives the month, the year of the Christian era, and the indiction, but no day date. The 1281 document adds the day date in the modern usage of consecutive days in the month. The 1292 document written by a notary by royal authority adds the year of the reign of Charles II with his full title. This pattern is followed in the two 1333 Landolfo-Benenato documents: year of the Christian era, regnal year of King Robert with his full title, day, month (always, when extended, in the genitive), and indiction. In 1336 Benenato, at the same time that he dropped the statement of royal authority from his notarial self-description, dropped the regnal year from his date; and in 1348 he replaced it with the pope's pontifical year. The pope's pontifical year remained until 1371 when Giovanni Cristono, describing himself as a royal rather than a papal notary, dropped the papal year and added the regnal year. Filippo de Oliva writing for Nicola de Sora, the appointee of the anti-pope Clement VII, in 1391 used neither regnal nor pontifical year, but in 1411 writing for Roberto Brancia he reinserted the pontifical year. Raffaello de Cunto followed this latter pattern and added the word "vero"

LIST OF MEDIAEVAL SEALED ARCHIEPISCOPAL DOCUMENTS AT AMALFI

The common archival classification of these documents is "Archivio della curia arcivescovile di Amalfi, P.S., Arciv. Amalf." The documents are measured in centimeters to the nearest half, the length always preceding the breadth. An asterisk before the notation indicates the survival of the lead seal.

Archival Classification	Year Date	Issuing Archbishop	Redacting Notary	Business of Document	Size	Edition
sec. xiii, no. 1	1274	Filippo Augustariccio	Pietro Montincolli	making proctors for Lyons	29½ × 23½	Ughelli, VII, cols. 228-229
sec. xiii, no. 2	1281	Filippo Augustariccio	Pietro Montincolli	celebration, feast of St. Andrew	66½ × 59	Ughelli, VII, cols. 224-226
*sec. xiii, no. 3	1292	Filippo Augustariccio	Giacomo Sabbatino	regulation of clerical stipends	55½ × 44	Ughelli, VII, cols. 226-228 Camera, I, 158-160
*sec. xiv, no. 1	1333	Landolfo Caracciolo	Benenato de Amoruczo	for chapel in Paradiso	53 × 41½	
sec. xiv, no. 2	1333	Landolfo Caracciolo	Benenato de Amoruczo	for chapel in north nave near Paradiso	60 × 43½	
sec. xiv, no. 3	1336	Landolfo Caracciolo	Benenato de Amoruczo	coadjutor for rector St. Januarius, Vettica Maggiore	41 × 25	
sec. xiv, no. 4	1348	Landolfo Caracciolo	Benenato de Amoruczo	institution, St. Peter de Tabulo, Amalfi	26½ × 20	
sec. xiv, no. 5	1359	Pietro Capuano	Giovanni Cristono	rehearsal of contract	39 × 35	

Archival Classification	Year Date	Issuing Archbishop	Redacting Notary	Business of Document	Size
sec. xiv, no. 6	1362(?)	Marino del Giudice	Benenato de Amoruczo	for chapel of St. Thomas, cathedral Amalfi	21 (torn) × 28½
*sec. xiv, no. 7	1370	Marino del Giudice	Giovanni Cristono	for chapel of St. Christopher in St. Martin Agérola.	60 × 45
sec. xiv, no. 8	1371	Marino del Giudice	Giovanni Cristono	for chapel of St. Catherine in St. Mary of Tramonti	63½ × 31½
sec. xiv, no. 9	1374	Marino del Giudice	Giovanni Cristono	collation, St. Peter of Atrani	37 × 32
sec. xiv, no. 10	1394	Nicola de Sora	Filippo de Oliva	confirmation of patronage rights of Marino family, St. Peter de Tabulo, Amalfi	41½ × 35
sec. xv, no. 1	1411	Roberto Brancia	Filippo de Oliva	creation of a cardinal of Amalfi	17 × 25.
*sec. xv, no. 2	1426	Andrea Palearea	Raffaello de Cunto	foundation, church of St. Catherine outside walls, Amalfi	61½ × 47
sec. xv, no. 3	1439	Andrea Palearea	Galiotto Pisanello	chaplainship, S. M. delle Grazie, Vettica Maggiore	24½ × 19½
*sec. xv, no. 4	1461	Nicola Miroballo	Andrea Pisanello	inspeximus of 1232 document	32½ × 50
sec. xv, no. 5	1477	Giovanni Niccolini	Dando Dandi	appropriation of St. Trofimena, Oliveto, to S. M. Dominicarum, Amalfi	60½ × 57
*sec. xv, no. 6	1485	Andrea de Cunto	Antonino de Campulo	construction at Avvocata	71 × 55
sec. xv, no. 7	1490	Andrea de Cunto	Antonino de Campulo	for building altar with icon, Amalfi	53½ × 36½

to the day date. Galiotto Pisanello left blank the space for the number of the pontifical year of Eugenius IV in which 3 June 1439 fell; and Andrea Pisanello in 1461 used the papal year but dropped the indiction. The indiction was restored by Dando Dandi in 1477 and remained. An important innovation occurs in the 1488 document: the year date is in Arabic numerals; another innovation appears in the 1596 Giulio Rossini document: in addition to the regnal and papal years the archbishop added the year of his own pontificate.

It is worth noting in these *acta* the hardiness of both the indiction and the papal year. The papal year reasserted itself both after the switch of a notary to royal authority and after the indecision of an anti-pope's appointee; but it is a sort of date that did not, at least in 1439, fly to the notary's mind. There is a constant use of modern day dating, an absence of dating by days of the week or saints' days. The year of the Christian era is omnipresent. Finally, the various expressions of personality in their documents by Nicola Miroballo and Giovanni Niccolini did not, at least in surviving documents, include the use of their pontifical years. That was left to the sixteenth century.

Some of the Amalfi *acta* explicitly answer a pressing question that their existence poses: why are these sealed archiepiscopal *acta* preserved in the archives of the issuing chancery?[39] Archbishop Marino's 1371 license for the construction of the Catherine chapel, for instance, says that as a precaution several copies of the instrument have been prepared. The archbishops of Amalfi seem not to have kept registers or recording enrollments. Instead they kept in their possession or in the archives of their church duplicate, sealed copies of important formal documents whose granting they or the recipients wanted recorded. Archbishop Filippo Augustariccio's 1292 document contains a clause recording the preparation of "duo publica consimilia instrumenta bullata ... quorum una conservatur in vestiario nostre ecclesie Amalfitane et reliquum in monasterio canonice de Amalfia"; and the dorse inscription of the preserved document says: "hoc privilegium est in vestario Amalf'." And both of the two 1333 licenses to construct chapels in or near the Paradiso, granted by Archbishop Landolfo Caracciolo, again record the making of "duo publica instrumenta ... uno penes nos retento aliud in archivio ipsius ecclesie." Unfortunately the retention clauses in the immediately succeeding *acta* are not readily legible, although the 1348 Landolfo document would seem to specify one copy to the rector, another to the patron. The retention clause occurs only through 1371. The 1426 Andrea Palearea document for founding the church of St. Catherine beyond the walls, however, has a dorse description ("Fundacio ecclie ste Catherine / extra muros Amalfie") accompanied by what seems a contemporary archival mark: a capital A joined to a capital B with a cross rising from the juncture.

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[39] Since the archives of Amalfi are composite and include fragments of various local monastic archives as well as those of the archbishop and the cathedral church, it is possible that one or more of these documents have found their way back to the arcivescovado through the accidents of archival disposition.

These documents would seem then to be the rather cumbersome recording of a registerless chancery. The change of terminology from vestry to archives between 1292 and 1333 may indicate a real institutional change, the actual creation of organized archives in the church of Amalfi during that period. The 1333 documents certainly demand that we accept the fact that archives existed in the church of Amalfi by that time.[40] The appearance of the retention clause in 1292 and its disappearance after 1371 are arguments for the existence of a specific period in the evolution of the Amalfi *acta* partially characterized by the fact that it had become desirable to insert exact explanatory clauses and that it was still considered necessary to be explicit about what might later be assumed.

Although callous in its conservatism the archiepiscopal chancery at Amalfi was not completely insensitive to external stimuli or completely immune to the conventional evolution of normal chancery practice. The chancery produced at least one real letter patent; and two other of its surviving products call themselves letters patent — in some ways an even more positive emulation of the external. The chancery seems not to have tolerated the peculiar local notarial hand in any of its most formal documents. It made its formal calligraphy conform to that prevalent Carolingian mode legible throughout the western church. Franciscan archbishops, the constantly new papacy, and a touch of the renaissance seem to have affected the documents, and the breath of an anti-pope to have ruffled Amalfi style. The fluctuation of the use of the regnal year illustrates the somewhat uncertain position of the Amalfi coast in the Regno. The complete absence of dating by either the Roman method or by feast days reflects perhaps the relative purposefulness of surrounding business techniques.

More importantly, after what need not but can be seen as an experimental period, through the mid-fourteenth century, some formal regularities appeared in the Amalfi chancery. For a roughly equivalent period in the later fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the style "permissione divina" became regular the dates of documents dropped regularly to the eschatacol, and archiepiscopal notaries gave their office the regular name "curie actorum notarius." This regularity seems connected, in its beginning, with the pontificate of Archbishop Marino del Giudice whose documentary relics hint that he may have been interested in establishing real and efficient order in his chancery. The "experimentation" with retention clauses in Amalfi *acta*, moreover, and the occasional repetition of harangues indicate that not all of Amalfi conservatism was unintentional and uncreative. But all of this is very slight. What is noticeable about Amalfi is the lack of regular chancery behavior. Even the susceptibility to externals which is occasionally observable really seems to have encouraged conservatism. The important stimuli were for the most part local archbishops and local notaries.[41].

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[40] Cf. Bascapè, 102-104 (no. 28); Bresslau, I, 179-181.

At Amalfi the last of the mediaeval *acta*, from 1490, has an *arenga*; it once had a lead seal. A huge 1485 document, longer than it is broad, still carries its lead seal; and the seal bears an obverse that looked archaic a century earlier. Although the two *acta* look very much alike, one calls itself a letter patent, the other a public instrument. These documents end a series that is conservative in its preservation of the ancient: in its documents' seals, their witnesses, their size and shape. It is also conservative in its refusal to accept common form, in the persistence of its irregularities of style, in its existence's being a cumbersome alternative to enrollment or registration. In these documents the historian constantly sees, as Hawthorne did at Perugia and with something of the same historical pleasure, "the life of the flitting moment existing in the antique shell of an age gone by."

It is obvious that this writing office developed lethargically because it was surrounded by too much rather than too little other writing. Irregularities persisted as they did not, for instance, in English chanceries, because the Amalfi chancery was not a unique office shaped by its isolation in an illiterate community. Southern Italy was alive with that writing and those writers that still echo in Mabillon's *Iter Italicum.* The Amalfi archiepiscopal chancery did not define writing for the surrounding community, nor did it act as a repository for all the community's written work. The city of Amalfi was rich in working notaries. Their work penetrated the chancery, and the archiepiscopal *acta* were never freed of their notarial form. The chancery itself seems half-dissolved in the notarial, literate, business community.

The fact that the Amalfi archiepiscopal chancery did not have the force, the push, even to achieve reasonable consistency was due to the fact that it was so inseparably involved in the surrounding community. But the effect of the chancery's involvement might well have been different had there been a different cast to Amalfi's trade in the late middle ages, if Amalfi had not been slack, decaying, and retrenching. Caught in a vigorous community, an episcopal chancery might have borrowed vigor or been forced to vigor, as it was not at Amalfi. The blinds always seem to be flapping and the dust accumulating as the Amalfi notaries of the later middle ages draw up their huge documents unhurried by the pressure of business from the decayed harbor.

Chanceries are complicated archaeological remains. This one is exposed not only as the crystallization of a specific community's characteristics. It is also an example in correspondences.

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[41] The products of individual notaries are recognizable at a glance from the general character of the script and the arrangement of the instrument as well as the sign, so that clumps of similarly slightly different instruments succeed each other.

" De Nobilitate Animi"

MARVIN L. COLKER

THE idea that personal merit, and not lofty birth, determines true nobility or the highest form of nobility in men might seem to be adevelopment of modern democratic thinking. Actually, not a few sources from classical antiquity to the Renaissance have stated that view:[1] for example, Epicharmus,[2] Euripides,[3] and other Greek writers cited by Stobaeus;[4] Philo[5] and Pseudo-Aristotle;[6] Publilius Syrus,[7] Seneca the Younger,[8] Juvenal,[9] Claudian,[10]

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[1] On the concept of nobility by merit, see: Adolf Gaspery, *Geschichte der italienischen Literatur* I (Berlin, 1885) p. 518; K. Vossler, *Die philosophischen Grundlagen zur süssen neuen Stil des Guinicelli, Cavalcanti, und Dante Alighieri* (Heidelberg, 1904) pp. 33ff.; Friedrich Vogt, *Der Bedeutungswandel des Wortes "edel"* (Marburg, 1909); John Livingston Lowes, 'Chaucer and Dante's *Convivio,' Modern Philology* XIII (1915-1916) 19-33; G. M. Vogt, 'Gleanings for the History of a Sentiment: *Generositas Virtus Non Sanguis,' Journal of English and Germanic Philology* XXIV (1925) 102-124 ; A. W. Reed in Edgar Partage *et al., Chivalry* (London, 1928) pp. 211-215; Ruth Kelso, 'Doctrine of the English Gentleman in the Sixteenth Century,' *University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature* XIV (1929) 13, 27, 29-30, 41, 185, 233; A. Hilka and O. Schumann (edd.), *Carmina Burana*, bd. II (Heidelberg, 1930) p. 11; Vittorio Rossi, *Storia letteraria d'Italia* V (Milan, 1933) pp. 132-133, 335; J. E. Mason, *Gentlefolk in the Making: Studies in the History of English Courtesy Literature and Related Topics from 1531 to 1774* (Philadelphia, 1935) pp. 6-8 ; Ernst Kantorowicz, *Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite* (Berlin, 1936) pp. 319-320; E. R. Curtius, 'Zur Literaturästhetik des Mittelalters' II, *Zeitschr. f. roman. Philol.* LVIII (1938) 213; Wilhelm Berges, 'Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späten Mittelalters,' MGH: Schriften des Reichsinstituts für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde II (1938) 10-11, esp. p. 11, nn. 1-2; F. H. Colson (ed.), *Philo* (Loeb Classical Texts, Cambridge, Mass., 1938) p. 449; Samuel Singer, *Sprichwörter des Mittelalters* III (Bern, 1947) pp. 21-22; E. R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern, 1948) pp. 186-187; Gilbert Highet, *Juvenal the Satirist* (Oxford, 1954) p. 272; J. Huizinga, tr. F. Hopman as *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (N.Y., 1956) pp. 56-67; Maurice Valency, *In Praise of Love* (N.Y., 1958) pp. 41-46; J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, *The Western Intellectual Tradition from Leonardo to Hegel* (N.Y., 1960) pp. 140-142.

[2] In Stobaeus' *Florilegium*, ed. A. Meineke III (Leipzig, 1856) pp. 154-155.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 155.

[4] *Ibid.* pp. 153-171 *passim.*

[5] *De Virtutibus* 35 (ed. Colson pp. 189, 190, 193, 206).

[6] *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 36, 1441a.

[7] *Sententiae* V 15 (ed. Otto Friedrich [Berlin, 1880] p. 78).

[8] *Epistulae Morales* 44, 5 and *De Beneficiis* III, 28, 1.

[9] *Sat.* 8, esp. line 20.

[10] *Panegyr. De Quarto Consolatu Honorii Augusti,* verses 220-221.

Pseudo-Seneca;[11] Pseudo-Bede,[12] Hildebert,[13] Matthew of Vendôme,[14] Alexander Neckham,[15] Gautier de Châtillon,[16] John of Salisbury,[17] Andreas Capellanus,[18] Alan of Lille,[19] Radulfus de Longo Campo,[20] Petrus Cantor,[21] *Carmina Burana*,[22] *Florilegium Gottingense*,[23] Guido Guinicelli,[24] Jean de Meun,[25] Brunetto Latini,[26] Dante,[27] *Ayenbite of Inwyt*,[28] Chaucer;[29] Castiglione[30] and James Cleland.[31] [32]

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[11] *De Moribus* 86 and 87.

[12] *Proverbia* PL 90, 1103.

[13] *Moral. Philos.* III, 51 (PL 171, 1043).

[14] *Ars Versificatoria* 27, ed. Edmond Faral in *Les arts poétiques du XII^e et du XIII^e siècle* (Bibl. de l'École des hautes études 238, Paris, 1924) p. 116.

[15] *De Vita Monachorum*, ed. Thomas Wright in *Anglo-Latin Satirical Poets and Epigrammatists of the Twelfth Century* (SS. Rer. Britann. 59, 2, London, 1872) II p. 185.

[16] *Alexandreis* I, 104 (ed. F. Müldener [Leipzig, 1863] p. 9).

[17] *Policraticus* VIII, 15 (ed. C. J. Webb [Oxford, 1909] pp. 336-338).

[18] *De Amore*, ed. Salvatore Battaglia (Rome, 1947) pp. 26, 28.

[19] *Anticlaudianus* V, 66-67 (ed. R. Bossuat, Textes philosophiques du moyen âge 1, Paris, 1955, p. 125).

[20] See B. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de la Bibl. nationale* I (Paris, 1890) p. 329.

[21] *Verbum Abbreviatum* 10 (PL 205, 47D).

[22] Edd. A. Hilka and O. Schumann, I (Heidelberg, 1930) pp. 8-9.

[23] Ed. E. Voigt, *Romanische Forschungen* III (1887) 300 no. 203.

[24] *Al cor gentil.*

[25] *Roman de la rose* 19421-19532, esp. 19421-19440.

[26] *Li livres dou tresor* II, 54 (ed. Francis J. Carmody, *University of California Publications in Modern Philology* XXII [1948] 229-230).

[27] *Convivio* IV, canzone 101-102 (ed. Enrico Bianchi in *Dante Alighieri: Le opere minori* [Florence, 1938] p. 306).

[28] Ed. Richard Morris (E.E.T.S. 23, London, 1866) p. 87.

[29] *Gentilesse*, and *Wife of Bath's Tale* lines 1109-1113.

[30] *Il Cortegiano* I, 15.

[31] *The Institution of a Young Noble Man* (London, 1611), original edition reproduced by Max Molyneux (N.Y., 1948) p. 5.

[32] Cf. also Diogenes Laertius IV, 46-47; Ovid, *Trist.* IV, 4, 1-2 and *Ex Ponto* I, 2, 1-2 and I, 9, 39-40 and II, 3, 1-2; Horace, *Serm.* I, 6, 63-64; Seneca the Elder, *Controv.* I, 6; Persius, *Sat.* IV, 1-23; and Valerius Maximus III, 4-5. The Pseudo-Plutarch *Hyper Eugeneias* (ed. Daniel Wyttenbach in Plutarch's *Moralia* vol. 5 pt. 3 [London, 1802] pp. 915-985), although the end is not preserved, strongly defends nobility by birth and seems to be a reply to the Stoic view condemning such nobility (cf. chapters 12 and 17, *ed. cit.* pp. 950-955, 966-967). Cf. also Boethius, *Consol.* III, pr. 6; St. Bernard's *Vita S. Malachiae* 23 (PL 183, 1102); and the proverbs N 78, N 81-84, N 87-88, and V 57 in Jakob Werner, *Sprichwörter und Sinnsprüche des Mittelalters* (Heidelberg, 1912) pp. 54-55, 101. The anonymous verse *distinctiones* in Trinity College Dublin Ms 251 (first half of the 13th cent.) include for the rubric "Nobilitas" on fol. 8^v: "Tunc genus extollit, sed si fastigia penses, / Nobilitas animi stemata celsa premit." A kind of parish handbook of the fifteenth century (Trinity College Dublin Ms 667, p. 41) declares: "Nota quod nobilitas parentum non prodest malis filiis nec ignobilitas parentum obest bonis filiis, nec aliquis debet erubescere de ignobilitate sine vitiis parentum suorum dum tamen ipse sit virtuosus."

Renaissance humanists like Buonaccorso,[33] Poggio,[34] Platina,[35] and Clichtove[36] sometimes devoted whole works to the theme of true nobility.[37]

Prior to these works of the Renaissance scholars named above, but without any influence on them, appears an anonymous book *De Nobilitate Animi*, a little-known product of thirteenth-century scholastic humanism.

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Though written in a rather clumsy style far from the perfection of a Thomas Aquinas, the *De Nobilitate Animi* is nonetheless a well organized opusculum. In the first of the two main divisions the author aims to prove that nobility of character guided by proper use of the intellect is the kind of nobility to be prized the most highly. He distinguishes such nobility from the advantages of body, luck, wealth, glory, and dominion, which pass as bases for nobility: the motif is reminiscent of philosophical arguments like Boethius' *De Consolatione Philosophiae* III, denying that popular vanities represent the highest good. But the author of the *De Nobilitate Animi* does claim that the nobility of lords is greater than that of commoners provided that the lords act virtuously, since they control the affairs of more persons than do commoners. A delinquent ruler is said to be only a vile slave. Plato's ideal of the philosopher-king should be pursued by leaders of state, whose important function is to serve the welfare of all their subjects and especially to preserve the peace. It is no wonder that a ruler's preoccupation with dogs or birds is sharply condemned. Another arresting feature is the fact that, even as there is an emphasis in part II on physiognomy for determining who is noble and who is not, so attention is given in part I to the power of the stars over human destinies. In the same part I are discussed certain questions of great interest for mediaeval thought: Are all men noble by nature; Are there noble women; Can children be noble; Would a child take after his father or his mother in nobility; May even some animals be regarded as noble; Is it possible for education or rearing to mould a man of wretched endowment into a superior individual; Is a king really more noble than a count, and an emperor than a king. The *De Nobilitate Animi*, then, provides valuable material for our knowledge of mediaeval social and political theory.

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[33] *Orationes De Vera Nobilitate* (Leipzig: Conrad Kachelofen, ca. 1494). On the wide influence of Buonaccorso's book, see A. W. Reed, *op. cit.* pp. 211-213 and R. J. Mitchell, *John Tiptoft (1427-1470)* (London, 1938) pp. 173-241.

[34] *De Nobilitate* in Poggio's *Opera* (Basel, 1538) pp. 64-83. See esp. pp. 78 and 83.

[35] *De Vera Nobilitate* (Lyons, 1512), esp. fol. 4^r.

[36] *De Vera Nobilitate* (Paris, 1520), esp. fol. 8^r.

[37] I have not been able to examine Johannes Nider's *De Vera et Falsa Nobilitate*, which lies in Mss Bamberg Q V 3 and Munich clm 7719, 18566, 27106, and Basel A X 131, but see Langosch-Stammler, *Verfasserlexicon* III (Berlin, 1943), col. 565.

The second part of the treatise, like the second part of Book II, the book on ethics, in Brunetto Latini's *Li livres dou tresor*,[38] supplies proof-texts in elaboration of the previous portion. The Bible, Aristotle, Plato, Seneca the Younger, Valerius Maximus are cited along with current proverbs and the troubadours, including Peire Vidal, Arnaut (Daniel or de Mareuil?), Folquet de Marseilla, Jauffré Rodel, Guillem de Montaignagol. And most of these troubadour passages are not to be found elsewhere.[39]

The author of the treatise very likely consulted a florilegium for his quotations: there were florilegia containing pieces from Provençal poets, as Francesco da Barberino discloses: "Hoc quidem eius dictum reperii cum suis aliis multis pulcris circa principium illius libri provincialis cuius est rubrica talis: Flores dictorum nobilium provincialium." [40]

Influenced by the statement of Barberino and by the prominence of the theme of true nobility in Italian literature at the time of Dante, Antoine Thomas was inclined to think that the *De Nobilitate Animi* was composed in Italy.[41] Thomas may be correct. However, the topos was certainly popular in mediaeval France, as the opening paragraph of this paper indicates, and the two manuscripts of the treatise which remain today are of French and Flemish origin respectively. In any case, since the older of the two manuscripts was executed in France toward the end of the thirteenth century and since Guillem de Montaignagol, cited in the treatise (Ch. 22), was active from about 1233 to 1258,[42] it is probable that the *De Nobilitate Animi* was originally penned in the second half of the thirteenth century.

The earlier of the two extant manuscripts is a constituent of Paris codex B.N. lat. 16089, which offers, in different hands from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, a collection of miscellaneous texts, including the *Secretum Secretorum*, *Prophetia Hildegardis*, and the *De Disciplina Scholarium*.[43] A crabbed French hand of the late thirteenth century transcribed the *De Nobilitate Animi*, which extends from folio 238 recto to 241 recto. Unfortunately, more exact information about the provenance of the codex seems unattainable.[44] The other manuscript is a member of Bruges codex 424 and is the effort of a Flemish copyist of about the middle of the fifteenth century.[45] The Bruges codex likewise offers a mélange of texts, among them being essays and moral letters by Seneca; excerpts from Martianus Capella; Robert Kilwardby's *De Ortu Scientiarum*; and a *Liber Eptategnis*, which consists of verses on the seven liberal arts — these verses turn out to be merely a partial recording of Alan of Lille's *Anticlaudianus*.[46] The treatise on nobility occupies folios 312 recto to 322 verso, and unlike the Paris text, is arrayed with *incipit*, section-titles, and *explicit*.[47]

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[38] Pp. 224-314 constitute the second part of Latini's Book II in the edition of Carmody.

[39] See Chaps. 21, 22, and 24 and the notes on these sections.

[40] *Documenti d'amore*, extracts ed. Antoine Thomas in his *Francesco da Barberino et la littérature provençale en Italie au moyen âge* (*Bibl. des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome* 35, Paris, 1883) p. 184.

[41] Antoine Thomas, 'Le "Liber De Nobilitate Animi" et les troubadours,' *Studi medievali* n. s. II (1929) 171-172.

[42] Alfred Jeanroy, *La poésie lyrique des troubadours* (Toulouse and Paris, 1934) I, p. 380.

[43] The codex is described by Leopold Delisle, 'Inventaire des manuscrits latins de la Sorbonne conservés à la Bibliothèque impériale sous les numéros 15176-16718 du fonds latins', *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* XXXI (1871) 37-38 and by B. Hauréau in *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale et autres bibliothèques* XXXV pt. 1 (1896) 209-239.

Both manuscripts of the *De Nobilitate Animi* give faulty texts. The Bruges text displays special disloyalty to the archetype. Besides dropping such expressions as "ut dictum est" and changing indirect to direct discourse, the manuscript introduces materials from outside sources (cf. "Secundum alios" in Ch. 1, the "Nota" in Ch. 2, and the Quintilian quotation in Ch. 15). The frequent alterations of the Bruges text, however, are in themselves of some worth for showing how an early scholar interpreted the treatise. And in several cases the Bruges manuscript alone holds the correct reading. This is conspicuously true in " aut ad potenciam corporis " (Ch. 2), omitted by the Paris text.

Relatively little of the *De Nobilitate Animi* has been published. Three brief notices and a nine-page article on the treatise have appeared, but they have dealt chiefly with the troubadour passages. Describing the codex as a whole, B. Hauréau, in 1896, was the first to show the significance of the *De Nobilitate Animi* in this regard.[48] Hauréau published the first words of the work ("Ex naturali" — "movemur") and then the quotations from Folquet, Arnaut, Rodel, and the first quotation from Peire Vidal (Ch. 21).[48] In a review of Hauréau's notice, Paul Meyer repeated Hauréau's transcriptions of the troubadour texts, with the remark "Il n'y a sûrement rien de pareil dans les poésies de Folquet de Marseille, de Peire Vidal, d'Arnaud Daniel, d'Arnaud de Mareuil, ni enfin de Jaufré Rudel."[49] The most extensive account of the treatise was furnished by Antoine Thomas in 1929.[50] Thomas used for the first time the Bruges manuscript, which had already been mentioned by Hauréau. From this text Thomas published the *incipit* and *explicit*; the section-titles of chapters 1-8 but of none thereafter; and the questions, without the responses, at the beginnings of chapters 9-18.[51] On the basis of both manuscripts, he published, with indication of variants, the general introduction and the introduction to part II,[52] the opening and closing words of the chapters in part II,[53] the second quotation from Peire Vidal (Ch. 24) and the quotations from Montaignagol (Ch. 22) and "Odantagalus" (Ch. 21),[54] and the passages "Nobilitas est habitus" — "eorum naturam" (Ch. 1),[55] "Et hoc dat intelligere" — "intrinsecus estis" (Ch. 21),[56] and "Plinius etiam" — "mali moris" (Ch. 22).[57] About his newly recorded troubadour passages Thomas concluded: "Les trois citations nouvelles, d'ailleurs, ne sont pas plus que les quatre autres identifiables avec aucun passage des œuvres jusqu'ici connues des troubadours auxquels elles sont attribuées, et les sources utilisées par l'auteur du *De Nobilitate animi* restent toujours pour nous indeterminées."[58] But in the same year 1929, Joseph Anglade identified the second of the Peire Vidal quotations with the corresponding Provençal verses and demonstrated a similarity between the first quotation from Vidal and other verses in Provençal.[59]

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[44] Cf. Hauréau *ibid.* p. 209.

[45] For a description of the codex, see A. De Poorter, *Catalogue des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque publique de la ville de Bruges* (vol. II of *Cat. gén. des mss. des bibliothèques de Belgique*, Gembloux and Paris, 1934) pp. 474-477.

[46] I secured a microfilm of the *Eptategnis*.

[47] The Paris text did not receive the rubrication that was intended for it: gaps were sometimes left for initials to be inserted.

[48] B. Hauréau, *Not. et extr. des mss. de la Bibl. nat. et autres bibliothèques* p. 231.

[49] *Romania* XXV (1896) 346-347.

[50] *Studi medievali* n. s. II (1929) 163-172.

My edition of the entire *De Nobilitate Animi* adopts the orthography (including such spelling as "pupblice") of the Paris manuscript. In keeping with Antoine Thomas' practice, I designate the Paris text as *P* and the Bruges text as *B*. P^1 and B^1 indicate that the original scribe was correcting himself. I have numbered the sections of the treatise.

I am grateful to the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris and to the Bibliothèque de la Ville of Bruges for photographs of *P* and *B* and to the British Museum for photographs of Hermes' *De Quindecim Stellis* in Royal Ms 12 C XVIII. I am indebted to Father J.C. Wey, C.S.B., of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, for his kindness in supplying a photostatic reproduction of a passage in the Venice 1506 edition of Algazel's *Logica* and in reporting on the same passage as it is found in Vatican Ms lat. 2186, photostats of which codex are in the possession of the Pontifical Institute.

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[51] *Ibid.* pp. 165-166.

[52] *Ibid.* pp. 165, 167.

[53] *Ibid.* pp. 167-168.

[54] *Ibid.* pp. 169-170.

[55] *Ibid.* p. 166.

[56] *Ibid.* p. 168.

[57] *Ibid.* pp. 170-171.

[58] *Ibid.* p. 170.

[59] Joseph Anglade, 'Peire Vidal et le "Liber de Nobilitate Animi,"' *Studi medievali* n.s. II (1929) 444-445.

DE NOBILITATE ANIMI

Incipit liber de nobilitate animi

Ex naturali appetitu ad bonum et ex eius cognicione ad bene operandum movemur, et ex bonis operibus boni noti et notabiles iudicamur in bonum. Dico notabiles, id est nobiles. Nobilis enim nichil aliud est quam bene operans, quod per sui contrarium probatur: vilis enim operacio et mala facit hominem iudicari vilem et malum. Ergo per oppositum bona operacio et notabilis faciet hominem nobilem de necessitate. Unde nobilitas nichil aliud videtur esse quam operacio bona vel saltem habitus vel potencia intrinseca que principium est bone operacionis, sine qua nullus ad bene operandum movetur sicut nichil disgregat visum nisi quod albedinem habet. Licet tamen potencia operacionem precedat, tamen non cognoscitur nisi per operacionem. Unde de aliquo non possumus dicere quod nobilis sit nisi quia notabiliter et bene agit. Unde quando hoc videmus, dicimus aliquem nobilem et nobilitatem habere.

Nunc autem ita est quod plures in noticia ipsius nobilitatis mirabiliter sunt decepti. Quidam enim credunt eam habere et cognoscere qui nec eam habent nec cognoscunt. Alii etiam sunt qui cum eam habeant, non tamen eam credunt habere eo quod eam non cognoscunt. Alii sunt qui eam habent et cognoscunt, non tamen ipsa utuntur ut deberent. Perfecte autem nobiles sunt qui eam habent et cognoscunt et secundum eam notabiliter operantur. Ut igitur nobilitas et qui sint vere nobiles cognoscantur, hunc libellum pro posse conabor construere, in quo ostendetur quid sit nobilitas et quot sint nobilitatis species secundum ordinem nature et secundum sentenciam omnium philosophorum et aliorum qui laboraverunt ad noticiam veritatis.

Iste liber duas habebit particulas. In prima ostendetur quid sit nobilitas cum suis speciebus, et determinabuntur in ipsa questiones communes quas fieri de nobilitate contingit. In secunda erunt plura proverbia et sentencie et sermones succincti in quibus quilibet in suo statu poterit cognoscere, si advertere voluerit, utrum sue operaciones sint nobiles sive viles. Intitulatur autem iste liber *De Nobilitate Animi* eo quod illa sit potior inter omnes, ut in prosecutione libri patebit.

Tit. Incipit—Animi *not in P* 1 Ex—bonum: Cf. Aristotle, *Nichom.* I, 1, 1094a 1 et ex: et *B* 2 et notabiles: et nobiles *B* 3-4 Nobilis—operans: Bona enim operatio indicat nobilem *B* 4 sui: suum *B* 6 facit *B* 6 nobilem: iudicari *add.* *B* 7 videtur esse: est *B* 7 operacio bona: b.o. *B* 11 nobilis sit: s.n. *B* 15 Quidam: quidem *Thomas* 15 habere et cognoscere: c. et h. *B* 16 sunt *om.* *B* 16 habeant: habent *B* 16 eam credunt: c.e. *B* 17 non cognoscunt: non cognoscant *B* 18-19 non tamen—operantur: et hii sunt vere nobiles. Alii sunt qui eam cognoscunt, non tamen ea utuntur ut deberent et hii veri litterati male operantes *B* 26 notabilitate *P* 26 plura *om.* *B* 26-27 et—quibus: seu sententie succincte quibus *B* 28 sive: seu *Thomas* 29 liber: libellus *B* 30 libri *om.* *B*

(I) Quid sit nobilitas

Nobilitas est habitus qui movet ad talia opera faciendum que in bonitate communiter cognoscuntur secundum quod pertinet ad eorum naturam. Dico quod est habitus quia cum in anima et corpore non sit aliud quam habitus vel potencia vel passio, nobilitas non est potencia nec passio quia per potenciam vel passionem (Fol. 312$^{\mathrm{v}}$*B*) homo non laudatur nec vituperatur, homo autem per nobilitatem laudatur: relinquitur igitur quod sit habitus quocumque modo nobilitas sit accepta. Per habitum autem quilibet dispositus est ad [bene] operandum [vel operari]. Unde habitus movet potenciam ad opus, et quia opera quedam sunt que [facta sunt] per habitum vilitatis et malicie in se vilia et despecta sunt, dictum est quod nobilitas est habitus etc. Sunt autem tria nomina idem significancia quantum ad propositum, licet in se et proprie accepta quodam modo differant: scilicet nobilitas generositas altitudo generis. Nobilitas enim proprie significat notabilem operis bonitatem, generositas vero notabilem multitudinem unius generis, altitudo vero magnitudinem dominii et qualitatem ipsius. Ego autem sub nomine nobilitatis intelligo illa tria sicut et in populari fit usu.

(II) De speciebus nobilitatis

Ex hoc quod dictum est in descripcione nobilitatis possumus plane ostendere quod 3 sunt nobilitatis species quia habitus, qui cum acquisitus dirigit potenciam in opus et ipsum opus reddit bonum, aut dirigit in hiis que pertinent ad potenciam anime aut ad potenciam corporis aut in hiis que fortune tribuuntur. Est enim manifestum [cuilibet] quod quilibet operatur male aut bene secundum quod sibi inest aut ex parte anime aut ex parte corporis aut ex parte fortune. Erunt igitur generaliter loquendo 3 species nobilitatis: scilicet nobilitas anime et corporis et fortune. Et quia anima precellit corpus et fortunam, primo dicendum est de nobilitate anime.

Tit. not in P 3 et: vel *B* 4 *alt.* potencia: potentio *B* 4 nec: vel *B* 7 est *om. B* 7 bene *om. B* 9 facta sunt: s.f. *B* 9-10 malicie—etc.: malicie et illa sunt in se vilia, quedam vero per habitum nobilitatis et illa sunt bona et laudabilia, ideo bene dictum quod nobilitas est habitus qui movet ad bona opera. Secundum alios: Nobilitas est secundum quam aliquis dicitur habere bonas disposiciones naturales ad suscipiendum habitus virtuosos. Et si ista bona disposicione quis bene utatur acquirendo habitus virtutis, iam nobilis dicitur natura et moribus *B* 9-10 vilia—sunt: Cf. Brunetto Latini, *Li livres dou tresor* II, 54 (ed. Carmody p. 229): "Et por ce que la foiblece des homes est si decheables as visces, dit Senekes, ha, comme li hom est vil chose et despisable..." 11 et *om. B* 12 quodam: quoquo *P* 12 differanter (*second* er *eras.*) *P* 12 generositas: et *add. B* 13 operis *om. B* 15 et *om. B*

Tit. not in P 2 sunt *om. P* (*ss. P*^{1}) 2 qui *om. B* 2 qui cum: *one might conjecture* quicumque 2 acquisitus: est *add. B* 2 dirigens *P* 2-3 potenciam in: bonum *add.* (*del.*) *B* 3 opus reddit: reddit *B* 4 aut ad—corporis *om. P* 5 manifestum cuilibet: notum *B* 5 bene: bone *P* 7-8 et corporis: corporis *B* 9 anime: animi. Nota: Quidam distingunt nobilitatem in nobilitatem nature secundum quod habet bonas disposiciones naturales, in nobilitatem morum, et nobilitatem generis. *B*

(III) DE NOBILITATE ANIMI

Anima humana 3 habet operaciones, unam scilicet propriam et duas communes. Communes sunt quibus communicat plantis et bestiis universis: sentit enim homo et utitur alimento, quod omnibus viventibus aptum in hoc mundo. Propria vero operacio est raciocinari aut intelligere per medium racionis. Ex bonitate vel malicia huius operacionis dicitur homo nobilis sive vilis, quod ex communibus operacionibus non contingit quia (Fol. 313 *B*) ex ipsis non laudatur vel vituperatur homo nisi forte in tantum [in] quantum deberet eas subdere racioni si contingat eas racioni esse rebelles. Sed vituperatur vel laudatur secundum bonitatem vel maliciam operacionis intellectus vel racionis, quare oportet nobilitatem anime illa operacione notare. Hec autem operacio, que raciocinari vel intelligere dicitur, duplex est. Est enim una que dicitur intelligere vel cogitare vel etiam inquirere veritatem omnium rerum secundum quod possunt per racionem cognosci. Et hec pars dicitur speculativa per quandam methaphoram quoniam sicut in speculo iudicamus speciem apparentem in eo. Sic intellectus diiudicat fantasmata que de rebus adveniunt fantasie, in ipsis quod quid est et essenciam rerum querens aut in suas causas resolvens. Ista operacio dirigitur per naturam et artem in noticiam omnium rerum, quecumque sint bone vel male, eo quod malarum rerum noticia valde est bona. Alia vero pars est que dicitur activa vel practica, que opus considerat et ea que requiruntur ad opus. Providet enim et movet ad fieri que fieri possunt et debent et prohibet que fieri non sunt digna. Iste due operaciones sunt nobiliores et meliores que fiunt in homine ex parte anime. Unde Philosophus X *Ethycorum* dicit: "Secundum intellectum operans et hunc curans est optime dispositus et Deo amantissimus esse videtur quia operacio sua similis est operacioni divine." Unde si operacio divina non tantum nobilis sed nobilitas ipsa est, de necessitate operaciones erunt nobiliores que ei magis assimilantur. Quare vere nobiles debent iudicari qui intellectualibus operacionibus gaudent et vivunt. Tales autem sunt philosophantes et sapientes qui res intelligunt prout sunt et quorum operaciones bonitate prefulgent. Preterea post mortem sola anima operacione intelligendi utitur. Illa enim tamquam nobilior non fuit servituti corporis obligata. Quare patet sufficienter quod illi erunt vere

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Tit. not in P 1 Anima: Prima *by error of the rubricator* (A *marginal direction by original hand*) *B* 2 communicat: cum *add. B* 3 alimento—mundo: alimento. Primum sibi commune est cum bestiis. Secundum commune est sibi cum omnibus viventibus. *B*; Cf. Aristotle, *De Animal. Generat.* II, 5, 741a 3-4 Propria—racionis: Cf. Aristotle, *De Re Publ.* VII, 13, 1332b and *Magna Moralia* I, 17, 1189a Cf. too Seneca, *Ep.* 76, 9-10 4 vero: enim *B* 4 operacio: hominis *add. B* 5 vel: et *B* 7 vitupatur (*as it seems*) *P* 7 in tantum *om. B* (*perh. rightly*) 7 quantum: homo *add. B* 7 eas subdere : esse subditus *P* 8 racioni esse: e.r. *P* 10 illa operacione notare: n.i.o. *B* 12 cogitare: cog're (cognoscere) *P* 14 methaforem (*as it seems*) *P* 15 adveniunt fantasie: f.a. *B* 16 quod quid est: that is, the quiddity 18 sint: sunt *B* 19 est bona: b.e. *B* 19 activa vel practica: p.v.a. *B* 22 fiunt: sunt *P* 23 Aristotle, *Nichom.* X, 9, 1179a 25 si *om. B* 25 non tantum: cum non sit *B* 26 est *om. B* 28-29 sapientes—prout sunt: Cf. Hermes, *De Quindecim Stellis* prol. (Ms Brit. Mus. Royal 12 C xviii of the 14th c., fol. 160^{v}): "Sapiens autem est qui res cognoscit prout sunt" 29 operaciones: opiniones *B* 30 sola anima: a.s. *P* 30 tamquam: servituti *add.* (*exp.*) *P* 31 fuit: servit *B* nobiles qui in hiis operibus erunt notati et illi vere viles qui privabuntur eisdem. Nobilitas igitur anime nichil aliud est quam sapiencia in speculando et studiositas in agendo. Est etiam hic advertendum quod iste due operaciones ita sunt annexe quod una sine alia non perficitur. Et causa huius est quia rectitudo operum adiuvat speculacionem et speculacio dirigit actionem, unde est sapiens perfecte qui studiosus est, quod patet per Platonem, qui legitur discipulis (Fol. 313^v *B*) suis, sicut testatur Galienus in libro *De Humana Natura*, dixisse : "Dum iuvenis es, munda te ab omni mala re corpore (Fol. 238^v *P*) et postea cognosces omnem veritatem, quia omnis mala operacio ex natura terre est, que cogit corpus cum aliis elementis." Hoc etiam sentit Boecius in libro *De Consolacione* dicens "Tu quoque, si vis lumine claro cernere verum, tramite recto carpe callem; Gaudia pelle, pelle timorem spemque fugato nec dolor assit. Nubila mens est, hec ubi regnant vinctaque frenis." Cato etiam tangens unicam passionem dedit omnes intelligere dicens "Impedit ira animum ne possit cernere verum." Et generaliter omnes philosophi intelligunt quod anima non est apta ad veritatis cognicionem nisi prius fuerit in quiete pacifica ab omnibus motibus animi passionum, secundum quod dicit Algazel in *Logica* sua quod tunc est apta anima ut depingantur in ea forme universi cum expiata fuerit a sordidis, scilicet moribus et turpibus fantasiis. Et causa huius est quia pars sensitiva in homine, que est proprium subiectum et principium passionum, debet intellectui deservire passiones relinquens. Unde si passiones insequitur et ad se trahit intellectum et in bestialem operacionem declinat, tunc cessat operacio intellectus. Quare nec acquiritur sapiencia passionibus non domatis. E contrario etiam intelligit Aristotiles tercio *Ethycorum* ubi dicit quod malus est ignorans ita quod per ignoranciam contingit actionum malicia. Et causa huius est quia defectus in actione non est nisi ex defectu alicuius vel aliquarum circumstantiarum que accionem informant et defectus in accione circumstantie non est nisi ex defectu electionis in contemplacione ipsarum circumstantiarum, quod nichil aliud est quam ignorancia in agendo, quare patet quod insipiens studiosus vel prudens non erit.

Licet ea que diximus veritatem contineant, ex hiis dubitare contingit quod, postquam sapiencia non potest haberi sine moribus nec mores sine sapiencia, dubium est a quibus incipiendum sit, utrum ab illis que faciunt scire vel ab

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32 operibus: operacionibus *B* 35-36 rectificatio *P* 37 studiosus est: e.s. *B* 38 suis: dixisse *add. B* 38 Cf. Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* V, 5 (ed. C. G. Kühn in *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia* V [*Leipzig*, 1825] pp. 459-467) 38 dixisse *om. B* 41 cogit: *One might conjecture* componit 41 Boethius, *Consol.* I, m. 7, 20-31 (ed. L. Bieler in Corpus Christianorum, ser. lat. 94 [1957] pp. 16-17) 44 *Disticha Catonis* II, 4, 2 43; etiam tangens: t.e. *B* 45 dicens *om. B* 48 animi passionum: p.a. *B* 48 agazel *B* 48 Algazel, *Logica* 2 (according to Ms Vat. lat. 2186 fol. 9 and the Venice edition of 1506 fol. 1 verso): "Munditia est anime ut expietur (expurgetur *edition*) a sordidis moribus et sanctificetur (suspendatur *edition*) a phantasiis turpibus... Anima igitur speculum est nam depinguntur in ea forme totius esse cum mundata (munda *edition*) et tersa fuerit a sordidis moribus" 48 Logica: mathematica *B* (*corr.* B^1) 50 sordibus *B* 51 et : vel *B* 52 relinquas *B* 55-61 E contrario—prudens non erit *om. B* 55 Aristotle, *Nichom.* III, 2, 1110b 58 circumstantiarum: que *add. P* 58-59 que accionem—circumstantiarum que *om. PB* (*mg.* P^1) 60 quod: que P^1 62 quod *om. B* 64 que: qui *B*

eis que ad bene agere ordinantur. Ad questionem hanc dicendum primo quod oportet hominem esse bonum et bene in actibus moralibus connutritum antequam possit vel debeat dici sapiens, et causa huius est quia illa que apta [nata] sunt operacionem moralem corumpere in nobis et vicium facere prius stimulant nos ad opus, puta ad ea que ad virtutem vegetabilem et sensibilem ordinantur. Unde Philosophus in 7 *De Animalibus* dicit quod anima puerorum nichil differt ab anima bestiarum secundum tempus hoc. Quare Philosophus quod primo bestialiter quodammodo vivimus antequam secundum intellectum. Oportet igitur prius illam vitam regulare secundum racionem ut intellectus non impeditus valeat speculari et in entibus querere veritatem et finaliter attingere sapienciam. Ad hoc autem faciendum sufficit aliquam grossam cognicionem habere vel premissionem operacionum, qua mediante inclinemur ad bonum virtutis; et convenienter (Fol. 314 *B*) experti et exercitati acquirimus habitum operacionis illius. Hec autem precognicio non est sapiencia, nisi quis abusive existimacionem appellet sapienciam et equivoce velit loqui et largo modo sumere sapienciam ad omnem precognicionem rerum. Et tunc sine dubio oportet aliqualem sapienciam habere antequam sit studiosus. Ex hiis satis apparet quid sit dicendum ad hoc quod dictum est quod malus est ignorans. Non enim est dubium quod malicia operacionis ex ignorancia venit sed ex hoc non sequitur quod bonitas eius veniat ex sapiencia sed sequitur bene quod veniat ex cognicione. Non enim sapiencia directe opponitur ignorancie sed cognicio. Et hec de nobilitate anime sint dicta.

(IV) De nobilitate corporis

Post hanc de nobilitate corporis dicendum, que duplex est secundum quod corpus in duobus notatur: aut enim in se secundum speciem et propriam figuram aut in respectu ad antecessores, scilicet parentes vel avos. Secundum primam loquitur Porphirius dicens de Priamo quod eius species digna foret imperio. Ille enim Priamus in bonis corporis plurimos excellebat, scilicet pulcritudine fortitudine promptitudine et similibus pertinentibus corpori. Secundum etiam

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65 eis: illis *B* 65 hanc dicendum: de *add.* (*exp.*) *P*, breviter dicitur *B* 66 connutritum: assuetum *B* 68-69 stimulant nos: stimulabant *B* 69 opus: nature *mg. add.* B^1 70 Aristotle, *Hist. Animal.* VIII, 1, 588b 70 in 7: septimo *B* 70 quod *om. B* 71 Quare Philosophus: autem philosophus dicit eo *B* 72 bestialiter quodammodo: q.b. *B* 75-76 cognicionem—operacionum: Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 5, 7: "cogitationes in longinqua praemittimus" 79 appellent *P* 80 aliquam *B* 81-85 Ex hiis—ex cognicione: licet malitia operationis ex ignorantia procedat quia omnis malus ignorans, non tamen bonitas operacionis venit ex sapientia sed bene venit ex cognicione *B* 85 directe opponitur: o.d. *P* 85 cognicio: cognitioni *B* 86 animi *B* 86 sint dicta *om. B*

Tit. not in P 1 hanc: nobilitatem animi *B* 3 primam: acceptionem *add. B* 4 Porphyry, *Isagoge* III, 3, in Boethius' commentary (PL 64, 99B and CSEL 48 [1896] 199): "primum quidem species digna imperio." S. Brandt, in his apparatus for the CSEL edition, indicates that "priami" is the vulgate reading and that some manuscripts offer "est" after "digna" 4 de Priamo—imperio: quod species priami digna est imperio *B* 6 pertinentibus: partibus *P*, accidentibus *B* 6 corporis *B* 6 etiam *om. B* hanc nobilitatem olim Romani consueverunt milites facere et eligere ex aliis et statuere ad defensionem rei pupblice. Sicut enim illi qui anime nobilitate prefulgent sunt fortes et potentes ad bene intelligendum veritatem in rebus et ad agendum operaciones virtutis, ita isti sunt potentes ad bene defendendum et sustinendum guerrarum labores secundum quod sciunt utilitati rei pupblice pertinere. Quare quicumque talis erat secundum corpus eligebatur in militem et instituebatur in hiis que ad artem pertinent militarem. Altera vero nobilitas corporis que ab antecessoribus habet ortum est adhuc duplex quia aut secundum veritatem aut secundum vulgarem opinionem tantum. Si autem secundum veritatem, tunc est necessarium quod filius sit similis patri et tunc sine mendacio potest dici quod est nobilis ad patris relacionem, retinet enim formam eius. Sed quando contingit quod filius erit patri contrarius, hoc est quod filius erit vilis vel malus qui patrem nobilem habebat, ignobilitat. Dico quod talis est nobilis sola gentium opinione, que de rerum veritate iudicare non possunt, quia talis secundum veritatem est corumptor nobilitatis et principium vilitatis existit. Quod optime Salustius intellexit quando Marius miles strenuus sibi fuit presentatus ut eum confirmaret in senatorem. Iste Marius erat miles optimus de se sed nobiles antecessores non habuerat. Quare aliqui impediebant eum ne confirmaretur in senatorem dicentes eum non fuisse nobilem genere. Tunc Salustius respondens obicientibus dixit : "Nova (Fol. 314^v *B*, see second note on the line) nobilitas isti inest, in qua melius est peperisse quam ab aliis habitam corrupisse. Et statim confirmavit eum in senatorem. Unde non tantum iudicabat eum nobilem sed nobilitatis principium. Ulterius dedit intelligere Salustius quod si filii nobilium non assimilentur parentibus in nobilitate, non solum erunt viles sed vilitatis principium et corruptores nobilitatis. Et constat quod Salustius optime dixit. Unde in hoc casu valde mirabilis, imo miserabilis, est opinio communiter loquentium et contra sensum expresse. Quis enim esset ita mentis inops qui diceret filium turpem et deformem existentem esse pulcrum quantumcumque pater pulcer fuisset, vel fatuum sapientem quantumcumque pater sapiens? Certe nullus, quamvis in hac falsa opinione vivant quam plures. Unde videmus contingere frequenter quod tales viles filii destruunt et consumunt propter eorum vilitatem et maliciam omnia bona que parentum probitate et bonitate fuerunt acquisita et faciunt sibi inimicos de quibus parentes amicos. Quid igitur sint nobilitas corporis et qui corpore nobiles sive viles nunc in tantum sit dictum.

8 anime nobilitate: n. animi (animi *ex mg.*) *B*   12 Quare *om. B*   16 sit similis: sim. sit *B*   17 quando *om. B*   18 vel malus *om. B*, but cf. "Vilis enim operacio et mala" in the first paragraph of the treatise   19 habebit *B*   19 Dico—talis: talis et *B*   20 possunt: potest *B*   20-21 secundum veritatem *om. B*   21 nobilitatis: vere *add. B*   22 Sallust is oddly misrepresented. Cf. *Jug.* 85, 36-43   22 strenuus *om. B*   23 sed: cum *add. B*   24 impediebant eum: e.i. *B*   25 Sallust, *Jug.* 85, 25   26 dixit: dicit *B*   26-27 Nova—inest: Nova inest/isti nobilitas *B*   27 est *om. B*   28-29 Unde—principium: Cf. Sallust, *Jug.* 85, 36-43   28 tantum iudicabat eum: tam eum iudicavit *B*   31 Et *om. B*   34 existentem *om. B*   34 quantumcumque: quamquam *B*   35 fatuum : filium esse *add. B*   35 quantumcumque: quamquam *B*   35 sapiens : fuisset *add. B*   39 sint: sit *B*

(V) De nobilitate fortune

Ex hiis que dicta sunt conveniens est determinare de nobilitate fortune, premittendo tamen quid sit fortuna, distinguendo ipsam ab aliis que cum ipsa convenire videntur ut directius habeatur circa que constent nobilitates ipsius. Dicimus enim aliqua fieri a fortuna vel a casu aut a fato aut a providencia aut predestinatione. Unde Boecius 4 *De Consolatione* horum intendens differenciam assignare, incipit a providentia divina dicens: "Omnium generacio rerum cunctusque mutabilium naturarum progressus et quicquid aliquo modo movetur causas ordinem formas ex divine mentis stabilitate sortitur." De hiis incipiens Boecius dicit quod si res consideretur cuiuscumque motus seu cause vel ordinis sive forme si mente divina vel intellectu, providentia nuncupatur, hoc est res si referantur ad Dei noticiam secundum esse vel fieri quodcumque, dicuntur esse vel fieri a divina providencia.

Ulterius (Fol. 239 *P*) si virtus providencie consideretur ut exsecutioni mandata secundum quod iam movet <res> ad esse vel fieri, ut per motum habent explicari et per causas inferiores, magis dicitur esse fatum, a *for faris* dictum. Per similitudinem sicut sermo ordinatus ab intellectu ostendit et precipit fieri que facienda sunt et significat operacionis promocionem, item fatum dicitur a providencia cecidisse et rebus mobilibus adhesisse, quod maxime poete et astrologi circa motus (Fol. 315 *B*) notaverunt celestes, et realiter nichil aliud intelligunt pro vili natura. Poete etiam, considerando huiusmodi fatum sicut motum quendam, 3 fatales finxerunt sorores. Quarum prima incipiebat motum et secunda continuabat in usum sed tercia terminabat, quod per unum versum insinuant: "Cloto colum baiulat, Lachesis trahit, Attropos occat." Similiter astrologi stellas posuerunt in principiis omnium rerum que per motum habent explicari sub celo promotivas continuativas et terminativas. Hoc etiam intelligunt naturales qui quadam peryodo mensurari dicunt omnia in celo proporcionaliter accepta pro natura communi et intelligentie et corporis celestis.

Si autem ulterius hec eadem virtus consideretur ut magis descendens et referatur de uno mobili ad aliud secundum proporcionem convenientem vel disconvenientem, dicitur augurium vel presagium alicuius futuri, ad actus humanos vel aliarum rerum torquendo. Et semper accipitur in cognitis et aliis impressionibus altis et in avibus augurialibus et visionibus sompniorum et consimilium.

Tit. not in P 4 *tert.* aut: a *add. B* 5 Boethius, *Consol.* IV, pr. 6, 7 (ed. Bieler p. 79) 5 4 *om. B* 5 intendens: videns *B* 6 Omnium generacio: re *add.* (*exp.*) *P*, Omnia genera *B* 7 processus *B* 7 motu *B* 8 mente *P* 9 Boethius, *Consol.* IV, pr. 6, 8-9 (ed. Bieler p. 79) and V, pr. 6, 36 (ed. Bieler p. 104) 9 quod *om. B* 9 seu *om. B* 10 si: fuerit in se a (in se *exp.*) *B* 10 hoc est: huius *B* 10-11 res si: s.r. *P* 11 quodcumque: quod habebunt *B* 12 divina providencia: p.d. *B* 13-15 si virtus—fatum: Boethius, *Consol.* IV, pr. 6, 8 and 10 (ed. Bieler p. 79) 13 <consi> deretur *om. PB* (*mg. add.* P^1) 14 <res> *I added* 15 magis: manifestari *B* 15 Isidore, *Etym.* VIII, 11, 90: "A fando igitur fatum dicunt" 17-18 item—adhesisse: Boethius, *Consol.* IV, pr. 6, 9 (ed. Bieler p. 79) 18 poeti *P* 19 celestia *B* 20 Poete—huiusmodi: considerandum poete huius *B* 21 quendam: considerantes *add. B* 22 sed: et *B* 23 Eberhard of Bethune, *Graecismus* VII, 45 (ed. Ioh. Wrobel [Breslau, 1887] p. 25) 23 collum *B* (*corr.* B^1) 27 accepto *P* 28 et *om. B* 30 ad *om. B* (ss. B^1) 31 retorquendo *B* 32 *pr.* et *om. B* 32 avibus: et *add. B*

Ulterius si consideratur hec eadem vis ut facit res concurrere aliter quam proposite sint ab homine et in aliis que a proposito non agunt, dicitur casus. Fortuna autem dicitur proprie secundum quod facit aliter concurrere ea que fiunt a proposito quam fuerint secundum intellectum previsa, secundum quod latius secundo *Physicorum* docetur. Generaliter tamen et in grosso gentes non faciunt differenciam. Totum enim quicquid in negociis eorum contingit, dum tamen aliter quam previsum fuerit vel non previsum sit contingat aut expediat aut impediat, si inexpectatum veniat, dicitur fieri per fortunam. Quod optime insinuat sua pictura, pingitur enim ceca vel cecis oculis volvens rotam quia ipsa quantum ad humanum intellectum improvise venit et cito immutat res aliter quam sint provise. Quare dicit Philosophus quod est causa per accidens in hiis que fiunt a proposito et que in minori parte contingant. Et secundum hoc quod tales concursus sunt boni vel mali, dicitur ipsa bona vel mala et bene vel male fortunati quibus talia contingunt.

Ex hiis patet quid sit fortuna et possumus convenienter accipere qualia sunt illa circa que contingit fortuna quia oportet quod sint res mutabiles et cito provenientes sine provisione humana (que enim de levi non mutantur vel a provisione fiunt secundum quod huiusmodi non dicimus fieri a fortuna). Tales res sunt 3 tantum : dominium divicie fama. In istis enim proprie salvatur racio fortuita quia ista subito et sine provisione acquirit vel perdit homo, nec in hiis est intellectus humanus sufficiens ut eorum (Fol. 315^v *B*) possessio fiat sibi firma. Quare plures philosophi fuerunt qui ista spreverunt triplici racione: primo quia, ut dictum est, possessio eorum non est firma; secundo quia dominium ut plurimum facit superbos, divicie intemperatos, fama vanigloriosos; amplius quia ipsi viderunt quod quelibet istarum rerum erat inter gentes propter defectum aliquem, non propter privationem nature, quia si omnes homines sapientes et amici fuissent et bonum alter alterius procurasset, nichil fuisset dominium quia dominium statutum est ut racio custodiatur contra stultos et amicicia contra malos et equitas contra perversos. Similiter divicie non fuissent si avaricia et rapina non forent quia quilibet cuilibet foret largus, quare in defectum alicuius non cumulasset nec etiam rapuisset. Nec etiam fama fuisset si lingua humana fuisset racione frenata. Hiis racionibus philosophi bona fortune spreverunt, tum quia firmiter custodiri non possunt, tum quia magis ad metum quam ad virtutem faciunt homines declinare, tum quia propter imperfectionem humanam contingunt. Verumptamen quamvis illa bona in se considerata non sint

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34 sint: sunt *B* 34 non *om. B* (*ss.* B^1) 36 fuerint: fuerunt *B* 36 provisa *B* 37 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys. Ausc.* II, 5, 196b-197a 39 *pr.* previsum: provisum *B* 39 *alt.* previsum: provisum *B* 40-41 See H. R. Patch, "The Tradition of the Goddess Fortuna in Medieval Philosophy and Literature," *Smith College Studies in Modern Languages* III (1922) 179-203 42 sint: fuit *B* 43 prouisum *B* 43 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys. Ausc.* II, 5, 196b-197a 44 contingunt *B* 47 convenienter accipere: communiter sumere *B* 49 provenientes: et *add. B* 50 huiusmodi: huius *B* 52 ista—provisione: illa subito sine ratione *B* 53-54 fiat sibi: fuerit *B* 54 philosophi: ph'y *P* 55 *pr.* quia *om. B* 55 dictum est: processio vel *add. B* 60 contra—amicicia: inter amicos et iusticia *B* 63 fama: mala *add. B* 65 *pr.* tum: tamen *B* 65 quam: quod *P* 67 illa: ista *B* 67 sint: sunt *B*

magni valoris, multum tamen immutant qualitatem operacionis humane. Aliquam enim bonitatam habent in relacione generis humani, ut patebit inferius, et si non absolutam habent, tamen relativam, et circa talia homines quibus contingunt bonum possunt reddere opus suum vel malum, unde ulterius circa talia poterunt iudicari nobiles sive viles. Unde secundum hoc erunt 3 nobilitates fortune, scilicet dominii diviciarum et fame.

(VI) DE NOBILITATE DOMINIORUM

Nobilitas dominiorum in duobus consistit in perfectione, scilicet ut racio inter homines conservetur et pax et amicicia inter ipsos. Et est data auctoritas omnium uni soli ut ad utilitatem omnium sit pacis et racionis custodia. Unde Philosophus primo *Polyticorum* dicit dominum esse naturaliter qui pre aliis viget intellectu. Quare ipse est potens in aliis custodire qui de seipso prevalet intellectu. Quare supreme competit domino et sibi et subditis ut intellectui et racioni studeat diligenter ita quod sicut sol omnia illuminat, ita dominus racione et intellectu subditos faciat relucere, stulticias et bestialitates reprimens, discordias et iniquitates castigans. Quod optime dixit Plato, ut allegat Boecius primo *De Consolacione* dicens beatas fore res publicas si sapientes eas regerent vel rectores earum sapiencie studuissent. Quando enim tales sunt domini et dominium suum taliter volunt deducere, optima vita vivunt et vere nobiles domini sunt quocumque modo eis dominium contingat. Et si contingat quod aliquis dominus voluerit nec racioni studere nec intellectui (Fol. 316 *B*) nec pacem nec utilitatem suam nec subditorum servare, dico quod talis est vilis dominus et despectus, et quanto maius est dominium tanto maior est vilitas et despectus. Et talis secundum veritatem non est dominus sed servus nec nobilis sed vilis. Unde talibus dominis multa sinistra contingunt occasione quorum eorum dominia sunt destructa. Unde de talibus dominis loquens Oratius dicit "Mox trahitur manibus regum fortuna retortis" quia propter eorum stulticiam talia sine racione incipiunt et committunt, in quibus eis contingit contrarium eorum que ipsis evenire credebant secundum eorum erroneam voluptatem. Unde de talibus loquens Salomon dicit "Ve terre cuius rex puer est," et expressius pater eius David dicit "Homo cum in honore esset," id est in dominio, "non intellexit" qualiter agendum esset secundum honorem dominii sui: "comparatus est iumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis." Ex quibus patet quod nobilitas dominii nichil aliud est quam racionale regnum, ex quo racio et pax inter subditos conservatur. De hac nobilitate loquitur Philosophus primo *Rethorice* dicens quod nobilitas est genti et civitati sui iuris antiquos esse presides quia absque dubio populares et cives sine aliqua nobilitate loqui nescirent. De nobilitate dominii hec dicta sufficiant.

68-69 Aliqua *B* 70 relatã *PB* 71-72 unde—viles *om. B*

Tit. not in P 4 Aristotle, *Polit.* I, 5, 1254a-b, 1255a 6 ut *om. P* 7 quod: ut *B* 7 sol: *om. PB* (*ss.* P^1, *mg.* B^1) 8 illucere *B* 9 dixit: dicit *B* 9 Boethius, *Consol.* I, pr. 4, 5 (ed. Bieler p. 7) 9 allegat: dicit *P* 10 dicens *om. B* 11 taliter: regulariter *B* 13 noluerit *B* 14 suam nec *om. B* 16 maior: magis *B* (*corr.* B^1) 15-16 See on Cap. 1 lines 9-10 19 Horace, *Ep.* II, 1, 191 20 talias *B* 20 et: vel *B* 21 eis contingit: c.e. *B* 22-23 *Eccles* X, 16 23 puer: iuvenis *P* 23-26 *Ps.* xlviii, 21 24 id—intellexit: non intellexit, id est non cognovit *B* 24 intellexit: cognovit *P* 25 est *om. B* 27 servatur *B* 27 hac *om. B* 28 Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* I, 5, 1360b 28 quod *om. B* 29 absque: sine *P*

(VII) De nobilitate divitiarum

Quamvis pro diviciis generaliter omnia mobilia aliquando intelligamus, proprie tamen intelligimus habundantiam pecunie congregatam ad possessionem alicuius pertinentem. Quando igitur contingit quod aliquis secundum statum (Fol. 239^{v} *P*) suum notabilem habet pecunie quantitatem, dives communiter appellatur, quamvis secundum veritatem non sit nisi sibi sufficiat et inde faciat quod recta racio dictaret. [Non sit dives, quantamcumque magnam habeat pecunie quantitatem quia divicie significant proprie sufficientiam quandam.] Unde postquam aliquis iudicat sibi non sufficere quod habet, statim iudicat non habere habundantiam, quare iudicat se non esse divitem. Quare statim concupiscit et nititur cumulare et aliam ducere vitam quam recta racio suaderet. Unde Oratius in *Epistulis* suis dicit "Imperat aut servit collecta pecunia cuique." Imperat enim avaris, servit autem hiis qui conantur vivere racione recta, hoc est large non prodige nec avare. Hoc idem intelligit Boecius in libro *De Consolacione* ubi dicit quod divicie in spargendo sive in distribuendo relucent non in accumulando. Quare subditur largos fore dilectos et avaros exosos. Largi enim sibi et aliis benefactores existunt, avari autem nec sibi nec aliis sed nocivi. Quare patet quod nobilitas diviciarum nichil aliud est quam usus (Fol. 316^{v} *B*) racionabilis et secundum virtutem diviciarum ipsarum, et <est> dominus et nobilis qui suis diviciis sic utitur ut est dictum quia operacio sua nobilis est et digna cognosci et similis operacioni divine que large et sine spe recompensationis suarum diviciarum distribuit. Divites autem in hoc deficientes sunt viles et miseri in duobus: unum est defectus et animi paupertas que facit eos timere de defectu eorum quorum habent habundantiam ultra terminos racionis; aliud est quia ipsi nesciunt iudicare quantum eis debeat sufficere nec quomodo hiis que habent debeant uti. Sed quod apud sapientes mirabilius debet esse est quod tales miseri, de quibus nunc loquor, frequenter inveniuntur inter aliquos inter quos nullus reperiri deberet, licet inveniantur ubicumque in qualibet hominum manerie quia ardentiores videmus ad accumulandum pecuniam quos sine herede legali oportet mori quam plures heredes habentes et redditus maiores habere quam heredes habentes. Ego autem credo quod illud vicium est in pluribus propter hoc quod quilibet dignum se iudicat ad possidendum amplius quam possideat, quare quod habet non sufficit, immo ex hoc ulterius incipit concupiscere plus et agregat ut statum suum possit ad altius promovere. Et

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Tit. not in P 1 intelliguntur *B* 4 suum *om. B* 6 recta—dictaret: Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 66, 32 and *Ep.* 76, 10 and 15 6-7 Non—sufficienciam: Et sic dives quantamcumque magnam habeat pecunie quantitatem si sibi non sufficiat, non est dives quia divicie proprie significant habundantiam *B* 8 iudicat sibi non: n.i.s. *B* 10 concupissit *P* (*corr.* P^1) 10 recta racio suaderet: See on Cap. 7 line 6 10 suadet *B* 11 Horace, *Ep.* I, 10, 47 13 intelligit *om. B* 13 Boethius, *Consol.* II, pr. 5, 4-5 (ed. Bieler p. 26) 14 ubi dicit quod : dicit *B* 14 lucent *B* 15 recumulando *B* 15 largi: large *B* 17 est *om. B* 18 <est> *I added* 19 est dictum: d.e. *B* 20 que: qui *B* 22 que: qui *B* 23 eorum: illorum *B* 25 debeant: debent *P* 25 est *om. B* 27 inter quos: ubi *B* 27 ubique *P* 28 cumulandum *B* 29 oporteret *B* 31 dignum se iudicat: se i.d. *B* 32-33 quare—plus *om. PB* (*mg. add.* P^1) 33 et agregat : et et a. *P* 33 altius *may have been corrected by erasure in both P and B from* alt'ius (alterius) sic pauci sunt qui sciant certum terminum imponere voluntati. Quare eorum tota vita peruritur ad habendum liquescens absque cordis pace in periculis agitata. Unde Boecius dicit: "O preclara opum mortalium beatitudo, quam cum adeptus fueris, securus esse desistis." Contingit autem quam plurimum periculum ex concupiscentia circa idem. Quare Cato precepit filio suo dicens "Quod nimium est fugito, parvo gaudere memento. Tuta mage puppis" etc. Hoc idem dicit Oratius in *Epistulis* suis optime: "Serviet eternum qui parvo nesciet uti." Omnes isti intelligunt quod nobilitas et libertas magna esset in certis imponere terminum voluntati et ad diviciarum superflua non vacare.

(VIII) De nobilitate fame seu glorie

Tercia species nobilitatis fortune est circa famam vel gloriam, que nichil aliud est quam laus communiter currens inter gentes, a qua gratia sui operis inter consortes iudicatur aliquis excellens. Inter autem alia bona fortune est quod plus habet de forma et minus de bonitate reali quia paucissimi sunt qui linguam habeant temperatam ad loquendum de aliis, ymo, ut in pluribus loquitur unus de alio, improvide et parva occasione ea vituperat que laudavit. Verumptamen nobilitas ista quasi momentanea est in illo cui attribuitur si talis sit ille qualis testatur fama communis. Unde de tali loquens Oratius dicit "Tu recte vivis si curas (Fol. 317 *B*) esse quod audis." Hoc idem Cato filio suo dicebat: "Cum te aliquis laudat, iudex tuus esse memento," in hoc Cato intelligens quod filius esset talis secundum veritatem qualis bonitate fame predicaretur ne alicuius adulatione vel inani gloria foret deceptus quia isti vanigloriosi ad hoc non laborant quod eorum opera sint digna laudis et glorie sed nituntur toto posse quia eorum opera appareant et quod appareant magne fame, unde laus sophistica moveatur ad linguas et aures diversorum. Hoc sufficit eis tamen, quasi plures talium videmus facere opera largitatis specialiter illis qui plura loquuntur in diversis locis et de personis diversis, sed illis quibus deberent distribuere bona sua secundum ordinem largitatis nichil darent. Alia quedam vanigloriosorum species reperitur satis vilis. Sunt enim plures qui libenter mixtim in propriam laudem redundant cum turpiloquio et turpia cum laudibus tamquam unum per alterum confirmantes. Quod multum vituperavit

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34 sciunt *B* 34 certum—voluntati: Cf. Horace, *Ep.* I, 2, 56 35 cordis pace : p.c. *P* 36 Boethius, *Consol.* II, pr. 5, 35 (ed. Bieler p. 28) 37 plurimum: pli *add.* (*exp.*) *P* 38 concupiscentia: multorum *add. B* 38 catho *B* 38 *Disticha Catonis* II, 6, 1-2 39 magis *B* 39 puppis: est *add. B* 40 Horace, *Ep.* I, 10, 41 41 nesciat *P* 41 esset: est in *B* 41-42 in certis—voluntati: Cf. Horace, *Ep.* I, 2, 56 42 imponere terminum: t.i. *B*

Tit. not in P 1 nobilitatis *om. B* (*mg.* B^1) 1 fortune *om. B* 2 communiter currens: cu. co. *P* 3 est: hoc *add. B* 4 forma: fortuna *P* 4 quia: quam *B* 5 habent *B* 7 ista: illa *B* 8 Horace, *Ep.* I, 16, 17 9 *Disticha Catonis* I, 14, 1-2 14 quia: quod *B* 14 et quod appareant *om. B* (*perh. rightly*) 15 ad linguas: et lingua *P* 16 tamen quasi: tantum quam *B* 16-17 facere—*pr.* illis: opera largitatis exercere erga illos *B* 17 loquantur *B* 17 de—diversis: de diversis locis personis (locis *del.*) *B* 18 distribuere: tribuere *B* 19 Sunt enim plures *om. B* 20 turpiloquio: turpibus *P* 21 laudibus: dicunt *add. B*

Cato dicens "Nec te collaudes" etc. Hoc idem dicit Aristotiles Alexandro: "Laudare seipsum est vanitas, vituperare stulticie signum dabit." Ex hiis satis patet quod nobilitas glorie nichil aliud est quam alicuius persone vera bonitatis fama, que talia facit que digna sunt gloria.

(IX) Dubium est de numero specierum nobilitatis

Tempus expostulat ut contra predicta de aliquibus dubitemus ut pateat melius veritas predictorum. Primo igitur queritur utrum tot sint species nobilitatis quot superius sunt distincte. Et videtur quod non. Quia omnis nobilitas ex bonitate operacionis accepta [apta] cuilibet, huius operacionis principium est anima. Preterea videtur quod nulla sit nobilitas corporis cum operacionibus anime non possit nisi solum organice deservire. Similiter potest ostendi de fortuna quia operaciones quibus nos nobiles iudicamur secundum quod huiusmodi in libertate nostra consistunt, sed de rebus fortune ut sic nullatenus potest dici secundum quod superius fuit dictum, quare videtur quod non nisi sola nobilitas anime sit. Ad oppositum fuit superius satis dictum. Ad questionem secundum predicta dicendum quod 3 sunt species nobilitatis, licet una altera sit prior et nobilior secundum quod in sequenti questione patebit quoniam quamvis ita sit quod anima sit principium omnium formale, verumptamen corpus materiale et instrumentale plurium operacionum existit, unde secundum bonam vel malam ipsius disposicionem operaciones in bonitate vel malicia disponuntur, unde anima viliter et nobiliter in operando procedit. Ex quo patet ad racionem (Fol. 317^v *B*) primam que nobilitatem corporis ammovebat. Ad aliud dicendum quod quamvis ita sit quod fortune bona frequenter veniant non previsa et absque racione humana contingant, tamen postquam contigerint, oportet hominem circa ipsa secundum racionem facere quod est dignum quia hoc potest facere et libere operari. Licet enim talium bonorum sit fortuitus eventus, non tamen usus eorum debet esse fortuitus haberi. Et circa huiusmodi usum bonum diximus hanc nobilitatem existere, non secundum quod talia bona improvisa diximus evenire, ex quo satis patet ad racionem.

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22 *Disticha Catonis* II, 16, 1 22 etc. : nec te vituperes ipse *B* 22-23 Cf. Valerius Maximus VII, 2, ext. 11. Walter Burley, *Liber De Vita et Moribus Philosophorum* 53 (ed. H. Knust, Bibl. der literarischen Vereins in Stuttgart 177 [Tübingen, 1886] p. 236) cites the remark of Aristotle as "qui se laudat vanus est, qui se vituperat stultus est" 23 dabit *om. B* 24 alicuius *om. B*

Tit. not in P 1 Tempus expostulat: Cf. *Disticha Catonis* II, 5, 2 and 18, 1 2 igitur *om. Thomas* 3 superius sunt: sunt sup. *B Thomas* 3 nobilitas : bonitas *P* 4 bonitate: nobilitate *P* 4 apta—operacionis : est sed cuiuslibet talis operacionis *B* 5 Preterea: Igitur *B* 5-6 operacionibus anime: corpus *B* 6 organice: anime *add. B* 7 nos *om. B* 7-8 huiusmodi: huius *B* 9 secundum *om. B* 10 superius satis: sa. su *B* 11 licet: sed *B* 12 sit: est *B* 12-13 quoniam quamvis: quamvis autem *B* 14 existit: consistit *P* 17 amovebat *B* 20 secundum : quod *add.* (*exp.*) *B* 22 eorum: eorumdem *B* 22 esse *om. B* 22 huiusmodi: huius *B* 23 existere *om. B*

(X) QUE NOBILITAS SIT MELIOR

Secundo queritur que species nobilitatis dignior vel melior debeat dici. Videtur enim quod nobilitas dominii sit pocior inter eas quia, sicut dictum fuit superius, omnes nobilitates sunt cognite propter nobilitatem operacionis cognitam, quare nobilitas erit potissima cuius operacio in bonitate potissime cognoscitur: sed nobilitas dominii est huiusmodi, patet enim quod operaciones unius nobilis domini meliores communiores et utiliores existunt quam operaciones aliorum nobilium quorumcumque. Ad res enim pupblicas primo et per se ordinantur maxime. Quare videtur quod hec nobilitas nobilitates (Fol. 240 *P*) alias excellat. Preterea composita secundum quod huiusmodi nobiliora sunt hiis ex quibus componuntur ut elementata elementis. Sed nobilitas dominii videtur esse composita ex anime nobilitate et fortune, quare videtur melior. Oppositum fuit declaratum superius et sufficienter probatum. Ad questionem intelligendum, secundum quod iam superius fuit tactum, quod non dicitur dominus nobilis a suo dominio nisi pro tanto quod ipse sapiens est et studiosus in omnibus secundum virtutes que pertinent ad dominium. Alias dominium in vilitatem convertitur, unde nobilitas anime forma et perfectio est omnium aliarum. Hec enim perficit et dirigit alias vivificat et illuminat, sine qua relique mortue et tenebrose vilescunt. Ex quo patet quid sit dicendum ad primum in oppositum quia quamvis ita sit quod operaciones nobilis et boni domini sint meliores et rem pupblicam magis respicientes, hoc non habent in quantum dependent a dominio sed in quantum sunt virtute et sapientia informate, quia cum dominus est sapiens et virtuosus secundum racionem, debet regere ea que fortuite contingunt. Unde fortuita in hoc materiam prebent solum. Ad racionem secundam dicendum quod minor est falsa que accipit nobilitatem dominii tamquam ex duabus nobilitatibus compositam, quod non est verum (sicut enim diximus, in rebus dominii nulla est nobilitas nisi in tantum quantum virtute et sapiencia informatur), et ideo non concludit. Quare patet quod nobilitas dominii est nobilitatis effectus anime. Et si for(Fol. 318 *B*)san velit quis ulterius querere quare communiter homines de sola hac nobilitate loquantur, dicendum quod vulgaris sentencia ut plurimum est imperfecta. Unde Philosophus hoc intelligens dixit "Loquendum est ut plures sed sapiendum est ut pauci." Quare in dictis communibus firmiter non est standum nisi dictis sapientum concordarent.

(XI) AN OMNES SINT NOBILES PER NATURAM

Tercio queritur utrum omnes homines sint nobiles per naturam. Et videtur quod sic. Omnes enim qui sunt eiusdem speciei in natura sunt eiusdem operacionis et forme. Sed omnes homines sunt eiusdem speciei et operacionis, quare omnes

Tit. not in P 1 dignior: nobilior *B* 2 enim *om. B* 5 huiusmodi: huius *B* 5 patet: per se *P* 6 existunt: dicuntur *B* 9 huiusmodi: huius *B* 10 elementata elementis: elementa elementatis *P* (*corr.* P^1) 11 videtur: esse *add. B* 12 questionem: est *add. B* 15 dominia *B* 20 *pr.* in *om. P* 20 domino *P* 21 informata *P* 26 in tantum: ī itiū *P*, in *B* 29 loquuntur *P* 30 Aristotle, *Topica* II 2, 110a, cf. the version of Boethius in PL 64, 925 31 sed: pati *add.* (*del.*) *B* 31 *alt.* est *om. B* 31 firmiter *om. B*

Tit. not in P 1 omnes *om. Thomas* 3-4 omnes erunt: e.o. *B* erunt eiusdem nobilitatis ut videtur. Maior patet de se et minor etiam. Omnes habent animam racionalem cuius operacio nobilis est ut patuit ex predictis. Hoc idem probatur aliter [ex dicto communi]. Omnes enim qui sunt eiusdem patris et matris sunt eiusdem nobilitatis, sed omnes homines sunt huiusmodi, quare etc. [quare videtur quod omnes homines sint nobiles vel viles]. Cuius oppositum superius est ostensum et patet ad sensum. Videmus enim plures ita viles et miseros [et eorum nequiciam] quod propter eorum nequitiam oportet eos expelli a communi, et exterminantur ab aliis propter maliciam operacionum suarum quia eorum operaciones bonum commune corumpunt et aliorum inficiunt honestatem. Unde Philosophus in primo *Politicorum* dicit quod talium iniusticia sevissima gerit arma, et sicut optimum est animalium homo vivens secundum legem et racionem, separatus a lege et iusticia pessimum est omnium. Sic etiam videmus aliquos quorum doctrina bonitas et honestas sunt lumen et regula inter alios quorum studium ad bona omnia se extendit. Unde aperte videmus quod operaciones aliquorum hominum plus differunt quam operaciones multorum secundum speciem differentium, puta leonis et vulpis. Unde quia nobilitas et vilitas formam accipit ex operacionum qualitate, oportet quod sapientes et probi secundum quamlibet speciem nobilitatis nobiles iudicentur, stulti autem et improbi debent ignobiles iudicari.

Ad raciones vero: ad primam dico quod ea que sunt eiusdem speciei si habent formam in materia, non oportet quod habeant operacionem eiusdem nobilitatis vel malicie. Contingit enim talibus quod ex bona vel mala disposicione in materia sint bene vel male in suis operacionibus expedita. Unde homines bene dispositi secundum corpus bene disponuntur in mente, ut vult Philosophus in libro *De Anima*. Dicit enim molles carne aptos mente. Et si forte aliquis instaret quod anima racionalis a corpore non dependet secundum quod huiusmodi, dico quod falsum est. Licet enim anima non dependeat vel indigeat forte corpore ut subiecto, indiget tamen ut obiecto. Sed videtur vehementius contra hanc solucionem esse quod dicit Philosophus in *Phisonomia* sua. Dicit

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4 Maior—etiam: Minor patet quia *B* 5 est *om. B* 5 patet *B* 6 probatur: patet *P* 6 ex dicto communi *om. B* 6-7 Omnes—huiusmodi: That all men had common parents in Adam and Eve and were therefore entitled to be regarded as of equal nobility was a topos of mediaeval literature: see e.g. Andreas Capellanus, *De Amore*, ed. Battaglia p. 22; *Ayenbite of Inwyt*, ed. R. Morris p. 87; John Gower, *Mirour de l'omme* 23405 (ed. G. C. Macaulay, *The Complete Works of John Gower* [Oxford, 1899] I p. 258). See also Kelso, *op. cit.* p. 31 for the famous words of John Ball; and see Vogt, *op. cit.* pp. 108, 114-117 and Crane Brinton, *A History of Western Morals* (N.Y., 1959) p. 14 6 enim *om. B* 7 huiusmodi: huius B 8 quare etc.—vel viles: igitur quia de adam et eva descenderunt igitur etc. *B* 8 Cuius *om. B* 10 et eorum nequiciam *om. B* 13 Aristotle, *Polit.* I, 2, 1253a 13 quod *om. B* 17 omnia : opera *B* 19 secundum speciem differentium : d. se. sp. *B* 23 vero *om. B* 24 operaciones *B* 25 enim: siquidem in *B* 26 expediti *B* 26 Unde: Hinc *B* 27 in mente *om. B* 27-28 vult—in : philosophus vult *B* 28 Aristotle, *De Anima* II, 9, 421a; cf. Pliny, NH XI, 226. See also Pseudo-Aristotle, *Physiogn.* 3 (34), 808b (ed. Richard Förster in *Scriptores Physiognomici Graeci et Latini* [Leipzig, 1893] I p. 39); Pseudo-Aristotle, *Secretum Secretorum* 23 (ed. Förster *ibid.* II, p. 218); Pseudo-Polemon, *Physiogn.* 23 (ed. Förster *ibid.* II p. 155) 28 enim: ibidem *add. B* 28 mente: dicimus *add. B* 29-30 huiusmodi: huius *B* 32 dicit Philosophus: p.d. *P* 32 Pseudo-Aristotle, *Physiogn.* 1, 805a and 4, 808b

enim quod diverse sunt disposiciones in corpore per diversas virtutes ipsius anime. Quare non videtur quod ex natura ipsius (Fol. 318^{v} *B*) materie vel corporis sit accipienda causa nobilitatis in operacione vel nobilitatis impedimentum. Unde dicunt aliqui quod licet omnes homines sint eiusdem forme secundum speciem, non tamen secundum naturam, immo in anima vel forma uniuscuiusque est aliqua proprietas vel alique proprietates sunt ita in uno quod non sunt in altero. Secundum hoc ponunt causam principalem in anima. Et si queratur ab eis unde habet anima hoc, dicunt quod acquiritur hoc in sui creatione a motoribus celestibus, confirmantes hoc per Ptholomeum et Haly, quod sicut sunt elementa in corporibus ita stelle in animabus, id est motores stellarum animabus, per quas virtutes explicantur ea que a Deo principaliter procreantur. Sed quia hec solucio metas naturales transcendit, hic magis naturaliter est loquendum. Dico ergo quod omnes homines habent animam eiusdem speciei, ut dictum est, et causa magis accipienda est ipsius vilitatis a parte corporis quam anime. Quia motores celestes secundum quod huiusmodi omnino uniformiter se habent, quare uniformes causantur anime, sed quia celum uniformiter non potest se habere in formacione omnium corporum, oportet quod difformiter informetur. Unde in quinto *De Animalibus* dicit Philosophus quod virtus informativa proporcionaliter operatur coordinationi astrorum. Anima igitur que naturalem habet inclinationem ad corpus et ipso in suis operacionibus utitur tamquam organo vel obiecto necessario, inducitur ad agendum per ipsum secundum aptitudinem corporis ipsius. Et istam talem inclinationem significant astronomi per stellas et naturales vel phisionomi per menbrorum figuras. Aliter non est intelligendum quod Philosophus dicit in *Phisonomia* et Ptholomeus in *Centilogio*.

Ad racionem secundam dicendum breviter quod quamvis omnes homines essent eiusdem patris et matris, non tamen oportet quod sint eiusdem nobilitatis. Eadem enim mater non disponit uniformiter materiam filiorum, immo numquam. Quare filii dissimiles in pluribus sunt reperti, unde quibus ita contingit quod corpus bene dispositum et temperatum et bene formatum existit animam habent expeditam nec malitia complexionis torquentur, immo naturaliter tendunt ad ea que sunt rationis et intellectus tamquam ad operationem propriam inclinati, unde tales dicuntur boni per se et primo *Politicorum* dicuntur domini per naturam.

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33 quod *om. B* 33 diverse—corpore: dis. in c. s. div. *B* 33 virtutes: naturas *B* 34 ipsius: anime *add.* (*exp.*) *P* 35 causa: ipsius *add. B* 36 quod *om. B* 37 naturam: numerum *P* 37 immo *om. B* 38 aliqua *om. B* 38 ita—quod: in uno que *B* 39 Et *om. B* 40 habet anima hoc: hoc ha. a. *B* 41 Ptolemy's *Centiloquium* and Haly's commentary on it are astrologically oriented, cf. the very outset of Haly's exposition (unnumbered p. 2 of the commentary in the Venice edition of 1484); "Quod dixit Ptholomeus 'Ex te et illis' significat quod qui res futuras scire desideret duabus viis oportet incedere..." 42 id est *om. B* 42 stellarum: sunt *add. B* 43 virtutes: earum *add. B* 46 ut dictum est *om. B* 46 a: ex *B* 50 in quinto: 15'to *P*, 15 *B* 50 philosophus *om. P* 50 Aristotle, *De Animal. Generat.* IV, 10, 777b-778a 50 quod *om. B* 52 ipso: corpore *B* 54 aptitudinem: applicacionem *B* 55 astonici *B* 55 phisonomici *B* 55 menbrorum figuras: f.m. *B* 58 dicendum breviter: b.d. *B* 58 quod *om. B* 60 disponiter *P* 62 bene *om. B* 63 torquetur *B* 64 inclinatā *PB* 65 tali *B* 65 Aristotle, *Polit.* I, 5, 1254a-b, 1255a

Alii vero quorum corpora dura rudia et inepta formantur habent multum animam impeditam et de facili ad rudem sensualitatem declinant et deficientes ab operacione humana in operaciones bestiales labuntur et sunt viles et servi iudicantur naturaliter. Qui autem medio modo se habent indigent doctrina et possunt fieri boni per alium, licet non per se perfecte. Ex dictis igitur patet quomodo omnes homines nobiles debent iudicari.

(XII) De nobilitate mulieris in comparatione ad virum

(Fol. 319 *B*) Quarto queritur utrum mulier sit ita nobilis sicut vir, et videtur quod non, quia cuius operaciones sunt meliores et nobiliores, eius nobilitas est maior et melior: sed operaciones viri sunt huiusmodi, quare etc. Operaciones enim (Fol. 240^{v} *P*) viri sunt communes, mulieris vero domestice et private, quare mulier, ut videtur, non erit ita nobilis. Hoc idem probatur aliter: quia in natura omne perfectius est nobilius, sed vir est muliere perfectior, ergo nobilior. In oppositum est quod apparet frequenter: videmus enim operaciones multarum mulierum meliores quam operaciones multorum virorum. Preterea mulieres sunt eiusdem speciei cum viris, quare eiusdem nobilitatis videntur. Ad questionem dicendum breviter accipiendo illud quod Philosophus dicit 8 *Ethycorum* quod opera viri et mulieris confestim natura distincta sunt ita quod privata et domestica et familiariter ordinata pertinent mulieri sed opera exteriora que maiorem providenciam et forciorem requirunt laborem pertinent viro. Et sic ad bonum commune dirigitur operacio utriusque. Si igitur ita sit quod uterque operaciones suas recta racione regulet, dico quod equaliter erunt nobiles secundum proporcionem, licet non simpliciter et absolute. Quantum enim cadit sexus mulieris a perfectione nature virilis, tantum operacio ab operacione et nobilitas a nobilitate discedit. Ex hiis facile est respondere ad raciones. Prime enim bene concludunt quod simpliciter et absolute mulier non est ita nobilis, et hoc verum est, sed proportionaliter loquendo non est verum. Ad raciones alterius partis dicendum ad primam quod non queritur questio de viris imperfectis quia vir in eo quod vir numquam habet deteriores operaciones quam mulier in eo quod mulier.

(XIII) Quinto queritur utrum aliquis puer sit nobilis. Videtur quod non, quia, ut dicit Philosophus in libro *De Animalibus*, vita puerorum, ut est dicere, a vita bestiarum non differt quia eorum operaciones non regulantur racione nec intellectu. Unde nobilitas que sequitur racionem non videtur quod possit esse in pueris. Oppositum patet per vulgare proverbium dicens quod in vitulo bene apparet si debeat esse taurus. Hoc est dictum quod in pueris

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Tit. not in P 1 sit ita *om. Thomas* 2 quia *om. B* 3 melior: vel nobilior *add. B* 3 viri *om. B* 3 huiusmodi: huius *B* 3 quare etc.: igitur *B* 5 quare: quia *PB* 5 erit: est *B* 5 Hoc *om. B* 5 quia *om. B* 6 Cf. Aristotle, *De Animal. Generat.* IV, 6, 775a and Pseudo-Aristotle, *Physiogn.* 6, 814a 6 ergo: igitur *B* 7 est *om. B* 10 illud *om. B* 10 Aristotle, *De Cura Rei Famil.* I, 2-3, 1343a-1344a 11 quod *om. B* 11 sunt *om. B* 13 forciorem—laborem: f. l. r. *P* 14 operacio : ratio *B* (*corr.* B^1) 15 racione regulet: re. ra. *P* 18 respondendum *B* 20 verum est: e. v. *B* 21 non queritur: querit *B* 22 numquam: non *B*

1 Quinto: Consequenter *P* 2 Aristotle, *Hist. Animal.* VIII, 1, 588b 6 dictu *PB*

sunt operaciones presignantes nobilitatem virilem. Ad istam questionem dicendum quod pueri secundum actum non possunt esse nobiles. Sunt enim adhuc sub esse imperfecto et in motu ad perfectionem. Unde quamvis possint esse dispositi ad nobiles actiones universaliter, quousque tamen perficiantur secundum ea que sunt corporis et anime, ad formam nobilitatis perfecte venire non possunt. Sunt in potencia et in fieri nobiles sicut sunt in potencia et in fieri viri. Ex hiis satis patet quid sit dicendum ad raciones.

(XIV) Sexto queritur utrum viles per naturam possint fieri nobiles per doctrinam vel nutrituram. Videtur quod non. Sicut enim dixit poeta "Quod natura negat (Fol. 319^v *B*) nemo feliciter audet," si igitur natura negat nobilitatem in aliquo, videtur quod sibi per doctrinam concedi non possit. Preterea opera nature et artis opera sunt intellectus, sed intellectus principaliter naturam dirigens dirigit et regulat omnia. Intellectus autem dirigens est humanus, solum artificialia secundum quod huiusmodi dirigens. Tunc arguo sic: sicut intellectus divinus ad humanum ita effectus divinus ad humanum sine comparatione est magis perfectus et infallibilis quam humanus. Ubi ergo natura vel intellectus divinus deficit, nullo modo videtur quod natura humana sufficere possit. Oppositum videmus quod per doctrinam bonam multi meliorantur in actionibus suis. Ad primam racionem dicendum quod Philosophus dicit primo *Ethycorum* quod etiam superius fuit dictum: scilicet quod quidam sunt boni per se ita quod eorum natura semper directa est ad bene agere et ad bene scire, et tales sunt nobiles per seipsos et sunt rectores et magistri. Alii sunt in quibus non invenitur perfecta natura, immo invenitur impedita in aliquibus propter aliqualem intemperiem corporalem. Quare alterius auxilio indigent. Verumptamen defectus non est ita fortis nec firmus quin sit possibile quod alterius beneficio corrigatur. Unde tales emendantur convenienti doctrina et fiunt nobiles beneficio nutriture. Tercius est gradus hominum in quibus natura ita defecta est quod iuvari non potest, et tales nec per se nec per alios nobilitari possunt. Unde dicit Philosophus quod ad mores tales sunt inutiles. Ex hiis est facile ad questionem respondere et ad raciones ad questionem igitur dicendum quod aliqui sunt viles si sibi dimittantur qui tamen per alios boni fiunt et aliqui sunt qui non possunt corrigi ut est dictum. Ad raciones dico quod in illis in quibus perfecte negat natura in illis numquam perficiet nutritura sed in illis in quibus imperfecte natura perficit et aliquid imperfectum relinquit ars bene perficit auxiliante natura,

8-9 pueri—perfectionem: Cf. Aristotle, *Nichom.* I, 10, 1100a 9 possunt *P* 12 *pr.* in *om. PB* (*ss.* P^1) 13 satis patet: p.s. *B*

1 possunt *PB*, possint *Thomas* 2 nutrimentum *B* 2 dixit: dicit *B* 2-3 Cf. Maximian, *El.* 5, 54:"Quod natura negat, reddere nemo potest" 4-10 Preterea—possit *om. B* 11 actionibus suis: bonis actionibus *B* 12 primam *om. B* 12 racionem: questionem *PB* 12 Cf. Aristotle, *Nichom.* I, 10, 1099b 13 etiam—scilicet quod *om. B* 13 superius fuit dictum: Cf. Cap. 11 sub fin. 14 natura *om. B* 14 directa est: e.d. *B* 16 perfecta natura: recta ratio *B* 16 aliquam *B* 20 *pr.* est *om. B* 20 hominum: est *add. B* 20 defecta: depravata *B* 21 *pr.* nec *om. P* 21 Cf. Aristotle, *Nichom.* I, 10, 1099b 22 est: ex *P* (*corr.* P^1) 23 et—dicendum: Licet *B* 23 quod *om. B* 23 sunt: sint *B* 23 viles: qui *add.* (*exp.*) *P* 24 qui tamen: cum *B* 24 sunt *om. P* 25 ut est dictum *om. B* 25 rationem *B* 25 quod *om. B* 26 in illis numquam—imperfecte natura *om. B* 26-27 imperfecte—auxiliante natura: Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 49, 11 and *Ep.* 124, 18 27 *pr.* perficit: deficit *P* (*corr.* P^1) 27 aliquid imperfectum: aliquam imperfectionem *B*

quod optime dicit Philosophus 7 *Politicorum*: "Omnis doctrina et omnis ars quod nature deficit vult supplere." Et est intelligendum de illis in quibus natura tantum dedit quod in maiori parte a perfectione non distant et tunc aliquis iuvando naturam ducit rem in melius. In hoc tamen natura omnium operatrix est et artifex et minister, ut dixit Galienus in *Tegni*. Ex hiis solvitur vis racionis secunde.

(XV) Septimo queritur cui filius in nobilitate debeat assimilari, utrum patri vel matri. Videtur enim quod patri, quia, ut dicit Philosophus in libro *De Animalibus*, pater dat formam, hoc est virtutem informantem, propinquam et mater dat materiam corporalem. Quare videtur quod filius debeat assimilari patri et non matri. Oppositum patet in pluribus qui mores et operaciones secuntur matris et non patris. Hanc questionem generalius positam solvit Philosophus in libro *De Animalibus* capitulo 1 de similitudine generatorum dicens quod in generacione multi sunt motus et ex parte patris et ex parte matris generales et particulares. Hoc est, virtus generativa [sortis] non tantum movet secundum quod est sortis sed secundum quod est rei per se existentis vel subsistentis, id est [substancie et] corporee substancie animate sensibilis et racionalis vel sic composite vel complexionate, et secundum quod masculus et femella generant. Nunc autem est ita quod motus viri contrariantur aliqualiter motibus mulieris, et quando concurrunt ad generacionem, virtus informativa oportet quod fortiores sequatur, debiliores enim solvuntur. Ex quo contingit quod quando paterni motus (Fol. 320 *B*) omnes maternos vincunt, tunc filius omnino assimilatur patri; et quando e contrario, omnino assimilatur matri. Quare ad questionem dicendum quod utrique potest assimilari vel alteri secundum quod in temperie generacionis contingit. Unde ad racionem dicere oportet quod pater virtutem prebet informativam et nisi impediatur, ut dictum est, similem filium faciet patri; sed si motus matris prevaleant, informabitur secundum illos et assimilabitur matri secundum quod huiusmodi. Ex quo patet ad racionem in oppositum.

28 Aristotle, *Polit.* VII, 17, 1337a 28 7: septimo *B* 28 ars *om. P* 29 de: in *P* 30 distat *B* 32 artifex et: a. est *P* 32 dixit: dicit *B* 32 Galen, *De Alimento* III, 13 (ed. Kühn, *op. cit.* XV [1828] 306); cf. Cicero, *De Oratore* I, 111 32-33 Ex—secunde *om. B*

1 eptimo (*space left for initial*) *P* 2 Cf. Aristotle, *De Animal. Generat.* I, 2, 716a and I, 20, 729a 7 Cf. Aristotle, *De Animal. Generat.* IV, 3, 767b-768b 7 in *om. B* 7 1: primo *B* 7 de *om. B* 8 quod *om. B* 9 particulares: principales *B* 10 sortis: *perh.* fortis *B* 10 vel: per se *add. B* 11 *alt.* et *om. B* 12 vel sic *twice PB* 12 vel complexionate: quod c. *P* 13 contrariantur aliqualiter: aliquando c. *B* 14-15 virtus—solvuntur: virtus enim informativa fortior prevalet et debilior solvitur *B* 15 sequantur *P* 15 *alt.* quod *om. P* 16 maternos: motus *add. B* 17 et *om. B* 17 Quare *om. B* 18 questionem: ergo *add. B* 19 temperie: tempore *B* 19-22 Unde—huiusmodi: cuius enim motus prevalent assimilabitur illi *B* 22 patet: solutio *add. B* 23 At the bottom of fol. 319^{v} of *B* and by the original hand of *B*: Quintilianus in *Institutione Oratoria*: Laudatur in quibusdam quod geniti sunt nobiles, in aliis quod nobilitatem virtutis sunt secuti. Pulchrum est respondisse nobilitati, pulchrum genus nobilium humilium factis illustrasse. (Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* III, 7, 9-10)

(XVI) Octavo queritur quare homines non loquantur nisi de una specie nobilitatis cum sit superius determinatum eas esse quinque species. De hoc breviter sine argumentis dicendum quod commune iudicium gentium licet presumptionem vel probabilitatem aliquam faciat, tamen de levi decipiuntur eo quod pauci sunt qui subtiliter et provide sciant iudicare de rebus, immo communiter alter alterius sequitur dicta realitatem supponens. Unde Philosophus in *Topicis* dicit "Loquendum est ut plures, sentiendum est ut pauci," id est ut sapientes tenent tenenda est veritas de rebus, non ut populares locuntur, sed in locucionibus loquamur communiter et ut plures. Difficile enim est cum popularibus disputare qui ad detrahendum de (Fol. 241 *P*) eodem loquendo opposita minimo moventur motu. Unde in proposito non est eis credendum sicut nec in pluribus aliis. Accipiunt enim pro nobilitate dominium tantum, ut Philosophus dicit primo *Rethorice,* unde ipse dicit quod genti et civitati est nobilitas sui iuris antiquos esse presides. Et non dixit "sapientibus" sed "genti et civitati."

(XVII) Nono queritur utrum rex sit nobilior comite vel imperator rege quia hoc videtur tenere communitas et domini inter seipsos. Cuius oppositum potest contingere, sicut patet per superius dicta. Ad questionem istam dicendum quod homines si fuerint equaliter dispositi ad bene regendum magnum vel parvum dominium, equaliter sunt nobiles, sive magnum sive parvum habere contingat dominium. Sed bene contingit quod aliqui [sibi] sunt boni rectores in parvis et quidam alii in magnis qui transmutati male se haberent, et tales sunt proporcionaliter nobiles et non equaliter. Alii sunt qui licet in parvo dominio sint boni, adhuc bene et melius se haberent in maiori. Et isti sunt nobiles sicut reges, dato quod essent simplices milites. Ex hiis et predictis patet ad questionem et racionem.

(XVIII) Ultimo queritur utrum nobilitas inveniatur in aliis rebus sicut in avibus equis et canibus quia hoc etiam tenere videtur communis opinio. Dicendum absque maiori disputatione quod nobilitas in aliis animalibus ab homine notatur dupliciter, scilicet generaliter et absolute aut particulariter et in relacione ad aliquid. Primo modo dicitur animal nobile vel generosum, ut dicit Philosophus in primo *De Animalibus*, quod perfecte facit quod pertinet ad opus suum. Unde individua alicuius generis animalium que ita operantur (Fol. 320^{v} *B*) quod non dimittunt opus proprium sui generis dicuntur generosa animalia vel nobilia

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1 ctavo (*space left for initial*) *P* 2 sit superius determinatum: constet *B* 2 species *om. B* 4 de levi: gentes *add. B* 5 providere *P* 6 Aristotle, *Topica* II, 2, 110a, cf. the version of Boethius, PL 64, 925 7 *alt.* est *om. B* 9 loquamur: loquimur *B* 9 et *om. B* 9 enim est: es. en. *B* 10 detrahendum—opposita: loquendum oppositum *B* 11 *alt.* in *om. P* 12 Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* I, 5, 1360b 13 unde ipse dicit quod *om. B*

1-2 quia hoc: Istud *B* 2 Cuius: Huius *B* 2 potest: videtur *B* 3 sicut: ut *P* 3 per superius dicta: p. predicta s. *P* 3 questionem istam: i.q. *B* 5 nobiles *om. P* (*mg.* P^1) 6 sibi *om. B* 6 paruis: *perh.* paro *B* (*corr.* B^1) 7 se haberent: regerent *B* 8 sint: sunt *B* 9 et: vel *B*

1 ltimo (*space left for initial*) *P* 2 etiam *om. B Thomas* 2 tenere videtur: tenetur *B Thomas* 2 opinio: quod sic *add. B* 3 ab: absque *B* 4 absolute: abstracte *B* 5 dicit Philosophus: p.d. *P* 5 Cf. Aristotle, *Hist. Animal.* I, 1, 488b 6 quod pertinet: pertinentia *B* 6 suum: eius *B*

[in relatione ad hominem sicut aves quedam et], quecumque fuerint illa. Secundo modo dicuntur generosa animalia vel nobilia in relacione ad hominem sicut aves quedam et canes et que ordinantur ad aliquam recreationem eorum qui tedio sunt affecti per longum et continuum laborem qui ad utilitatem rei pupblice ordinatur, et talis est labor nobilium dominorum. Sicut enim dicit Cato, curis quandoque interponenda sunt gaudia. Unde nobiles viri possunt quandoque racionabiliter talibus uti, et usus eorum sic factus nobilis potest dici. Sed si aliquis nimis delectatur in talibus, ita quod ex hiis opera que ad suam pertinent nobilitatem frequenter postponat, dico talem usum ad vilitatem et bestialem fatuitatem converti. In altioribus enim, ut fuit dictum, debent opera nobilium frequentari.

De hiis que pertinent ad primum librum sit determinatum in tantum.

Pars huius libelli secunda tangit breves et tutas lecturas quibus quilibet sive nobilis sive vilis cognoscetur perfecte. Erunt enim x capitula quibus [harum] ostendentur proverbia et sentencie 5 specierum nobilitatis dictarum et 5 de oppositis earumdem.

(XIX) Secundum quod Philosophus disputat et sufficienter dat intelligere prohemio *Metaphisice*, sapiens est qui scit omnia difficillima per certitudinem et causam seipsum dirigens et aliis persuadens. Hermes in libro *De 15 Stellis* dicit quod sapiens est qui res cognoscit prout sunt et racione probari possunt. Plato dicit in libello de materia prima "Sapiens est qui non operatur preterquam utilia et honesta." Alfraganus dicit in quibusdam secretis suis quod sol solus in celo, sapiens solus in mundo quia ille solus tempora distinguit, nebulas dissipat, viventia confortat, omnia illuminat; hic homines ordinat, vicia corrigit, virtutes inserit, et animas ignorantium informat. Sapiens principaliter diligit Deum quia fons bonorum omnium et sui amore diligit omne bonum. Sapiens sobrie bonis utitur, et mala si contigerint intrepidus sustinet. Sapiens omnes diligit, neminem despicit, sed in paucis omnino confidit, et omnino de nullo

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9 illa: similia *B* 11 quedam et: vel *B* 11 et que *om. B* 11 ordinati *B* 11 qui: que *B* (*corr.* B^1) 13 Sicut enim dicit: Unde *B* 13 *Disticha Catonis* III, 6, 1 13-14 Curis—gaudia: Interpone tuis interdum gaudia curis *B* 14-15 possunt—uti: q.p. uti r.t. *B* 14 racionaliter *B* 16 delectetur *B* 16-18 opera—converti: opera nobilitatis negligat, tunc talis usus vilis est *B* 17 vilitatem : utilitatem *P* 18 ut fuit dictum *om. B* 18 operi *P* 19 sit—tantum: tantum dictum sit *B*

1 ars (*space left for initial*) *P* 1 et tutas lecturas: sententias *B* 1 quilibet sive *om. B* 2 sive vilis cognoscetur : vel vilis cognoscitur *B* 2 harum *om. B* 3 *pr.* et: seu *B* 3-4 de oppositis eorumdem: earundem oppositarum *B*, de opposito earumdem *Thomas*

1 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphys.* I, 1, 981a-b 1 intelligere : intendere *Thomas* 2 scit : sit *Thomas* 3 Hermes, *De Quindecim Stellis* prol. (Ms Brit. Mus. Royal 12 C xviii of the 14th c., fol. 160v): "Sapiens autem est qui res cognoscit prout sunt et recte probari possunt"

4 quod *om. B* 4 res cognoscit: c.r. *B* 5 Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* in the version of Chalcidius, ed. Ioh. Wrobel (Leipzig, 1876) pp. 6-7 5 preterquam: preter *B* 6 I have not been able to find the Alfraganus passage in Al Faraghani's *Differentie Scientie Astrorum* (ed. F. J. Carmody, Berkeley, Calif., 1943) 6 quod *om. B* 7 celo: et *add. B* 10 fons *om. B* 10 omnium: fons est *add. B* 11 contigerit *B*

diffidit. Sapiens est qui de malis et bonis elicit bona. Sapiens terram respicit et celum considerat. Sapiens se et alios cognoscit et est exemplar noticie et operacionis perfecte. Ex hiis suprema patet nobilitas et quia sapiens nobilis est.

(XX) Ptholomeus dicit in proverbiis suis *Almagesti* quod insipiens est qui sui ipsius quantitatem ignorat (supple non "corporis" sed "anime virtutem"). Salomo vero dicit quod stultus est qui prius respondet quam audiat et confusione dignus est. Willanus dicit quod stultus est qui ponit pedes ante oculos eo quod stulti (Fol. 321 *B*) improvide operantur. Similiter stultus est qui de factis penitet. Hoc est dictum quod quilibet deberet ita provide operari ne haberet occasionem penitendi. Stultus nec Deum nec divina cognoscit, et si forte sentit, postponit. Demostenes dicit quod stultus vilibus volvitur primo in oculis per superhabundantiam, secundo in lingua mendaciis et sermonibus inhonestis, tertio in manibus per turpia facta, quarto in corde malitia voluntatis et consideracione maligna, quinto in pedibus propter velocitatem cursus ad malum. Hoc idem intelligit Salomon in *Parabolis* ubi dicit "Septem sunt que odit Deus." Stultus est qui alios turbat. Stultus est qui parum scit et multum putat et post factum et ante. Et quamvis inter stultum insipientem et ignarum [et] malum aliqua sit differencia, ad presens tamen accipimus pro eodem.

(XXI) De nobilibus secundum corpus plurium ordo philosophorum multa dixerunt. Inter quos Fulco Marsiliensis dicit: "Si corpus bene formetur et eidem cor bene proportionetur, sive in viro sive in muliere, nobilitatem ostendit." Et hoc dat intelligere Philosophus per totam *Phisonomiam* suam iudicando ex parte forme corporis menbrorum mores hominum naturaliter perfectos.

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13 malis et bonis: b. et m. *B*   13 Sapiens terram respicit: Cf. Ps. ciii, 32 and cxii, 6   13 respicit: despicit *B*   14 se et—cognoscit et: se et omnes alios cognoscit omnes et *B*

1 Cf. Walter Burley, *De Vita et Moribus Philosophorum* 121 (ed. Knust p. 372) on Ptolemy: "De proverbiis eius moralibus hec notabilia hic scripta sunt: Insipiens est qui ipsius quantitatem ignorat"   1 suis *om. P*   1 quod *om. B*   3 Salomo vero: Item *B*   3 *Prov.* xviii, 13   3 quod *om. B* respondeat *B*   4 *pr.* est *om. B*   4 Perhaps this old quotation was based upon something like *Li proverbe au vilain* n° 216 (ed. A. Tobler [Leipzig, 1895] pp. 89-90): "Fous est qui trop se fie/D'entrer en la folie/... Tant va li poz a l'iaue qu'il brise le col/ ce dit li vilains"   4 quod *om. B*   5 stulti : ipsi *B*   5-6 Similiter stultus—penitet: Cf. *Proverbe au vilain* n° 53 (*ed. cit.* p. 24): "Qui avant prent n s'en repent/ce dit li vilains" and esp. no. 241 (*ibid.* p. 100): "Fous est qui met s'entente,/ Tant que il se repente"   6 dictum quod *om. B*   7 Stultus—cognoscit: Cf. Ps. xiii, 1   7 Stultus: enim *add. B*   8 I have been unable to identify the quotation assigned to Demosthenes   8 quod *om. B*   9 et sermonibus *om. B*   12 Cf. *Prov.* vi, 16   13 Deus: etc. *add. B*   13 *alt.* est *om. B*   14 ãnte *P*   14 Et *om. B*   14 stultum: et *add. B Thomas*   14 insipientem et: insipientem *B*

1 plurium ordo: plurimi *B*   2 Marsiliensis: magister siliensis *B*. Massiliensis *Hauréau*   2 Folquet was active as a poet ca. 1180-1195. On him see Alfred Jeanroy, *La poésie lyrique* I p. 367 and Alfred Pillet and Henry Carstens, *Bibliographie des troubadours* (Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Sonderreihe bd. 3, Halle, 1933) pp. 125-132. About the closest Folquet approaches the sentiment of the *De Nobilitate Animi* is by the verses "Pero lo cors no·s deu blasmar/ del Cor, per mal que·il sapcha fer,/ que tornat l'a al plus honrat senhor" (*Le troubadour Folquet de Marseille*, ed. Stanislaw Stronski [Cracow, 1910] p. 29, lines 31-33).   3 mulire *P* (*corr.* P^1)

Unde proverbialiter dicitur "Est vultus testis quales intrinsecus estis." Petrus Vitalis dicit quod pulcritudo corporis est magnum precium nisi intrinsecus paciatur defectum. Unde Arnoldus dicit quod pulcritudo corporis sine cordis pulcritudine et absque nobilitate est vilitas et flos transiens sine fructu. Gaufridus Rodel dixit: "Multi laudant magnitudinem cum fortitudine, et ego laudo si racio gerat frenum." Odantagalus dicit quod promptitudo corporis vel levitas dominium habet pedum sed laus erit si pedes absque stultitia moveantur." Omnes generaliter: Virtutes corporee perfecte corpus nobilitant si recta racione in suis operibus regulentur.

(XXII) Antequam proverbia vilium corporum proponantur, sciendum generaliter quod vilitas propter aliquam contingentem occasionem in complexione vel compositione corporis denotatur unde figura corporis vel menbri non est situata vel plasmata secundum quod speciei deceret plasmari, unde contingit defectus in operacionibus que nature debentur corporali. Sed est advertendum quod hec vilitas est duplex: uno modo reperitur corpus habere defectum in operacionibus cuius defectus incorrigibilis est per naturam, de quo etiam (Fol. 241^{v} *P*) dolent habentes et corrigerent libenter si possibile foret eis. Et talis vilitas corporis non efficit hominem vilem quia non est in potestate sua correctio talis defectus. Unde ceci vel claudi a nativitate vituperari non (Fol. 321^{v} *B*) debent. Alio modo contingit hominibus talis defectus propter maliciam propriam secundum quod contingit in illis in

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6 "Est vultus—estis": In the *Florilegium Gottingense*, ed. Voigt p. 298, and also in Joseph Klapper, *Die Sprichwörter des Freidankpredigten*: *Proverbia Freidanki* (Volkskundliche Arbeiten Namens d. Schles. Gesellsch. f. Volkskunde 16, Breslau, 1927) p. 24 6 vultus: virtus *P* 6-7 Peire Vidal was an active poet ca. 1180-1208. On him see Jeanroy, *op. cit.* p. 411 and Pillet and Carstens, *op. cit.* pp. 315-325. J. Anglade, in *Studi medievali* n.s. II (1929) 445, finds that the quotation of the *De Nobilitate Animi* approximates Vidal 15, 61-64: "Domna, vostra beutatz/E·l fin pretz mentaugutz/ Mi fai semblar sebenc/ Tot autre joi" (*Les poésies de Peire Vidal*, ed. Joseph Anglade, 2nd ed., Les classiques français du moyen âge 11 [Paris, 1923] p. 46). Cf. too the comment of Anglade in *Studi medievali* p. 446: "pour cette chanson, nous n'avons qu'un manuscrit; et... nous ne sommes pas toujours sûrs du texte" 7 quod *om.* *B* 8 Arnaut Daniel was active as a poet ca. 1180-1210 and Arnaut de Mareuil in the late 12th century. But there were quite a few other Arnauts who were troubadours. On the different Arnauts see Jeanroy *op. cit.* pp. 337-339 and Pillet and Carstens *op. cit.* pp. 25-37. I have not located the Arnaut quotation either in *Les poésies d'Arnaut Daniel* (ed. René Lavaud, Annales du Midi 22 [Toulouse, 1910]) or in *Les poésies lyriques du troubadour Arnaut de Mareuil* (ed. R. C. Johnston [Paris, 1935]) 8 *perh.* arnaldus *B* 8 quod *om.* *B* 10 Rodel was an active poet in the mid 12th century. On him see Jeanroy *op. cit.* p. 389 and Pillet and Carstens pp. 238-242. The quotation is not identifiable with any verses in *Chansons de Jauffré Rodel* (ed. Alfred Jeanroy, Les classiques français du moyen âge 15 [Paris, 1924]). 10 dixit: dicit *B* 10 fortitudine: forma *B* 11 racio: non *B* (*corr.* B^1) 11 gerat: regat *Hauréau* 11 Odantagalus: Item quidam alter *B*, Montancolus *conj. Thomas* (*probably rightly*); see on Cap. 22 line 35. I have not found the quotation elsewhere 11 dicit quod *om.* *B* 14 operibus: operationibus *B*

3 unde: si *add.* *B* 3 scituata *P* 4 unde *om.* *B* 5 est *om.* *B* 10 nativitate: sua *add.* *B* 10 vitupari *B* 10-11 hominibus talis defectus: d.t.h. *B* 11 secundum quod: sed *P* 11 contingit: eis *add.* (*del.*) *P*

quibus manus vel pedes vel huiusmodi abscinduntur bonitate iusticie observata in eis. Unde tales vilissimi iudicantur sicut proprie nature contrarium operantes. Similiter etiam sunt viles qui maliciam complexionis secuntur que posset subici iudicio racionis. Unde proverbia huius capituli intelligenda sunt de illis qui in operacionibus corporalibus deficiunt que possent corrigi racione. Menbra autem corporis que maiorem vilitatem ostendunt sunt ista: oculus manus pes os nasus auris, ut patet in physonomiis philosophorum. Et hoc racionabiliter dixerunt quia deterior defectus est qui in menbris dignioris operacionis contingit. Unde Philosophus in libro *Topicorum* dicit quod oculus est in corpore sed intellectus in anima, hoc est proportionaliter: sicut intellectus excellit omnes vires anime, ita virtus oculorum virtutes omnium menbrorum. Unde sicut mala disposicio oculi multum vilificat corpus habentis, ita malicia in actibus nisi fuerit racione correcta. Philosophus etiam dicit in *Physonomia* sua quod grossus oculus rubens et inversus rammosus et expositus inverecundum vel luxuriosum ostendit. Et si cum hoc os grande fuerit et labia grossa et carnosa et brevis nasus sursum versus, significat glutonem et maledicum. Et si cum hiis habuerit tybias et cavillas pedum grossas et uncas et posterius in incessu ad utrunque latus vacillans tamquam in pedibus paciens, talis habebit corpus supreme male figuratum. Et adhuc vilius si cum hoc habuerit manus grossas et duras brevium digitorum qualis fuit in Hanonia Bradefer. Tale corpus vilissimum existit et secundum animam mali moris. Et est adhuc quedam vilitas corporis que causatur magis ex complexione cordis. Reperiuntur enim aliqui optime formati et complexionati in exterioribus menbris et in tempore necessitatis nullum habent vigorem, et tales dicuntur communiter pulcri et mali. De istis dicit Montaneolus quod pulcri corpore sine cordis vigore sunt ymagines sine vita. Quod optime dictum est. Utrobique enim apparet quod non existit. Et de vilibus corpore sint hec dicta.

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12 huiusmodi: huius *B* 12 abscinduntur: aliquid abscinditur *B* 14 qui *om.* *B* 14 complexionis—posset: sequentes qui possent *B* 15 Unde: Hinc *B* 16 in *om.* *B* 16 posset *P* 17 vilitatem: corporis *add.* *B* 17 ista: illa *P* 17-18 pes os: pedes *B* 18 physomiis *P* (*corr.* P^1) 19 deterior: determinatorum *B* 19 dignioribus *B* 19 operacionis *om.* *B* 20 Aristotle, *Topica* I, 17, 108a, cf. the version of Boethius I, 14 (PL 64, 922) 20 *pr.* in *om.* *B* 20-21 sed intellectus: hoc intellectus est *B* 23 disposicio: corporis *add.* (*del.*) *P* 23 ita malicia: nisi malicia fuerit *P* 23-24 nisi fuerit *om.* *P* 24 Philosophus: Plinius *PB*, Philosophus *conj.* *Thomas* 24 Cf. Pseudo-Aristotle, *Physiogn.* 3 (23), 808a (ed. Förster *op. cit.* I p. 35), likewise *Physiogn.* 3 (30-31), 808b (*ibid.* p. 39); cf. Rasis, tr. Gerard de Cremona as *De Re Medica* II, 44 (*ibid.* II p. 172) and Pseudo-Polemon 5 (*ibid.* p. 152) 25 inverecundum: iracundum *B* 27 glutonem: gulosum *B* 27 si: sii (*second* i *exp.*) *P*; *om.* *B* 28 tybia *P* 28 oncas *P* 28 *tert.* et: ad *P* 31 qualis—Bradefer *om.* *B*. This Bradefer was unknown to Antoine Thomas (*op. cit.* p. 171) and is unknown to me 31 Hannonia *Thomas* 33 aliqui *om.* *B* 35 istis: hiis *B* 35 Guillem de Montaignagol was active ca. 1233-1258. On him see Jeanroy, *La poésie lyrique* I p. 380 and Pillet and Carstens *op. cit.* pp. 187-189. I have not located the quotation in *Le troubadour Guilhem Montanahagol* (ed. Jules Coulet, Bibl. méridionale ser. I, t. 4 [Toulouse, 1898]) 36 quod pulcri: pulchri *B* 37 Utrobique—existit: Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 2, 2 37 Utrolibet *B* 38 sint hec: h.s. *B*

(XXIII) Consequenter aliqua dominorum proverbia tangamus. Sed prius advertendum quod proverbia vel breves sentencie circa dominos dicta tria maxime respiciunt, scilicet eorum docilitatem in consiliis et eorum iusticiam in correctionibus et penis et largitatem in eorum beneficiis tribuendis. De isto Aristotiles ad Alexandrum scripsit ei probos viros habere in suis conciliis eo quod proborum consilia sunt sententie summe disputate. Cato vero docuit filium suum largius in hac parte dicens "Utile consilium dominus ne despice servi. Nullius (Fol. 322 *B*) sensum si prodest spreveris umquam." Quantum ad secundum summe precipit vitare avariciam. Avari enim principes nullo modo sunt iusti. Unde *Alexander*: "Cum semel obtinuit viciorum mater in aula pestis avaricie que sola incarcerat omnes Virtutum species spreto moderamine iuris, Curritur in facinus nec leges curia curat." Quantum ad tercium dixit "Non opus est vallo quos dextera dapsilis ambit." Unde proverbialiter de dominis dicitur quod avari fortibus non tuentur nec largi in planicie sunt devicti. Et hec sufficiant in hoc loco.

(XXIV) Nunc dicamus de servitute vel servo. Et quia decet bonum servientem quod sit amicus domino et humilis et etiam curialis fidelis et providus, proverbia que ad hoc capitulum pertinent semper recipiunt aliquam proprietatem dictorum vel oppositas servientium malorum. Unde <......> dicit quod amor servientis cordi domini requies non suspecta est. Item dicit quod servus fidelis, multorum custodia, est clavis. Item dicit quod servus irascibilis existit cordi domini honus grave. Et Seneca dicit quod servus piger est propheta. De curialitate servi Petrus Vitalis dicit quod prudentia servi et valor est magnus si dominus fuerit silvester et iracundus quod ab ipso sine infamia separetur. Hec et similia pertinent ad hanc partem.

(XXV) Nunc divitum proverbia tangamus. Plurium philosophorum est sentencia quod dives est cui suum cor sufficit. Alii dicunt quod dives est qui sufficit cordi suo. Idem tamen intelligunt quia ex cordis iudicio sufficiencia venit rerum que facit hominem divitem, ut satis patuit supra. Unde Dyogenes

1 Cosequenter *P* 2 vel breves sentencie *om. B* 4 penis: penitenciis *P* 5 consiliis *P* 6 sententie summe: su. se. *B* 7-8 *Disticha Catonis* III, 10, 1-2 7 dicens *om. B* 8 sperneris *B* 10 Gautier de Châtillon, *Alexandreis* I, 111-114 (ed. F. Müldener [Leipzig, 1863] p. 9) 10 semel: semper *P* 11 Virtutum species: verumptamen *P* 12 dixit: dicit *B* 12-13 Non opus—ambit: Gautier de Châtillon, *Alexandreis* I, 158 (ed. Müldener p. 11) 12 est *om. B* 13 quos : quem *P* 13 Unde: Hinc *B* 13 de dominis dicitur: di. de do. *B*

2 curialis: et *add. B* 4 <......>: Both *P* and *B* omit the name of the source 4 dicit: *perh.* dicitur *B* 5 dicit quod *om. B* 6 custodum *P* 6 dicit quod *om. B* 6 extitit *P* 7 I have not been able to identify the quotation assigned to Seneca 7 quod *om. B* 7 est *om. B* 8-9 J. Anglade, in his *Studi medievali* article, p. 445, identifies the quotation with Vidal 2, 28-30: "Quar sens es e grans valors/ Qui de brau senhor felo/ Se lonha ses mal resso" (Anglade's 2nd ed., p. 4) 8 quod *om. B* 8 prudentia: est *add. B* 9 separetur: se separet *B* 9-10 Hec—partem *om. B*

2 *pr.* quod *om. B* 2 *alt.* quod *om. B* 2 *alt.* est *om. B* 3 cordi suo: s.c. *P* 3 Idem tamen: Hoc *B* 4 satis patuit: p. sa. *P* 4 Cicero, *Tusc.* V, 92. Also cf. Walter Burley, De *Vita et Moribus Philosophorum* 50 (ed. Knust pp. 198, 201): "Dicebat enim Diogenes, ut dicit Tullius in libro v de Tusculanis questionibus, se vita et fortuna regem Persarum superare eo quod sibi nil deesset, illi autem satis numquam foret"

dicebat quod ipse erat dicior et quod vita et fortuna sua plus valebant quam regis Persarum quia cordi Dyogenis nichil deficiebat, regi autem nichil sufficiebat. Ptholomeus in proverbiis *Almagesti* intendit quod dives est qui habet dominium intellectus. Cato dicit quod dives avarus habet nummos sed non habet ipsum. Boecius dicit quod dives plures habet amicos sed de nullo est certus. Hec et similia in hoc loco possunt scribi, sed hec sufficiant propter opus.

(XXVI) Hiis habitis est de paupere subiungendum. Invenitur in hystoriis Grecorum quod Alexander quesivit ab Aristotile quid sibi de paupertate videretur. Respondens Philosophus ait "De paupertate non plus sentio nisi quod pauperibus subvenire non possum." In quo subtiliter respondit quia, sive large sive stricte sumatur paupertas, verum respondit. Pauper enim est qui alium iuvare non potest de suis mobilibus sive corporali vigore sive sciencie et consilii bonitate. Et hoc intendit Rusticus qui dicit (Fol. 322^v *B*) quod pauper est cui suum non sufficit quia paupertas large non est nisi defectus alicuius trium predictorum et maxime intellectus. Dyogenes multum laudavit paupertatem diviciarum propter tria, quia scilicet subtiliat ingenium, salvat sanitatem, et facit statum securum. Primum facit providendo, secundum facit per temperanciam, tercium quia nullus invidet pauperi nec videt quod rapiat paupertati. Unde Boecius dicit "O preclara mortalium beatitudo" etc. et "Cantabat (Fol. 242 *P*) vacuus coram latrone viator." Cato consuluit filio "Infantem nudum" etc. et precipit "Denarium" etc., hoc est ad usum non ad cumulum quia cumulator diligit formam sed largus denarium. Sine dubio sapientes non fecerunt vim de diviciis, et raciones superius fuerunt dicte, immo in solo intellectu posuerunt divicias quia istas perdere non poterant et alie fortuite secuntur istas. Unde Salomon: "Venerunt michi omnia bona pariter cum illa." Quare pro vera paupertate non intellexerunt aliud quam defectum sapiencie et intellectus. Et Oratius dicit quod non est pauper cui sufficit rerum usus. Qui plane et satis subtiliter verum dixit.

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5 ipse *om. B* 7 Walter Burley, *De Vita et Moribus Philosophorum* 121 (ed. Knust p. 372) on Ptolemy: "De proverbiis eius moralibus hec notabilia hic scripta sunt: ...Pauper non est qui suo intellectui dominatur" 7 proverbiis *om. B* 7 intendit quod *om. B* 8 *Disticha Catonis* IV, 5, 2 8 quod *om. B* 8 ipsum : corpus *P* 9 Boethius, *Consol.* III, pr. 5, 13 (ed. Bieler p. 45) 9 quod *om. B* 9-10 Hec—opus : Hec ad presens sufficiant *B*

1 iis (*space left for initial*) *P* 1 paupe *P* 3 Walter Burley, *De Vita et Moribus Philosophorum* 53 (ed. Knust p. 238) on Aristotle: "Dicebat eciam unum se solum incommodum paupertatis pati quod non posset egentibus subvenire" 4 respondet *B* 5 respondet *B* 6 sciencie et *om. B* 7 The quotation of "Rusticus" does not appear in *Proverbia Rustici* (ed. Ernst Voigt, *Romanische Forschungen* III [1887] 633-641) or in *Proverbe au vilain* (ed. cit.) 7 quod *om. B* 7 pauper: non *add.* (*del.*) *B* 9 I have not been able to identify the following quotation assigned to Diogenes 9 diuciarum *P* 10 quia scilicet: s.q. *B* 12 Boethius, *Consol.* II, pr. 5, 34-35 (ed. Bieler p. 28) 13 et: iterum *add. B* 14-15 "Infantem"—"Denarium" etc.: Dilige denarium sed parce dilige formam *B* 14-15 *Disticha Catonis* I, 21, 1-2 and IV, 4, 1-2 14 consulit *B* 16 Sine dubio *om. B* 17 superius fuerunt: f.s. *B* 18 fortune *B* 18 *Sap.* vii, 11 19 omnium *P* 20 Horace, *Ep.* I, 12, 4 21 quod *om. B* 21 satis *om. B*

(XXVII) Nunc de gloriosis dicamus. Socrates dicit, quod Valerius narrat vii *Hystoriarum*, quod illi veniunt ad gloriam qui tales sunt in operibus quales hominibus cupiunt apparere. Hoc idem dicit Tullius in libro *De Officiis* quod brevior via ad gloriam est quod talis sit homo in se qualis cupit esse inter gentes. Oratius dicit "Tu recte vivis si" ("veram" supple non "vanam gloriam") "curas esse quod audis," id est quod vis audiri. Quamvis fama vel gloria bona sit, parum appreciatur inter sapientes eo quod inter gentes vix secundum racionem potest haberi quia paucissimi sunt qui de bonis hominibus recte iudicent aut quia nesciunt eos esse tales, aut si sciant, livoris occasione tacebunt. Adhuc est fama magna vi laboris ad tuendum et magni timoris et vacuitatis, quare parum valet.

(XXVIII) Ultimo est de vanigloriosis dicendum. Opus talium est seipsos laudare aut vituperare gratia consequende laudis. Unde Cato precipit filio "Nec te collaudes" etc. Et tales sunt generaliter omnes qui aliis bene vivere precipiunt, secundum Senecam, et ipsi ad hoc laborare non curant. Quare dicit quod similes sunt naute loquaci de gubernacione navis qui postea navem tempestati dimittit. Unde ipse dicit quod homo debet facere et non loqui quia gloria bonorum virorum non est in propria lingua sed eorum gloria inter bonos.

Tales et similes sentencias dixerunt sapientes quibus quilibet cognoscitur nobilis sive vilis, quod a principio huc diximus describendum. Sufficiat igitur quod dictum est. Laudetur Altissimus qui nobis hec concessit scribere licet pauca, a quo fluit omnis nobilitas et in quem omnis actio nobilis terminatur.

Explicit de nobilitate animi liber

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1 Valerius Maximus VII, 2, 6, ext. 1 1 dicit quod: dixit *B* 2 quod *om. B* 3 Cicero, *De Officiis* II, 12, 43 3 quod *om. B* 4 est *om. B* 5 Horace, *Ep.* I, 16, 17 5 veram—gloriam *om. B* 7-8 eo quod—haberi *om. B* 8 pacissimi *P* 8 qui: recte *add. B* 8 recte *om. B* 9 sciunt *B* 10 timoris : timoris *P* 10 vanitatis *Thomas*

1 *pr.* est *om. B Thomas* 1 vanigloriosis: est *add. B Thomas* 2 *Disticha Catonis* II, 16, 1 3 etc.: nec te vituperes ipse *B* 3 Et *om. B* 4 Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 85, 30-37 and *Ep.* 20, 1-2 5-6 tempestati: in tempestate *B* 6 quod *om. B* 7 gloria: est *add. B*

1 dixerunt sapientes: sa. d. *P* 2 huc *om. B* (*perh. rightly*) 2-4 igitur—pauca: hec dixisse a qu domino largiente (a qu *del.*) *B* 4 *pr.* omnis *om. B* *The explicit is not in P*

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Lyrical Form and the Prophetic Principle in the Towneley Plays *

E. CATHERINE DUNN

I

MEDIEVAL liturgical drama came into existence in the French monastic choirs of the tenth century and from the earliest "Quem quaeritis" plays to the great fifteenth century cycles this drama maintained a close connection with choral chanting and lyrical expression. The relative importance of music and dramatic action can be easily studied in the Latin texts edited by Karl Young, especially in the four hundred or so Easter plays which he included. The small proportion of movement and incident in the midst of extensive static lament or rejoicing is clearly evident in all of the texts. As later types of drama were written to narrate the Christmas story, the slaughter of the Innocents or some other event connected with New Testament history, the exultation and the sorrow continued to be the substance of the little plays. The antiphonal chanting of a monastic or cathedral choir did not, of course, continue to dominate the ceremony throughout the medieval period, for the chorus gradually relinquished its share in the dramatic dialogue to smaller groups and to individual actors; but it long continued to serve as a unifying force in the plays, integrating the various little scenes by lyrical commentary and filling the pauses in the action with familiar antiphons or hymns related to the liturgy of the occurring feast. The slow replacement of the liturgical choir in German religious drama has been studied in Berthold Venzmer's dissertation of the last century,[1] but he left untouched a special phase of this development — the one in which I am interested — the relationship between the chanting of Messianic prophecies in the *Processus prophetarum* and the lyric poetry in the Old Testament vernacular plays.

Three broad phases of lyricism seem to emerge from the history of medieval drama, beginning with the liturgical chorus itself, passing into the single role of an expositor and finally breaking up among small groups or individual characters to whom the functions of chorus and expositor could be delegated.[2] One cannot with security assign precise temporal limits to these phases, because the transformations took place at different times in various locations.

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* Read at the University of Kentucky Foreign Language Conference, April 29, 1960.

[1] *Die Chöre im geistlichen Drama des deutschen Mittelalters* (Ludwigslust, 1897).

Ibid., pp. 17-18; 38-41.

In general, the first stage belongs to the era of Latin liturgical drama, while the second and third are characteristic of the vernacular cycles; but one must recognize variations in the cycles. Chester retained an expositor throughout the duration of the medieval period, while the Towneley plays show no role of expositor in the manuscript which we have, but do reveal the transfer of the expository function to certain other characters.

The expositor himself was not an entirely new creation in the second phase of the above developments, for he was, after all, the precentor or choir director, who had been in his place from the earliest days of liturgical drama. His task had always been one of controlling and directing the production of the plays, which were chanted and which therefore required a musician's baton to initiate and sustain them.[3] One of the first dramatic transformations which he assumed was that of the pseudo-Augustinian voice in the prophet plays, summoning each one of the witnesses to the Messiah to come forth and pronounce his testimony.[4] He was thus fulfilling the demands of the "Sermo contra Judaeos," an oration erroneously attributed to Saint Augustine throughout the Middle Ages, in which the basic speaker, (pseudo-Augustine), had marshalled in non-dramatic form a series of prophetic quotations drawn mostly from the Old Testament. As is now well known, this sermon had long been one of the *lectiones* of Matins in the Christmas season, recited by one or more members of the choir, and was cast into dramatic form about the end of the eleventh century, the oldest surviving prophet play being that of the monastery of St. Martial at Limoges.[5] This role of the pseudo-Augustine opened the way for other comparable directive roles, such as that of Augustine as debater with Archisynagogus in the Benediktbeuren Christmas play.[6] Such is the role of "Ecclesia," the allegorical impersonation of the Church, in a late fifteenth century Passion play mentioned by Marius Sepet.[7] Comparable to Ecclesia's fulfillment of the Augustinian role is that of the Pope's entry into two German Corpus Christi cycles, those of Künzelzau and of Innsbruck.[8]

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[3] Gustave Cohen, *Histoire de la mise en scène dans le théâtre religieux français du moyen âge*, Rev. ed. (Paris, 1951), pp. 33-4.

[4] In the Limoges, Laon and Rouen prophet plays the summoning is variously marked for "Vocatores" or "Appellatores" or left indefinite. See Karl Young, *The Drama of the Medieval Church*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1933), II, 138, 146 and 156; Young is very cautious about inferences concerning the precentor, as one can see in his footnote 2 on p. 138.

[5] Marius Sepet, "Les prophètes du Christ," *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, XXVIII (1867), 1-27 ; Young, *op. cit.*, II, 138 ff.

[6] Young, *op. cit.*, II, 172-93, edits the text.

[7] Sepet, *loc. cit.*, XXXVIII (1877), 423.

[8] Paul Weber, *Geistliches Schauspiel und kirkliche Kunst in ihrem Verhältnis erläutert an einer Ikonographie der Kirche und Synagoge* (Stuttgart, 1894), p. 50.

The prophet play, therefore, is the liturgical drama which most clearly reveals the three phases of lyrical development mentioned above. It had originated in a recited *sermo* or *lectio* of Matins, had then been cast into a dramatic dialogue between the pseudo-Augustine and the prophets whom he summoned, and had finally undergone a transformation into separate Old Testament plays, in which prophetic utterance and expository comment were apportioned anew among individual characters. This last phase of the prophetic lyrical development is my own hypothesis, but it is related to the theory of Marius Sepet, French historian of the medieval drama,[9] whose monograph of 1878 argued that the *Processus prophetarum* became, through elaboration and reorganization, the Old Testament cycle plays. Although Sepet has been challenged in our century by a number of scholars, especially by Professor Hardin Craig,[10] I am convinced that his work was fundamentally sound, and that an analysis of the lyricism in the Towneley plays may be one method of vindicating him. I do not, of course, acquiesce in his terminology of an evolutionary development for a literary *genre* and I would reject his "laws" of "amplification," "désagrégation," and "juxtaposition." I regard these designations as the fashionable language of literary criticism in his day, comparable to the Freudianism which runs through our own literary discussions now. Sepet's essential contribution was independent of the biological metaphor for literary growth, and was a revelation of the liturgical riches in the *processus prophetarum.* He postulated an experimental and tentative search for a more flexible framework than the narrow one of the prophetic procession, an experiment made differently in various locales. I see many ways in which such an attempt to enlarge the *cadre* of the *processus* is visible in the later vernacular plays and I have devoted several essays to this problem. Here I can deal only with the repetitive lyrical *planctus* of the Old Testament patriarchs and precursors of Christ, but I am interested also in the philosophy of history which informs the vernacular cycles, in the "voix de l'Église" which enters as the basic interpretative voice, and in the stylistic complexities which the interplay of expository and mimetic voices creates. All of these possibilities are suggested by a reading of Sepet's work.

The prophet play in the Towneley vernacular cycle, although belonging to the oldest "layer" of composition,[11] displays a lyrical richness far greater than that in any of the surviving Latin prophet plays. Already at this early stage of cycle making the author of the vernacular drama has grasped the possibilities for lyrical expansion of the simple prophetic utterances available to him in the "Sermo contra Judaeos" or in the succeeding dramatic forms of the "Sermo." Most of the speeches in the pseudo-Augustinian work had been one or two sentences in length, the only extended passage in a prophetic voice being that of the Erythraean Sibyl, whose twenty-seven lines of verse were quoted from St. Augustine's *De civitate Dei.*[12] The brief prophecies in the "Sermo" had not been much expanded in the Latin prophet plays. It is all the more striking, then, to discover in the Towneley play that Moses speaks for ninety lines, David seventy-two, Daniel eighteen and the Sibyl fifty-four. The comparison is perhaps most revealing if the lines of David are isolated for special study, so that the Towneley elaborations may be clearly disclosed.

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[9] *Les prophètes du Christ* (Paris, 1878). The book, published in Paris, is a reprint of the several articles which had appeared since 1867 in the *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, referred to above. Since the periodical essays are much easier to obtain in this country, I have used them instead of the book.

[10] *English Religious Drama of the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 63-74.

[11] *The Towneley Plays*, ed. George England and A. W. Pollard. Early English Text Society, Extra Series, LXXI (London, 1897), Introd., pp. XXIII-XXV.

In the "Sermo contra Judaeos" David is quoted as a witness to the Messiah by the pseudo-Augustinian voice:

> "'Adorabunt,' inquit, 'eum omnes reges terre, omnes gentes seruient illi.' Cui seruient? dic, cui seruient? Vis audire cui? 'Dixit Dominus Domino meo: Sede ad dexteram meam, donec ponam inimicos tuos scabellum pedum tuorum.' Et expressius atque nominatim: 'Quare,' inquit, 'tumultuate sunt gentes, et populi meditati sunt inania? Astiterunt reges terre, et principes conuenerunt in unum aduersus Dominum et aduersus Christum eius.'"[13]

In the earliest surviving dramatic form of the "Sermo," that from St. Martial at Limoges, the summoning voice[14] calls upon David:

Dic tu, Dauid, de nepote
causas que sunt tibi note,

and the versified reply is as cryptic as that of the "Sermo":

Vniuersus
grex conuersus
adorabit Dominum,
  cui futurum
  seruiturum
omne genus hominum.
Dixit Dominus Domino meo:
Sede a [sic] dextris meis.[15]

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[12] Young, *op. cit.*, II, 132.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 127. Professor Young has printed the "Sermo" as it was arranged in a twelfth century lectionary of Arles for the sixth *lectio* of Matins.

[14] Marked "Cantor" conjecturally by Young, II, 138, n. 2.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

The corresponding text from Laon in the thirteenth century is even shorter, omitting the last two lines ("Dixit Dominus..."),[16] as does also the fourteenth century text from Rouen.[17]

When one turns from these Latin prophet plays to the English one in the Towneley manuscript, he finds no summoner nor expositor. David's prophecy begins at line 90 with a Latin statement, almost exactly the one which had opened his prophecy in the "Sermo contra Judaeos": "Omnes reges adorabunt eum, omnes gentes seruient ei."[18] David then chants a lengthy expository address (ll. 91-162), which draws more freely upon the Psalms than the "Sermo" or the Latin plays had done.[19] The passage has a heightened intensity which contrasts sharply with the preceding speech of Moses, who has expounded the Ten Commandments with prosaic didacticism. David unquestionably *sings* his lines, for he advises his hearers:[20]

> As god of heuen has gyffen me wit,
> shall I now syng you a fytt,
> With my mynstrelsy... (ll. 103-5)

Miss Lu Emily Pearson expressed genuine admiration of David's "ministrelsy" here, for she considered it one of the best isolable lyrics in the English religious plays. It appeared to her as a lyric incorporated into the play for its own sake and reminded her of the entertainment proffered to a lord by his scop or minstrel.[21] I see it myself as an indication of the dramatist's intuition that the simple prophecies of his Latin sources could be extended by embellished lyrical utterance, raising the mere statement of prophecy to a degree of intense emotional ardor as the prophet expressed his joy and his yearning for the Messiah. Writing in the *rime couée* or tail-rhyme stanza,[22] the author has given David a role in keeping with his Biblical designation as a harpist:

> Myrth I make till all men,
> with my harp and fyngers ten,
> And warn theym that thay glad;
> ffor god will that his son down send,
> That wroght adam with his hend,
> And heuen and erth mayde. (ll. 109-14)

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

[18] *The Towneley Plays*, p. 59.

[19] Lines 121-26, e.g., are a paraphrase of several verses in the eighteenth psalm (Douay numbering).

[20] The immediate audience is the "folk of Israell" addressed in the first line of the play by Moses, but the theater audience is in a sense also included, apparently.

[21] "Isolable Lyrics of the Mystery Plays," *ELH*, III (1936), 237.

[22] The pattern is $aa^4b^3cc^4b^3$.

The mood of hope and joyful expectation suffuses the entire passage, only a touch of sadness being suggested here and there as David, so to speak, envies those who will live to see the day of Christ's coming —

well were hym that that lordyng,
and that dere derlyng,
Myght bide on lyfe and se. (ll. 136-38)

II

The Towneley cycle, moreover, reveals this expansion and embellishment of Latin prophecy even beyond the limits of the prophet play. In its Old Testament division it contains plays on the Creation and Fall of Man, Cain and Abel, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Moses. These are the usual subjects of Old Testament dramas in the vernacular cycles, as Professor Craig observes,[23] with the exception of the Isaac-Jacob fragments. The protagonists of most of them are the patriarchs, and it is Craig's basic contention that the prominence of the patriarchs rather than the prophets in these cycles destroys the probability of Sepet's theory on the development of the Old Testament plays from the *Processus prophetarum*.[24] One may suggest, however, that the patriarchs have a role which is in a genuine sense prophetic, for they are precursors of Christ and prefigurative types of Him. Sepet himself used "prophecy" in this wider meaning at times,[25] and W. W. Greg found a very felicitous term for it when he spoke of "the prophetic principle" as operative in the Old Testament vernacular plays.[26] To Sepet's and Greg's ideas I would like to add that the lyricism of these plays, in the Towneley cycle at least, is a further extension of the prophetic utterance in the *Processus prophetarum*, even when this lyricism is the speech of patriarchs rather than of prophets.

The figures of Adam, Noah, Abraham and Moses unquestionably dominate the Old Testament span in Towneley, forming a procession of their own, so to speak, leading up to the prophet play, which is itself a miniature procession. The patriarchs (except Adam) are presented as old and venerable, in experience and usually also in years, and they radiate an aura of melancholy weariness which casts a solemn shadow across the plays. They acquire a majestic grandeur through their age, comparable to the effect which Émile Mâle found in the statuary adorning the north cathedral porch at Chartres. At the entrance are twelve statues of patriarchs and prophets, who seem, he says,

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[23] *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

[25] *Loc. cit.*, XXIX (1868), 106-9 and 283.

[26] *Bibliographical and Textual Problems of the English Miracle Cycles* (London, 1914), p. 16.

"like true fathers of the race, pillars of humanity, but how much do they gain in grandeur and mystery as precursors of a greater than themselves."[27] Mâle regarded this series of stone figures as the most profound of the medieval graphic representations of the Bible in which history and symbol meet. They stand like beings who belong to the dawn of the world, having a more than human magnitude.[28] Something of this grandeur is there in the Towneley plays as the patriarchs express in their own persons the sadness of Israel longing for its Messiah. To the ones I have enumerated may also be added Simeon, who in the seventeenth play, the "Purification," speaks as do the Old Testament patriarchs.

Since the Creation drama is incomplete in the Towneley manuscript (twelve pages apparently containing Adam's fall and subsequent remorse having been lost, as the editors surmise)[29] the first pertinent play is that of Noah. He opens the scene with a monologue of seventy-two lines, which begins as a prayer addressed to "Myghtfull god," shifts into a rumination on the fate of the fallen angels and of our first parents (15-54), becomes subjective in reference as Noah expresses fear of God's vengeance on the whole sinful world (55-63) and ends with a prayerful address crying for mercy (64-72). The entire monologue is unified by the pervasive melancholy in both its subjective and objective reference,[30] and can very well be called a lyric *planctus* of an old man:

> Sex hundreth yeris and od/ haue I, without distance, [indisputably]
> In erth, as any sod/ liffyd with grete grevance
> All way;
> And now I wax old,
> seke, sory, and cold,
> As muk apon mold
> I widder away. (57-63)[31]

Abraham's monologue at the opening of the next play is very similar in structure to that of Noah. He first addresses "Adonay, thou god veray," (l.l.) in a plea for succor, lapses into a puzzled meditation on his ancestors

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[27] *Religious Art in France in the Thirteenth Century*, trans. Dora Nussey (London and New York, 1913), p. 152.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 152 and 173.

[29] *The Towneley Plays*, p. 9.

[30] My interest in the problem of voice and address, and some of the terminology of "reference" are derived from Professor J. Craig La Drière's work. See the *Dictionary of World Literature*, ed. Joseph Shipley, 2d ed. (New York, 1953), under "Classification," "Expression," and "Voice and Address."

[31] One cannot help remarking that Noah's age and venerable character are lost sight of in his domestic quarrel.

"Wheder ar' all oure elders went?" (l. 11), recalls the history of the race from Adam to Lot and then, before his closing prayer, breaks into a subjective *planctus*:

When I thynk of oure elders all,
  And of the mervels that has been,
No gladnes in my hart may fall,
  My comfort goys away full cleyn.
lord, when shall dede make me his thrall? [death]
  An hundreth yeris, certis, haue I seyn;
Ma fa! sone I hope he shall, [my faith]
  ffor it were right hie tyme I weyn. (33-40)

Moses appears in the role of both prophet and leader, the first in his extensive part of the "Processus prophetarum" (Play VII), and the second in the "Pharao" (The Exodus), No. VIII.[32] In neither drama does he have a passage of old-age lamentation, although his first appearance as a shepherd in the "Pharao" is accompanied by an address to God (89-96) in the manner of the prayers spoken by Noah and Abraham, and a narrative of his Providential preservation from Pharaoh's scheme of exterminating all Jewish males (93-100). Moses' sense of inadequacy for his role as deliverer and his overpowering fear are movingly expressed in his colloquy with God (142-57), as his sense of a Providential destiny wars with his human terror at the personal danger:

Good lord, lett som othere frast, [try]
that has more fors the folke to fere (146-7) [to frighten]

The motif of the aged prophet or patriarch awaiting the Redemption of Israel is struck once more in the cycle, in the play of the Purification, (No. XVII). Simeon totters on to the stage with a prayer "Myghtfull god, thou vs glad"! (1-8), and falls like his predecessors into a reflection on those who have departed before him:

Bot yit I meruell, both euyn and morne,
Of old elders that were beforne,
wheder thay be safe or lorne,
  where thay may be;
Abell, noye, and abraham,
Dauid, daniell, and balaam,
And all othere mo by name,
  Of sere degre. (9-16)

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[32] This Exodus play, as Pollard observes, should precede and not follow the prophet play. (*Op. cit.*, Introduction, p. xxiv.)

Simeon mingles patriarchs and prophets in his list. The shift from third person to first person reference brings the now familiar *planctus* on old age, and Simeon's is very protracted, covering seven stanzas and detailing the stiffness, the pains, and the creaking of joints which he suffers. Decrepitude has not, however, destroyed his vivid memory —

> yit if I be neuer so old,
> I myn full well that prophetys told... (53-4) [recall]

and he concludes the monologue with a prayer that death will not overtake him until he can see and handle the One Who is to come (70-72).

Many years ago Professor G. C. Taylor, in discussing the lyricism to be found in the English religious plays, paused for a special observation on the laments of old men. He had found many such lyric complaints outside of the drama, sufficient to constitute a little genre of *planctus* on the theme of age, and he thought that the complaints of dramatic characters like Noah, Joseph and Simeon had been influenced by this independent genre.[33] Professor Taylor did not remark, however, on the great difference between the poems within the drama and those outside. The poems which he cited in collections of Middle English lyrics are laments of aged men approaching death after a gay and sinful life, weighed down by the sense of youthful folly and guilt. This theme never appears in the *planctus* of the Towneley patriarchs, for they are Old Testaments *saints*, burdened not by their sins but by the long and weary vigil anticipating the Messiah's advent. The grandeur and the sadness of their "more than human magnitude" rise far above the lyric ejaculations in the *danse macabre* tradition of Lydgate and such poets.

Miss Pearson was also impressed by the occurrence of the old-age laments in the English cycle drama and she postulated a common source for them all in non-dramatic vernacular literature.[34] She did not identify such a source, however, and I think the search for such an origin of these laments outside of the drama is a mistake. At present I am not convinced that the motif is found in the other cycles in a state comparable to that in Towneley, although the possibility exists that Miss Pearson's "common source" is one of the dramatic cycles (perhaps Towneley) in an early stage of development — a possibility which points to a stronger support for Sepet's theory than I am offering in the present article.[35]

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[33] "The Relation of the English Corpus Christi Play to the Middle English Lyric," *MP*, V (1907-8), 6-7.

[34] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 251-52.

[35] I am in agreement with Miss Mary Marshall and R. H. Wilson that the material of the vernacular plays is derived principally from earlier dramatic sources rather than from non-dramatic ones. (Marshall, "The Dramatic Tradition Established by the Liturgical Plays,"

This motif of lament, repeated at intervals throughout the cycle, seems to me a special creation, different from non-dramatic poetry; it is an extension of the prophetic utterances in the *Processus prophetarum.*—The patriarchs, who are precursors and types of Christ, are prophetic in the larger sense of that word, and come forward at the beginning of their respective pageants to deliver the testimony of their personal expectation in a series of stylized monologues. These are similar to the familiar pattern of prophecy found in the Latin prophet plays. The arrangement is peculiar to the Towneley plays, nothing comparable to it being visible in Chester or Hegge, and only a faint similarity traceable in York.[36] It is an aesthetic pattern giving to the plays, a beauty which merges into the artistic design of the whole, and helps to raise that totality above the level of rhetorical didacticism and discursive speech.

The thematic pattern has variations in other monologues throughout the cycle which strike me as written in a different "key" but as related in function to the old-age *planctus.* Such is the lengthy exposition by John the Baptist in Play XIX, 1-64, which is clearly prophetic, as indeed John had been among the prophetic witnesses to the Messiah in the "Sermo contra Judaeos"[37] and in the Latin prophet plays.[38] He says here:

> Emang prophetys then am I oone
> That god has send to teche his law,
> And man to amend, that wrang has gone,
> Both with exampyll and with saw. (9-12) [speech]

The entire play seems to me an elaboration of John's brief dramatic part in the prophet plays, and yet I do not recall that any historians of the drama have admitted its testimony to Sepet's theory of the expanded *Processus prophetarum.* It is comparable to the expansion of Simeon's role from the *Processus* into a play of the Purification, as noted above.[39] John's monologue cannot be called a *planctus* and certainly not that of an old man (for he was of the same age as Christ). The lyricism, instead, is suffused with joyful expectation of imminent fulfillment, for the waiting is over and John recognizes

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PMLA, LVI (1941), 962-9; Wilson, "*The Stanzaic Life of Christ* and the Chester Plays," *SP,* XXVIII (1931), 413-32.

[36] See the York play of Noah (No. VIII), ll. 89-119. (*York Plays,* ed. Lucy Toulmin Smith (Oxford, 1885). The lament of Adam after the fall is found in many vernacular cycles, but it is not a part, as I see it, of the old age *planctus* pattern. Professor Craig refers to the frequency of Adam's lament, in "The Origin of the Old Testament Plays," *MP,* X (1912-13), 6.

[37] See text in Young, *op. cit.,* II, 129.

[38] *Ibid.,* p. 141 (St. Martial at Limoges); p. 149 (Laon); p. 163 (Rouen).

[39] Professor Hardin Craig sees the Purification plays as independent and late additions to the cycles. (*Op. cit.,* p. 63).

his mission as precursor:

> I go before, bodword to bere,
> And as forgangere am I send... (27-8)

The structure of his opening monologue has, however, the same design as that of the patriarchal laments and places him in the line of precursors and prophets. It begins with the prayer to "God, that mayde both more and les," shifts into the historical reference to his forebears (Zachary and Elisabeth), adverts to the imminent coming of Christ (15-62), whose Passion and death he prophesies (31-40), and finally closes with a prayer of praise for the mercy of God the Father (57-64).

In conclusion, I should recognize the problem created by the three strata or layers of dramatic composition in the Towneley cycle. As scholars have shown, the plays are not the work of one man but of various redactors over at least a half century. One may well question, therefore, whether a lyrical motif repeated in plays of different chronological periods can be regarded as a genuine pattern. Simeon's *planctus* occurs in the play of the Purification, which belongs to the primitive layer of composition;[40] that of Abraham may well be of the second stratum,[41] and Noah's lament is unquestionably the work of the Wakefield Master, a third redactor of the plays.[42] The presence of the *planctus* in all three strata is, to my thinking, strong evidence that it formed an important part in the earliest version of the cycle and was retained or imitated by the redactors in their later versions precisely because they recognized it as a structural principle in the cycle's formation.

Another architectural analogy from the cathedral of Chartres has occurred to me in contemplating this lyrical pattern. The famed rose motif of Chartres, which awed and delighted Henry Adams, dominates its western facade, is repeated on a smaller scale above the clerestory windows along the walls and bursts into splendor again in the transept windows above the north and south porches.[43] In both the drama and the cathedral a patterned unity prevails in the midst of variety. In the drama this unity forms a kind of prophetic procession of witnesses to the Messiah, and constitutes the cycle as an expanded prophet play,[44] thus lending its evidence to the general theory of Marius Sepet on the history of the Latin *Processus prophetarum*.

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[40] Pollard, *Towneley Plays*, p. XXIV.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. XXVI.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. XXVIII; Hardin Craig, *op. cit.*, pp. 215 ff., deals with the "Wakefield Master" as a redactor, but differs from Pollard on the two earlier strata.

[43] Henry Adams, *Mont-St.-Michel and Chartres* (Boston, 1904), pp. 112-17.

[44] I am not arguing, of course, that everything in a play like the "Noah" or "The Purification" is developed from the *Processus prophetarum*. The quarrel of Noah with his wife, e.g., and the sacrifice of Isaac are narrative elements not dependent on the *Processus*.

The Date of the Cornish "Ordinalia"

DAVID C. FOWLER

THE Cornish *Ordinalia*[1] is one of the most important texts for study of the medieval drama in England. It consists of three dramatic productions designed for performance on three successive days: *Ordinale de Origine Mundi*, depicting events extending from the creation of the world to the building of Solomon's temple; *Passio Domini Nostri Jhesu Christi*, presenting the life of Christ; and *Ordinale de Resurrexione Domini Nostri Jhesu Christi*, in which are grouped traditional events associated with the Resurrection. These three dramas are often referred to more briefly as the *Origo Mundi* (O.M.), *Passio Christi* (P.C.), and *Resurrexio Domini* (R.D.).

While it is true that the individual episodes in the *Ordinalia* are found in a sequence analogous to those in the English cycle plays, nevertheless the Cornish text is not a mere accumulation or stringing together of plays, but rather it has a deliberate and skillful dramatic development extending through the entire three-days performance. The events taken from the Old Testament in the *Origo Mundi* are given a unity and a typological significance by the dramatist's skillful employment of the legend of the Holy Rood, beginning with Seth's journey to Paradise in quest of the oil of mercy for his father Adam. Dramatic intensity is achieved in the *Passio Christi* by a concentration on events surrounding the Crucifixion. There is no Nativity, no Slaughter of the Innocents; the *Passio Christi* begins with the temptation in the wilderness, and then proceeds immediately to the entry into Jerusalem. The heart of the *Resurrexio Domini*, as might be expected, is the *Quem Quaeritis* and associated episodes; but these are followed by a lively interlude on the death of Pilate, and the whole drama comes to an impressive conclusion with what is unquestionably one of the finest Ascension plays ever written.

In addition to its importance as a literary text, the *Ordinalia* is especially rich in stage directions, and at the conclusion of each of the three dramas appears a diagram in the MS showing the disposition of the main characters in the drama for that particular day. These diagrams and stage directions show that the stage used in this case was fixed and circular, and that, in all probability, the Cornish drama in the Middle Ages was presented in an open-air theater-in-the-round or "playing place" (Cornish *plen an gwary*), of which a beautifully preserved specimen survives to this day near Perranporth in Cornwall.[2]

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[1] Edwin Norris (ed.) *The Ancient Cornish Drama* (2 vols.) Oxford, 1859.

Yet in spite of its superior quality as a literary text, and as a source of information about the medieval stage, the Cornish *Ordinalia* has been almost totally neglected by students of the medieval drama.[3] Such studies as do exist have been largely confined to its text and language.[4] As a result we know very little about the circumstances and date if its composition, the basis of its metrical form, its sources, and its relationship, if any, to the other dramas in England or on the Continent.[5] My purpose in the present study is to consider only one of these unknowns: the date of composition of the *Ordinalia*. The conclusions which I offer here must of course be regarded as tentative, for it should be obvious that other problems, such as the identification of sources, will of necessity affect our thinking about the date of composition.

I. Previous Opinions

The Bodleian manuscript of the *Ordinalia* was probably copied during the first half of the fifteenth century.[6] This copy, however, because of the types of errors it contains, cannot be the author's original, which must therefore have been made at an earlier date.[7] But how much earlier? The difficulty of this question can be seen in the fact that previous estimates of the date of the original range from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries.

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[2] Cf. R. Morton Nance, 'The Plen an Gwary or Cornish Playing-Place,' *Journal of the Royal Institution of Cornwall*, XXIV (1935), 190-211; also the Introduction to F. E. Halliday's *The Legend of the Rood*, London, 1955.

[3] The most recent bibliography is Carl J. Stratman, *Bibliography of Medieval Drama*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1954, pp. 145-47. Later studies mention the Cornish drama, but do not exhibit any original research: Hardin Craig, *English Religious Drama of the Middle Ages*, Oxford, 1955, pp. 142, 153; Richard Southern, *The Medieval Theatre in the Round*, London, 1957, pp. 60-69, 130 f., 147, 223-26; Glynne Wickham, *Early English Stages, 1300 to 1660* (Vol. I, 1300 to 1576), London, 1959, pp. 129, 233. A dissertation by George H. White, *The Cornish Drama*, University of Chicago, 1929, is listed by Stratman (*op. cit.*, p. 147), but I have not been able to locate it.

[4] Cf. especially Whitley Stokes, 'Collation of Norris' *Ancient Cornish Drama*,' *Archiv für Celtische Lexikographie*, I (1898) 161-74; J. Loth, 'Études Corniques,' *Revue Celtique*, XXVI (1905) 218-67. For other references cf. Henry Lewis, *Llawlyfr Cernyweg Canol* (Argraffiad Newydd), Caerdydd 1946 pp. 1-5.

[5] Norris' edition (*op. cit.*, note 1 above) has the fullest account, in II, 437-514. Also of some value are Henry Jenner, *A Handbook of the Cornish Language*, London, 1904, pp. 24-46; the articles by Jenner in the *Celtic Review*, III (1906-07) 360-75 and *ibid.*, IV (1907-08) 41-68; F. E. Halliday, *The Legend of the Rood*, London, 1955, Introduction and extracts from the *Ordinalia* in translation.

[6] F. Madan and H. H. E. Craster (eds.), *A Summary Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford*, vol. II, part 1, Oxford, 1922, p. 465 (no. 2639): 'written in the first half of the 15th cent.' The MS is Bodleian 791. E.H. Pedler, in an appendix to Norris' edition, makes the parenthetical statement (II, 510), that 'the MS. is said to have been brought to Oxford in 1450.' He appears to have derived this statement from William Hals,

The first person to attempt anything more than an impressionistic judgment of the date of the text was E. H. Pedler, whose notes on the place names, etc., in the *Ordinalia* were incorporated in Norris' edition.[8] After having discussed and identified most of the place names that appear in the text, Pedler adds the following observations on the date (II, 506):

> It is much to be desired that the date of these Dramas could be fixed with something like certainty, but it is feared that this is not quite practicable. An approximation to it however seems to be attainable. The use of the barbarous and scarcely recognizable word *Vuthek* for *Budock* and of *Fekenel* for *Feock*, notwithstanding that the names of Budock and Feock are to be found in the census of 1291, and the occurrence of *Lostuthyel* for *Lostwithiel*, when we know that the former word was superseded by the latter in the reign of Edw. I., are so many independent grounds for presuming that these writings cannot well be assigned to a period much later than the last quarter of the thirteenth century. The Anglo-French words which are found interspersed throughout the text furnish another criterion, though perhaps an imperfect one, whereby an opinion may be formed of the date, and from such portions of the Drama as I have seen, it does not appear that this test would lead to a conclusion adverse to that already stated.

It is difficult to determine from the statement above just how extensive was Pedler's knowledge of the history of Cornish place names, and indeed it must be admitted that some of his identifications (e.g. *Fekenel* for *Feock*) are certainly erroneous. The important point, however, is that his recourse to place names was probably the soundest possible basis for a linguistic judgement concerning the date of composition of the plays.[9]

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eighteenth century antiquary and Cornish historian, who cites a passage from the *Origo Mundi* and identifies it as 'a play brought into Oxford in 1450, and still extant in the Bodleian library there' (quoted by John Whitaker, *The Ancient Cathedral of Cornwall Historically Surveyed* [2 vols.], London. 1804, II, 24-5 n.). Where Hals got this information I do not know. Already Edward Lhuyd, *Archaeologia Britannica*, Oxford, 1707, p. 265, had examined the MS and listed it as "*Ex dono* Jacobi Button *Armigeri, e Comitatu* Wigorniensi. *An.* 1615" (cf. also *Summary Catalogue*, vol. II, pt. 1, p. 465: 'Donum Jacobi Button armigeri ex comitatu Wigorniensi 28° Mart. 1615').

[7] I am indebted to the Royal Institution of Cornwall, and to Mr. Douch, curator of the Museum, in Truro, for granting me permission to consult the papers of the late R. Morton Nance, whose 'Notes on the MS. of the *Ordinalia*' contain valuable observations on the text. For further information on Nance and his work see note 11 below.

[8] *The Ancient Cornish Drama*, II, 473-514.

[9] The history of the decline of the Cornish language has not yet been written. Indeed the

Since the appearance of the *Ordinalia* in Norris' edition in 1859, no one has seriously studied the problem of dating the text. Norris himself had only this to say (II, 437):

> The date of the composition of these works [the *Ordinalia* and the Cornish passion poem] is nowhere stated, but from the condition of the language, the form of the English words introduced into it, and a comparison with an ancient Cornish Vocabulary in the British Museum, reproduced in the preceding pages, it may be inferred that it cannot be much older than the age of the Manuscripts; certainly it cannot be assigned to a period earlier than the fourteenth century.

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dating of the *Ordinalia* is an important prerequisite to the writing of that history. The model for this type of study is Kenneth Jackson, *Language and History in Early Britain*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953. Jackson, however, is concerned with the Brythonic languages as a group, and stops in the twelfth century where Middle Cornish begins. There is a brief history of the Cornish language in Jenner's *Handbook* (cf. note 5 above), pp. 3-23. A more recent account which takes issue with Jenner on some points, is A.S.D. Smith, *The Story of the Cornish Language. Its Extinction and Revival*, Camborne, 1947. But these are mere sketches. A full account would need to make use of all the evidence, historical and linguistic, in the manner of Kenneth Jackson.

For study of the Cornish language the pioneer work of Edward Lhuyd in *Archaeologia Britannica*, Oxford, 1707, is still important. Other works, of unequal value, may be mentioned: The Cornish-English vocabulary inserted in William Borlase, *Observations on the Antiquities... of the County of Cornwall*, Oxford, 1754, pp. 374-413; William Pryce, *Archaeologia Cornu-Britannica, or An Essay to Preserve the Ancient Cornish Language...*, London, 1790 (apparently this book is the work of Lhuyd, augmented by Thomas Tonkin — cf. Norris, *op. cit.*, II, 470-72); Norris' own 'Sketch of Cornish Grammar' is appended to his edition of the *Ordinalia* (II, 217-308), and he also prints the valuable Old Cornish vocabulary from British Museum MS Cotton Vespasian A xiv (II, 309-435); Robert Williams, *Lexicon Cornu-Britannicum*, Llandovery and London, 1865, is especially useful because of its quotations, with line references, in support of the definitions, although Williams did not know of the existence of the *Bewnans Meryasek*, which is therefore not represented in his dictionary

Virtually all of the Cornish texts were edited during the ninteenth century. In addition to Norris' *The Ancient Cornish Drama* (1859), the following were edited, all by Whitley Stokes: 'The Passion. A Middle-Cornish Poem,' *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1860-61, Appendix, pp. 1-100; *Gwreans an Bys. The Creation of the World, A Cornish Mystery*, The Philological Society: Berlin, 1863 (London, 1864); *The Life of St. Meryasek*, London, 1872.

Indispensable for study of all the Celtic languages, including Cornish, is Holger Pedersen, *Vergleichende Grammatik der keltischen Sprachen* (2 vols.), Göttingen, 1909-1913. An abridged version of this in English, with some modifications and additions, is Henry Lewis and Holger Pedersen, *A Concise Comparative Celtic Grammar*, Göttingen, 1937. Lewis has also published a small volume in Welsh, *Llawlyfr Cernyweg Canol* ['Handbook of Middle Cornish'], Caerdydd, 1946, which contains a grammar, readings from Cornish literature, and a glossary.

The Cornish revival (see note 11 below) produced a number of valuable works. In addition to Jenner's *Handbook* already mentioned, there are the following important books by R. Morton Nance: *Cornish for All: A Guide to Unified Cornish*, St. Ives, 1929 (several edi-

E. K. Chambers, in his monumental study, *The Mediaeval Stage*, was skeptical of Pedler's early date, but then simply followed Norris by stating that the text is "not earlier in date than the fourteenth century."[10]

Perhaps the most outstanding student of the Cornish language and literature in recent years has been the late R. Morton Nance, who, with the able assistance of the late A. S. D. Smith, prepared new editions of all the significant Cornish texts.[11] Their edition of the *Ordinalia* has not been printed in its entirety, but extracts from it have been published within the last ten years. In the Preface to one of these extracts, Nance remarks that "internal evidence points to [the *Ordinalia*] having been written somewhere about 1450 at Glasney Priory, Penryn."[12] Unfortunately, he does not say what the internal evidence is.[13] We are left, therefore, with a choice of dates covering a period of one hundred and seventy-five years, from 1275 to 1450.

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tions); *English-Cornish Dictionary*, St. Ives, 1934 (with A.S.D. Smith; rev. ed., 1951); *Gerlyver Noweth Kernewek ha Sawsnek: A New Cornish-English Dictionary*, St. Ives, 1938 (rev. ed., 1955). Nance did not publish these books for the benefit of scholars, but they are scholarly nevertheless. An excellent short grammar, with exercises, was published by 'Caradar' (A.S.D. Smith), *Cornish Simplified*, in 1939 (2nd ed., Exeter, 1955). Of the new editions of Cornish texts prepared by R. Morton Nance and A. S. D. Smith, only *Gwryans an Bys* (in a mimeographed edition, 1959) has thus far appeared. For a list of their published extracts from the *Ordinalia* and *Bewnans Meryasek*, see note 12, below.

[10] *The Mediaeval Stage* (2 vols.), London, 1903, II, 433.

[11] The Nance MSS have recently been turned over to the Museum of the Royal Institution of Cornwall (see note 7 above). They include complete editions and translations (in typescript) of the *Ordinalia*, *Pascon agan Arluth*, *Bewnans Meryasek*, and Jordan's *Creation (Gwryans an Bys)*, in unified Middle Cornish, prepared by Nance and A. S. D. Smith. There is also a transcript of the recently discovered Tregear MS. These texts are of great value to the student of Cornish, for, although they are regularized in a manner unacceptable to the philologist, they are based on fresh collations of the original MSS, and contain perceptive emendations, as well as frequent improvements in translation. The quotations in the present study are taken from the printed editions, but I have corrected these where necessary from the collations of Nance and Smith, and have also adopted some of their improvements in translation. For a brief account of the preparation of these texts, see Nance's note, 'Caradar,' in *Old Cornwall*, vol. IV, no. 12 (Winter, 1951), 477. Scattered through the issues of this journal are some valuable notes by Nance on cruxes in the *Ordinalia* and other Cornish texts. Nance and Smith were important leaders in the recent Cornish revival. For an account of this interesting movement see John J. Parry, 'The Revival of Cornish: An Dasserghyans Kernewek,' *PMLA*, LXI (1946), 258-68.

[12] 'Extracts from the Cornish Texts in unified spelling with amended translation' (1949 ff.), No. I: *Bewnans Meryasek* (lines 759-1096); No. II: *An Tyr Marya* (R.D., lines 679-834); No. III: *Sylvester ha'n Dhragon* (B.M., lines 3896-4180); No. IV: *Abram hag Ysak* (O.M., lines 1259-1394); No. V: *Adam ha Seth* (O.M., lines 684-880); No. VI: *David hag Urry* (O.M., lines 2105-2254). Nance's estimate of the date of the *Ordinalia*, quoted above, appears in No. II, *An Tyr Marya*, Preface, p. 1.

[13] In his 'Notes on the MS. of the *Ordinalia*' (cf. note 7 above), Nance has this to say

In view of the existing uncertainty about the date of the *Ordinalia*, a review of the evidence would seem to be desirable. In the following pages I will attempt such a review and, in addition, will introduce other evidence of my own which may at least serve to reduce the range of possible dates.

II. THE EVIDENCE OF PLACE NAMES

Twenty-three place names appear in the text of the *Ordinalia*, and, as E. H. Pedler has shown,[14] they are valuable in two ways. First of all, they indicate by their geographical distribution that the plays were almost certainly intended for an audience familiar with Penryn and its environs.[15] This interpretation of the evidence seems to be generally accepted. F. E. Halliday, for example, makes the following observation:[16]

> That the provenance [of the *Ordinalia*] is Penryn is clear from the number of references to neighbouring places; thus, Solomon grants his masons the parish of Budock and the Seal Rock 'with its mead,' a joke that would be relished by the local audience, for the rock is a barren and dangerous crag in the middle of the harbour entrance; and then, the bishop gives the executioners 'the Canonry of the Close' as well as 'the town' which he does not trouble to name, as for members and neighbours of Glasney College it could mean only Penryn.

Furthermore it seems likely, as Pedler suggests,[17] that the author of the plays was a cleric attached to Glasney College, which was located in Penryn and was

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about MS Bodleian 791: 'from the handwriting and the style of Cornish used in it, however, it can be judged to belong to the 15th century, and probably to its second half, and the expert opinion of Middle-English scholars decides that the bits of English in it are also such as might have been current between 1470 and 1500.' Unfortunately, this statement is as much as I have been able to find in the Nance papers on the date of the *Ordinalia*, and it is of dubious value, for three reasons: 1) It runs counter to the estimate of date in the Bodleian catalogue (first half of the 15th century) without attempting to refute it on paleographical grounds (cf. quotation from *Summary Catalogue*, note 6 above); 2) although Nance's opinion on the 'style of Cornish' must be respected, there is, as we have seen (note 9 above), no firm chronology for the decline of the Cornish language; 3) I am afraid that the expert opinion of Middle-English scholars, on which Nance was forced to rely, was not based on a study of the text of the *Ordinalia* itself, but merely on extracts which Nance copied out and sent to them (Nance, 'Notes', n. 2).

[14] *The Ancient Cornish Drama*, II, 473 ff.

[15] See accompanying map, 'Place Names in the Cornish *Ordinalia*.'

[16] *The Legend of the Rood*, London, 1955, pp. 12-13. Halliday (Preface, p. v) acknowledges his indebtedness to R. M. Nance.

[17] *The Ancient Cornish Drama*, II, 504 ff. John Whitaker, *The Ancient Cathedral of Cornwall*, II, 25n, had already pointed out that the place names in the *Ordinalia* suggest that the author was a 'parishioner' of St. Gluvias.

PLACE NAMES IN THE CORNISH ORDINALIA


CORNWALL
Lostuthyel
gon Darsotha
ar Enys
Guerthour
Bosuene
le Kenel
Behethlan
PENRYN
Heyl
Carnsuyow
Trehembys
pu Vuthek
an Garrak Ruen
Arwennek
Tregerve
Kegyllek
Bosaneth
Lanerhy
Merthyn
Hellas
Carvenow
Marghes jow
Cruk-heyth
N
0
4
8 miles
GREAT BRITAIN
Area shown on large scale map

the intellectual capital of Cornwall in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[18] There are, however, no allusions in the plays that enable us to be any more specific than this, although efforts have been made to identify the author.[19]

The other way in which the place names have potential value, as we have seen, is the evidence for dating the text provided by their forms.[20] Pedler's study of these names is valuable, but it is inevitably vitiated by the paucity of evidence available to him at the time of his investigations. Fortunately a thorough study of the place names of Cornwall has been made in recent years by J. E. B. Gover,[21] which enables us to arrive at a far more reliable evaluation of the evidence than was possible in Pedler's day. Let us therefore turn to an examination of the place names in the *Ordinalia.*

In the analysis which follows I give as a heading each place name as it is spelled in the text, together with a reference to the line(s) in which it occurs in the *Ordinalia*; then the forms of that name provided by Gover, including the date of the documents in which the names appear;[22] and, finally, I append my own comment on the identity and form of each name. Unless otherwise indicated, all the parishes mentioned are in Kirrier Hundred.

gon Dansotha (R.D. 377)

Dofen soðo 960, *Dounsoda* 1302, *Dunsoda* 1338, *Donsoda* c. 1530.

Dansotha does not survive as a modern place name, but once designated a plain or down (*gon*) in the parish of St. Agnes, Pyder Hundred (Gover, p. 363). Pedler's identification (Norris, II, 496 f.) is wide of the mark. Unfortunately the form *Dansotha* cannot be assigned significant chronological limits. The voiced dental spirant appears as early as 960 (Cornish *th* can be either voiced or voiceless), and this same sound may be intended by the later spellings with *d*.

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[18] Thurston C. Peter, *The History of Glasney Collegiate Church, Cornwall*, Camborne, 1903.

[19] Charles W. Boase, *Registrum Collegii Exoniensis* (Oxford Historical Society XXVII), Oxford, 1894, p. LXXV: 'John de Landreyn fellow of Exeter was canon of Glasney 1376, William Noe canon 1413; Walter Trengoff was Provost of Glasney 1427-36, and Michael Trewynard and John Evelyn Provosts later on in the century. These University men may have had something to do with the composition of these dramas, in which more art is used in continuing the series of events than we find in the Towneley, Chester, and Coventry Mysteries, the contemporary English collections.' In the light of evidence presented in this study, Boase's first suggestion seems especially attractive. For details of the life of John de Landreyn see A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500* (3 vols.), Oxford, 1957-59, II, 1090. Other possible candidates for authorship of the *Ordinalia* are John Crabbe (Emden, I, 508), William de Heghes (Emden, II, 903), and William de Polmorva (Emden, III, 1492 f.).

[20] Pedler, in *The Ancient Cornish Drama*, II, 473 ff.

[21] J. E. B. Gover, *The Placenames of Cornwall*, 1948. The original typescript is in the Museum of the Royal Institution of Cornwall, Truro, and a carbon copy is deposited in the National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth. I am indebted to Mr. Gover for allowing me to make use of this excellent study.

[22] To save space I omit mention of documents in which the place names appear; e.g. Gover has '*dofen sodo* 960 A.S. Ch.' [= Anglo-Saxon Chronicle], etc.

Lostuthyel (O.M. 2400)

> *Lostwetell* 1194, *Lostudiel* 1195, *Lostwidiel* 1198, *capella de Loshuliel* [*sic*] c. 1200, *Lustodiel* 1200, *Lustudiel* 1201, *Lostwitthiel* 1201, *Lostwithiel* 1234. This last is the usual spelling from now on except: — *Lostwythyel* 1224, and occasionally up to 1500, *Lostwhidiel* 1269, *Lostuthiel* 1275, *Lostwydyel* 1284, *Lostuzyel* 1303, *Lostuwythiel* 1303, *Lostwythyel juxta Penknegh* 1349, *Lustwythiel* c. 1420.

This is modern Lostwithiel, in the parish of Lanlivery, Powder Hundred (Gover, p. 402). The forms of the name exhibit interesting and significant variation. Despite the apparent anarchy of the spellings, two sound changes can be detected. One is the shift from dental stop to voiced spirant: *d* to *th* (*Lostwidiel* to *Lostwithiel*); the other is the modification of vowel in the accented syllable: *u* to *wi* (*Lostuthiel* to *Lostwithiel*). The latest occurrence of the dental stop is 1284; the latest occurrence of the *u* in the accented syllable is 1303. The form of the name in the *Ordinalia* (*Lostuthyel*) shows the first shift completed, and the second shift not yet established. If we take Gover's citations as representative, therefore, the form *Lostuthyel* should fall theoretically within the years 1284 and 1303. Actually, the nearest comparable form instanced by Gover is *Lostuthiel* (1275).

plu Vuthek (O.M. 2463)

> *Ecclesie Sancti Budoci de Triliver* 1208, *Ecclesia Sancti Budoci* 1245, *Parochia Budoci Majoris* 1349, *St. Bedock* 1430, *Seynt Buthek* 1449, *Parish of Bewtheck by Penryn* 1466, *Budok* 1535, *Bewdocke* 1563, *St. Budocke* 1601, *Bythick* 1727, *Beaudock nigh Falmouth* 1749.

This is the parish (*plu*) of Budock, south of Penryn (Gover, p. 496). The sound change *d* to *th*, which occurred in the thirteenth century, and which we have already encountered in *Lostwithiel*, is here obscured by the fact that *Budock* is the name of a Celtic saint. The persistence of the Latin form of the name has inhibited the regular shift from *Budock* to *Buthek*, although the shift did occur in popular speech, as can be seen from some of the later spellings. Pedler argued against identifying this name with the saint, and regarded *Buthek* as the original form, but on insufficient grounds; *Budic* appears in the

Bodmin Manumissions (tenth century).[23] According to Gover (p. 496) it is from O. British *Boudiccos* (cf. the fem. *Boudicca*, corruptly *Boadicea*).

Arwennek (O.M. 2592)

Arwennech 1260, *Arwennek* 1285, *Arweneke* 1374, *Arwennock* 1421.

Arwennack, in the parish of Budock (Gover, p. 497).

Tregenver (O.M. 2593)

Tregenver 1336, etc.

Tregenver, in the parish of Budock (Gover, p. 500).

Kegullek (O.M. 2593)

Kekyliet [*sic*] 1313, *Kegulyek* 1327, *Kegelicke* 1328, *Cugilliek juxta Penryn* 1345.

Modern Kergilliack, in the parish of Budock (Gover, p. 498).

Lanerhy (O.M. 2400)

Lannergh 1333, *Lanharth* 1506.

This is probably Lanner in the parish of Constantine (Gover, p. 504), although places with the name *Lanner* or *Lannarth* also appear in the parishes of St. Allen, Gwennap, and St. Sithney (Gover, pp. 431, 515, 527). Lanner in Constantine was once a part of the Manor of Carwythenack.[24] I cannot explain the *Ordinalia* spelling with final *y* (*Lanerhy*). Norris (I, 182) misprints it as *lanerchy*.[25]

Merthyn (R.D. 94)

Merðin 1186, *Mereðin* 1195, *Meredin* 1195, *Merethin* 1198, *Merthin* 1216, *Merethyn* 1235, *Merthyn* 1306, *Marthyn* 1556.

This is Merthen in the parish of Constantine (Gover, p. 504), as Pedler indicated (Norris, II, 493). Norris' suggested identification of Merthen with the Arthurian Merlin, on which Pedler diplomatically speculates (II, 494 f.) seems ill-advised. According to Gover (p. 504), the name is identical in origin with Carmarthen, Wales, that is, from O. British *Mori-dunum*, "fortress by the sea."

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[23] Cf. Max Förster, 'Die Freilassungsurkunden des Bodmin-Evangeliars,' in *A Grammatical Miscellany offered to Otto Jespersen*, Copenhagen, 1930, pp. 77 ff.

[24] Charles Henderson, *A History of the Parish of Constantine in Cornwall* (Royal Institution of Cornwall, 1937) pp. 139, 245.

[25] Stokes, *Archiv* (cf. note 4 above), I, 165.

Behethlan (O.M. 2588, 2767)

Behethlan 1270, *Behetlan* 1310, *Ecclesia parochialum de Behethelan* 1318, *Ecclesia de Behedlan* 1315, *Behethelan* 1334, *Ecclesia Sancti Gluvyaci de Beethlan* 1375, *Behellan* c. 1500.

The field (*gueel*) of Bohelland in the Parish of St. Gluvias, near Penryn; *Behethlan* seems to have been the older name for the parish (Gover, p. 510). The only significant phonological development here is the assimilation of *th* to *l* (*thl* to *ll*). Unfortunately, late forms of the older name are rare, since St. Gluvias seems to have replaced Behethlan in the fourteenth century. We know only that *Behellan* appears c. 1500. Hence the forms in the *Ordinalia* (*Behethlan*, *Behethlen*) are compatible with all the exemples cited by Gover from 1270 to 1375.

Penryn (O.M. 2589, R.D. 673)

Penryn 1236, *Penrin* 1259, *Penren* 1274, *Penryn Burgh* 1373, *Penrynburgh* 1384, *Peryn* 1388, *Perynburgh* 1487.

This is Penryn in the parish of St. Gluvias (Gover, p. 510), the home of Glasney College. The first occurrence of the name (O.M. 2589) mentions the wood (*coys*) of Penryn, the second (R.D. 673) mentions the town only. The form *Peryn* or *Perin* is common after 1388. *Penryn* also occurs after that date (e.g. *Episcopal Register*, 1414, cited by Gover, p. 510), but modern *Penryn* seems to be a learned spelling (cp. *Vuthek*, above).

Bosuene (O.M. 2399)

Bosvanna 1776.

Pedler correctly identified this (Norris, II, 474) as the small farm, Bosvannah, in the parish of St. Gluvias near Penryn (Gover, p. 511). But the name is too rare to be of value for our present purpose.

an Enys (O.M. 2592)

(*John del*) *Enys* 1301, *Enes juxta Crukleu* 1340.

Here I think Whitaker (*Cathedral of Cornwall*, II, 25 n.) was correct in identifying this place with Enys in the parish of St. Gluvias, in spite of Pedler's argument for *Pendennis* (Norris, II, 485 f.). Gover follows Whitaker (*Place-names*, p. 511).

Guerthour (O.M. 2591)

Werdur 1201, *Gwerther* 1301, *Guerdour*, *Weredour* 1302, *Gwerthour* 1312, *Guerthour* 1342, *Gwerthor* 1407, *Gverthyr* 1463.

This is modern Gwarder in the parish of St. Gluvias (Gover, p. 512). Norris did not recognize it as a place name (I, 196-97); the line reads, *hag ol guerthour*, which Norris translates, "and all the water courses."

Carnsuyow (O.M. 2311)

Carnduyou 1293, *Carnduwyou* 1309, *Carnsuyou* 1422, *Carnesewe* 1456.

Carnsew is in the parish of Mabe (Gover, p. 518). A distinct sound shift here is *d* to *s*. The form *Carnduyou* actually occurs in a deed as late as 1349. Hence the *Ordinalia* form could theoretically be dated any time from 1349 forward.

Trehembys (O.M. 2311)

Treghembes 1314, *Treghembys* 1412, *Trehembrys* 1620.

Trehembis was in the parish of Mabe, but no longer survives as a place name (Gover, p. 519).

Bosaneth (O.M. 2767)

Bossannett 1690.

Bosanneth in the parish of Mawnan (Gover, p. 520).

an Garrak Ruen (O.M. 2464)

Pedler discusses this name at length (Norris, II, 477-81), and concludes that it designated land in the parish of Mylor. Strangely enough, Gover (p. 522) seems to accept Pedler's speculations, in spite of the fact that Nance (*Cornish-English Dictionary*, 1938, p. 144, *rün*) correctly identifies the name with that referred to by John Leland in his *Itinerary* (ed. L. T. Smith, vol. I, London, 1907, p. 321 f.):

> At the entre of the haven [of Falmouth] lyith a blynd roke covered at ful see, nerer the west syde of the haven then the east, cawled Caregroyne, *i.e. insula vel rupes potius vitulorum marinorum, alias Seeles.*

Surely this is the *Carrek Rün* (*an garrak ruen*), or "Seal Rock" referred to in the *Ordinalia*, and known today as "Black Rock," located in the entrance to Falmouth harbor. Needless to say, Solomon did not show much generosity in offering his masons this rock "with its land" as a reward for their labors.

fe Kenel (R.D. 93)

Kennel 1201, *Keniel* 1296, *Kenel* 1278, *Kynel* 1302, *Kenyel* 1376, *Kennell* 1386.

This is certainly the fief (*fe*) of Kennall in the parish of Stithians (Gover, p. 530). Pedler identifies it as Feock (Norris, II, 489-90), but he was misled by Norris, who prints it as one word (*fekenel*). The variation in the last syllable (*-el*, *-yel*) is not decisive enough to provide evidence of chronology. By this identification we eliminate one of the two main cases used by Pedler (Norris, II, 506) in support of a thirteenth century date for the *Ordinalia*.

Hellas (R.D. 673)

> *Henlistone* 1086, *Helleston* 1175, *Heleston* 1181, *Hellesland* 1196, *Henleston* 1201, *Hayleston in Kerier* 1284, *Helliston* 1331, *Helston* 1428, *Hailstoun alias Hellas* c. 1540 (Leland).

Modern Helston, in the parish of Wendron (Gover, pp. XIII, XXXII, 533). The only significant sound change here is *nl* to *ll* (*Henleston* to *Helliston*), which seems to have been completed early in the thirteenth century.

Cruk-heyth (R.D. 377).

> *Crucwaeð* 977, *Groguth next Treles* 1302, *Grogoed* 1332, *Groegoed* 1333, *Grogeith* c. 1510, *Grugyth* c. 1516.

Probably this is Grugwith (or Grugith) in the parish of St. Keverne (Gover, p. 554), as Pedler suggests (Norris, II, 497 f.), although the form is unusual.

Carvenow (R.D. 94)

> *Karmennou* c. 1280, *Carmynou* 1284, *Kaermynaw* 1299, *Kaermenou* 1300, *Caermynou* 1302, *Caermenou* 1318, *Carmenouw* 1356.

Carminow in the parish of Mawgan-in-Meneage (Gover, p. 571). As early as 1308 the Carminow family held this manor as free-tenants under the Episcopal Manor of Penryn.[26] The mutated form of this name in the *Ordinalia* is unique.

Marghes jow (P.C. 2668)

> *Marchadyou* c. 1200, *Markasiou* 1261, *Margasiou* 1277, *Mercadyow* 1284, *Marcadyow* 1284, *Marchadiou* 1291, *Marcadyou* 1304, *Portus de Mercadyou* 1305, *Marcasiou juxta Marcasbyghan* 1311, *Marghasyou* 1331, *Marghasdiow* 1359, *Markaseu* 1371, *Marasyou* 1377, *Markysiow* 1424, *Marhassow* 1428, *Marghasʒowe* 1439, *Marghajowe* 1449, *Mergasyewe* 1474, *Marghesewe*, *Marghesowe* 1499, *Markeju*, *Markju* c. 1540 (Leland), *Markas Jewe* c. 1570, *Marazion alias Markett Jew* 1690.

This is Market Jew, close to modern Marazion (= *Marcasbyghan*), near Penzance, in the parish of St. Hilary, Penwith Hundred (Gover, p. 601 f.). Market Jew Street in modern Penzance is a reminder of the importance of the old town. Norris misread this name as *marghas row* (I, 432). Although the spellings vary considerably, there appears to be only one significant sound change: *d* to *s* (*Marchadyou* to *Marghasyou*). This was completed near the beginning of the fourteenth century. The last clear occurrence of the earlier form is 1305.

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[26] Henderson, *A History of the Parish of Constantine*, pp. 92 ff.

Heyl (P.C. 2744)

Heylpenword 1260, *Heyle river* c. 1540, *Haile, Hayle* 1584.

This is the Hayle River, whence the modern town of that name in the parish of Phillack, Penwith Hundred (Gover, p. 611).

Of the twenty-three place names discussed above, seven offer possible evidence for dating the text of the *Ordinalia*.[27] This evidence is summarized in the following table:

NAME	NUMBER OF EXAMPLES	FIRST OCCURRENCE OF ORDINALIA FORM	LAST OCCURRENCE OF OLDER FORM	LAST OCCURRENCE OF ORDINALIA FORM
Lostuthyel	16	1275	1284	1303
Behethlan	7	——	——	1375
Penryn	8	——	——	1414
Guerthour	8	1301	1302	——
Carnsuyow	4	1422	1349	——
Hellas	9	1175	1201	——
Marghes jow	24	1277	1305	——

In cases where the *Ordinalia* form is the same as that of the earliest recorded examples, I have left the first two dates blank; when the *Ordinalia* form persists through the fifteenth century, I have left the third date blank. The result is that two names provide a *terminus ad quem* (*Behethlan*, *Penryn*), four names provide a *terminus a quo* (*Guerthour*, *Carnsuyow*, *Hellas*, *Marghes jow*), and one (*Lostuthyel*) has both, by virtue of its possession of two distinct sound changes. I have included the number of examples cited by Gover in each case, since this of course affects the reliability of the dates. *Carnsuyow*, for instance, with only four examples, lacks the usual overlap of old and new spellings.

The testimony of the individual place names varies considerably. If we relied solely on the form *Lostuthyel*, we would have to conclude, as did Pedler, that the dramas were composed in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. Taking the names as a group, and weighting them in accordance with the number of examples provided by Gover, we get in round numbers the following results: first occurrence of *Ordinalia* form, 1275; last occurrence of older form 1290; last occurrence of *Ordinalia* form, 1350. In other words, the earliest possible date is 1275; the earliest likely date is 1290; and the terminal date is 1350.

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[27] One other place name, *tryger* (P.C. 2274), might have been included (discussed by Pedler in *The Ancient Cornish Drama*, II, 502-3). This is a very common name (Gover, pp. 102, 120, 144, 337, 452, 469, 573, 591), but Pedler is probably right in assuming it to refer to Trigg Hundred (Gover, pp. v, 92), which as early as 1131 was called *Trigerscire*, later shortened to *Trigshir* (1428). Also worthy of note is *chenanry an clos* (O.M. 2772), misread as *chennary an clos* by Norris (Stokes, *Archiv* [cf. note 4 above], I, 165), an error which invalidates Pedler's discussion (II, 488-89). The 'Canonry of the Close' is no doubt intended to refer to Glasney College itself, just as *an dremma*, 'this town' (O.M. 2771), is almost certainly Penryn (cf. Halliday, *Legend of the Rood*, pp. 12-13).

These results, however, are very fragile indeed. The discovery of a single later occurrence of the form *Lostuthyel* not listed in Gover, for example, could materially affect our conclusions. Perhaps it would be safer to say that the evidence of place names points to a date somewhere between 1300 and 1375.[28]

III. THE "ORDINALIA" and the "PASCON AGAN ARLUTH

A Middle Cornish passion poem of about the same period as the *Ordinalia* is the *Pascon agan Arluth*, "Passion of our Lord," sometimes referred to as "Mount Calvary" (abbreviated M.C.).[29] The relevance of this poem to the present study arises from the fact that it has been named as one of the sources utilized by the author of the Cornish *Ordinalia*, especially in the second day's drama, the *Passio Christi*.[30] Unfortunately, no attempt has been made to date the passion poem with anything approaching precision; but present opinion places it in the late fourteenth century.[31] Hence if this is indeed a source of the *Passio Christi*, then it is possible that the drama should be dated somewhat later than the evidence of place names would suggest.

The indebtedness of the *Passio Christi* to the Cornish passion poem has been asserted, but the problem has never been seriously investigated. Nance seems to have based his inference on certain parallel passages in which the wording is so nearly identical that coincidence must be ruled out.[32] He may also have been influenced by the fact that in English drama the Chester plays, for example, draw upon the *Stanzaic Life of Christ*.[33] We need not assume, however, that passion poems invariably precede dramas of the passion and I see no real evidence that the Cornish *Passio Christi* is indebted to the *Pascon agan Arluth*.[34] On the other hand, there is at least a hint, I think, that the passion poem is indebted to the drama. The evidence for this can be seen in a comparison of the metrical form of the two texts.

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[28] Obviously the only evidence for the *terminus ad quem* (1375) is found in *Lostuthyel* (1303), *Behethlan* (1375), and *Penryn* (1414). But *Behethlan*, perhaps because of the paucity of examples, does not certainly appear as *Behellan* until c. 1500; on the other hand, *Peryn* for *Penryn* first occurs in 1388. An equal uncertainty surrounds the *terminus a quo* (1300). If we concede to *Carnsuyow*, in spite of its rarity, a kind of 'veto power,' then the early limit would have to be c. 1350 instead of 1300.

[29] British Museum MS. Harleian 1782, edited by Whitley Stokes in *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1860-61, Appendix, pp. 1-100. The stanzas of the poem are actually written in four long lines, but I print eight-line stanzas as a convenience for comparison with parallel passages from the *Ordinalia*. An unpublished modern edition of the passion poem in unified Middle Cornish by R. M. Nance and A. S. D. Smith is among the Nance papers in the Museum of the Royal Institution of Cornwall, Truro.

[30] See R. M. Nance, 'A Cornish Poem Restored,' *Old Cornwall*, vol. IV, no. 10 (Winter 1949), pp. 368-71, esp. 368n.; also Halliday, *Legend of the Rood*, pp. 13-14.

[31] Halliday, *Legend of the Rood*, dates the *Ordinalia* fourteenth century (p. 12), and the passion poem, which he regards as a source, 'rather earlier' than the *Ordinalia* (pp. 13-14). J. E. B. Gover, in *The Placenames of Cornwall*, assigns the poem to the 'late 14th century' (e.g., p. 92, under *Trigg*).

[32] The parallels are P.C. lines 65-72, 95-106, 137-44, 539-46, 855-58, 1155-66, 1171-74, 1271-76; M. C. stanzas 12, 14-15, 17, 37, 46, 72, 74, 82.

[33] Frances A. Foster (ed.) *A Stanzaic Life of Christ* (EETS OS 166), London, 1926. For

As Norris points out,[35] there is a good deal of variety in the line length, rhyme scheme, and stanza patterns employed in the *Ordinalia*. The *Passio Christi*, for example, begins with Jesus addressing his disciples in a rather elevated speech of 34 lines, the first unit of which is as follows:[36]

IHC.	JESUS
thyvgh lauara · ow dyskyblyon	To you, I say, · my disciples,
pyseygh toythda · ol kes-colon	Pray forthwith, · all with one heart,
dev dreys pup tra · evs a huhon	To God above all things, · who is on high,
theygh yn bys-ma · y grath danvon	To you in this world · to send his grace,
yn dyweth may feugh sylwys	In the end that you be saved.
gans an eleth yw golow	With the angels who are bright
yn nef agas enefow	In heaven your souls
neffre a tryg hep ponow	Ever shall dwell without troubles,
yn ioy na vyth dywythys	In joy that shall not be ended.

The first four lines of this unit can actually be regarded as eight short ones (four syllables each), rhyming alternately, to which is added a single longer line (seven syllables), followed by four more of these longer lines joined to the first by the rhyme scheme. The resulting pattern is *abababab c dddc*. This scheme is repeated exactly in lines 10-18, and then modified by the removal of one line from the closing quatrain, thus producing the pattern *abababab c ddc*, which occurs twice (lines 19-26, and 27-34). Peter and Andrew then respond to Jesus, each in one short-line stanza (*abababab*), and Jesus replies in the same form (lines 35-46). At this point Satan speaks, using the longer line (seven syllables), in a stanza of six lines rhyming *aabccb* (lines 47-52, 53-58, and 59-64). Thus in the short space of sixty-four lines in the *Passio Christi* we see no less than four types of stanzas, and these of considerable complexity.

In the *Pascon agan Arluth*, on the other hand, there is a single stanza form throughout, having eight seven-syllable lines, and rhyming *abababab*, with occasional variations, e.g. *ababacac*.

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an account of the relationship of this poem to the Chester plays, see the *Introduction*, pp. XXVIII-XLIII.

[34] Neither MS is the author's original. Hence scribal errors appear in both, and cannot be used as an argument for priority of one or the other. The *Ordinalia* contains a larger admixture of English words and phrases (see below, section IV of this study), but this appears to be deliberate stage business, and cannot be regarded as representing a later accommodation of English elements in the Cornish language.

[35] *The Ancient Cornish Drama*, II, 446 ff.

[36] *Ibid.*, I, 222, P.C. 1-9.

I quote the opening stanza:

Tays ha mab han speris sans	Father, and Son, and the Holy Ghost,
wy abys a levn golon	Ye shall beseech with a full heart
re wronte ʒeugh gras ha whans	That He grant to you grace and desire
ʒe wolsowas y basconn	To hear His Passion,
ha ʒymmo gras ha skyans	And to me grace and knowledge
the ʒerevas par lauarow	To declare (it) by words
may fo ʒe thu ʒe worthyans	That there be honour to God,
ha sylwans ʒen enevow	And salvation to the souls.

This scheme, to be sure, is common enough, and occurs frequently in the *Ordinalia.* The important point in our comparison, however, is that while the drama has a great variety of patterns, the passion poem adheres strictly to this one basic stanza form.

The metrical regularity of the *Pascon agan Arluth* and the great variety of patterns in the *Ordinalia* provide a useful ground for comparison of the parallel passages which Nance observed. In what type of stanza do these passages occur? If they all occurred in the common eight-line stanza in the drama, of course, this would strongly suggest that the playwright "lifted" them bodily from the poem. But unfortunately the problem is not so simple, for the passages are found in the *Passio Christi* in several types of stanzas. Hence we are left with these alternatives: either the dramatist borrowed them and remodeled them to suit his metrical needs; or the poet borrowed from various types of stanzas in the *Passio Christi* and made them all conform to the eight-line stanza in his poem. This is a difficult choice, but I think the latter explanation is more likely. It is hard to believe that the dramatist could possess so refined a sense of metrical propriety as to borrow here and there from the *Pascon agan Arluth*, and, at the same time, alter a stanza form which he himself uses elsewhere, merely to suit the metrical needs of the moment. It would have been much simpler to retain the regular eight-line stanza of the passion poem. With these considerations in mind, therefore, I suggest that the following parallel passages are the result of borrowing by the poet from the *Ordinalia.*[37]

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[37] Study of sources common to both texts would, I think, confirm the priority of the *Ordinalia.* There is no room for such a study here; but the episode concerning the smith who was asked to make the nails for the cross, rare in English literature, would provide a good example. It may be true, as Halliday suggests (*Legend of the Rood*, p. 14), that the version of this story in the *Pascon agan Arluth* (M. C. stanzas 154-59) is more subtle; nevertheless the *Ordinalia* episode (P.C. 2663-2742) seems closer to the earlier versions. The earliest literary example of this curious legend appears in the Old French *Passion des Jongleurs.* Cf. Frances A. Foster (ed.), *The Northern Passion* (EETS OS 145, 147), 2 vols., London, 1913-16. The text of the *Passion des Jongleurs* is in the second volume, pp. 102-125; the legend of the nails is given in lines 1227-1260. This French passion poem was composed in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century. The Cornish text, however, could conceivably be indebted to later forms of the legend in the French drama, e.g. *La Passion du Palatinus*, or the St. Genevieve *Passion.* Cf. Grace Frank, *The Medieval French Drama*, Oxford, 1954, pp. 127, 141. The possi-

1. *Stanza Forms Identical*

P.C. 65-72:	M.C. 12:
map den hep ken ys bara	mab den heb ken ys bara
byth nyn ieves ol bewnes	nyn geuas oll y vewnas
leman yn leuarow da	lemmen yn lauarow da
a thue thyworth an drenses	a the ȝe worth an dremas
[*ad discipulos*]	
ow dyscyblyon dre henna	dre worȝyp crist yn vrna
leman why a yl gueles	lemmyn ny a yll gwelas
laver dev maga del wra	lauar du maga del wra
neb a yl y kemeres	neb a vynno y glewas
JESUS	
Son of man, without other than bread,	Son of man, without other than bread,
Never has all of life	Has not all his life,
But in good words,	But in good words
Coming from the Trinity.	That come from the Supremely-good.
[*To his disciples*:] —	
My disciples, from this	By Christ's answer then
Now you may see	We may now see
How the word of God feeds	How the word of God feeds
Him who can take it.	Him who will hear it.

P.C. 93-100:	M.C. 14:
SATHANAS	
huhel ythos ysethys	an ioul ȝegryst a gewsys
ha dyantel ro'm laute	yn delma rag y demptye
yn lyvyr yma scryfis	a hanas y thew scrifys
bos eleth worth the wythe	bos eleth worth ȝe wyȝe
ragh ovn the vos dese[f]ys	rag own yw ȝom desevys
the tros worth men pystige	ȝe droys worth meyn ȝe dochye
mar sos map dev a mur prys	mar sos mab du a vur brys
dyyskyn ha the'n dor ke	dijskyn ha yen dor ke
SATAN	
High thou art seated	The devil said to Christ
And dangerously, by my troth:	Thus to tempt him: -
In a book it is written,	Of thee it is written,
There be angels to guard thee,	There be angels to guard thee,
For fear lest thou be thrown down,	For fear it is that thou stumble,
Hurting thy foot against a stone.	Dashing thy foot against a stone.
If thou be Son of God, of great worth,	If thou be Son of God, of great worth,
Descend, and go to the ground.	Descend, and go to the ground.

P.C. 137-44:	M.C. 17:
IHC.	
ty sathnas deawl mylygys	Ihesus crist a leueris
yma scryfys yn lyfryow	y vos scryfys yn lyffrow
yn pup maner y coth thy's	yn pub gwythres ycoth thys

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bility of Cornish indebtedness to the English *Northern Passion* seems remote; the details of this episode in both the *Ordinalia* and the *Pascon agan Arluth* are closer to the French.

gorthye the dev ha'y hanow	gorȝye ȝe ȝu hay hanow
ke the ves ymskemenys	ke ȝe ves omscumvnys
yn defyth yn tewolgow	ȝe ȝyveyth veth yn tewolgow
the vestry a vyth leyhys	the vestry a vyth leȝys
neffre war an enevow	neffre war en enevow
JESUS	
Thou, Satan, devil accursed!	Jesus Christ said
It is written in books,	That it was written in books,
In every way it behoveth thee	In every work it behoveth thee
To worship thy God and his name.	To worship thy God and his name.
Go away, accursed,	Go away, accursed,
Into desert, into darkness;	To a wilderness ever, into darkness;
Thy mastery shall be diminished	Thy mastery shall be diminished
Ever over the souls.	Ever over the souls.

P.C. 539-46:	M.C. 37:
IHC.	
na thegovgh sor yn colon	na thegough sor yn golon
worth neb a wra ow vre	war neb a vyn ow sawye
rak ow thorment a the scon	ow thermyn a the yn scon
genogh na'm byve tryge	genough me nvm byth trege
why a gyf bohosugyon	wy a gyff bohosogyon
pup vr warnogh ow karme	pub er warnough ow carme
pan vynnogh agas honon	pan vynnough agis honon
why a gyl gul da thethe	wy a yll gull da ȝeȝe
JESUS	
Do not bear anger in heart	Do not bear anger in heart
Against her who doth anoint me,	Against one who would save me.
For my suffering will come soon;	My time will come soon;
With you I shall not stay.	With you I shall not stay.
You will have the poor	You will have the poor
Always upon you calling;	Always upon you calling;
When you will yourself,	When you will yourself,
You may do good to them.	You may do good to them.

2. *Stanza Forms Different*

P.C. 1155-66:	M.C. 72:
a peder treyl the clethe	
gorre yn y won arte	
yn levyr yma scrifys	
dre clethe nep a vewo	Gor ȝe gleȝe yn y goyn
ef a vyru yn sur dretho	ȝe peder crist a yrghys
ha'n scryptor yw guyr yn wys	rag dre gleȝe a veughe
	dre gleȝe yfyth leȝys
dar deseuos a wreugh why	dewȝek lygyon yn vn ro
na allaf ow thas pygy	vye an nef danvenys
hag ef a thanfon a'n nef	ha moy a mynnen ȝymmo
dev-thek legyon yn vn ro	pesy ow ȝas pur barys
a eleth wharre thy'mmo	

ny'm nagh mar a'n pesaf ef	
O Peter, turn thy sword, Put it into its sheath again; In a book it is written: He who lives by the sword He shall surely die by it, And the Scripture is true indeed. Do you raise a doubt That I cannot pray to my Father, And he will send from heaven Twelve legions in a row Of angels presently to me? He denies me not if I pray to him.	Put thy sword into its sheath, Christ commanded Peter, For (he) that lives by sword, By sword shall be slain. Twelve legions in a row Would be sent from heaven, And more, should I wish for myself To pray to my Father, very readily.
P.C. 1171-76:	M.C. 74, 75^{1-4}:
why re thueth thy'm gans arvow gans fustow ha clythythyow kepar ha pan vene vy an pure lader yn pow pan dyskys yn eglusyow ny wrug den fyth ow sensy	Ihesus a gewsys arte why a theth ʒym yn arvow dre dreyson yn un scolchye gans boclers ha cleʒyʒyow thom kemeres ʒom syndye ʒom peynye bys yn crow kepar ha del vena ve an purra lader yn pow In agis mysk pan esen la[h]ys du ʒeugh ow tysky gallus nyn gese kemmen ʒom cara na ʒom sensy
Ye have come to me with arms, With staves and swords, As if I were The veriest robber in the land. When I taught in the churches No man did seize me.	Jesus said again: Ye have come to me in arms Through treason, skulkingly, With bucklers and swords, To take me, to hurt me, To torture me even unto death, As if I were The veriest robber in the land. When I was among you, Teaching you God's laws, There was not power any way To fetter me nor to hold me.
P.C. 1271-76:	M.C. 82:
mara keusys falsury ha henna dok dustuny mes mara keusys yn lel prag y wreth ov boxusy nyn syv lemmyn vyleny awos guyryoneth keusel	In meth ihesus yn vrna mara kewsys falsury ha na blek genas henna ha fals te dok dustuny mes mara kewsys yn ta han gwreoneth y synsy prag omgwysketh yn delma nyn gyw mernas belyny

	Said Jesus then,
If I have spoken falsehood,	If I have spoken falsehood,
Of that bear witness.	And that is not pleasing to thee
But if I have spoken honestly,	And false, do thou bear witness.
Why dost thou strike me?	But if I have spoken well,
It is only villainy	And have adhered to the truth,
For speaking truth.	Why dost thou strike me thus?
	It is only villainy.

The closest parallels can be seen in the first category of examples above, where the stanza forms are identical. But this is ambiguous; the borrowing might be from either side. The really significant evidence appears in the second category, where the stanza forms differ, and where the parallels are less exact. This, too, might at first seem indecisive; a change in stanza form would require a change in the language, no matter which writer does the borrowing. But the significance of the examples in the second category becomes clear when we perceive that in each case the *Passio Christi* presents a rather close translation of passages from the Gospels, whereas the variant readings of the passion poem *are also departures from the biblical text.*[38] The last passage quoted above, for example, is based on John 18:23. I give the Gospel verse, followed by the parallel Cornish texts in translation, with rhyme schemes indicated and with departures from the biblical text printed in italics:

> John 18:23: Jesus answered him, If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil: but if well, why smitest thou me?

P.C. 1271-76:		M.C. 82	
		Said Jesus then,	*a*
If I have spoken falsehood,	*a*	If I have spoken falsehood,	*b*
Of that bear witness.	*a*	*And that is not pleasing to thee*	*a*
But if I have spoken honestly,	*b*	*And false,* do thou bear witness.	*b*
Why dost thou strike me?	*a*	But if I have spoken well,	*a*
It is only villainy	*a*	*And have adhered to the truth,*	*b*
For speaking truth.	*b*	Why dost thou strike me *thus*?	*a*
		It is only villainy.	*b*

The italicized lines show, I think, that the author of the *Pascon agan Arluth* has borrowed from the *Passio Christi* (including the non-biblical lines, P.C. 1275-76), and has "padded" the passage so as to convert a six-line stanza rhyming *aabaab* into an eight-line stanza rhyming *abababab*. A more extensive comparison of the two texts and their sources would, I believe, confirm this indebtedness of the passion poem to the drama. Hence we may conclude that nothing in the relationship of these two texts conflicts with the testimony of place names previously considered, and that the composition of the *Ordinalia* preceded that of the "late fourteenth century" *Pascon agan Arluth.*

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[38] P.C. 1155-66 (M.C. 72) from Matt. 26: 52-3; P.C. 1171-76 (M.C. 74, 75 $^{1-4}$) from Matt. 26:55; P.C. 1271-76 (M.C. 82) from John 18:23.

IV. Middle English Elements in the "Ordinalia"

ellas mornyngh y syngh mornyng y cal
our lord ys deyd that bogthe ovs al
— R.D. 733-34

The presence of this beautiful Middle English lyric, sung by the three Maries in the *Resurrexio Domini* may serve to remind us that the Cornish *Ordinalia* contains a considerable number of Middle English words, phrases, and lines. Of course these Middle English elements cannot serve to date the Cornish text with any great precision, but a careful study of them would show, I think, that their forms are not inconsistent with the fourteenth century date suggested by the evidence previously considered. No such detailed examination can be undertaken here; but I would like, in this section, to offer some examples of Middle English elements that appear in the *Ordinalia*, and to point out at least a few ways in which these elements may be useful in dating the Cornish text.

1. *Middle English Lines and Phrases*

In any discussion of the Middle Engish elements of the Cornish *Ordinalia* it should first of all be emphasized that the three dramas, taken together, contain some ten thousand lines, and that most of these exhibit a remarkably fine classical Cornish of the middle period (1200-1600). The *Origo Mundi*, for example, opens with a majestic speech by God, who invariably speaks pure Cornish. It is perhaps significant that the first identifiable English phrase, nearly two hundred lines later, is spoken by the devil, who tempts Eve in the following words (O.M. 197-200):[39]

torr'e yn ow feryl vy	Pluck it at my risk,
heb hokye *fast haue ydo*	Without delay *quickly have done*;
hag inweth gvra the'th worty	And also make thy husband
may tebro ef annotho	Eat of it.

Indeed it is fairly safe to say that the dramatist employs pure Cornish when he wishes to write in the "courtly" style, and that he admits English lines and phrases only when he descends to the "bourgeois" style for purposes of realism in general or comedy in particular.[40] A few examples may serve to illustrate this.

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[39] So that they may be seen at a glance, I print the English words or phrases in italics.

After Judas has outlined his plan for the arrest of Jesus, Caiaphas thanks him and summons the torturers (P.C. 947-52):

benneth maghom re'th fo *prest*	The blessing of Mahound be on thee *always*,
rak *certan lell* os ha *trest*	For *certainly* thou art *loyal* and *trusty*
ha *stedfast* y'th ambosow	And *steadfast* in thy agreements.
tormentourys wythow[t] rest	*Tormentors, without rest,*
comyth hedyr lest and mest	*Come hither, least and most,*
lemyn yn ol ovthommow	Now in all needs.

Caiaphas' linguistic versatility is perhaps surpassed only by that of his messenger, who is sent to fetch the "doctors" to dispute Jesus' claim, and who indulges in some amusing bi-lingual asides (P.C. 1635-40):

henna me a wra hep let	That I will do without delay
and elles the difl yow fet	(*And else the devil fetch you*
ganso the dre yn y wlas	With him, home to his own country).
bot yowr doctours y yov fet	*Unless your doctors I fetch you*
bys yn ierusalem sket	Even to Jerusalem, straight —
god yeue yow al yfle gras	(*God give you all evil grace*).

Most of the Middle English lines and phrases in the *Ordinalia* resemble the two examples just given. Rarely do we find more than two or three lines of pure English, unmodified by a Cornish word or idiom, and in most passages enough is said in Cornish to provide a context for the English lines. With these facts in mind, I offer the following additional examples, in which speakers are identified so as to suggest the context for each quotation.[41]

Carpenter: by godys fast wel y set
thys tumbyr ys even y met (O.M. 2483-84)
Bishop: nygh for sorw y am ful woud
thow harlot for goddys bloud (O.M. 2670-71)
Bishop: by godys fast wel y seyd

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[40] See the illuminating discussion of these styles with special reference to Chaucer in Charles Muscatine, *Chaucer and the French Tradition*, Berkeley, 1957.

[41] Other English lines or phrases appear in O.M. 485, 1547, 1699, 1963, 1967, 2223, 2358, 2447, 2455, 2458, 2459, 2465, 2586, 2598, 2632, 2686, 2697, 2773-74, 2803; P.C. 132, 379, 575, 579, 889, 941, 990, 1198-99, 1346, 1463, 1472, 1474, 1856, 2073, 2099, 2106, 2528, 2539, 2694, 2721, 2734, 2736, 2756, 2767; R.D. 543, 619, 636, 1796, 1841, 2087, 2645. In addition to the English lines, there are occasional lines or phrases in French (e.g. O.M.1911 spoken by King David's butler), and Latin (e.g. O.M. 1953, spoken by David).

vos eel bon se dev ma eyd (O.M. 2679-80)
Caiaphas: wolcom iudas *par mon fay*
wolcom by maghomys lay (P.C. 935-36)
Torturer: wel y met harlot ioudyn (P.C. 1366)
Caiaphas: heil syr lord and emperour
heil now kyng of kynggys flour (P.C.1681-82)
Herod: and yk annas me cosyn (P.C. 1688)
Doctor: farwel syres we wol go
for thys cher haf we y do
somot y thue (P.C. 1823-25)
Jailer: heil pilat syre iustis stout
heil syre cayphas epscop prout
heil pryns annas
heil doctors ha mestrygi (P.C. 2343-46)
Soldier: for y dred noth by my hod
hys red baner ne hys rod (R.D. 546-47)
Torturer: me lord anon her we buth (R.D. 1767)
Emperor: geiler thow schal be wel gladt (R.D. 2057)
Veronica: my lord y schal be ther for (R.D. 2236)

2. *Middle English Vocabulary*

In addition to lines and phrases recognizably English, the *Ordinalia* employs a rather large English vocabulary which, we may presume, came into the language gradually as a result of English political and cultural domination in Cornwall. The difficulty of defining this vocabulary is evident, however, when we attempt to decide which words in the text may be called "English." Does *a point* "headlong" (P.C. 3032) come directly from Old French, or through Middle English? Is *yn poynt ta* "in good health" (R.D. 1756) from *en bon point*, or *in good point*? Is *asper* "grim" (O.M. 2203) borrowed from English, French, or directly from Latin? Is *brogh* "badger" (P.C. 2926) pure Celtic, or did it come to Cornish via Old or Middle English? Does *flerye* "stink" (O.M. 945, 2707, etc.) come from French, or is it an early, pan-Celtic borrowing? What about *margh* "horse" (O.M. 124, 1065)? Is it borrowed from O. E. *mearh*, or merely a cognate of it? Some of these questions, of course, can be answered with reasonable confidence.[42] Most of them, however, must be left unanswered. Hence the following list of "English" words taken from the *Ordinalia*, although it is not exhaustive, includes some words which may or may not have come into Cornish from Middle English.

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[42] Cf. Lewis and Pedersen (*op. cit.*, note 9 above), pp. 56-63. Pedersen (*Vergl. Gramm.*, I, 126) treats *margh* as a normal Celtic cognate. The purpose of the list of Middle English words is simply to display the nature and scope of the English vocabulary in the *Ordinalia*. Space limitations prohibit systematic classification of parts of speech, or the inclusion of etymologies. An analytical concordance to the *Ordinalia* is, of course, urgently needed.

abel "able" P.C. 2305. *acord* "agreement" O.M. 1240, 1248, 1252. *adla* "outlaw" O.M. 1499. *acusye* "accuse" P.C. 1625. — *age* "age" P.C. 1184. *alter* "altar" O.M. 1170, 1174, 1177, etc. *amendye* "amend" O.M. 1526, 2259 (*amendys*, noun), 2522 (p.p.). *a-meys* "distraught" O.M. 193. *amonnt* "avail" O.M. 1223, 2791; P. C. 439. *anger* "anguish" R.D. 499, 1402. *anon* "anon" P.C. 2237. *apert* "openly" P.C. 1251, 1410. *a poynt* "headlong" P.C. 3032. *aquyttys* "repaid" P.C. 310. *argument* "argument" P.C. 1661. *asper* "grim" O.M. 2203. *aspy* "spy" O.M. 747, 1115, 1119, 1178, 2039, 2062; R.D. 1918. *assaye* "try" O.M. 2477; R.D. 2051. *assentye* "assent" P.C. 2037. *astrang* "strange" O.M. 1402. *avonsye* "promote" O.M. 2609, 2612. *avow* "confess" P.C. 1301, 1783. *auysyas* "advised" R.D. 399. *bad* "bad" "mistaken" P.C. 2284; R.D. 1774, 1886. *ballok* "testicles" O.M. 2067. *baner* "banner" O.M. 2200; P.C. 3044. *basnet* "basinet" R.D. 2581. *bason* "basin" P.C. 842. *batel* "battle" O.M. 2177; R.D. 109. *battys* "clubs" P.C. 608. *beggars* "beggars" R.D. 1507. *benfys* "benefice" O.M. 2613. *bestes* "beasts" O.M. 43, 52, 118, 124, 312, 798, 977, 995, 1021, 1044, 1051, 1059, 1160, 1182, 1213, 1215; R.D. 2227 (*best*, sing.). *blamye* "blame" O.M. 266, 2797; P.C. 2158 (noun), 2215 (noun), 2737 (noun). *blogon* "bludgeon" O.M. 2709 Note: This is earliest occurrence of the word; hence it may not be English. Compare "shillelagh." *blyue* "quickly" P.C. 2526. *boba* "dunce" P.C. 1778, 2385, 2394. *body* "body" O.M. 61, 2069, 2242; P.C. 1732, 1750; R.D. 545. *bostye* "boast" P.C. 385, 1576, 2109 (*vosteryon*, noun, plu.), 2439; R.D. 338, 374. *botler* "butler" O.M. 1903, 1917, 2042, 2170, 2202, 2215. *box*^{1} "box tree" P.C. 261. *box*^{2} "receptable" P.C. 485. *box*^{3} "blow" "stroke" P.C. 1269, 1274 (verb), 1362, 1367, 1389. *branchys* "branches" O.M. 785, 1122 (sing.); P.C. 244, 267. *brest* "breast" O.M. 2717; R.D. 2591 (*brust plat*). *brogh* "badger" P.C. 2926. *bros* "broth" R.D. 142. *brybor* "beggar" P.C. 375, 1452, 1710. *bryght* "bright" O.M. 771; P.C. 1684. *busy* "busy" "diligent" "briskly" etc. O.M. 335, 398, 405, 748, 1633, 2039, 2448; P.C. 644, 999, 1391, 1932, 2960; R.D. 1060, 1113, 2645.

cabel "cavil" "wrangling" O.M. 2673, 2784 (*pyt[h] cafalek*, "a cause of wrangling"—Nance). *cache* "catch" "hitch" P.C. 452, 987, 2293 (p.p.), 2523 (impv.), 2721; R.D. 2596 (p.p.). *carynnyas* "carrion" O.M. 1103, 1107. *cas* "case" O.M. 305, 1401. *cast* "trick" P.C. 1884; R.D. 36. *castel* "castle" "village" O.M. 1709; P.C. 133 (plu.); R.D. 920, 1295, 1471. *cendel* "sendal" O.M. 1752; P.C. 3156. *cercot* "surcoat" P.C. 1784. *certan* "certain(ly)" O.M. 14, 93, 489, 494, 501, etc. *chacys* "chased" O.M. 706; P.C. 1196 (*cheas*, inf.). *challa* "jowl" O.M. 540, 2733; P.C. 1181, 2130. *chammbour* "chamber" O.M. 2110. *chappon* "capon" O.M. 1206. *chartur* "charter" O.M. 2312, 2594. *chatel* "chattel" "property" O.M. 522. *chaynys* "chains" P.C. 2060. *chek* "pot" "crock" R.D. 139. *cher* "cheer" "condition" O.M. 166; P.C. 2595, 3106; R.D. 710, 1256, 1284. *cheson* "occasion" O.M. 1835; P.C. 1970. *chet* "chit" "fellow" O.M. 2486; P.C. 3042. *cheyrys* "chairs" P.C. 2229. *chyf* "chief" O.M. 2331, 2397; P.C. 1926. *chyften* "chieftain" O.M. 1445. *clap* "tongue" R.D. 1113. *clem* "claim" R.D. 625. *cler* "clear" O.M. 1918. *clok* "cloak" P.C. 2682. *clos* "close" "sanctuary" R.D. 164, 389 (verb, p.p.), 1290. *clotte* "clot" "clod" P.C. 1399. *clout* "clout" "blow" "patch" R.D. 384, 1509 (*cloutys*, p.p. "patched"). *colour* "color" P.C. 1684. *commonnd* "command" O.M. 1094, 2552. *comners* "commoners" P.C. 2470. *company* "company" O.M. 2031; P.C. 868; R.D. 556. *compes* "compass" O.M. 2510. *compressa* "oppress" O.M. 1424. *concludye* "confute" P.C. 1464, 1675 (p.p.), 1777 (p.p.). *concyans* "conscience" P.C. 1979, 2433. *confort* "comfort" O.M. 1341, 2628 (verb); P.C. 1052; R.D. 437 (verb), 688, 891, 1175, 2371. *conior* "conjure" P.C. 1321. *connyngh* "cunning" P.C. 1458. *conquerrye* "conquer" O.M. 909. *conseler* "counsellor" O.M. 1566, 1579, 2255, 2325. *conternot* "counternote" O.M. 561. *contraryus* "contrary" P.C. 1731. *contreweytys* "ambushed" P.C. 2299. *copel* "couple" O.M. 1024. *cors* "course" P.C. 2146. *cortes* "courteous" O.M. 2315; R.D. 675. *cost* "coast" "region" O.M. 1552. *cosyn* "cousin" P. C. 1688. *courser* "courser" O.M. 1959, 1965. *coward* "coward" O.M. 2157, 2161 (*gowardy*, "cowardice"). *coynt* "quaint" "cunning" P.C. 340, 1000, 1819, 3031. *crak* "crack" O.M. 2184; R.D. 294. *creator* "creature" R.D. 259. *creft* "craft" O.M. 2491. *cropya* "grope" P.C. 2120. *crous* "cross" O.M. 1952. *croust* "crust" O.M. 1901. *crowd* "fiddle" O.M. 1997. NOTE: This word is usually derived from Welsh *crwth*. *crye* "cry" O.M. 1418; P.C. 2062; R.D. 268. *cur* "cure" "care" O.M. 1620. *cur* "choir" R.D. 1899. *curyn* "crown" R.D. 1247, etc. *cvsyl* "counsel" O.M. 188, 217, 643 (verb), 2041; P.C. 567 (verb). *cymbalys* "cymbals" O.M. 1999. *cyte* "city" O.M. 2263, 2278, 2407, 2430; P.C. 132. *cythol* "zither" O.M. 1997.

dafole "defile" P.C. 1398; R.D. 492. *damneys* "damned" O.M. 324; P.C. 1500. *damsel* "damsel" O.M. 2105. *danger* "difficulty" O.M. 168, 548, 1580, 1615, 1910, 2008, 2292; P.C. 1869; R.D. 319. *defens* "defense" P.C. 2306. *delyfre* "deliver" O.M. 1110, 1113, 1117; P.C. 2036, 2038. *deray* "disarray" O.M. 2224. *desyr* "desire" O.M. 5; P.C. 309, 718, 1068; R.D. 858, 869, 1206, 1926, 1933, 2473. *doctours* "doctors" P.C. 1626, 1633, 1676. *donssye* "dance" R.D. 2647. *dout* "doubt" O.M. 718, 729, 1426, 2118, 2206, 2668; P.C. 1182 (verb), 1356, 1776; R.D. 381. *draght* "draught" O.M. 2627. *duk* "duke" P.C. 1926. *dygth* "prepare" "dight" P.C. 624, 639, 2605 (*dyghtys*, p.p.). *dylyt* "delight" P.C. 2323 *dyner* "denarius" P.C. 505, 536. *dynyte* "dignity" O.M. 1926. *dyscant* "descant" O.M. 562. *dysenour* "dishonor" O.M. 2793. *dysputye* "dispute" P.C. 1458, 1628. *dyspyt* "despite" O.M. 2058, 2740 P.C. 995, 1010, 1193, 1267, 1349. *dyuers* "diverse" R.D. 1509.

ellas "alas" O.M. 309, 351, 545, 590, 614, etc. *emperour* "emperor" O.M. 2053 (*emprour*), 2055; P.C. 1681. *encressyens* "increase" O.M. 48. *erberow* "arbors" O.M. 32. *erbys* "herbs" P.C. 261. *ertech* "heritage" O.M. 354. *examyne* "examine" P.C. 389. *exilyys* "exiled" O.M. 1576. *eysel* "vinegar" P.C. 2977.

faborden "faux bourden" "bass" (music) R.D. 2359. *face, fas* "face" O.M. 60, 418, 588, 896, etc. *fals* "false" O.M. 565, 914, 1855, 2692; P.C. 375, 1101 1335 (noun), 2438 (*falslych*, adv.); R.D. 36, 1796, 2263 (adv). *falsury* "falsehood" O.M. 287, 394; P.C. 1271, 1319. *fannye* "fan" P.C. 1243. *fardellow* "fardels" O.M. 1593, 1617 (*farthel*, sing.). *farwel* "farewell" O.M. 2165, 2289; P.C. 560; R.D. 1625. *faryng* "goings-on" P.C. 374. *fat* "fat" O.M. 1192. *fel* "fell" "terrible" O.M. 1086. *felon* "felon" P.C. 1983. *fenten* "fountain" O.M. 771, 836, 2436. *fer* "fair" P.C. 342, 1684. *ferror* "farrier" "smith" P.C. 2669. *ffesont* "pheasant" O.M. 1192. *fest, fast* "fast" "very" etc. O.M. 719, 749, 808, 833, 852, 1041 (*ffystynnyn fast*, "hasten quickly"), 1108, 1300, 1347, 1361, 2430; P.C. 946, 1883, 2477, 2938; R.D. 1174, 1181, 1535, 2626. *fet* "fetch" P.C. 1636, 1638. *fey* "faith" O.M. 473, 677, 1080, 1206, 1441, 2041. *feyntys* "fainting" "faintness" P.C. 148. *flam* "flame" O.M. 2637. *flattre* "flatter" R.D. 1058, 1067, 1511. *flerye* "stink" O.M. 945, 2707; P.C. 1546, 1547, 1566, 2739; R.D. 171, 2133, 2160. *flok* "flock" P.C. 895. *flour* "flower" O.M. 712, 769, 1541, 2121, 2136; P.C. 258, 267, 1682; R.D. 1632. *flous* "idle talk" P.C. 1346; R D. 935. *flynt* "flint" O.M. 1860. *foly* "folly" O.M. 191, 708; P.C. 1438, 2112 (*foul*, "fool"), 2751 (*fol*, adj.), 2752 (*foul*, "fool"), 2897 (*foul*, "fool"), 3051 (*fol*, adj., "mad" "fierce"); R.D. 950 (*fol*. adj.)

953 (*fol.* adj.), 961 (*folneth*, noun), 973 (*fol*, adj.), 1273 (*fellyon*, "fools"), 1515 (*foul*, "fool"), 2182 (*fol*, plu., "fools" "madmen"). *formye* "form" O.M. 8, 11, 22, 42, 56, 87, 109, 142, etc. *formys* "benches" P.C. 2229. *fors* "(no) force" "(no) matter" O.M. 2801; P.C. 2758. *forth* "way" "road" O.M. 734, 1677, 1972; P.C. 2294; R.D. 1344, 1474. *fout* "fault" "lack" O.M. 361, 1808, 2293, 2457. *frvt* "fruit" O.M. 30, 77, 79, 167, 171, 187, 192, 210, etc. *fykyl* "fickle" O.M. 234. *fylh* "viol" O.M. 1997. *fyn* "fine" "pure" O.M. 1915, 2041, 2100; P.C. 822, 824. *fyn* "last" R.D. 416 (*deyth fyn*, "last day" "Doomsday").

gadlyng "rogue" P.C. 1817, 2691. *gage* "pledge" P.C. 1186. *garlont* "garland" O.M. 2096. *gay* "gay" O.M. 1964, 2685. *gentyl* "gentle" O.M. 1566, 2105 (noun, plu.), 2153, 2401, 2557, 2778; R.D. 1800, 1821. *geyler* "jailer" P.C. 1865, 1985. *giglot* "gigolo" "wanton" P.C. 1183. *glas* "blue" "green" "pale" O.M. 1109, 1122, 1135. *glotny* "gluttony" P.C. 52. *gode chons* "good chance" O.M. 2822. *goky* "fool" "fooolish" O.M. 173, 489, 2655; P.C. 1149 (plu.), 1290, 1662, 1781, 2043, 2890 (plu.?), 2897; R.D. 87, 972, 983, 989, 1043, 1105, 1136, 1273, 1454 (superlative, "most foolish"), 1464, 1465, 1513, 1565. NOTE: This word is rare in English, and common in Cornish ; it may be of Celtic origin, having Latin *cæcus* as cognate *gokyneth* "foolishness" (from *goky*, above) O.M. 473, 1512; P.C. 1808, 1989. *governye* "govern" O.M. 89, 2390 (*governour*); P.C. 930. *grabel* "grapnel" R.D 2268, 2271. *grannt* "grant" O.M. 326, 412; P.C. 1088, 1562, 3142. *gras* "grace" O.M. 6, 73, 101, 186, 251, 263, 422, 436, 495, 530, 669, 680, 695, 836, 974, 1085, 1148, 1149, 1187, 1304, 1413, 1463, 1472, 1475, etc. *gre* "degree" P.C. 777; R.D. 1923. *gref*, *gryvye* "grief" "grieve" O.M. 482, 497, 1416, 1772, 1787, 1921, 2631; P.C. 2218. *grisyl* "grisly" P.C. 2118. *gromersy* "gramercy" O.M. 407, 2313, 2384, 2395, 2595; P.C. 3133. *gronnd* "ground" "depths" O.M. 1083 (Genesis 7:11). *gronntye* "grant" O.M. 2130; P.C. 3142, 3146. *guan* "wan" "weak" O.M. 855, 2482; P.C. 1334. *guandre* "wander" O.M. 934; P.C. 108; R.D. 1634, 1639. *guet* "wait" "watch" "take care" O.M. 980, 1024, 1139, 1784; R.D. 1345. *gwarnye* "warn" O.M. 1423, 1980; P.C. 1955. *gyl* "guile" O.M. 196, 2402, 2559. *gyst* "joist" O.M. 2493, 2496, 2528, 2544, 2547, 2559; P.C. 2582, 3067. *gyttrens* "gitterns" O.M. 1998.

hakney "hackney" O.M. 1966. *hakyas* "hacked" O.M. 2228. *hale* "haul", P.C. 2830; R.D. 2275. *harlot* "harlot" "rogue" O.M. 901, 907, 1529; P.C. 967, 981, 1195, 1200, 1366, 1832, 2065, 2070, 2106, 2112, 2247, 3071, 3073; R.D. 544, 1965, 2048. *harlych* "hardly" "precisely" O.M. 2515; R.D. 2597 (*hardlych*). *harpes* "harps" O.M. 1996. *hast* "haste" O.M. 1361; P.C. 2768. *hel* "hall" O.M. 1501, 2110. *heyl* "hail" O.M. 563, 905, 2582, 2685, 2757; P.C. 361, 573, 953, 1681, 1682. *hobersen* "habergeon" R.D. 2536. *hore* "whore" O.M. 2705 (*hora*), 2728, 2753. *hovtyn* "proud" O.M. 2069; R.D. 545.

iaudyn "knave" P.C. 367, 1366, 1691, 1792, 1894; R.D. 1796. *ieuody* French, "je vous dis" R.D. 594, 1920. *iolyf* "jolly" R.D. 2013. *ioy* "joy" O.M. 154, 306, 359, 517, 558, 1374, 2476; P.C. 1903; R.D. 870, 1030, 1089, 1223, 1258, 1285, 1307, 1433, 1561. *iugge* "judge" P.C. 815, 1333, 1344, 1979. *ivnnyas* "joined" O.M. 2658. *iustys* "justice" P.C. 370, 1795, 1920, 1984, 2049.

kangeon "wretch" P.C. 2921; R.D. 137 (*cangeon*), 644 (*cangyon*). *karpentorryon* "carpenters" O.M. 2410, 2422. *kert* "cart" R.D. 236. *knoukye* "knock" O.M. 2676, 2694, 2699. *kynde* "kind" O.M. 979, 989 (*kunda*); P.C. 1731 (*kende*). *kyng* "king" P.C. 1682.

lanterns "lanterns" P.C. 609, 945. *lappa* "lap" P.C. 1244. *largys* "largesse" O.M. 2465. *last* "last" P.C. 1890. *lathys* "laths" O.M. 2446. *lavur* "labor"

O.M. 273, 299, 683, 851, 968, etc. *lawe* "praise" O.M. 2504, 2539; P.C. 1329. *ledya* "lead" O.M. 1876. *legyon* "legion" P.C. 1164 (plu.). *lel* "loyal" O.M. 572, 1111 (*lelle*, comp., "more loyal"), 1799, 2187, 2518; P.C. 948, 1318, 1923; R.D. 315, 1143 (adv.)., 2369. *les* "lie" "falsehood" P.C. 1879. *lettye* "hinder" O.M. 470, 722, 1495, 1903, 1982, 2236, 2427, 2487 (*let*, noun), 2505; P.C. 1635 (*let*, noun). *lorden* "wretch" P.C. 2585. *lordye* "lord" O.M. 901 (verb); P.C. 1681 (noun). *lorel* "wretch" O.M. 1504 (plu.); P.C. 1125 (plu.), 1381. *losel* "knave" P.C. 940, 1206, 1776, 2079, 2097, 2589 (plu.), 2693, 2718, 2735. *lowte, laute* "loyalty" O.M. 611, 2124, 2183, 2502, 2576, 2611 (*levte*); P.C. 1085, 1579 (*leaute*), 1611 (*leaute*). *lym* "lime" O.M. 2317. *lyn* "line" O.M. 2518. *lynneth* [=*lynnech*?] "lineage" O.M. 315, 316, 1242; P.C. 1183 (*lynage*); R.D. 1810. *lyst* "lists" "tournament" R.D. 223. *lysten* "edge of cloth" "strip" O.M. 808, 840. *lyth* "limb" "leg" P.C. 2512; R.D. 848.

mad "mad" O.M. 489. *madama* "madame" P.C. 1935. *mallart* "mallard" O.M. 1199. *maner* "manner" O.M. 993, 1291, 1825, 1856 (plu.), 1900, 2006, 2044, 2200 (*manerlich*); P C. 1294, 1513. *mantel* "mantle" P.C. 1186. *margh* "horse" O.M. 124, 1065 (*mergh*). *masons* "masons" O.M. 2262, 2278, 2298, 2304, 2410, 2423, 2470 (*masones*). NOTE: Substitution by the "B" scribe of *mysterdyns* in O.M. 2470 perhaps suggests dissatisfaction with the artificiality of trisyllabic *masones*. *mater* "matter" P.C. 2448. *maylys* "wrapped" O.M. 807, 810, 840, 1750; P.C. 3156 (inf.), 3197 (inf.). *menestrouthy* "minstrelsy" O.M. 770. *menstrels* "minstrels" O.M. 1995, 2845. *menteyne* "maintain" O.M. 2602. *mercy* "mercy" 327, 329, 495, 592, 694, 703, 731, 742, 815, 841, 1822, 1865, 1974, 2629, 2722; P.C. 1897, 2062; R.D. 1157, 1406 (*merciabal*). *merkye* "mark" O.M. 602. *merkyl* "miracle" O.M. 1450. *merthurye* "martyr" R.D. 1282 (verb). *mery* "merry" O.M. 2466. *meschonns* "mischance" O.M. 619. NOTE: Original *veschonns* was altered in MS to read *venyons* (so Norris). *messyger* "messenger" O.M. 1969, 2169, 2199, 2291, 2309, 2401; R.D. 1595, 1606, 1633. *mester* "master" O.M. 1005, 1045, 2468 (*mestrysy*, plu.); P.C. 119. *mettye* "meet" R.D. 1343. *meyny* "household" O.M. 1018. *meystry* "mastery" O.M. 409, 2144, 2164, 2738 2739. *mone* "money" P.C. 486, 505 (plu.), 1508. *mornyngh* "mourning" R.D. 438. *morter* "*mortise*" "socket" P. C. 2816. *musur, musure* "measure" (noun, verb) O.M. 393, 2506, 2507, 2513, 2514, 2550, 2566, 2568. *musyn* "measure" (O. French *moison*, Mid. Engl. *muson*) O.M. 2511. *myl* "thousand" O. M. 324; R. D. 2258 (*mylyon*), 2506. *myres* "admire" "look" O.M. 746 (impv.), 774, 801 (impv). *mysshyf* "mischief" O.M. 1426, 1539, 1549, 1704 (p.p.), 1707. *mysterdens* "craftsmen" OM.. 2416, 2431, 2470 (*mysterdyns* "B" scribe, over original *masones*). NOTE: Mid. Engl. *mister*, "craft" plus Cornish *den* "man". *mytour* "miter" O.M. 2615.

nakrys "kettle drums" O.M. 1998. *natur* "nature" R.D. 458. *nomber* "number" O.M. 1614. *notye* "observe" P.C. 434. *now* "now" P.C. 2239. *noyes* "noise" R.D. 2296.

obeye "obey" O.M. 1505. *odor* "odor" R.D. 144. *oel* "oil" O.M. 327, 329, 741 (*oyl*), 815 (*oyl*), 841. *offendye* "offend" O.M. 1330, 1339, 1350 (*offens*, noun). *offryn* "offering" R.D. 1241. *offrynne* "offer" O.M. 441, 500, 504, 505, 512, etc. *olyf* "olive" O.M. 1122. *onour, enour* "honor" O.M. 1169, 1190, 1201, 1204, 1986, 2033 (p.p.), 2051, 2095, 2283, 2384, 2504, 2553, 2623; P.C. 161, 171, 259, 266, 303, 311, 378, 1627 (plu.), 1685, 1712, 1842, 1904, 1992. *ordyne* "ordain" O.M. 92, 116, 296, 1040, 1218 (p.p.), 1303 (p.p.), 2260. *ordyr* "order" O.M. 2160 (noun). *organs* "organs" O.M. 1999. *ost* "host" O.M. 1652, 1713, 2141. *ostel* "hostel" "mansion" O.M. 1710. *out* "out !" (exclam.) O.M. 221, 1499, 1529, etc. *oynement* "ointment" P.C. 475, 534, 547.

page "page" "lad" P.C. 1866. *palfray* "palfrey" O.M. 1966. *palm* "palm" P.C. 261. *palmoryon* "palmers" R.D. 1477. *paly, pal* "satin" P.C. 1784, 2128. *parhap* "perhaps" O.M. 1352. *passyon* "passion" R.D. 2556. *pat* "pate" "head" P.C. 1385. *payon* "peacock" O.M. 132. *pek* "pitch" O.M. 954. *perfyth* "perfect" O.M. 33, 55, 140, 383, 436, 452, 1449, etc. *person* "persons" (plu.) O.M. 110 (*persons*), 1734, 1771. *peryl* "peril" O.M. 197, 2154. *peyn* "pain" O.M. 555, 600, 1354, 2040, 2046, 2254, 2301, 2409, 2556; P.C. 3186; R.D. 269. *plankos* "planks" O.M. 950, 2475 (*plynkennow*); P.C. 2517 (*plynken*). *planse* "plant" (verb) O.M. 1887, 1892, 1932, 1946, 2078, 2092; R.D. 1355 (*plontye*). *plas* "place" O.M. 420, 920, 1807, 1941, 2528, 2573, 2578, etc. *playnys* "planed" O.M. 950. *plente* "plenty" O.M. 2247, 2262; P.C. 2229. *pleysys* "pleased" O.M. 1546, 1562. *plynch* "twitch" "slight movement" (?) P.C. 1004. *plyt* "plight" P.C. 2638; R.D. 2058. *pol* "head" O.M. 2298; P.C. 2756. *pons* "bridge" O.M. 2804, 2811. *popel* "people" O.M. 1489, 1514. *porpus* "porpoise" O.M. 136. *port* "port" "window" O.M. 962. *posnys* "poisoned" O.M. 1559. *possybil* "possible" P.C. 1032. *post* "post" P.C. 2058, 2071. *poynt* "point" R.D. 1383 (*yn poynt da*, "in good point"). *prat* "trick" R.D. 605. *precyous* "precious" O.M. 418, 918; R.D. 492. *pref* "prove" O.M. 2161, 2164 (*profo*, wrongly expanded *perfo* by Norris). *prest* "fast" "always" etc. O.M. 578, 913, 1072, 1468; P.C. 947; R.D. 1559. *preve* "privy" "secret" O.M. 499, 936 (*pryve*). *prout* "proud" O.M. 2596, 2669; P.C. 362. *pryns* "prince" P.C. 554, 563. *prys* "value" "excellence" P.C. 132. *prysner* "prisoner" P.C. 2036, 2231 (*prysners*), 2250 (*prysners*), 2278 (*prysnes*), 2289 (*prysnes*), 2329 (*prysners*); R.D. 48 (*prysnys*), 646 (MS *prysners*, though rhyme requires *prysnes*). *pryson* "prison" P.C. 1871, 1878, 2042, 2267. *psalmus* "shawm" O.M. 1998. *punscie* "punish" O.M. 1482, 1527 (*punssye*), 1563 (*punsys*, p.p.), 1600 (*punsys*, p.p.). *pur* "pure" "very" O.M. 14, 91, 93, 312, 335, 433, etc. *purpyr* "purple" P.C. 2122, 2128; R.D. 2592. *purvers* "reversal" "overthrow" O.M. 882. *pych* "pitch" "throw" "thrust" P.C. 3017. *pycher* "pitcher" P.C. 629, 656, 662. *pyment* "spice" O.M. 1915. *pyn* "pin" "nail" O.M. 963. *pynkyl* "pinnacle" P.C. 84 (*pynkyl*, altered to unmetrical *pynakyl*), 88 (*pynakyl* in original hand; metrically regular). *pynsor* "pincers" P.C. 3149, 3151. *pyte* "pity" O.M. 502, 1768, 1854, 2369.

question "question" P.C. 1856. *quyc* "quick" O.M. 1068, 1530 (*quyk*, perhaps for *quyt*; altered to *voyde*); P.C. 2828. *quyt* "quite" P.C. 149, 345.

rach "wrack" ? "reck" ? P.C. 2722. NOTE: The first torturer, helping the smith's wife forge nails for the cross, says (O.M. 2721-23): *me a wysk so god me cach / ha henna gans mur a rach / may thy's tenno a uel cor*, which Nance translates: "I will strike, so God me catch, / and that with great care, / so that it shall stretch out like wax !" Both Norris and Nance seem to read *rach* as Mid. Engl. *recche, reck*, translating "care." But perhaps the man strikes the forge with great "force," or, as we say, "with a vengeance" (*wrack*). *rafsys* "ravished" R.D. 198. *recevys* "received" O.M. 2160; P.C. 830 (*resceue*, inf.). *record* "record" O.M. 1243 (noun). *recordys* "recorders" (musical instruments) O.M. 2000. *redye* "read" P.C. 550 (p.p.), 1168. *remmvve* "remove" O.M. 2045 (*remmvys*, p.p.), 2057. *repryfa* "reprove" O.M. 1500. *requyrye* "require" "request" P.C. 2474. *reson* O.M. 927; P.C. 822 (plu.), 1248, 1591, 1661; R.D. 458. *restye* "rest" R.D. 2586 (noun). *restys* "roasted" P.C. 698. *resyf* "receive" O.M. 503, 506, 1897. *revlys* "ruled" O.M. 1434; P.C. 1707 (*reulye*, inf.). *reuerons* "reverence" R.D. 495.

rewardyys "rewarded" O.M. 2201. *ro* "row" P.C. 1164. *rol* "roll" "scroll" P.C. 422. *romes* "rooms" O.M. 952. *rych* "rich" O.M. 1925; P.C. 132, 2122. *ryel* "royal" O.M. 14; R.D. 1907 (*ryal*).

sad "sad" O.M. 491; R.D. 1593. *sallugy* "salute" P.C. 2126. *sans* "holy" O.M. 85. *savtry* "psaltery" O.M. 1997. *sawor* "savor" O.M. 1740, 1991. *scannt lyn* "footrule" (Mid. Engl. *scantilon*, O. French *escauntilon*) O.M. 2510. *scapya* "escape" O.M. 1656, 1706; P.C. 1888; R.D. 383, 2019, 2270. *scarf* "scarf" "joint" O.M. 2523 (verb), 2530 (noun). *scham* "shame" P.C. 1902, 2629; R.D. 658. *schapys* "shaped" O.M. 2562. *scherewynsy* "shrewedness" "wickedness" O.M 942. *scherewys* "shrews" "rascals" P.C. 1142. *scherp* "sharp" P.C. 927, 2119 (*scharp*); R.D. 2269. *sclandrys* "maligned" "offended" P.C. 743, 891, 899. *sconyo* "shun" "object" O.M. 2388. *scorne* "scorn" O.M. 2730; P.C. 349, 1335 (p.p.); R.D. 918. *scout* "hussy" (?) O.M. 2667. *scryfys* "written" P.C. 78. *scryp* "scrip" P.C. 914, 920. *scryptours* "Scriptures" P.C. 1673. *se* "see" "seat" O.M. 905, 2373, 2392 (*see*). *secund* O.M. 17. *sefryn* "sovereign" O.M. 2189 (adj.). *sel pryve* "privy seal" O.M. 2600. *semlant* "appearance" R.D. 2060. *serponnt* "serpent" O.M. 1451. *servont* "servant" O.M. 572, 933, 1807 (plu.), 2402, 2609 (plu.); R.D. 315 (plu.), 2470 (*seruysy*, plu.). *servye* "serve" O.M. 647, 665, 680, 852, 929, 1019, 1477 (noun), 1496, 2309 (noun), 2603 (noun), 2608, 2616, 2622, 2776. *sescyas* "ceased" P.C. 523. *settya* "set" O.M. 1244 (p.p.), 1385, 2571, 2573; P.C. 2134 (p.p.); R.D. 2284. *seym* "fish oil" O.M. 2708. *sheft* "shaft" O.M. 2494. *shyndye* "injure" O.M. 288, 1778 (p.p.), 2133; P.C. 580, 1548, 2279 (p.p.). *sket* "at once" P.C. 1639. *skorgys* "scourges" P.C. 2056, 2107 (sing.); R.D. 2538 (verb, p.p.) *skul* "skull" P.C. 1355. *skyens* "knowledge" O.M. 82, 167. *slodyys* "sledges" "hammers" O.M. 2318. *smyllyng* "smelling" O.M. 1743. *snell* "quickly" R.D. 2144. *socor* "succor" P.C. 3008; R.D. 314. *sodon* "sultan" O.M. 2056. *somper* "without equal" P.C. 978. *son* "sound" "noise" O.M. 896, 1815, 1836, 2583. *sonys* "signed (with cross)" O.M. 466. *soper* "supper" P.C. 605 (*soppye*, "sup" verb), 640, 652, 675, 689, 696, 701, 703 (*sopye*, "sup" verb), 708, 834. *sostone* "sustain" O.M. 398, 682, 1163 (*sustoneys*, p.p.). *sotel* "subtle" O.M. 2491. *sovl* "soul" P.C. 1617, 2919. *sowmens* "salmon" O.M. 136. *sparie* "spare" O.M. 946, 1514 (p.p.), 1643; R.D. 1788, 2016. *spedye* "succeed" P.C. 440, 1934. *spencer* "butler" P.C. 802. *speys* "space" O.M. 947; P.C. 1088 (*spas*). *spikys* "spikes" P.C. 2140, 2670 (*spik*); R.D. 2590 (*spyggys*). *spyrys* "spirit" O.M., 4, 13, 62, 85, 925, 1090, etc. *spyt* "spite" R.D. 1795. *squyr* "square" O.M. 2510, 2544. *squyer* "squire" O.M. 1640 (*squyerryon*, plu.), 2004. *stanch* "stanchly" O.M. 954. NOTE: MS reads,*gans pek bethens stanch vrys*; Nance translates, "let them be staunchly daubed with pitch." *stede* "steed" O.M. 1964. *stedfast* "steadfast" P.C. 949, 3225. *sterlyn* "sterling" P.C. 1554. *stop* "stoop" "bend" O.M. 201. *stordy* "sturdy" P.C. 2271. *stout* "stout" O.M. 2221, 2668, 2685; P.C. 361, 573, 776; R.D. 920. *streche* "stretch" "delay" O.M. 2166, 2288. *stremys* "streams" O.M. 1083. *strokosow* "strokes" O.M. 2225, 2716 (*strekyas*); P.C. 2072 (*strecusow*), 2081 (*strekesow*). *stryf* "strife" P.C. 30, 2248. *sur* "sure" O.M. 14, 338, 877, 948, 966, 1174, etc. *suyt* "sweet" P.C. 1684. *swan* "swan" O.M. 133. *symphony* "symphony" O.M. 2000. *syre* "sire" "sir" O.M. 383, 1651, 2123, 2214, 2216, etc. *sywe* "follow" O.M. 661, 711, 1394, 1630, 1674, 1688, 1693, 1917.

tabours "tabors" O.M. 1995. *tackyys* "nailed" P.C. 2164, 2518, 2938. *talkye* "talk" O.M. 150. *tallyovr* "tray" "plate" P.C. 745. *tastye* "taste" O.M. 268, 284. *temple* "temple" O.M. 1259, 2260, 2284, 2412, 2425, 2487, etc. *temptacion* "temptation" P.C. 25, 225. *tempte* "tempt" O.M. 303, 308 (p.p.). *termyn* "term" "time" O.M. 351, 686, 813, 1221, etc. *thron* "throne" O.M. 897, 2372, 2378, 2582; R.D. 462. *tokyn* "token" O.M. 716 (plu.), 1243, 1247, 1733; P.C. 343, 971, 984, 1081, 1781, 2497. *tormont* "torment" O.M. 491, 2723; P.C. 541, 721, 1029, 1056; R.D. 694, 704, 1427. *torn* "turn" (noun) P.C. 1298; R.D. 409. *tour* "tower" O.M. 2030, 2110, 2389; P.C. 1711. *toval* "towel" P.C. 836. *trebyl* "treble" R.D. 2360. *treghury* "treachery" R.D. 90. *trespas* "trespass" P.C. 1814, 2458; R.D. 1153 *trest* "sad" O.M. 1467, 2094; P.C. 123, 731, 1023; R.D. 204, 499. *trestye* "trust" O.M. 1659; P C 948 (*trest*, "trusty"); R.D. 1737, 2036. *treynyn* "torment" "grieve" R.D. 73, 1797 (*drynyaf*) NOTE: The word is rare in English (e.g. *Piers Plowman* C XXI, 87, *trine*); it appears to be a verb formed from the Celtic root *tru* "alas." *treytor* "traitor" P.C. 556, 1108, 1177, 1449, 2174; R.D. 337, 640 (*treyson*). *trompours* "trumpeters" O.M. 1996. *trufyl* "trifle" R.D. 1055. *trynyte* "trinity" O.M. 58, etc. *tuch* "touch" P.C. 1714. *turont* "tyrant" P.C. 1603. *tyldye* "cover" "pitch (a tent)". O.M. 1073. *tymbyr* "timber" O.M. ʒ479, 2484 (*tumbyr*). *venym* "venom" O.M. 1757 (p.p.), 1779, 1798. *verement* "verily" P.C. 1664. *vertu* "virtue" O.M. 230, 1748, 1763, 2636. *voward* "vanguard" O.M. 2156. *voys* "voice" O.M. 577, 1436, 1487; P.C. 2026. *vyag* "voyage" O.M. 2163. *vyl* "vile" O.M. 2667, 2705, 2728; P.C. 940, 1817. *vylyny* "villainy" O.M. 1609; P.C. 572 (*bylen*, "villain"), 1275, 2629, 2827 (*vylen*, "villains" plu.). *vyngeauns* "vengeance" O.M. 1250, 1498; P.C. 1921, 1937, 1949.

wage "wage" P.C. 1187, 2257 (*wagys*, plu.). *war* "(be)ware" O.M. 2703; P.C. 999. *wassel* "wassail" P.C. 2978. *wast* "waist" P.C. 1889. *wast* "waste" "idle" R.D. 905, 2155. *west* "west" P.C. 2744. *wod* "insane" R.D. 544. *wolcumme* "welcome" O.M. 258; P.C. 1687; R.D. 2625. *worshyp* "honor" R.D. 1943. *wrynch* "wrench" "trick" P.C. 1001 (plu.). *whyp* "whip" P.C. 1196 (*wyp*), 1866, 2048 (plu.), 2056 (plu.), 2100, 2239; R.D. 2013, 2081.

yet "gate" O.M. 691 (*ʒet*), 743, 764, 793; P.C. 3039 (plu.); R.D. 115 *yeue* "give" P.C. 1640, etc. *yfle* "evil" P.C. 1198 (*yflle*), 1404, 1640; R.D. 574 (*elf*) *yk* "eke" P.C. 1688. *yngyn* "ingenious" "crafty" P.C. 1886. *yredy* "ready" "readily" O.M. 281, 727, 817, 821, etc.

3. *Pronunciation of the Final -E in Middle English*

The text of the Cornish *Ordinalia* is of considerable importance for anyone interested in the vexed problem of the pronunciation of the final *-e* in Middle English. Surprisingly enough, no one seems to have perceived this, in spite of the fact that in recent years there has been a revival of interest in the problem, especially as it relates to the versification of Chaucer.[43] The importance of the Cornish text in this matter is immediately apparent when we recall the kind of meter in which it is written. Norris describes this as follows:[44]

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[43] James G. Southworth, 'Chaucer's Final *-E* in Rhyme,' *PMLA*, LXII (1947), 910-35; E. Talbot Donaldson,' Chaucer's Final *-E*,' *PMLA*, LXIII (1948), 1101-24; the final arguments of both men appear in 'Chaucer's Final E (Continued),' *PMLA*, LXIV (1949), 601-610; and, finally, Southworth reviews the whole problem and gives his conception of Chaucer's prosody in *Verses of Cadence*, Oxford, 1954.

[44] *The Ancient Cornish Drama*, II, 446-7.

> Two or three verses in a hundred perhaps have four syllables only; but with this exception, the versification is made up wholly of seven-syllable lines; this rhythmical simplicity is maintained with barely a single exception throughout the 10,000 lines of the composition, and, monotonous as it appears, it constitutes the raw material out of which the whole metrical system is built up; it is never varied with the unaccented or uncounted syllables so common in the English Mysteries, which give such a variety to the old dialogue, where the verses may be perhaps scanned by feet, rather than by counting syllables. Nothing of the kind is seen in the Cornish rhythm; in this the number of syllables is adhered to as strictly as in the syllabic rhythm of Pope and his imitators.

Norris goes on to point out that no attention seems to have been given to regularity of accent. Indeed, although Norris does not say so, what we see in the Cornish meter is very likely an imitation of the French syllabic line.[45] Hence it seems rather pointless to indicate the meter by any kind of accentual system, as does Borlase,[46] who, for example, scans the opening line of the *Origo Mundi* as follows:

Eń tăs á nĕf ý'm gy̆lwýr.

This is highly artificial, for the normal Cornish accentuation is just the opposite:

En̆ tás ă néf y'm̆ gýlwy̆r.

Furthermore, the normal accentual pattern varies from line to line. In O.M. 7 we have:

y̆ lăuárăf néf hă týr

Hence it seems best simply to indicate the syllabic units thus:

En̄ tās ā nēf ȳ'm gȳlwȳr

This method reveals the syllabic count, and identifies the syllables to be pronounced.

If, therefore, the poetic line in Cornish has such a striking syllabic uniformity, we may then ask this question: do the occasional English lines in the text have this same regularity? The answer is emphatically yes. Here are some examples:

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[45] Cf. C. S. Lewis, 'The Fifteenth-Century Heroic Line,' *Essays and Studies*, XXIV (1938), 28-41, esp. p. 32: 'The French verse of Chaucer's immediate predecessors had parted company with stress-accent as a metrical element and was, in that respect, the same as French verse in the nineteenth century.'

[46] Quoted by Norris, *op. cit.*, II, 448.

mȳ tēllȳng ȳs nō fābēl (O.M. 2674)
tēl mȳ ānnōn ȳ thē prāy
whāt shāl ȳ dō ȳf ȳ māy (O.M. 2688-89)
vōlāvēth wē būth ȳ cōm
tēllȳth ānōn āl ān sūm (P.C. 1351-52)
hēyl sȳr iūstīs ȳn thē toūr (P.C. 1841)
lōrd tībērȳ bȳ mȳ hoūd (R.D. 1611)
tōrmōntōrs cōm hȳdēr snēl (R.D. 2144)

Given this regularity in the English lines, we must now see whether there is any evidence for the pronunciation of the final *-e*. Here are some pertinent examples:

wēl thōv fārē mēssȳgēr (O.M. 2291)
ā pūr lōrēl hāuē thāt (P.C. 1381)
pūr cōntrāryūs ȳn kēndē (P.C. 1731)
wēl thōw fārē sȳr cāyfās (P.C. 1805)
hālē hālē ōp ās schāl (P.C. 2830)

Each of the above occurs in a stanza in a position that calls for the seven-syllable line; and in no case would the line have seven syllables if the final *-e* were not counted. There can be no mistaking the fact that these examples offer firm evidence for pronunciation of the final *-e*.[47] Nor would it be safe to invoke the "conscious archaism" of the poet, as is so often done in the case of Chaucer, for we have to do here with a Cornish text, the meter of which, moreover, seems based on a French rather than an English model.

On the other hand, although there is ample evidence for pronunciation of the final *-e* in the *Ordinalia*, exceptions do occur, and should be mentioned. One of these, of course, is elision before a following vowel. Here are two examples:[48]

hēb hōkyē fāst hāue ȳdō (O.M. 198)
sȳr cāyphās sō mōte ȳ gō (P.C. 1623)

The verb *yeve* "give" (spelled *yeue*, *yve*) seems to be regularly monosyllabic:

hāuē thāt gōd ȳve thȳ wō (P.C. 1270)
ānd ēllȳs gōd yēue yōw wō (P.C. 1630)
ā gādlȳng gōd yēue thē wō (P.C. 2691)

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[47] Many more examples can be seen by consulting the list of English words in sub-section 2 above, dealing with the Middle English vocabulary (and cf. note 41 above). The word *kynde*, for example, occurs in the following line (O.M. 979): 'ā būp *kȳndē* ēthēn vās.'

[48] Exceptions seem to be limited to isolated English words in Cornish lines, e.g. *kynde*, cited in preceding note, and *lelle* in the following line (O.M. 1111): '*lellē* ēthēn rēn-ōv-thās'. I have not tried to establish rules for the behavior of the *-e* in the *Ordinalia*; such a study is needed, but requires separate treatment.

The term of address, "sir", is usually monosyllabic, spelled *syr* as above (P.C. 1623), but is occasionally also spelled *syre*, while retaining its monosyllabic value:

hēil sȳre cāyphās ēpscōp prōut (P.C. 2344)

On rare occasions we find a disyllabic *syour*:

fārwēl sȳoūr wē wōl gō (P.C. 1802)

The word "foot" is monosyllabic, usually spelled *foud*, *fout*, but it appears once with a final *-e* which is not pronounced:

lȳʒt fōude cānnās pārāmoūr (P.C. 1632)

In addition to these irregularities, there seems to be occasional flexibility in the use of final *-e* in words like "without." For example we find:

ȳn cāchēr wȳthōvtē nāy (P.C. 987)
kȳchēugh ēf wȳthōwtē fāl (P.C. 2523)

But in at least one instance the final *-e* is lacking, and not required by the meter:[49]

pēpēnāk vō wȳthōut dōut (P. C. 1356)

When all the irregularities in the appearance of the final *-e* are added up, however, they constitute but a fraction of the evidence attesting its pronunciation.[50] The spelling of the Middle English words and phrases in the *Ordinalia* seems remarkably phonetic, and extremely sensitive to the requirements of the meter.[51]

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[49] I note one case where the meter seems to demand pronunciation of a final *-e* which is not spelled in the text (P.C. 1879): 'wȳth oūt [¯] lēs'.

[50] See note 47 above. It should be borne in mind, however, that the *Ordinalia* also provides strong evidence *against* the pronunciation of *-e* in certain cases, e.g. in words of Old Franch origin like *grace*, *space* (usually spelled *gras*, *spas* in the Cornish text).

[51] As in Chaucer, certain words are treated flexibly. 'Counsellor,' for example, may be treated as having either two or three syllables. In O.M. 1579 it has three: 'ōv vānnēth thȳ's cōnsēlēr.' In O.M. 1566 it has only two: 'cōnsẹlēr gēntȳl ȳ'th pȳsāf ' (the first *e* is expuncted in the MS). With this flexible treatment of syllables compare the observations of E.T. Donaldson in *PMLA*, LXIII (1948), 1131, on variation of syllables and accent in Chaucer's use of the word *housbonde*. Especially interesting from a metrical point of view are P.C. 1183-84, which, as written in the hand of the original scribe, read as follows:

ā gīglōt ōf lȳnāgē
hā tȳ mār yōnk ā'n āgē

Here, with final *-e* pronounced, each line has exactly seven syllables. A later scribe, To summarize: the *Ordinalia* contains Middle English lines, phrases and words which in their form and character are consistent with the fourteenth century date which has usually been assigned to this text. Especially significant is the fact that, in the Middle English passages, final *-e* seems to have been pronounced. Since our text is Cornish, it would be hazardous to explain this as a deliberate archaism on the part of the dramatist, for we would be speaking of an archaism which has no meaningful place in Cornish prosody; rather it seems more natural to suppose that he used the final *-e* because he was accustomed to hearing it pronounced in the English speech of his day. Hence this feature would seem to provide valuable evidence for dating the *Ordinalia*, or at least to suggest a *terminus ad quem*. But alas, when did the final *-e* cease being pronounced? Scholarly opinion remains divided.[52] Probably the nearest thing to a compromise position is the view of Joseph and E. M. Wright: they believe that the *-e* disappeared from London speech about the middle of the fourteenth century.[53] But even if this is correct, it may still have lingered on for a time in the more conservative southern dialect found in the Cornish text — perhaps till the end of the century.

The Middle English elements in the *Ordinalia*, therefore, although interesting and significant in many ways, cannot be said to be decisive in establishing the date of the text. At best they provide general confirmation of the evidence previously considered, and suggest that the dramas may have been composed before 1350, or, at the latest, before 1400.[54]

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however, whom Norris calls 'B,' altered the lines as follows (putting B's alterations in italics):

ā *thōv* giglōt ōf lȳnāge
hā tȳ *whāth* mār yōnk ā'n āge

Now these lines scan *only if the final -e is not pronounced*. Hence it seems likely that the final *-e* became silent at some time before scribe B made his 'corrections.' Norris saw the significance of this (note to line 1183, vol. I, p. 316, bottom of page).

[52] Cf. Southworth, *PMLA*, LXII (1947), 912, 917, 931, 935; Donaldson, *PMLA*, LXIII (1948), 1110 ff., 1120 f.

[53] *An Elementary Middle English Grammar*, Oxford, 1923, p. 69; cited by Southworth, *PMLA*, LXII (1947), 917.

[54] For the possibility that the Middle English alliterative poem *Piers the Plowman* is indebted to the *Ordinalia*, see David C. Fowler, *Piers the Plowman: Literary Relations of the A and B Texts*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961, especially chap. 3. Compare O.M. 123-34 with *Piers the Plowman*, B-text, passus XI, 332-53. Another possible point of contact can be seen in the treatment of the Ascension in the two texts. In the *Ordinalia* the Ascension is dramatized in R.D. 2487-2630. The corresponding passage in *Piers the Plowman* is B passus XIX, 4-14. The Christ-knight imagery of the *Ordinalia* (R.D. 2517-22, 2535-40, 2571-2606) and *Piers the Plowman* (B XIX, 10-14, 26 ff.) contrasts sharply with the rather extravagant "tavern" imagery of *The Golden Legend* (ed. F.C. Ellis, London, 1900), I, 115, and the *Stanzaic Life of Christ* (*op. cit.*, note 33 above), lines 9045-64. Hence if these passages are taken as evidence of the indebtedness of *Piers the Plowman* to the *Ordinalia*,

V. Conclusion

Previous estimates of the date of the Cornish *Ordinalia* range from c. 1275 to c. 1450. A re-examination of the place-name evidence suggests a date somewhere between 1300 and 1375, or, more narrowly, between 1350 and 1375.

There is also possible significance for dating in the relationship between the *Ordinalia* and the *Pascon agan Arluth*. If, as scholars seem to agree, the latter was written in the "late fourteenth century," and if, as I have tried to show, the passion poem is indebted to the *Ordinalia*, then the drama must be assigned to a somewhat earlier period.

Our examination of the Middle English elements in the drama is mainly of value in eliminating the possibility of a fifteenth century date, although even this generalization is threatened by the cleavage of opinion concerning the chronology of Middle English sound changes. Nevertheless the evidence of Middle English lines and phrases, vocabulary, and, above all, pronunciation of the final *-e*, point strongly to a date no later than 1400. Looking at the other end of the scale, it is difficult to believe that the Middle English elements would allow a date earlier than the fourteenth century.

The general neglect of the Cornish drama by modern scholars has made it impossible to explore, in this study, all of the areas which might yield evidence concerning the date of the text. We need to know more about the chronology of the decline of the Cornish language, and more about the (French?) sources used in the dramas. A historical study of documents relating to Glasney College, where these plays seem to have been staged, would also be very useful.[55] Yet it is possible to affirm, I believe, with some measure of confidence, that the evidence thus far considered points to the third quarter of the fourteenth century as the period in which to place the composition of the Cornish *Ordinalia*.

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and if, as I think, the B-version of *Piers* was composed between 1378 and 1382, then the *Ordinalia* should probably be dated prior to 1378.

[55] E.g. Thurstan C. Peter, *History of Glasney Collegiate Church* (cf. note 18 above), pp. 49 ff.: 'The bishops and their officers had doubtless to watch institutions such as Glasney pretty carefully. Amongst other laxities of which we have record was that of acting plays in the churches during the Christmas holidays and on certain saints' days. To prevent such abuses, Bishop Grandisson on 10 December, 1360, issued a prohibition, addressed to the warden and chapter of Ottery, to the dean, precentor and chapter of the collegiate church of Crediton, and to the provost and chapter of Glasney, forbidding, under pain of excommunication, such unseemly and improper pastimes.' This of course cannot be decisive for our purposes, but it at least suggests that the production of plays at Glasney was a problem to the Bishop as early as 1360. A seach of the Episcopal registers, especially that of John Grandisson (1327-69), should uncover more information of this kind. Cf. F. C. Hingeston-Randolph (ed.), *Episcopal Registers of the Diocese of Exeter*, London, 1886-99.

A Christmas Sermon by Gilbert of Poitiers *

NICHOLAS M. HARING, S.A.C.

THE first scholars to draw public attention to the manuscript which contains Gilbert's Christmas sermon were the two famous travellers Martène and Durand.[1] They found it in the library of St. Amand at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and from their description of the visit we may present the following excerpts: "Nous partîmes le lendemain de grand matin pour nous rendre à S. Amand, tant pour nous édifier, que pour revoir les manuscrits que nous avions déjà vu autrefois." Later on we read: "La bibliothèque était autrefois excellente en manuscrits. Les religieux se plaignent d'une personne d'autorité, qui en a enlevé une bonne partie des meilleurs. Il en reste pourtant encore un bon nombre, qui sont fort précieux. La plupart contiennent des ouvrages des Pères de l'église, et plusieurs anciens Grammairiens."

Our manuscript was among them and was later transferred to the library of Valenciennes[2] where its modern shelf mark is 197, formerly 189. Another rather famous *codex* in the same library, but not mentioned by our Maurists, contained a commentary on St. Paul falsely ascribed to Gilbert of St. Amand but convincingly restored to its true author, Gilbert of Poitiers, by the militant H. Denifle.[3]

The two Maurists were so impressed by the beauty of our manuscript that they grew oblivious of its contents. They tell us: "Parmi les livres de Théologie, nous vîmes les commentaires de Gilbert de la Porrée évèque de Poitiers sur les livres de la Trinité de Boëce." As a matter of fact, the volume contains all four commentaries on the *Opuscula sacra* of Boethius. In addition, it contains a sermon not mentioned by our two illustrious scholars: *Sermo magistri Gisleberti de Natali Domini* (f. 87v-88v). It has been widely ignored ever since. A. Clerval[4] failed to mention the existence of this sermon because he relied on the *Voyage littéraire* (III, 99). It is listed in the catalogue published by A. Molinier[5] who assigns the manuscript to the twelfth century. No reference is made to it by H. Denifle although he knew Molinier's catalogue. He calls the manuscript "eine Prachthandschrift aus dem Ende des 12. Jahrhunderts, welche den berühmten Kommentar Gilberts de la Porrée *super librum Anicii Boetii de Trinitate aquilino stilo scriptus* enthält."[6]

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[1] Martène-Durand, (Second) *Voyage littéraire de deux Religieux Bénédictines de la Congrégation de S. Maur* (Paris, 1724) 99.

[2] A. Molinier, *Catal. Gén.* 25 (Paris, 1894) 275.

[3] H. Denifle, *Die abendl. Schriftausleger bis Luther* (Mainz, 1905) 30-34 and 334-346. The present number is 89. At St. Amand its number was 165 as listed by A. Sanderus, *Bibl. Belg. manuscripta* I (Insulis 1641) 46.

[4] *Les Écoles de Chartres* (Chartres, 1895) 185-186. The *Histoire litt. de la France* and A. Berthaud, *Gilbert de la Porrée* (Poitiers, 1893) are also silent on the matter.

The Latin passage quoted by Denifle is found at the end of Gilbert's *Praefatio* and accounts for the inaccuracy we have noted in the description given by Martène and Durand. The full text reads: "Incipit commentarius magistri Gilleberti Pictavensis episcopi super librum Anicii Boetii de Trinitate in ictibus altividis aquilino stilo conscriptus" (f. 3). M. Grabmann hardly studied the manuscript personally, but he mentions the fact that it contains a Christmas sermon by *magister Gislebertus*.[7]

A doubt concerning its authenticity has not been raised with the exception of my own appraisal of its contents which caused me to consider Gilbert's "authorship doubtful".[8] On first sight, the reasons for such a view would seem obvious. At least two-thirds of the sermon consists of literal quotations from his commentary on the Boethian tractate *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*. These quotations are such that the mind rebels against the very thought that the bishop of Poitiers could have expected the faithful to listen to him. The sermon is of such doctrinal depth and so technical in its terminology that it cannot have been delivered before a general audience. But the sermon is more than a compilation of texts, and the objections one might raise against its authenticity fade before the simple fact that the sermon is explicitly attributed to *magister Gislebertus* by the very scribe who copied it, not by a later hand.

The reasons which may be alleged to militate against Gilbert's authorship all but vanish if we assume that the sermon was what might be called a university sermon preached before students who followed his courses and were familiar with his particular ways of handling theological subjects. The assumption that some one else pieced the various quotations together and published the product under Gilbert's name can be ruled out by a consideration of the uniformity of style which unites all parts of the sermon.

It is clearly divided into three parts, the first of which deals with the words of the Gospel (*John* 1:13): *Verbum caro factum est* (Nos. 3-14). The second part is devoted to an explanation of: *Et habitavit in nobis* (Nos. 15-23). The preacher then turns to the words: *Et vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi Unigeniti a Patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis* (Nos. 24-20). The parts, however, are not of equal length.

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[5] *Catal. Gén.* 25, 275.

[6] H. Denifle, *Die abendl. Schriftausleger*, p. 344.

[7] M. Grabmann, *Gesch. der schol. Methode* 2 (Freiburg i.B. 1911) 431.

[8] The commentary of Gilbert, bishop of Poitiers, on Boethius' *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*, *AHDLMA* 21 (1954) 247.

The introduction is brief and opens with a liturgical text: *Hodie nobis de caelo pax vera descendit* etc. The same text appears again at the beginning of the beautiful epilogue (No. 31). The opening passage is explained with the help of a text from *Leviticus* (26: 10). Its first two words: *Vetustissima veterum* (*comedetis*) are interpreted in a rather ingenious manner: "*Vetustissima veterum* sunt Pater et Filius et eorum Spiritus, tres personae, unus singulariter Deus, unum principium omnium rerum, unus auctor, qui omnia ex nihilo creavit quae multis modis vicissim variantur." There is no denying that this is Gilbert's style. The speaker then cites two texts from the Prophets to elucidate the passage from *Leviticus* and declares that St. John announced the fulfilment of the prophecies in the words: *The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.*

The first of the many excerpts which now follow serves to show that, according to the true faith, the divine plan concerning mankind depended on man's obedience to the Creator's commandments and that after man's disobedience the divine will was the sole cause and reason for the manifold sufferings and even the death of man. Yet later it pleased God to save the sinner. To reform man, *the Word was made flesh*, which, we are told, means: the Son of God was made man.

We now learn that the ancient authors express this *factura* in various ways without changing the thought. Thus they say: 'God assumed man' or 'the divinity assumed humanity.' In both sentences the subject, 'God' or 'the divinity' respectively, designates a person, the object a nature, despite the fact that, strictly speaking, the word 'divinity' designates a nature, not a person. Gilbert then states the rule which was soon to become a classical formula: "Non enim assumpsit persona personam neque natura naturam neque natura personam sed tantummodo persona naturam." He tells his audience that the error of Nestorius resulted from a misunderstanding of the sentence: 'God assumed man,' which he took to mean that God assumed a person, since as a rule the concrete noun 'man' designates a person.

The second part of the sermon begins with the words: *And he dwelt among us*, a true man, found in the garment of true humanity. In Him, in the one Person, His nature was united to our nature. This is carefully explained by the preacher in several excerpts taken from his fourth commentary on the *opuscula sacra*. We saw in the first part that He who assumed human nature was a person. Now we learn that in Christ the human nature or subsistence is united to the divine essence.

The third part (Nos. 21-30) appeals more strongly to the heart than to the mind. The audience is encouraged to rejoice and to receive Him who received us first. What we say of Him as man should never cause us to become oblivious of the fact that He is God, *full of grace and truth.*

The liturgical atmosphere in which the sermon began returns and the vision of the Nativity scene is conjured up as the bells toll for matins breaking the silence in the middle of the night — the time when the Virgin is believed to have given birth, the shepherds appeared and the angels sang their *Gloria in excelsis*, lulling the child to sleep, just as mothers do singing softly over the cradle. The sermon ends by summoning the audience to rise and celebrate the new birth of the child born to us, the child who liveth and reigneth one God with God the Father and the Holy Spirit, world without end. Amen.

Most of the sermon must have resembled a dry, lackluster and bloodless lecture delivered in some auditorium rather than before an audience waiting anxiously for the unfolding of the liturgical solemnities on Christmas night. But it must be granted that it does not lack beautiful moments and moving words of profoundly human sentiment.

It is of some interest to relate this sermon to the charges made against Gilbert at the trial after the Council of Rheims, in 1148. His adversaries declared: "We believe that the divinity, no matter whether you call it divine substance or nature, was made flesh — in the Son, however."[9] According to Gilbert's teaching, the subject of this sentence should not be "the divinity" but "the Word" or "the Son of God." He says in his sermon (No. 5): *Verbum* itaque *caro factum est* i.e. Filius Dei factus est homo. This, as we have seen, is explained in the first part of the sermon. In the second part, Gilbert endeavours to show that, although only a Person assumed human nature or only a Person brought about the union, the union itself is that of two natures: the divine essence and human nature. In other words, Christ's human nature was united not *to* a divine Person but *by* a divine Person to a divine nature.

However, Geoffrey of Auxerre, who would rather indulge in abuse than attempt to see Gilbert's point of view, claims that the bishop of Poitiers had completely eliminated the divinity from the Incarnation: "Divinam quippe naturam Deum non esse contendens eo usque prorupit — etiam non interrogatus — ut incarnationem sic tribueret personae Filii, ut ipsi divinitati eam omnino negaret."[10] How untrue this statement is becomes evident in the second part of our sermon.[11] It contains nothing that was not publicly known through his commentaries on the *Opuscula sacra.*

When was the sermon written? Obviously after Gilbert's last commentary on the Boethian *Tractates.* Hence it was probably delivered on a Christmas night between 1140 and 1153.

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[9] Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Contra cap. Gilberti*; PL 185, 618B.

[10] *Contra cap. Gilberti*; PL 185, 614A.

[11] A more detailed analysis of Gilbert's Christology is found in my paper: 'Sprachlogische und philosophische Voraussetzungen zum Verständnis der Christologie Gilberts von Poitiers', *Scholastik* 32 (1957) 373-397.

SERMO MAGISTRI GISLEBERTI DE NATALI DOMINI

1 *Hodie nobis de caelo pax vera descendit. Hodie per totum mundum* etc.[1] Ad horum verborum intelligentiam necessarium est scire quod legitur in *Levitico* in hunc modum: *Vetustissima veterum comedetis et vetera novis supervenientibus proicietis.*[2]

2 *Vetustissima veterum* sunt Pater et Filius et eorum Spiritus, tres personae, unus singulariter Deus, unum principium omnium rerum, unus auctor, qui omnia ex nihilo creavit quae multis modis vicissim variantur. *Vetera* sunt Mosaica, legalia scilicet et figuralia, tantum promittentia et neminem ad perfectum ducentia, percutientia et non sanantia. Audi qualia sunt: *Dens*, inquit, *pro dente, oculus pro oculo*, et *mulierem in adulterio deprehensam lapidare*, et huiusmodi.[3]

3 *Nova* sunt de quibus in Ieremia legitur: *Ecce novum faciet Dominus super terram, femina circumdabit virum.*[4] Et in Isaia: *Ecce concipiet et pariet filium.*[5] Quod ille discipulus cui arcana caelestia revelata sunt manifeste declarat dicens: *Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis.*[6]

4 *Habet*[7] *recte credentium fides quod in homine corporis et animae compagem sine aliqua corruptione divina servasset voluntas, si* impius *homo mandata sui Creatoris*[8] *servasset. Cum vero mandati praevaricatione poenam meruit, Dei iustitia ex* se,[9] *voluntatis suae unica causa multorum generum passionibus et etiam corporis et animae dissolutione* miserum hominem[10] *afflixit.*

5 *Postea*[11] *placuit tamen illi iustificare peccantem, assumere deiectum, reformare corrumptum et in illa reformationis natura eundem deinceps sine fine conservare. Verbum* itaque *caro factum est* i.e. Filius Dei factus est homo.

6 Ad huius admirabilem facturae profunditatem quoquomodo intelligendam sciendum est quod *auctores*[12] *consueverunt dictionibus eisdem sensus* quoque *diversos, saepe diversis*[13] *eosdem*[14] *proferre. Eodem enim intellectu* quo dictum est: Verbum caro factum est, *dictum* invenerunt[15]: *et Deus assumpsit hominem et divinitas assumpsit humanitatem: illud personae, hoc naturarum nominibus. Illa enim* (fol. 87vb) *nomina 'Deus,' 'homo,' a naturis diversis sed tamen personae unius nomina sunt. Haec vero 'divinitas' et 'humanitas' naturarum sunt nomina.*

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[1] Christmas liturgy: Responsorium after the second lesson of the first nocturn.

[2] *Lev.* 26:10.

[3] *Lev.* 24:20; *Deut.* 19:21; Cf. *John* 8:3.

[4] *Jer.* 31:32.

[5] *Is.* 7:14.

[6] *John* 1:14.

[7] Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 6, 10; ed. Haring, *AHDLMA* 21 (1954) 323.

[8] Gilbert: Factoris.

[9] Gilbert: ex suae voluntatis unica causa.

[10] (miserum hominem) Gilbert: illum.

[11] Postea... conservare: Gilbert, *ibidem*.

[12] Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 4, 55; p. 313.

7 *Sed*[16] *et illa, hoc est 'Deus' et 'homo' quandoque ex intellectu personae, quandoque ex intellectu naturarum utraque, quandoque alterum pro persona alterum pro natura intelligenda ponuntur. Similiter et haec i.e. 'divinitas' et 'humanitas' aut utraque pro naturis aut utraque pro personis aut alterum pro persona aut alterum pro natura.*

8 *Nam*[17] *cum dicimus 'Deus assumpsit hominem' et 'divinitas assumpsit humanitatem,' ex eodem sensu* haec *dicimus, et ibi 'Deus' et hic 'divinitas' ad intelligendam personam, 'hominem' et 'humanitatem' ad intelligendam naturam* in *his orationibus proferuntur. Non enim assumpsit persona personam neque natura naturam neque natura personam sed tantummodo persona naturam.*

9 *Formam*[18] *enim servi nihil nisi Christus accepit. Sed Nestorius audiens 'Deus assumpsit hominem' putat intelligendum quod, qui Deus erat, eum, qui homo est, assumpserit. Quod esse non potest. Nam unus et idem est Christus qui et Deus erat et homo est. Qui seipsum nulla ratione assumere potuit quia nisi diversorum nulla*[19] *potest esse assumptio.*

10 *Quod*[20] *si in Christo unam putat esse personam illum, qui Deus erat, alteram esse personam illum, qui homo est, atque illum, qui Deus erat, eum, qui homo est, assumpsisse, hoc quoque impossibile est. Nam sicut omnino idem ita omnino diversum assumi non potest.*

11 *Non*[21] *sunt aliqua inter se magis diversa quam ea quae omni genere* totisque *personalibus proprietatibus diversa sunt. Non indefinite dicimus 'genere' sed universaliter 'omni genere.' Nec dicimus 'quibuslibet proprietatibus' sed 'personalibus proprietatibus'. Sunt enim quae differunt genere, sed non omni ut lapis et lignum, quae tamen uno genere corpora sunt, et differunt proprietatibus sed non personalibus. Ideoque unum aliquid componere possunt ut domum et huiusmodi alia.*[22]

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[13] supple: dictionibus.

[14] supple: sensus.

[15] Gilbert: invenitur.

[16] Sed... pro natura: Gilbert, *ibidem.*

[17] Nam... persona naturam: Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 4, 56; p. 313.

[18] Gilbert, *ibidem.*

[19] Gilbert: nonnisi diversorum ulla.

[20] Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 4, 57; p. 314.

[21] *Ibidem.*

[22] Gilbert: aliud.

12 *Sunt*[23] *etiam quae omni genere* differunt (fol. 88ra) *ac per hoc totis proprietatibus sed non personalibus, et idcirco in uno esse possunt ut color et superficies quae nullo genere, nulla proprietatum naturalium parte conveniunt. Et tamen in uno sunt quoniam eorum proprietates personales non sunt. Non enim est color per se a superficie unus, cuius proprietas id non efficit, ut cum superficie in uno* non *esse possit.*

13 *Item*[24] *sunt* alia *quae proprietatibus etiam personalibus differunt et tamen omni genere suo et etiam specie conformia sunt ut Plato et Cicero. Sunt etiam quae conveniunt, non dico numero naturarum diversarum suarum imaginaria vel substantiali conformitate, sed unius simplicis atque individuae essentiae singularitate. Differunt autem personalibus proprietatibus ut Pater et eius Filius et utrorumque Spiritus.*

14 *Sed*[25] *sicut iam diximus non sunt horum omnium aliqua a se invicem ita diversa sicut ea quae omni genere totisque personalibus proprietatibus differunt.* Evidentissime ergo patet haeresis Nestorii dicentis Christum Jesum constare ex duabus personis, Dei videlicet et hominis, quod videlicet catholica fides abhorret et reprobat.

15 Sequitur: *Et habitavit in nobis* i.e. homo verus, *habitu* verae humanitatis *inventus,*[26] nobis est inventus i.e. in ipso, una persona, nostra natura suae naturae est coniuncta ita ut copulatione diversarum naturarum una fieret persona. *Et*[27] *non intelligas quod naturarum copulatione fieret* Christus *persona sed quod fieret copulatione una.*

16 *Non*[28] *enim, quod erat, factus est Christus sed quod non erat. Erat autem Deus et Filius Dei et persona et unus sed* non[29] *diversarum naturarum copulatione. Si quis ergo quaerat Christus quid factus est, nemo respondebit quod ipse factus sit Deus vel quod factus sit Filius Dei vel quod factus sit persona vel quod factus sit unus. Sed quod factus sit diversarum naturarum copulatione unus.*

17 *Quid*[30] *unus? Unum totum, unum compositum et huiusmodi. Et haec admirabilis novitas.* Unde Ieremias: *Ecce novum faciet Dominus super terram. Solent*[31] *usu nascentium, qui vocatur 'natura', in una persona plurima diversarum specierum coniungi ut carnes, ossa, sanguis, colera et huiusmodi, et cum his omnibus anima, quae tamen inter se aliquo genere et aliqua ratione conveniunt.*

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[23] Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 4, 58; p. 314.
[24] Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 4, 59; p. 314.
[25] Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 4, 60; p. 314.
[26] *Phil.* 2:9.
[27] Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 4, 41; p. 308.
[28] *Ibidem.*
[29] Gilbert: sine.
[30] Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 4, 41; p. 309: Quid... novitas.
[31] Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 4, 42; p. 309: Solent... conveniunt.

Item subsistentiae generales et differentiales quae partes[32] *spiritualium*[33] *subsistentiarum et accidentia quae etiam numerantur in partibus personarum*[34] *proprietatum quae inter se quandoque aliquo genere, semper aliqua ratione conveniunt.*

18 *Sed*[35] *quod omni genere omnique ratione diversa aliquod unum componerent, nulla umquam consuetudo nascentium habuit. Quod tamen in ea persona quae Christus vocatur factum est in qua divinae essentiae subsistentia*[36] *coniuncta est quae ab eo*[37] *non modo omni genere verum est*[38] *omni ratione intelligitur esse diversa.*

19 *Illa*[39] *est enim essentia, ista subsistentia. Illa sine principio, haec ex principio. Illa Creator est, ista creatura est aliquid. Unde horum in Christo facta coniunctio novitas est.* Nihilominus etiam de hac novitate sciendum est quod *Deus*[40] *qui nusquam non est ubique substantiae suae plenitudine totus est. Ideoque in homine*[41] *est cui etiam ad aliquos usus Pater et Filius donavit*[42] *Spiritum sanctum.*

20 *Sed*[43] *nullus illorum essentia divinitatis*[44] *est. Jesus autem solus est in quo omnis plenitudo divinitatis*[45] *est. Nam et sicut ubique et extra omnia ita in eius humano corpore atque spiritu Pater et Filius et eorum Spiritus totus est. Spiritus quoque Patris et suus, ad quoscumque usus idem Jesus vult, in ipso est. Pater quoque in ipso est personali proprietate alius ab ipso.*

21 *Ipse*[46] *vero in se esse non potest. Unde cum ipse dixisset: Pater in me est, non subiunxit: et ego in me, sed potius: Et ego in Patre. Sunt ergo in Filio Pater et Spiritus sanctus personalibus proprietatibus ibidem sicut ubique alii ab ipso. Ipse vero non est in se quoniam personali proprietate a seipso alius esse non potest.*

22 *In*[47] *corpore tamen eius et anima, sicut dictum est, et Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus totus est: et personalibus proprietatibus diversi a corpore ipsius et anima. Nam neque corpus eius neque anima est vel Pater vel Filius vel Spiritus sanctus. Essentia* tamen *qua Filius cum Patre et Spiritu sancto idem singu-*

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[32] Supple: sunt.

[33] Read: specialium.

[34] Read: personalium.

[35] Gilbert, *ibidem*: Sed... esse diversa.

[36] Gilbert: humana subsistentia.

[37] Gilbert: ea.

[38] Read: etiam.

[39] Gilbert, *ibidem*: Illa... novitas est.

[40] Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 4, 45 ; p. 310: Deus... Spiritum sanctum.

[41] Gilbert: omni homine.

[42] Read: donant.

[43] Gilbert, *ibidem*: Sed... alius ab ipso.

[44] Supple: Deus.

[45] Col. 2:9.

[46] Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 4, 46; p. 310: Ipse... non potest.

[47] *Ibidem*: In... factum est.

lariter et individualiter est Deus, subsistentiis corporis eius et animae, immo toti humanitati in Christo *coniuncta est. Quod in nullo homine alio factum est* (fol. 88va).

23 *Unde*[48] *nullus aliorum, quamvis in eorum corporibus atque animabus immo in ipsis Pater et Filius et eorum Spiritus sit, quamvis etiam illis a Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto*[49] *datus sit et multae gratiae in eodem Spiritu, nullus divinitatis essentia Deus est. Ipse vero, cuius essentiae humana substantia*[50] *coniuncta est, et homo est et Deus est.*

24 Haec est gloria illius hominis de qua consequenter subiunxit evangelista: *Et vidimus gloriam eius* i.e. hominis Jesu Christi *gloriam quasi Unigeniti a Patre.* Hoc adverbium 'quasi' non est imaginariae similitudinis innutivum[51] sed essentivae varietatis expressivum.

25 *Vetustissima* ergo *veterum comedetis* i.e. Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum in Trinitate et hanc Trinitatem in unitate firma et inconvulsa fide teneamus. *Vetera* vero i.e. legalia tantum et figuralia quasi umbram, re habita, proiciamus et *nova* his figuralibus praesignata i.e. pro nobis Filium Incarnatum et de gloriosa Virgine Maria hodierna die natum, laeti suscipiamus.

26 Ipse enim prius suscepit nos. Unde Apostolus: Filius Dei *cum sit splendor et figura substantiae eius seipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens,*[52] non in peccato quidem sed ut poena peccati afficeretur et nostris doloribus non necessitate sed sola voluntate affligeretur.

27 Quem cum praedicamus infirmum utpote in cunis vagientem, ubera Virginis ad humanae sustentationis remedium suggentem, esurientem, sitientem, fatigatum, ligatum, flagellatum, consputum, spinis coronatum, felle et aceto potatum, novissime vero morte turpissima condemnatum, non his, inquam, praedicamentis eum privamus firmitudine, cuius firmitas manet in natura utraque.

28 Est namque Filius Dei in natura divinitatis immutabilis, indeclinabilis et in natura humanitatis ab omni peccato immunis. Unde beatus Augustinus: Christus secundum plenitudinem utriusque naturae verus Deus et verus homo est. Qui ex quo homo esse coepit, Filius Dei unicus esse coepit. Quae tam celsa et summa subvectio praedestinata est humanae naturae, ut quo tolleretur altius non haberet.[53]

29 Sequitur: *Plenum gratiae et veritatis.* Solus Christus et non alius dicitur gratiae plenus quoniam illi ad omnes sed nemini alii ad omnes immo ad aliquos usus gratiarum et munerum ut Iob ad poenitentiam (fol. 88vb), David ad mansuetudinem, Salomon ad sapientiam datus est unus et idem Spiritus qui soli Christo omnes in munere contulit usus, *dividens* aliis *prout vult.*[54]

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[48] Gilbert, *Contra Eutychen* 4, 47; p. 311; Unde... et Deus est.

[49] (et spiritu sancto) read: Spiritus sanctus.

[50] Gilbert: subsistentia.

[51] Read: innuitivum.

[52] *Heb.* 1:3; *Phil.* 2:7.

[53] Cf. Augustine, *De Praed. sanctorum* 15, 30 f.; PL 44, 982 f.

30 Item solus Christus et nemo alius dicitur veritatis plenus quoniam sicut in corpore in substantiam[55] ipsius est corporalitas ut secundum illud et unitate substantiae suae sit corpus ita in solo Christo et nemine alio in substantia eius est divinitas ut solus ipse et nemo alius veritate sui generis suaeque substantiae Deus sit. Sic[56] enim nec corporalitas esset corporalitas[57] nec corpus esset corpus nisi corporalitas esset in corpore quae est forma suae substantiae suaeque essentiae quae ipsum facit esse Deum.[58]

31 Haec est ergo Veritas per quam *nobis hodie pax vera descendit* i.e. Christus de Virgine natus per quem Deo Patri reconciliati sumus. Christi ergo nativitatem nobis celebraturis sciendum est quod media nocte matutinum pulsatur quia tali hora credimus Virginem peperisse, angelos pastoribus apparuisse et illo[59] summo puero pro cantilenis, quas diligentes nutrices suis pueris faciunt, *gloria in excelsis* decantasse. Dicitur enim: *dum medium silentium tenerent omnia et nox in suo cursu iter perageret omnipotens sermo tuus, Domine, a regalibus sedibus venit.*[60].

32 Siquidem cum ante legem esset quasi particulare silentium, qui[61] erant qui audirent si essent prophetae vel doctores qui dicerent, in tempore legis exclusum est hoc silentium, quia fuerunt qui dicerent et audirent. In tempore vero prophetarum item particulare silentium fuit quia erant qui dicerent sed non erant qui audirent.

33 Decurrente autem tempore prophetarum, factum est *medium silentium* i.e. commune silentium, ut non essent qui dicerent nec qui audirent. Quo silentio existente et nocte infidelitatis cursum suum consummante, invisibilis Deus *formam servi* suscepit et apparens mundum illuminavit. Unde *cum venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus Filium suum.*[62].

34 Hac igitur ratione matutino media nocte pulsato, surgamus et novam nativitatem invitatorio et antiphonis et psalmis et lectionibus et responsoriis et versiculis solemniter celebremus novo puero nobis nato qui vivit et regnat cum Deo Patre et Spiritu sancto unus singulariter et individualiter Deus per infinita saecula saeculorum. Amen.

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[54] 1 *Cor.* 12:11.

[55] Read: substantia.

[56] It seems that the original reading was *sicut* which was then changed to *sic.*

[57] Some reader surrounded the word with dots.

[58] Part of the sentence must be missing.

[59] Read: illi.

[60] Christmas liturgy: Antiphon to the Benedictus on the Sunday within the octave of Christmas.

[61] Read: quia.

[62] *Gal.* 4:4.

The Structure of "Sir Orfeo"

D. M. HILL

ONE word in the Auchinleck version of *Sir Orfeo* must bear some of the responsibility for the mistaken views which are current concerning the nature and scope of medieval romance. It is the word which is invoked whenever anyone couples romance with unenlightened views about fairy stories. It occurs in the passage which describes how Orfeo, during his ten years of exile in the wilderness, was accustomed to seeing the king of the other world hunting with a host of followers and hounds:

He miȝt se him bisides
(Oft in hot vnder-tides)
Þe king o fairy wiþ his rout
Com to hunt him al about
Wiþ dim cri & bloweing,
& houndes also wiþ him berking;
Ac no best þai no nome,
No neuer he nist whider þai bi-come.[1]

The word is 'dim,' and at once it conjures up pictures of a fairyland drawn by Tennyson, who comes long after the revivals of interest in the medieval past which distorted the past by — if we may use the term — romanticizing it:

O hark, O hear! how thin and clear,
And thinner, clearer, farther going!
O sweet and far from cliff and scar
The horns of Elfland faintly blowing!
Blow, let us hear the purple glens replying:
Blow bugle; answer, echoes, dying, dying, dying.[2]

The faint modulations of the 'horns of Elfland' may readily be equated with the 'dim cri & bloweing,' but in making this equation we distort the romance grotesquely: it becomes an eighteenth or nineteenth century parody of itself.

Take 'dim' away, and is there anything else anywhere in *Sir Orfeo* to support the idea of a world of faery which is muted, distant, contained, harmless, 'romantic'? Leave 'dim' there, and can one find any other passage in *good*,

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[1] *Sir Orfeo* ed. A. J. Bliss, Oxford 1954, Auchinleck 281-288. In later references to the three manuscripts I adopt the editor's designations, *viz.* Auchinleck = A, Harley 3810 = H, and Ashmole = B.

[2] *The Princess*, second stanza of the poem appearing at end of Pt. III.

English, medieval romance to put with it in support of the same idea? The answer in each case is surely 'No.'

In his edition of *Sir Orfeo* A. J. Bliss records of the word that

> The early editions read *dun*, and Sisam was the first to print *dim*; the stroke over the *i* is quite clear in the manuscript. But the common ancestor of H and B must have had *dune, dine* 'din', OE *dyne*. It is difficult to choose between these two readings: each gives excellent sense; *dune* is the more obvious reading, but *dim* is certainly more poetic.[3]

'More poetic'? 'Dim' is only 'more poetic', that is (presumably) more in keeping with the effect of the whole, if one accepts for the medieval other world that view of it imposed by later ages. Even then, though by means of the word the romance is partially adjusted to the view, 'dim' has to bear excessive stress, for no other word in its immediate vicinity carries similar connotations. Let us reconsider the passage, emending 'dim' to 'dine' (which would look very similar in the MS, 'm' and 'ne' consisting of the same number of minims) and removing the editorial brackets round 282:

He miȝt se him bisides
Oft in hot vnder-tides
Þe king o fairy wiþ his rout
Com to hunt him al about
Wiþ dine, cri & bloweing;
& houndes also wiþ him berking;
Ac no best þai no nome,
No neuer he nist whider þai bi-come.

It is now all of a piece; it builds up to a climax at A 285-6, and, incidentally, is more in keeping with the equivalent sections in the Harley and Ashmole manuscripts. The passage describes how, during Orfeo's solitary and no doubt for the most part silent sojourn in the wilderness, he would be on occasion afflicted by the sudden bursting about him of the other world hunt. The passage constitutes a representation of the threat of madness: an objectifying of a mental state. The king himself, whom Orfeo knows to have been responsible for the ravishing away of Heurodis (*vide* e.g. 138 and 142, confirmed by H and B; if indeed so incontrovertible a fact needs proof), would be there, and he would have with him his *rout* (used long before this time of an evil, disorderly gathering, and carrying with it associations of tumultuous noise: not unlike, in those respects, the *rout* of *Comus*);[4] the hunt would be *al about*

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[3] *Op. cit.* 53, note to 285.

[4] Milton's *Mask*. The poet's directions between lines 92 and 93: 'Comus enters, with a charming-rod in one hand, his glass in the other: with him a rout of monsters, headed like sundry sorts of wild beasts, but otherwise like men and women, their apparel glistering. They come in making a riotous and unruly noise, with torches in their hands.'

Orfeo, and would be full of *dine* (noise, clamour), *cri* (shouting, screaming), and *bloweing* (hunting horns, and the panting of animals and men) and there would be *houndes berking*. All this activity, noise and business, contrasts with the fact that *the hunt makes no kill* and disappears as miraculously as it came. It contrasts too with the solitary quietness of the forest which in turn contrasts with the sound of Orfeo's harp on occasion filling the forest, described in the immediately preceding passage:

> & when þe weder was clere and briȝt
> He toke his harp to him wel riȝt
> & harped at his owhen wille.
> In-to alle þe wode þe soun gan schille,
> Þat alle þe wilde bestes þat þer beþ
> For ioie abouten him þai teþ,
> & alle þe foules þat þer were
> Come & sete on ich a brere,
> To here his harping a-fine
> — So miche melody was þer-in;
> & when he his harping lete wold,
> No best bi him abide nold. (A 269-280)

This is noise which is ordered and controlled and able to draw the beasts and birds to the harper by filling the depths of the forest with sound ('In-to alle þe wode þe soun gan *schille*' ['schille': to ring out, resound]) where the noise of the *rout*, although tumultuous about Orfeo's ears, seems to be local and contained. For the harping the weather is 'clere & briȝt,' as distinct from that which obtains on the occasions of the hunt involving 'hot vnder-tides.' This last fact clinches any proof of the inappropriateness of 'dim' in the passage, with its modification of the hunt in the direction of a faint and harmless elf-land. Heat and *undern* together, or even *undern* on its own, comprise the conventional sign for the threat of the other world.[5] We can scarcely diminish *undern* parenthetically when it has played so conspicuous a part in the ravishing of Heurodis (A 65, 133, 181). We can scarcely limit it when its appearance in any romance signifies the oppression of human beings in terms of terror and tragedy.

If 'dim' should not appear in the text ('dine' or some equivalent taking its place), if the quiet charm of elfland be made to disappear, what are we to make of *Sir Orfeo*? What sort of romance is it, and how are we meant to respond to it? An approach to an answer to these questions can usefully be made by an analysis of its structure, and if, in embarking on this, I again differ (this time not radically) from what A. J. Bliss has said in his edition of the poem (ø 52 et seq.), I assert now that I have found that edition useful and profitable.

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[5] *Vide* 'Romance Convention I Conventions of Structure.' (Due to appear in *Romania*).

Bliss divides the poem into four parts: (1) 1-56; (2) 57-194; (3) 195-476; (4) 477-604. The first division comprises the introduction with its details about Orfeo and his wife; the second 'tells of the abduction of Heurodis'; the third 'tells of Orfeo's long search for Heurodis, and of his eventual success'; and the fourth 'tells of Orfeo's return to his kingdom and his welcome by his faithful steward.' A better way of looking at the poem, I think, is to see it in three parts: (1) 1-56; (2) 57-476; (3) 477-604. The first section comprises the introduction, the other two sections containing respectively the major and minor assays. The major assay concerns the testing of Orfeo and Heurodis and through them the quality of human heterosexual (if you like, 'romance') love. The minor assay concerns the testing of the steward and through him the quality of male (epic, and romance) love.[6] The word 'asay' (H 'a-say'; B a-sey') occurs only twice in A and B (once in H, but missed out in the second assay because the ending is foreshortened), each time appearing at the climax of the assay: 'Now speke, & tow miȝt asay' (A 452); 'For-to asay þi gode wille' (A 568).

The first assay begins with Heurodis's walk with two companions along the edge of an orchard on a hot May morning, and her falling asleep during *undern* under 'a fair ympe-tre' (a fruit tree). We have here a complex of standard conventions which inform us that an individual (or individuals) is to be assayed in respect of some aspect of love, and through the individual the quality of love itself.[7] The assay ends only with the recovery of Heurodis and the return to Winchester. There is no break at A 194. Although this line marks the disappearance of Heurodis, her assay continues. It began when she reached the edge of the orchard, or even earlier. It began when the day became hot and bright and when therefore the shade beneath any fruit tree would be intense, marking the contrast between the light and dark, good and evil. And there is certainly no break in respect of Orfeo. His assay began at the same time as his wife's though he does not feel the impact of it until he becomes aware of her distress. The individuals are tested as individuals but with special reference to what they have between them, their love.

This being a romance which by assaying explores the nature and power of human attributes and qualities, we may expect, as has been noted elsewhere,[8] an atmosphere of inevitability, destiny, fate to be an important feature of it. This atmosphere is essential to the creation of the feeling that we are actually concerned with explorations of aspects of human nature itself, the data, the given facts of existence, the 'this is what is because it has to be so.' The creation of this atmosphere is one of the outstanding features of *Sir Orfeo*, and it is achieved by diverse means. First, the mode of writing is favourable to it. Romance writing is essentially conventional. It operates largely, that is, through the employment of symbols whose meanings have been established by continuous corporate use. An effect of this mode of writing is not unlike following the steps of a geometric proof, an effect comprising compact and necessary logical sequence expressed in symbols. Secondly the particular complex of standard conventions which I have subsumed under the name of the tree convention is peculiarly associated with a feeling of tragic inevitability. When a human being becomes involved in the complex, contact with the other world *must* result, to be followed inevitably by consequences dangerous to the individual concerned. Thirdly the poet of *Sir Orfeo* makes use of the reiteration of phrases expressive of (tragic) inevitability:

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[6] I have elsewhere pointed out that it is somewhat misleading to restrict one category of love to the romances and the other to epic (*vide* 'Sovereignty and Sexuality'): romance has both kinds. But the distinction is convenient.

[7] I have called this complex 'the tree convention' and aspects of it are discussed in "Romance Convention I Conventions of Structure" and "Sovereignty and Sexuality Part I." (Due to appear in *Romania*).

[8] *Vide* 'Romance Convention I' and 'Sovereignty and Sexuality Part I.' On the importance of the assay in romance writing see also 'Romance as Epic' (to appear in due course in *English Studies*).

A 126: '— Do þi best, for y mot go.'
194: Men wist neuer wher sche waz bicome.
(Cf. 'Men ne cunnan secgan to soþe...)
200: Þer was non amendement.
226: 'Do way!' quaþ he, 'It schal be so!'
233: No man most wiþ him go.
(The whole sequence from here to 264 contains phrases with these implications).
288: No neuer he nist whider þai bi-come.
296: Ac neuer he nist whider þai wold.
330: Sche most wiþ him no lenger abide.
(The sequence 331-338 is a lament of this kind.)
339: 'Tide wat bitide' (plus resolution here).
342: 'Of liif no deþ me no reche.'

After 342 comes the recovery, but phrases with tragic implications reappear in the corresponding part of the minor assay, culminating in 'It nis no bot of mannes deþ' (A 552). Fourthly, Heurodis's acceptance of the inevitable in her preview of the other world is poetically very convincing, and it is paralleled by Orfeo's acceptance when he hands over the kingdom to the just steward. Here human beings move by sheer necessity. This part of the romance is strangely and profoundly Christian. Not only does the tree convention have affinities with the tree of good and evil in the garden of Eden (despite the major and undeniable source in Celtic tradition), but the implied temptation when the king of the other world shows Heurodis his domains,

castels & tours,
Riuers, forestes, friþ wiþ flours,
& his riche stedes ichon (A 159-161)

is reminiscent of Christ's temptation; and the Old Testament provides part of Orfeo's very moving declaration:

> Whider þou gost ichil wiþ þe,
> & whider y go þou schalt wiþ me.' (A 129-130)

And we may add that Orfeo's handing over of the kingdom to the just and faithful steward when going on his long journey has subdued parabolic echoes of the New Testament. Finally, the poet makes very effective use of a traditional method of portraying compulsion and inevitability in his employment of the conjunction 'and.' This has two aspects, the general and the specific. The conjunction is used widely throughout the romance in support of the feeling of inevitability: the most casual reader notes its frequent appearance at the beginning of a line (the edition by A. J. Bliss, where the ampersand is used, makes the appearance conspicuous). But further, as one would expect, in those parts of the romance which are particularly concerned with compulsion and inevitability, namely those parts involving the other world's active power, the conjunction is used very frequently. There is the climax of the story of the ravishing told by Heurodis:

> &, as son as he to me cam,
> Wold ich nold ich, he me nam,
> & made me wiþ him ride
> Opon a palfray bi his side;
> & brouȝt me to his palays,
> Wele atird in ich ways,
> & schewed me castels & tours,
> Riuers, forestes, friþ wiþ flours,
> & his riche stedes ichon;
> & seþþen me brouȝt oȝain hom
> In-to our owhen orchard,
> & said to me þus after-ward,
> "Loke, dame, to-morwe þatow be
> Riȝt here vnder þis ympe-tre,
> & þan þou schalt wiþ ous go,
> & liue wiþ ous euer-mo;
> & ȝif þou makest ous y-let,
> Whar þou be, þou worst y-fet,
> & to-tore þine limes al,
> Þat noþing help þe no schal;
> & þei þou best so to-torn,
> ȝete þou worst wiþ ous y-born."' (A 153-174)

Twelve of the twenty-two lines begin with '&'. But the full significance of the technique becomes apparent only when Orfeo penetrates to the centre of the compulsion itself in the castle of death:

Þan he gan bihold about al
& seiȝe liggeand wiþ-in þe wal
Of folk þat were þider y-brouȝt,
& þouȝt dede, & nare nouȝt.
Sum stode wiþ-outen hade,
& sum non armes nade,
& sum þurth þe bodi hadde wounde,
& sum lay wode, y-bounde,
& sum armed on hors sete,
& sum astrangled as þai ete;
& sum were in water adreynt,
& sum wiþ fire al for-schreynt. (A 387-398).

The traditional technique is an important feature of Blake's *A Poison Tree*, a poem which amongst other things shows the inevitability of the consequences of undissipated anger:

And I water'd it in fears,
Night & morning with my tears:
And I sunnèd it with smiles,
And with soft deceitful wiles
And it grew both day and night,
Till it bore an apple bright.
And my foe beheld it shine,
And he knew that it was mine.
And into my garden stole...

It marks simply and effectively the necessary and logical sequence of events. The technique is apparent in a modified form in modern writing when 'And' is used at the beginning of (often) the final sentence of a paragraph to clinch an argument with a feeling of 'yet another and inevitable point to hammer home what I am saying.' T. S. Eliot makes not infrequent use of it, as in "The Function of Criticism"[9], where in fact the use is so frequent as to constitute the abuse of it. But here is an example of a complete paragraph:

> But no writer is completely self-sufficient, and many creative writers have a critical activity which is not all discharged into their work. Some seem to require to keep their critical powers in condition for the real work by exercising them miscellaneously; others, on completing a work, need to continue the critical activity by commenting on it. There is no general rule. And as men can learn from each other, so some of these treatises have been useful to other writers. And some of them have been useful to those who were not writers.

Another important structural feature of *Sir Orfeo* involves what I have called elsewhere the convention of symmetry.[10] This convention is often used where epic qualities and values are being evoked, as in the broad structural features of *Havelok the Dane* or of *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight.* Of the many structures which the convention can inform, two — parallelism and contrast — have particular importance in *Sir Orfeo.* When Orfeo hands over his kingdom to the steward and goes into the wilderness, the change in his situation is seen in terms of a series of contrasts, some five in close juxtaposition:

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[9] *Selected Essays*, London, reprinted 1948, 31.
[10] 'Romance as Epic'; 'Romance Convention I.'

O, way! What þer was wepe & wo
When he þat hadde ben king wiþ croun
Went so pouerlich out of toun!
Þurth wode & ouer heþ
In-to þe wildernes he geþ.
Noþing he fint þat him is ays,
Bot euer he liueþ in gret malais.
He þat hadde y-werd þe fowe & griis,
& on bed þe purper biis
— Now on hard heþe he liþ,
Wiþ leues & gresse he him wriþ.
He þat hadde had castels & tours,
Riuer, forest, friþ wiþ flours
— Now, þei it comenci to snewe & frese,
Pis king mot make his bed in mese.
He þat had y-had kniȝtes of priis
Bifor him kneland, & leuedis
— Now seþ he no-þing þat him likeþ,
Bot wilde wormes bi him strikeþ.
He þat had y-had plenté
Of mete & drink, of ich deynté
— Now may he al-day digge & wrote
Er he finde his fille of rote. (A 234-256)

These contrasts have an obvious and immediate function in the poem in the rhetorical description of Orfeo's present situation, but beyond that they have a further important function in that they prepare the reader for a crucial section of the major assay, where the stress of the assay is seen in terms of Orfeo's fight for his sanity. Their effect is like the bending back and forth of a bar of metal to see how many times it will bend before breaking. The contrasts end with a short section (A 257-266) which emphasises the bodily distress and hardship of the exile. This section is followed immediately by one which affirms the positive (non-physical) strength of Orfeo in terms of the harping (A 267-278). The sound of the harp penetrates the whole forest (A 272: and we remember that conventionally the forest is the threat of the other world), its ordered modulations causing the *wilde* beasts and birds to come to him. When the harping stops, the creatures vanish (A 279-280: the abruptness of the statement is presumably meant to convey their manner of going). The effect of A 279-280 is to suggest that Orfeo's inner strength though potent is finite, and the passage is followed immediately by the threat of insanity seen in the other world hunt. Here the noise and tumult, the abrupt appearing of it all around him and the disappearing, the terror of *undern*, and the fact that all the upheaval is negative and unproductive (a negation of life — 'no best þai no nome'), suggest the threat to the mind. In fact we are compelled to see the hunt as part of a pictorial representation of the threat of insanity in the form of hallucination. It is followed immediately by the procession of the host of knights (a thousand of them) in battle array. 'Of cuntenaunce stout & fers,' which reinforces the threat by further and now ironic contrast with the situation before *undern*. No reasonably careful reader would fail to note that Orfeo had a thousand knights (A 183) with him in his attempt to prevent the disaster of the second *undern*, and that these had been 'stout & grim.' The procession of the host is succeeded by the dancing. The dancing, the final part of the description of the threat to the mind, has the effect of a kind of mocking irony. It offers another contrast with the ordered modulations of the harp. The sound of the harp is ordered and penetrating; the dancing as it is described here is, with its stress on 'queynt,' the use of 'softely,' and the reference to 'menstraci,' a parody of that order and penetration.

These four facts concerning Orfeo's mind (harp, hunt, battle array, dance) recur again and again during Orfeo's exile in the forest. They are indicative of a continuous imbalance of mind. Succeeding them is a particular event ('on a day') which establishes Orfeo's return to sanity and leads to the eventual recovery of Heurodis:

> And on a day he seiȝe him biside
> Sexti leuedis on hors ride,
> Gentil & iolif as brid on ris;
> Nouȝt o man amonges hem þer nis;
> & ich a faucoun on hond bere,
> And riden on haukin bi o riuere.
> Of game þai founde wel gode haunt,
> Maulardes, hayroun & cormeraunt;
> Þe foules of þe water ariseþ,
> Þe faucouns hem wele deuiseþ;
> Ich faucoun his pray slouȝ. (303-313).

To understand this passage several facts, apart from the particularity of the event (which contrasts with the preceding continuum), need to be borne in mind, especially where the convention of symmetry is maintained in parallel and contrast. First, Orfeo sees sixty ladies. Sixty involves a convention of vital movement. Earlier in the poem sixty 'damisels' (A 90) are part of the group which gets Heurodis to her bed after the first *undern*. In *Sir Launfal* sixty ladies attend Gueneviere (another queen) when, after seeing Launfal dancing below in front of her tower, she sweeps down to declare her love for him. The 'sexti leuedis' at A 304 in *Sir Orfeo* tell us that Heurodis is not far away and that something dramatic is about to take place. Secondly, 'nouȝt o man amonges hem þer nis' and we are to remember that at the time of his going into exile Orfeo declared that he would never again look upon a woman, 'Neuer eft y nil no woman se' (A 211). Thirdly the 'leuedis' 'riden on haukin bi o riuere', and we are to remember that as a consequence of the first *undern* Heurodis was '*reueyd* out of hir witt' (A 82). The restoring of the original *reueyd* to the text is Bliss's achievement and it improves the poem enormously. He suggests (p. 52) that the word 'seems to be the past participle of ME *reuey* 'to hunt along the banks of a river,' — precisely the activity of the 'sexti leuedis' in whose midst, we soon learn, is Heurodis herself, who earlier had been *hunted* out of her mind. The hunting along the river contrasts with the hunt involving the king of the other world because it is successful, where in the other 'no best þai no nome.' The success of the hunt helps Orfeo to begin his return to normal life. The importance of this particular contrast is made clearer when we give the forest its proper status. Tatlock reminds us (à propos of something else) that 'forest' was 'land, wooded or not, reserved for game, and after the Conquest controlled by special laws.'[11] A major fact concerning the forest in *Sir Orfeo* is the symbolic function of the creatures in it. Orfeo's harping has power over them; the men of the other world hunt without seizing them; and the successful hunting of them by the group which includes Heurodis signifies the beginning of Orfeo's return to life. The hunt of the other world is the negation of life and the power of this symbol is reinforced by the description of the castle of death (A 387-404) with its stress on the immobility and impotence of its tableau of victims of *undern* and on madness (*wode* and *awedde*: nothing else is mentioned more than once in the catalogue of afflictions.)

That the sojourn in the forest involves the madness of the hero seems to be confirmed in source material. There is no single extant immediate source for the poem,[12] and a survey of classical references to and treatments of Orphic material shows how ravelled and tangled a topic the legends are.[13] The most relevant classical treatment is Ovid's (*Metamorphoses* X and XI: neither Virgil nor Boethius adds very much, and both lack important details). In Ovid there is the parallelism between this world and the other world whereby Eurydice in the latter limps towards Orpheus (X 49) because she was bitten in the foot by a snake in the former, just as, in *Sir Orfeo*, Heurodis is shown in both worlds asleep under a tree, and in the description of the castle of death the parallelism is stressed in respect of all the victims of *undern* (A 402-404). In Ovid the question of whether Orpheus deliberately eschewed all women because of his distress at losing Eurydice or because of the finality of his pledge is left open (X 79 et seq.), where in *Sir Orfeo* the former reason is given, though the latter is very strongly implied. (There is a difference in situation here, of course, in that in Ovid the eschewing comes after the final and irrevocable mortal separation of the lovers.) In Ovid Orpheus charms the beasts and birds by means of his lyre and summons shade to a place devoid of it. In *Sir Orfeo* the music of the harp can summon the beasts and birds, but shade is not needed (there would of course be some connection between Orpheus's power to summon shade, and the 'shade' of the underworld). The most crucial point of similarity between the two also involves an important difference. At the beginning of Book XI of the *Metamorphoses*, while Orpheus is singing to the lyre, the *mad* women of the Cicones throw various things at him (a spear, a stone, and so on). Whilst his music dominates, these things cannot harm him, but then, in the increasing tumult, part of which is caused by the playing of music associated with frenzy, the sound of his lyre is overwhelmed, and at this point the stones thrown draw blood, Orpheus being killed in consequence. Given the power for allegorizing, so dominant in the Middle Ages, it would be hard for a poet to avoid seeing this final episode as a battle between sanity and insanity, the latter ultimately prevailing. In *Georgics IV* Orpheus has only a momentary touch of madness (dementia), not after Eurydice has been lost to him, but as the cause of his looking back at the mouth of hell and so losing her. In Boethius, though Orpheus is deeply moved at the loss of Eurydice, there is no question of his being *non compos mentis*.

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[11] J. S. P. Tatlock, *The Legendary History of Britain*, Berkeley, Calif. 1950, 358.

[12] *Vide* Bliss *op. cit.* xxvii *et seq.* for a study of source material and articles connected with it.

[13] *Vide* I. M. Linforth, *The Arts of Orpheus*, Berkeley, Calif. 1941 and E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley, Calif. 1951, 47 et seq.

The impulse to see the Ovid episode allegorically might have been strengthened by several elements in classical traditions, some of which may have augmented (perhaps indirectly) Celtic influences briefly mentioned *infra*. Such traditions would include the ancient association of madness with music, poetry, prophecy and love. All the main elements connected with the status of the Orpheus of the legends and with Orphism are listed as forms of 'divine' madness in the *Phaedrus*: prophetic, telestic, poetic and erotic,[14] though presumably there is no direct connection here. An important classical influence must have involved the celebrated Book IV of the *Aeneid*. The book deals with the separation of lovers, Dido and Aeneas, and this separation is seen as something inevitable, ineluctable; just like the situation in *Sir Orfeo*. Further, if we do not worry for the moment about the fact that in Virgil the man goes from the woman, not the woman from the man, two more important points of similarity become clear. First, in the ensuing separation Dido, before committing suicide, becomes deranged, and this derangement is seen partly in terms of hallucination:

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[14] Labelled thus by Dodds, *ibid.*

> hinc exaudiri voces et verba vocantis
> visa viri, nox cum terras obscura teneret. (IV 460-461)

And again in

> agit ipse furentem
> in somnis ferus Aeneas; semperque relinqui
> sola sibi, semper longam incomitata videtur
> ire viam et Tyrios deserta quaerere terra:
> Eumenidum veluti demens videt agmina Pentheus,
> et solem geminum et duplicis se ostendere Thebas,
> aut Agamemnonius scaenis agitatus Orestes
> armatam facibus matrem et serpentibus atris
> cum fugit, ultricesque sedent in limine Dirae (IV 465-473)

where the hallucination is not unlike that of Pentheus. Secondly, significant use is made of forms of *agitare* (*agit* and *agitatus* in the passage just quoted) which can be used for hunting or for being tormented in mind, just as *reuey* is used in two senses for Heurodis in *Sir Orfeo*.[15]

In the Celtic sources madness is explicit and omnipresent in treatments of heroes whose situation is in one or more important respects like that of Orpheus. Bliss (not speaking of madness) points out that Orfeo's sojourn in the wilderness 'owes something to the Celtic tradition of the wild man of the woods, and in particular to the accounts of Merlin Silvestris.' He shows that Geoffrey of Monmouth's *Vita Merlini* parallels *Sir Orfeo* at two points, namely 'Merlin's grief at the death of his brothers' (which parallels Orfeo's grief at the loss of Heurodis) and his 'diet in the wilderness.' More important than these parallels, however, when one looks at the poems as wholes, is the status of Merlin. He is a king, and periodically he goes mad. When he is mad he becomes a 'prophet,' but *vates* also means 'poet,' and poet and musician in contemporary Celtic life are not easily separated. His need to go to the woods or return to them has the same intensive force as Orfeo's. When he is mad the music of the cither (*cithara* = harp?) effects a kind of classical catharsis and tempers the madness just as in Orfeo the music of the harp balances and then overpowers the threat of madness. His desire to be free of his sister and of his wife parallels Orfeo's declaration to eschew women. He is cured at last by drinking from a new fountain which had cured a madman who had lived in the same woods like a wild beast.

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[15] The phenomenon of visual or optic hallucination is described in some detail by Cornelius Celsus in his *De re medica* written about the time of the *Aeneid* (*vide* G. Zilborg and G. W. Henry, *A History of Medical Psychology*, New York 1941, 67). Like Virgil Celsus cites the case of Orestes.

Drinking from a new fountain or being given a healing ointment to effect a return to sanity is a feature of a number of medieval poems, Celtic or showing Celtic influence, whose heroes have affinities with Orfeo. There is no point here in considering these individually in any detail, but one should be mentioned as it precedes *Sir Orfeo* in point of time and provides an unambiguous instance of a romance treatment of the madness of the lover on loss of the beloved. Chretien's *Yvain* has an extended passage where the hero becomes the 'wild man of the woods,' going insane when he realises he has broken faith with his lady:

> Lors li monta uns torbeillons
> El chief si granz, que il forsane,
> Lors se descire et se depane
> Et fuit par chans et par arees
> Et leisse ses janz esgarees,
> Qui se mervoillent, ou puet estre.[16] (2804-2809)

He is subsequently cured by the application of an ointment which came originally from Morgan herself, the representative *par excellence* of the other world. His madness is reminiscent of that of Orpheus portrayed in *Georgics IV.*

Preceding Yvain's madness in Chretien's poem and, as it were, the first cause of it, is the discussion between Yvain and Gawain, where Gawain tries to persuade Yvain to leave his lady temporarily and frequent the *tornoiemanz.* If Yvain will not go to the lists, Gawain argues, he will be less of a lover and knight. Yvain is persuaded to go, and he is given leave of absence by his lady for a year. But the day for his return comes and goes without his being aware of it, so Laudine withdraws her love and he becomes the wild man of the woods. The discussion is crucial to the poem in that it serves to qualify the love between Yvain and Laudine by making us consider two other interests each of which conflicts with it. These are the 'epic' love between Yvain and Gawain, and what is signified by the tournaments. They are complementary. Together they comprise the traditional means by which man has identified himself as a man. This identification carries over from epic into romance, but now has to contend with a new kind of identification, that which is achieved through heterosexual love. The clash in interests is a convention of theme in the romances, as has been shown elsewhere,[17] but the romances which elaborate the theme in terms of the clash are to be distinguished from *Sir Orfeo* which exists in part to show that the interests themselves are really complementary.

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[16] Foerster's text in T. B. W. Reid, *Yvain*, Manchester 1942.

[17] *Vide* e.g. 'An Interpretation of *King Horn*', *Anglia* Bd. 75 (1957).

Part of the function of the major and minor assays is to posit that the entities signified by Heurodis and by the steward are both essential to a reasonable life. This is why the author has been at such pains to give the minor assay the same kind of shape as he gives to the major assay — the same kind of climax, the same use at the same place of 'asay,' and the exact parallelism between Orfeo's distress at losing Heurodis and the steward's at losing (as he thinks) his lord (A 176-178 and 195-200; A 542-552: each ends with the same kind of phrase, 'þer was non amendement' and 'It nis no bot of mannes deþ.') The assays are bound together by these links, but they are also compared. The very means by which the unity of interest is established gives point to any differences. The same kind of structural parallelism informs the five stanzas of Herbert's *Aaron*, where the differences between Aaron, Herbert and Christ are as important as their similarity of position. The poet of *Sir Orfeo*, in other words, is also maintaining that 'romance' love and 'epic' love differ in importance: the former is greater than the latter which depends on it. If A, then B. Without A, B could not properly be sustained. Heurodis recognises Orfeo during the later stages of the major assay, but the steward, at the corresponding point in his, does not. Orfeo has to declare himself. The first assay discloses that heterosexual love counts above all else. The court does not condemn Orfeo's departure.

The same kind of point is being made, by somewhat different means, in Lawrence's *Women in Love*. Any serious medieval reader pulled into the twentieth century would instantly recognize there the convention of theme elaborated in the story of Birkin's search for the good (secular) life. Beginning from the assumption that God does not exist Birkin establishes, quite early in the book, the fact of 'perfect union with a woman' as the core of life for a man.[18] But later this fact is modified: the union with a woman (in the special sense which Lawrence is at pains to define as far as he can) requires, for its completeness, union (of a kind also defined in the book) with a man. The end of the novel, where the need for and truth of the ideal are reaffirmed whilst at the same time Birkin admits his failure (for the time being) to reach it, is particularly fine; though one is left with the feeling that in the imaginative portrayal of the attempts to reach the ideal, as distinct from the definitions of it, the two kinds of union are not kept as separate as Lawrence might have wished. But a proper discussion of this must wait for a more suitable occasion.

In Lawrence's novel the failure to achieve the ideal is due to human frailty, both of the individual who can see it fairly clearly and of a much blinder society in which he is placed. What of human frailty in *Sir Orfeo*? At first sight the answer seems simple. Two sinless human beings work out their destiny through a given situation which demands human impairment. We are presented with a typically blameless hero and heroine who have to endure the pressure of an evil world in order that human qualities and virtues might be affirmed. But this answer is not enough when the romance is read in terms of its conventions, and in order to do this we need to know as much as possible of what has gone before. To an incredible degree romance convention relies on earlier literature. To read one romance aright we need to have read all those which have gone before it. Sources are crucially important, and critics have been right to lay great stress on them, though they have usually stopped short of the important tasks of relation and evaluation. There is more than a possibility that Orfeo's ten years of exile and madness are in part his own fault. Orpheus was himself responsible for the loss of Eurydice. Merlin was himself responsible in part for his madness in the *Vita Merlini* for he bore a share of the responsibility for the crucial battle where those whom he loved were slain. The use of the thousand knights in battle array at *undern*, and the battle parade of the otherworld host in the forest, quite apart from the madness of the hero and the threat to the beloved from another lover, help us to make our response to Merlin qualify our response to Orfeo. With Merlin we should put the Suibhne of the Irish *Buile Suibhne*, Suibhne being (like Merlin) a poet and king unhinged by a battle for which he was in part responsible.[19] Yvain was in part responsible for his madness in the forest following on his failure to remember his promise to return from the essentially male activity of the *tornoiemanz* in Chretien's *Yvain*. Kings, heroes, poets, prophets, harpers and lovers coalesce in Orfeo and give him an embodiment, a personality and a history which were his before he was born. With very little effort (providing that effort be good) a medieval poet could have at his command material which, if embodied in the poem, would have increased its bulk ten-fold and have produced a different aesthetic effect. We know that Orfeo was in part responsible for his madness and exile, for the temporary though prolonged absence of his wife, though the poet tells us nothing of it directly. This makes for an infinitely more rewarding poem, when the human frailty apparent in the impairments is also, as in tragedy, manifest in causes. There is no need for an explicit statement of cause when in this subtly revealing way we are given the precariousness of the human condition.

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[18] *Women in Love*, Heinemann 1954, 51 etc.

The more we read the poem the more we become aware of its conventional structure and the more we know of its meaning. An *exact* assessment of the nature, scope and functions of its conventions would be a long and arduous task. Conventional (in addition to everything noted *supra*) is Orfeo's entry to the castle of death as a minstrel. When the king of the other world has been moved by Orfeo's skill and grants him anything he might ask he is part of the convention of the unlimited boon established over a long period of time, and readily and unquestioningly accepted because of that. Support for the convention comes partly from the early power and authority of the Celtic minstrels and bards. 'Bard-king' is a Celtic phenomenon. Conventional too is the binding power of the king's word which follows Orfeo's music. Conventional as a sign of the other world are the white beasts at A 145. Conventional are the assays, which are also sustained and nourished by assays in real life, not only in the various forms of legal trial (battle, fire, water) but also in the assay of metals, especially of silver in the mints, where by the trial of fire the quality of the metal was verified. The whole subject of the relations obtaining between romance convention and contemporary life are being dealt with elsewhere,[20] but it should be said here that with so much bad silver about (as the records testify), the assay must have been connected strongly with the idea of being tested and found wanting; or, at any rate, as the necessary loss of some portion of pure metal in the assay was everywhere recognised, the idea of necessary impairment must have been deep-rooted. The affirmation of a hero or heroine being assayed and found good would be conditioned by the experience of the mints. Conventional is the symmetrical shape of the whole romance. This has been considered *supra* and elsewhere, but symmetry has a particular relevance in *Sir Orfeo* in the curves of the assays when the importance of the harp (in terms of the story, the legend and also the Breton lai) is admitted:

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[19] *Vide* i.a. J. J. Parry, 'Celtic Tradition and the Vita Merlini', *PQ* IV (1925) and University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature X No. 3 (1925).

> Although the outline has varied at different times and in different countries, the relation of its proportions to the musical scale — a condition of symmetry in musical instruments — is in the harp very close.[21]

In some extraordinary way the harp itself is embodied in the poem.

Conventional also is the vow which Orfeo takes when he insists that because of the loss of Heurodis he will never look upon woman again. This vow has already been discussed in connection with his return to sanity and also with the legend of Orpheus. But a further fact about vows in terms of their conventional nature is hinted at by Huizinga in *The Waning of the Middle Ages*:

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[20] 'Romance Convention II Conventions and Life' is in preparation. In the meantime those interested in the assay of metals and the mints should see R. L. Poole, *The Exchequer in the Twelfth Century*, Oxford 1912; J. F. Willard, W. A. Morris and W. H. Dunham, *The English Government at work 1327-1336*, Camb. Mass. 1950 Vol. III; and Charles Johnson, *Dialogus de Scaccario* and *The De Moneta of Nicholas Oresme and English Mint Documents*; etc.

[21] *Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians,* 5th edition by Eric Blom, IV 89.

> In making a vow, people imposed some privation upon themselves as a spur to the accomplishment of the actions they were pledged to perform.[22]

Strictly speaking Orfeo's vow is his dedication to a life of exile and the privation is given at A 211, 'Neuer eft y nil no woman se.' The important conventional point about vows and privations is that they are in some sense affirmations of the will to live. The paradoxical strength of Orfeo's plunge towards insanity resides in the simultaneous will to live and rejection of life.

But if the conventional nature of the poem needs to be stressed as offering the only way to the meaning, the revitalising of the conventions — the power which makes them live in individual poems — should not be minimised. There is space here for only one example. The power of *Sir Orfeo* partly depends on the successful employment of the tree convention involving the other world. But the presentation of the other world is essentially ambiguous here. Does it exist or not? To a fourteenth century audience it is as real as the witches in Macbeth or the ghost of Hamlet's father. It assuredly exists. Yet its existence is also questioned in order to create a real feeling of hallucination. We must accept the other world and doubt it. We accept its tremendous power in the ravishing of Heurodis, but the visions in the forest are as much a part of Orfeo's mind as entities having a separate identity, and our impression of this is confirmed later when we reach the castle of death where on the one hand Heurodis asleep under the tree is part of the *perpetual* tableau of victims of *undern* and on the other she is able to hunt, within the power of the other world king. We are left ultimately with the same kind of impression of the other world as of Shakespeare's creations of spirits. In both cases these creatures are crucially dependent on the mind of the hero or heroine experiencing them. The convention of the other world has been modified in this romance because of the madness, but of course it directly assists in portraying the madness. As Dodds puts it (à propos of something else):[23] 'It is the common belief of primitive peoples throughout the world that *all* types of mental disturbance are caused by supernatural interference.' Add to this the classical and also medieval view (not of course the only view) of love as the cause of deep psychological disturbance, and we have the component parts of one romance convention individually and vitally employed.

Such, then, structurally, is the romance of *Sir Orfeo*. There has been no attempt here to account for the poem as a whole. Such an attempt would have to take account of many other things; the lyrical qualities of a good deal of the verse, for example; the beautiful blend of the very human with the mathematics of convention; the direct human observation in the way in which Heurodis after the shock and screaming settles down to copious weeping; and so on. But one hopes that enough has been said to justify the approach to *Sir Orfeo* as a serious and important poem. Its religious echoes show perhaps traces of the sanction imposed upon the court bards (as distinct from the Teuluwyr) who 'were enjoined to celebrate the praise of God and of brave or good men,'[24] but its real power lies in its direct and effective exploration of human nature and life as good as say Conrad at his best and in a medium more spare and economical in relation to what is said than any other medium in English literature.

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[22] London 1924, 79.

[23] *Op. cit.*, 65-6.

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[24] T. Gwynn Jones 'Bardism and Romance' in *The Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion, Session 1913-1914*, London 1915. Jones does not have *Sir Orfeo* in mind.

Two Chaucerian Gardens

KENNETH KEE

NURTURED as we are in the Wordsworthian tradition of nature appreciation, we tend to read into Chaucer's descriptions of gardens a feeling for nature the fourteenth-century poet did not necessarily possess. Those fresh, morning scenes we encounter in *The Book of the Duchess*, the *Parliament of Fowls*, and the *Prologue* to the *Legend of Good Women* create the illusion of spontaneous personal observation. As such, these garden or garden-like settings generate a charm which has engaged the sympathies of generations of readers. But the charm, undeniably present, is also deceptive; these descriptions are as much the product of tradition as of the poet's personal experience. To borrow terms from the Wife of Bath, we can even argue that "auctoritee" plays a greater role in the poet's conception of the garden than "experience." It is our purpose in this paper to demonstrate the existence of the garden tradition in medieval literature, to direct attention to some of the connotations possessed by this tradition, and to examine Chaucer's exploitation of these connotations in the tales of the Merchant and the Franklin.

Chaucer inherited — perhaps assimilated is a better word — the motif of the garden when he first started to read the *Roman de la Rose* and the works of his cross-Channel contemporaries Machaut, Froissart, and Deschamps. In their turn, these contemporaries are the heirs of a tradition which stretches back into antiquity. Part of the history of this tradition has been elucidated by Ernst Curtius,[1] who sees the origin of the ideal landscape (or more particularly for our purposes here, the *locus amoenus* or pleasance) in classical Latin literature, though there are adumbrations of it in Greek literature. Curtius points out too that "Model examples [of the *locus amoenus*] are also to be found in the arts of poetry which began to appear in increasing numbers from 1170,"[2] and cites the *descriptio loci* in Matthew of Vendome's *Ars Versificatoria*[3] as an example. Further light on the tradition of the garden is shed by D. W. Robertson, Jr.,[4] who attributes to medieval vernacular writers an acquaintance with a highly specialized tradition of Scriptural exegesis which places special significance on the garden. This is not the place for a criticism of Robertson's views; what is important for our purpose here is his recognition of the existence of the literary garden as a topos in medieval literature. More recently, in his interesting study exploring the meaning of the *Parliament of Fowls*, J. A. W. Bennett says of the garden setting in that poem, "it exemplifies the popularity of the medieval *topos* of the ideal landscape."[5] Bennett devotes a chapter to tracing through classical and medieval vernacular literature some of the traditional elements which Chaucer employs in his description of the garden setting in the *Parliament of Fowls.*

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[1] E. R. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. W. R. Trask (New York, 1953). See particularly Chap. 10, Section 6. "The Pleasance." (The original German edition of this work was first published in 1948).

[2] Curtius, op. cit., 197.

[3] Ed. E. Faral, *Les Arts Poétiques du XII^e et du XIII^e Siècle* (Paris, 1924), 109-93.

[4] D. W. Robertson, Jr., "The Doctrine of Charity in Mediaeval Literary Gardens," *Spec.* XXVI (1951), 24-29. Robertson's interpretation of the garden in such works as Andreas

That the pleasance, even in classical Latin literature, became associated with the god or goddess of love is well known, and both Curtius and Bennett point out examples of this.[6] But the descriptions of the classical *locus amoenus* cited by Curtius and Bennett, taken by themselves, seem insufficient to account for all the features of the later medieval literary garden. A brief comparison will clarify this. In the notes to his edition of the *Roman de la Rose,* Langlois[7] cites a passage from Tibullus as the probable "prototype de tous ces vergers"; i.e., descriptions of gardens of love. And the following passage from Tibullus is a typical example of how the *locus amoenus* in classical literature was adapted as a setting for the goddess of love:

> sed me, quod facilis tenero sum semper Amori,
>   ipsa Venus campos ducet in Elysios.
> hic choreae cantusque vigent, passimque vagantes
>   dulce sonant tenui guttere carmen aves;
> fert casiam non culta seges, totosque per agros
>   floret odoratis terra benigna rosis;
> ac iuvenum series teneris immixta puellis
>   ludit, et adsidue proelia miscet amor. (I, iii, 57-64)[8]

When we compare these few lines from the Roman poet with the elaborate description of the abode of the god of love in the *De Phyllide et Flora* (or CB

Capellanus' *Art of Courtly Love* (Chapt. 6) and Guillaume de Lorris' section of the *Roman de la Rose* involves such a radical revaluation of these works as not to carry conviction. But see note 26 below.

[5] J. A. W. Bennett, *The Parlement of Foules: An Interpretation* (Oxford, 1957), 62.

[6] Curtius, op. cit., 200, note; Bennett, op. cit., 79, note and 80.

[7] E. Langlois, *Le Roman de la Rose* (Paris, 1914-24), II, 295.

[8] Text from F. W. Cornish, J. P. Postgate, and J. W. Mackail, *Catullus, Tibullus, and Pervigilium Veneris*, Loeb Classical Library (New York, 1931), 208. Bennett, op. cit., 80, suggests Statius' *Silvae* as a source for the association of the *locus amoenus* with the abode of Venus. Since the *Silvae* was "virtually unknown until Poggio's discovery of a MS. of this work at St. Gallen in 1416," according to E.F. Shannon, *Chaucer and the Roman Poets* (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), 329, the suggestion perhaps needs some qualification.

92 as its most recent editors colourlessly call it), we realize the enormous gap between the Roman and the medieval conception:

> 59. Ad Amoris destinant ire paradisum...
> 60. Parvo tractu temporis nemus est inventum.
> ad ingressum nemoris murmurat fluentum,
> ventus inde redolet myrrham et pigmentum,
> audiuntur tympana cithareque centum.
> 61. Quicquid potest hominum comprehendi mente,
> totum ibi virgines audiunt repente:
> vocum differentie sunt illic invente,
> sonat diatessaron, sonat diapente.
> 62. Sonant et mirabili plaudunt harmonia
> tympanum, psalterium, lyra, symphonia,
> sonant ibi phiale voce valde pia,
> et buxus multiplici cantum prodit via.
> 63. Sonant omnes avium lingue voce plena:
> Vox auditur merule dulcis et amena,
> corydalus, graculus atque philomena,
> que non cessat conqueri de transacta pena...
> 66. Immortalis fieret ibi manens homo.
> arbor ibi quelibet suo gaudet pomo,
> vie myrrha, cinnamo flagrant et amomo;
> coniectari poterat dominus ex domo.
> 67. Vident choros iuvenum et domicellarum,
> singulorum corpora corpora stellarum...
> 69. Circa silve medium locus est occultus,
> ubi viget maxime suus deo cultus:
> Fauni, Nymphe, Satyri, comitatus multus
> tympanizant, concinunt, ante dei vultus.
> 70. Portant vina manibus et corona florum;
> Bacchus Nymphas instruit et choros Faunorum.
> servant pedem ordinem et instrumentorum;
> sed Silenus titubat nec psallit in chorum.[9]

The wealth of detail in this twelfth-century poem is not accounted for by the typical *locus amoenus* of classical literature,[10] and Faral[11] rightly called attention to its similarities with the tradition of the earthly paradise. The whole question of the legend of the terrestrial paradise was thoroughly investigated as early as 1892 by the eminent Italian scholar Arturo Graf.[12] Graf presents a full study of the motif of the earthly paradise, and in a lengthy appendix he gives the originals of descriptions of paradise from Tertullian to the fifteenth-century Italian writer, Federigo Frezzi. A comparison of the passage we have just quoted from the *De Phyllide et Flora* with the descriptions of the earthly paradise cited by Graf in his appendix reveals that the twelfth-century poem, while not absolutely identical with the tradition of the earthly paradise, shares many of its details. There is also an affinity between the details of this poem and many of the examples cited by Robertson.[13] The twelfth-century Latin poem would thus seem to represent a fusion of the classical tradition of the *locus amoenus* and its association with the god of love with the conception of the terrestrial paradise. As such, then, this twelfth-century Latin poem can be said to represent the inception of a new topos in later medieval literature which we may call the *paradis d'amour.*

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[9] Text from A. Hilka and O. Schumann, *Carmina Burana* (Heidelberg, 1930-41), I, ii, 100-02. No author cited by Curtius or Bennett presents such a detailed description of the *locus amoenus*, though the early Christian descriptions of the terrestrial paradise do.

[10] Celtic elements would also seem to merit consideration in a discussion of the origin of details in garden descriptions. See O. M. Johnston, "The Description of the Emir's Orchard in Floire and Blancheflor", *ZRP* XXXII (1908), 705-10. Robertson, loc. cit., 35, also refers to Celtic elements.

[11] E. Faral, *Recherches sur les Sources Latines des Contes et Romans Courtois du Moyen Age* (Paris, 1913), 202.

The widespread popularity of the *paradis d'amour* in later medieval vernacular literature resulted from a variety of influences. According to Faral,[14] the *De Phyllide et Flora* is the progenitor of a whole family of vernacular poems whose theme is the *débat du clerc et du chevalier*. The popularity of these poems undoubtedly helped to give the conception of the *paradis d'amour* the impetus it needed for its frequent appearance in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In addition, Matthew of Vendome's model example of the *descriptio loci* in the *Ars Versificatoria*, possibly contemporaneous with the *De Phyllide et Flora*, also provides in true rhetorical fashion a lavish amplification of detail in nature description which removes it from the classical Latin tradition and brings it into affinity with the poem from the *Carmina Burana*. Thus the influence of the family of poems on the *débat du clerc et du chevalier* was augmented by the popular handbook of rhetoric, and both therefore provided authoritative and traditional examples for poets wanting to use garden descriptions in succeeding literature. Indeed, Langlois has observed that one fourteenth-century manuscript of the *Roman de la Rose* marginally attributes some details of the garden description in that poem to Matthew of Vendome's model.[15] And without exaggeration one might say that the *Roman de la Rose* represents the finest flowering of the topos of the

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[12] A. Graf, "Il Mito del Paradiso Terrestre," *Miti, Leggende, e Superstizioni del Medio Evo* (Torino, 1892-93), I, 1-238. The tradition of the earthly paradise is also partly covered by A. S. Cook, *The Old English Elene, Phoenix and Physiologus* (New Haven, 1919), lii-lvi. Further bibliographical information on gardens is contained in W. A. Neilson, *Origins and Sources of the "Court of Love"* (Boston, 1899), chapt. 3.

[13] Such as the presence of the well or fountain, the shady trees, and the singing birds.

[14] Faral, *Recherches*, 248.

[15] Langlois, *Roman de la Rose*, II, 294.

paradis d'amour. But of the ubiquitous influence of this poem on Chaucer's work we need not speak here.[16]

Not only was the garden *per se* an accepted and traditional motif in the literature with which Chaucer was acquainted, but also the specific details of the description of gardens followed a set pattern. The frequent appearance of the May morning,[17] the idealization of nature, and the persistent appearance of such particular details as shady trees, flowers, singing birds, and fountains or streams — however appropriate these details are to descriptions of gardens — are all details which recur with almost regular uniformity in the long tradition of garden description. And annotated editions of Chaucer's poetry are full of references showing Chaucer's indebtedness to his French contemporaries and medieval Latin predecessors for such details in the descriptions of individual gardens.[18]

This brief review of current scholarship is sufficient, I think, to indicate that the garden setting was a conventional feature in medieval literature. This garden setting was the result of a fusion of two traditions, one classical, the other ultimately Biblical and based on the conception of the Garden of Eden. The connotations of the garden setting are therefore mixed; on the one hand we have the garden as the abode of the deity of love. In this aspect the garden can easily be associated with Courtly Love and ultimately with adultery. On the other hand we have the garden conveying connotations of the terrestrial paradise and ultimately of the Fall. Thus the garden setting is not merely the pleasant secluded retreat into which members of the aristocracy and upper classes retired from the wilder aspects of the world around them for solace or for private conversation. To be sure, the garden can fill this function solely, and it does just this at times in Chaucer's poetry.[19] But Chaucer is also able to exploit the connotative possibilities latent in the whole tradition of the garden.

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[16] The complete history of the medieval literary garden has not been written. Such a history would have to include reference to the descriptions of Nature's garden in such works as Alain de Lille's *Anticlaudianus* (Migne, *PL* CCX, cols. 489-90) and the *De Planctu Naturae* (Migne, *PL* CCX, cols. 433-35, 441-42). Curtius, op. cit., 106-27 and Bennett, op. cit., 107-32 discuss at length the "goddess Natura"; the latter's views are criticized in part by T. Silverstein, *MP* LVI (1958-59), 270-76. See also E. C. Knowlton, "Nature in Middle English," *JEGP* XX (1921), 186-207, where references are given to the author's previous articles on Nature. In addition, Sir Frank Crisp, *Mediaeval Gardens* (2 vols., London, 1924) provides numerous illustrations from manuscript sources which depict the different kinds of gardens described in literary works.

[17] Rosamond Tuve, *Seasons and Months* (Paris, 1933), 58-70 and 181-91 discusses the complex tradition of descriptions of spring and their relation to Chaucer's work. J. E. G. de Montmorency, "The Gardens in Chaucer and Shakespeare," *ConR* XCIX, suppl. 44 (1911), 1-8, pointed out what is generally overlooked, that May "when it opened under the Old Calendar, some fourteen days later than it has done since 1752... was perhaps a little nearer the poet's ideal than it is with us." (p. 1).

[18] See, for example, F. N. Robinson, *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1957), 775, 792-94, 842. Quotations from and references to Chaucer's poetry are from this edition.

We have to be fully aware of the existence of this tradition of the garden in order to understand fully the extent of Chaucer's poetic artistry. Chaucer never accepts passively the poetic conventions and the rhetorical traditions of his age. He constantly moulds and fashions the *données* of tradition into new and distinctively Chaucerian meanings and implications. An examination of the garden in the tales told by the Merchant and the Franklin will illustrate this. Both these tales are concerned with basically the same situation: the relationships between a married couple and a young squire who is in love with the wife. Our relegation of these tales to the categories of fabliau and Breton lay respectively should not obscure this basic similarity. And the garden is employed by Chaucer in each tale, I believe, in a way which both emphasizes the similarities and heightens the differences.

Nowhere outside the occasional poems does Chaucer describe the garden setting with the detail he employs in these two tales. The garden in the *Merchant's Tale* is the more fully described:

> So fair a gardyn woot I nowher noon.
> For, out of doute, I verraily suppose
> That he that wroot the Romance of the Rose
> Ne koude of it the beautee wel devyse;
> Ne Priapus ne myghte nat suffise,
> Though be he god of gardyns, for to telle
> The beautee of the gardyn and the welle,
> That stood under a laurer alwey grene.
> Ful ofte tyme he Pluto and his queene,
> Proserpina, and al hire fayerye,
> Disporten hem and maken melodye
> Aboute that welle, and daunced, as men tolde. (E 2030-41)[20]

Elsewhere we learn that the garden contained flowers (E 2221), "a bench of turves, fresh and grene" (E 2235), and a fruit tree, the pear (E2210, 2217). The elements that we have already noted as belonging to the medieval tradition of the literary garden are all present here. That we have to do with the terrestrial paradise is evident in the phrase "so fair a gardyn woot I nowher noon," since the Garden of Eden is always described as the fairest that ever existed.[21] And the mention of the *Roman de la Rose* invokes the *paradis d'amour* and indeed the whole tradition of Courtly Love with its attendant notion of adultery, so appropriate to this tale. The action of the tale fulfils the promises of the connotations involved in the garden setting. The young squire Damyan is the woeful and lovesick copy-book suitor whose importunities finally win from the young wife May her consent to his advances, for, as Chaucer says in a superb burst of irony,

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[19] As in *Troilus and Criseyde*, II, 813-26 and the *Knight's Tale* (A 1051-60). The garden in the *Shipman's Tale* (B² 1279-1397) is the scene of the compact between the merchant's wife and the priest.

[20] The descriptive details here conform to the usual pattern of garden description, though the action occurs in June, not May.

> Lo, pitee renneth soone in gentil herte![22]

And like the serpent in medieval and renaissance paintings of the Garden of Eden, he waits in a fruit tree to seduce the young wife, if not from her innocence, at least from her chastity.

But the mention of Priapus takes the garden in the *Merchant's Tale* a step beyond the usual connotations of the medieval literary garden. The name Priapus occurs only twice in Chaucer's poetry; in addition to his appearance here in the *Merchant's Tale*, Priapus also makes an entrance in the *Parliament of Fowls*. In this latter poem he is described

> In swich aray as whan the asse hym shente
> With cri by nighte, and with hys sceptre in honde. (255-56)

It has been pointed out that Chaucer's description here follows fairly closely Boccaccios' *Teseida*, but the detail with phallic implications seems to be Chaucer's addition to his source.[23] J.A.W. Bennett has said of this passage, this is "not Priapus as 'god of gardins,' his role in the Merchant's Tale... but in his most notorious guise ('abito'): naked and lustful."[24] But I would suggest that even in the *Merchant's Tale* Priapus functions as a symbol of shameless lust as well as a god of gardens. The nature of the action in this tale confirms this suggestion. Chaucer makes it explicit that the garden is the setting for old January's sexual play with his wife "...whan he wolde paye his wyf hir dette / In somer seson..." (E 2048-49), and emphasizes the lustful design of the old lecher when he adds

> And thynges whiche that were not doon abedde,
> He in the gardyn parfourned hem and spedde. (E 2051-52)

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[21] See, for examples, the descriptions of the terrestrial paradise given in the appendix by Graf, op. cit. Chaucer's remark earlier in the tale that "wheither hir thoughte it paradys or helle" (E 1964) when January lay with May is possibly intended to evoke ideas of the Biblical paradise.

[22] The phrase occurs also in the *Prologue* to the *Legend of Good Women* (F 503, G 491); the *Knight's Tale* (A 1761); and the *Squire's Tale* (F 479). The Merchant's use of the phrase is perhaps the bourgeois' comment on the chivalric pretensions of the Knight and the Squire.

[23] See Robinson, ed. cit., 794. He explains the "sceptre" by a reference to the Carmina Priapea, especially no. 25.

[24] Bennett, op. cit., 92.

Add to this the fact that Pluto and Proserpina "and al hire fayerye" disported themselves about the well in January's garden, and the action in this tale takes on the implications of an orgiastic, pagan fertility rite.[25] The introduction of Priapus into the garden setting in the *Merchant's Tale*, then, is not only suitable because of that deity's function as god of gardens, but also because of his association with unbridled sexuality which is so appropriate to the tale.[26]

If the garden in the *Merchant's Tale* carries with it expectations — expectations which are realized in the course of the tale — of adultery, the Fall, and unbridled sexuality, far otherwise is it with the garden in the *Franklin's Tale*. This garden is not so fully described as the other, but we can catch a glimpse of the connotations which the medieval literary garden conveyed. Chaucer describes the garden thus:

> So on a day, right in the morwe-tyde,
> Unto a gardyn that was ther bisyde,
> In which that they hadde maad hir ordinaunce
> Of vitaille and of oother purveiaunce
> They goon and pleye hem al the longe day.
> And this was on the sixte morwe May,
> Which May hadde peynted with his softe shoures
> This gardyn ful of leves and of floures;
> And craft of mannes hand so curiously
> Arrayed hadde this gardyn, trewely,
> That nevere was ther gardyn of swich prys,
> But if it were the verray paradys. (F 901-12)

The phrase "verray paradys" is an obvious link with the tradition of the terrestrial paradise and its suggestion of the Fall, while the other details, slight though they be, fit in with the accepted conventions of garden description. The connection with the *paradis d'amour* and hence ultimately with Courtly Love and adultery is more tenuous, but it is implied, I believe, by the description of the squire Aurelius as "servant to Venus" (F 937) and by the placing of the scene of his courtship of the wife Dorigen in the garden itself. Nor should we forget that when the clever young squire has, with the aid of the magician, created the illusion of complying with the lady's seemingly impossible demands, and when she is reluctantly forced by her husband Arveragus to live up to her promise to bestow her favours on the importunate young squire, the site of their assignation is a garden, presumably the same garden as that in which Aurelius first made his declaration of love. That assignation, of course, does not take place. The woeful lady Dorigen and the triumphant but ultimately generous-hearted Aurelius never reach the garden. By having the squire Aurelius renounce his rights to the lady before the garden is reached, Chaucer effectively suppresses the implications which the tradition of the garden carries with it. Thus the shadows cast by both the love-garden and the Garden of Eden are lifted. Courtly Love and the Fall are held in abeyance, and Dorigen returns to her husband Arveragus as innocent in body and in heart as when she left him.

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[25] For Proserpina (Persephone) as "one of the principal goddesses of the fertility of the earth," see H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Greek Mythology* (New York, 1959), 91. According to R. Graves, *The Greek Myths* (Penguin Books, 1955), II, 406, Priapus means "pruner of the pear tree," a curious coincidence in view of the presence of the pear tree in this tale. The pear tree here, of course, is not original with Chaucer; see W. F. Bryan and G. Dempster, *Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales* (Chicago, 1941), 341-56.

[26] This interpretation of the function of the garden in the *Merchant's Tale* was worked out before I became acquainted with the article by D. W. Robertson, Jr. cited above, note 4. My interpretation coincides with his in many places, and it is gratifying to see one's views confirmed, even if anticipated, by another.

The *Franklin's Tale* has been held to represent Chaucer's final views on love and marriage in that group of tales called the Marriage Group.[27] Whether or not the twentieth century is right in this view of the morality of the tale, there is something engaging in that "humble, wys accord" which makes Arveragus "servant in love, and lord in mariage." In addition, it provides an effective and characteristically English[28] counter-weight to the famous decision handed down three hundred years earlier by Countess Marie of Champagne in one of her courts of love on the question whether love could exist in marriage:

> We declare and hold as firmly established that love cannot exert its powers between two people who are married to each other. For lovers give each other everything freely, under no compulsion of necessity, but married people are in duty bound to give in to each other's desires and deny themselves to each other in nothing.[29]

The concluding stanzas of *Troilus and Criseyde* imply, among other things, Chaucer's dissatisfaction with a love affair conducted outside the bounds of matrimony. The *Franklin's Tale* seems to imply a solution to the dilemmas posed by Courtly Love and exploited so successfully in the drama of the tales in the Marriage Group of the *Canterbury Tales*. If we want to conjecture that the *Franklin's Tale* does give Chaucer's considered opinion on the proper relationship between man and woman in love and in marriage, then Chaucer's skilful handling of the garden motif reinforces that conjecture.

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[27] The position of the *Franklin's Tale* as the conclusion of the Marriage Group has been questioned by D. R. Howard, "The Conclusion of the Marriage Group: Chaucer and the Human Condition," *MP* LVII (1959-60), 223-232, who states that "...the Franklyn's clever solution to the problem of 'maistrye' is by no means the last word that could have been said on the subject of marriage" (p. 226).

[28] English resistance to tales of adultery or of casual sexual encounters is noted by A. B. Taylor, *An Introduction to Mediaeval Romance* (London, 1930), 250.

[29] Andreas Capellanus, *The Art of Courtly Love*, trans. J. J. Parry (New York, 1941), 106-07.

Henry of Harclay's Questions on the Divine Ideas

ARMAND MAURER, C.S.B.

TO the best of my knowledge Henry of Harclay disputed two Questions on the divine ideas, one preserved in manuscript Vatican Borghese 171, the other in manuscript Worcester F. 3. These are here edited for the first time. Fr. Franz Pelster, who described the manuscripts, adequately established their authenticity.[1] At the top of the first folio of the Vatican manuscript we read the title: "Quaelibet bonae memoriae Henrici de Hartclay quondam cancellarii Oxoniensis." The Question on the divine ideas is fourth in the group, though it is skipped in the marginal enumeration of the Questions and omitted in the two lists of Harclay's works at the end of the manuscript. This omission is understandable because the scribe did not clearly indicate the beginning of a new Question.

Following Harclay's Questions in the Vatican manuscript there is one by Francis Caraccioli entitled "An magis expediat bonus iurista ad regendam ecclesiam quam bonus theologus" (fol. 33rv). After this there is a list of Harclay's Questions (fol. 33vb). The next three folios (34r-36v) contain another treatise with the title "Quaestio de Ideis: An propter cognitionem Dei creaturarum perfectam et distinctam et productionem earum sit necesse ponere in Deo rationes distinctas ideales correspondentes creaturis cognitis." The manuscript concludes with a second listing of Harclay's Questions (fol. 36vb). The *Quaestio de Ideis* is not contained in the group ascribed to Harclay and it does not appear in either list of his works. What is more, its doctrine flatly contradicts that of his two authentic Questions. It maintains that the divine ideas not only have objective, cognitional, or "diminished" being in the divine mind; they are realities existing in God and distinct from Him in reality.[2]

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[1] F. Pelster, "Heinrich von Harclay, Kanzler von Oxford, und seine Quästionen," *Miscellanea Fr. Ehrle* I (Rome, 1924) 323-329.

[2] "Dico ergo ad quaestionem quod non video qui voluerit sustinere dicta Augustini, Dionysii, Senecae et aliorum sanctorum de ideis quin oporteat concedere quod ideae sint formaliter et realiter in mente divina. Ad quod probandum duo suppono: primum est quod istae rationes non habent solum esse objectivum vel cognitum sed aliquod esse in se formaliter in actu; secundo quod non sunt entia diminuta, puta entia rationis sed realia...Ergo oportet dicere quod istae ideae habent entitatem aliquam in se praeter quam in cognosci... Videtur ergo mihi quod intentio sanctorum sit in ista materia quod istae ideae sunt for-

This is contrary to the Vatican Question, which adopts the Scotist view that the ideas are nothing but objects eternally known by God and contained objectively in His mind: "Non sunt ergo ideae aliud nisi objecta cognita ab aeterno, et ut cognita dicuntur contineri in intelligentia divina, quia continentur objective in illa."[3] It is also in opposition to the Worcester Question, which denies any distinct being to the divine ideas: "... creaturae, ut intellectae a Deo ab aeterno, non habent distinctum esse a Deo."[4] The ideas are said to be identical with God's essence, so that like that essence they are worthy of adoration and the cause of our beatitude.[5] Because the manuscript does not attribute the *Quaestio de Ideis* to Harclay and its doctrine is so radically different from that of his known works, in all probability it is not authentic.

The only evidence in favor of its authenticity comes from a manuscript of William of Alnwick. Alnwick attributes to an anonymous author the opinion that God does not know creatures directly through His own essence but through distinct realities. In short, for this author the divine ideas are real beings existing in God but really distinct from Him. In the margin of the manuscript there is the note: *Opinio cancellarii Oxoniensis* — undoubtedly a reference to Harclay.[6] Fr. Pelster suggests that this may be a reference to Harclay's Vatican Question on the ideas,[7] but neither here nor in the Worcester Question does Harclay describe the ideas as realities (*res*) distinct from God. He does, however, deny that the divine essence is the adequate principle of God's knowledge of creatures.[8] Fr. Ledoux, the editor of Alnwick's *Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de Quodlibet* thinks that Alnwick refers to the *Quaestio de Ideis* and that this is an authentic work of Harclay.[9] The first assumption may well be true, but this is hardly convincing proof that the work is really Harclay's. We cannot be sure that Alnwick himself made the marginal reference to Harclay; it may be the work of a reader who thought the

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maliter existentes in Deo et etiam quod earum distinctio aliqualiter est ex parte rei, non per operationem intellectus, nec divini nec nostri; non enim formatae sunt, per Augustinum, nec per consequens ab aliquo productae vel causatae." Cod. Vat. Borgh. 171, fol. 35vb. Quoted by A. Ledoux, *Fr. Guillelmi Alnwick O.F.M., Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de Quodlibet* (Quaracchi, 1937), p. 29, n. 1. I have read several words differently from Fr. Ledoux.

[3] Infra, Question I, p. 171. See Scotus, *Opus Oxon.* I, 35, 1 (Paris, 1893) X, pp. 536-560; *Repor. Paris.* I, 36, 2, XXII, pp. 431-446.

[4] Infra, Question II, p. 177.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Cod. Vat. Palat. lat. 1805, fol. 28r. See A. Ledoux, op. cit. p. 30, n. 1.

[7] Fr. Pelster, however, thought that Alnwick possibly had another Question in mind. See art. cit. p. 329.

[8] Infra, Question II, p. 189.

[9] Op. cit. p. 3, n. 1; p. 30, n. 1.

Quaestio de Ideis belonged to Harclay because of its proximity to his Questions in the Vatican manuscript. In the face of the evidence for its non-authenticity, the marginal note in Alnwick's manuscript is not convincing. It remains highly doubtful, to say the least, that the *Quaestio de Ideis* was written by Harclay.

Only approximate dates can be given for Harclay's Questions. He obtained his degree of Master of Theology about 1310, became Chancellor of Oxford in 1312, and died in 1317.[10] His Commentary on the *Sentences*, recently discovered by Fr. Carlo Balić,[11] dates from before 1310 when Harclay was reading the *Sentences* at Paris. Fr. Pelster presents evidence that the Questions in the Worcester manuscript were written in 1313 or a little later, and that they postdate the Vatican group.[12] The latter point is borne out by the greater maturity of the Worcester Question on the divine ideas in comparison with the Vatican. The Vatican treatise is brief and unoriginal, reflecting Harclay's youthful leaning towards Scotism. Like Scotus, he holds that the ideas are not essentially relational in character but absolute objects existing in the divine mind with cognitional being (*esse cognitum*).[13] Fr. Balić has shown that Harclay's Commentary on the *Sentences* echoes many of Scotus' doctrines,[14] so we should expect that an early treatise on the divine ideas would reveal tendencies towards Scotism. The Worcester Question, on the contrary, is critical of Scotus' views on the divine ideas. It rejects the Scotist doctrine that the ideas are the essences of creatures established in intelligible being within the divine mind.[15] It also holds, against Scotus, that by itself the divine essence is not adequate to provide God with a distinct knowledge of creatures; ideas are necessarily required, at least as a *sine qua non* condition of such knowledge.[16] The position he adopts in this treatise is a variation of the traditional thirteenth-century theme that the ideas are both absolute and relational: they are the divine essence understood by God as imitable in various ways by creatures.[17]

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[10] For information about Harclay's life, see F. Pelster, art. cit. 308-320.

[11] See *Adnotationes ad nonnullas quaestiones circa Ordinationem I. Duns Scoti*, in *Opera Omnia Duns Scoti*, ed. C. Balić (Vatican, 1956) IV, 1*-39*.

There are two Questions on the divine ideas in Harclay's Commentary, Book I, d. 36: Utrum ad hoc quod intellectus divinus intelligat alia a se necesse sit ponere quod requirat distinctas ideas cognoscibilium; Utrum Deus habeat distinctas ideas omnium eorum quae distincte cognoscit. Ms. Vat. lat. 13687, fols. 82vb-86rb. I am indebted to Fr. Balić for providing a microfilm copy of Harclay's Commentary. In a subsequent article I hope to compare the doctrine of this Commentary with that of the Questions.

[12] Art. cit. 332.

[13] Infra, Question I, p. 171.

[14] See C. Balić, "Henricus de Harcley et Ioannes Duns Scotus," *Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson* (Paris, 1959) 93-121.

[15] Infra, Question II, p. 176. See Duns Scotus, *Opus Oxon.* I, 35, 1, n. 10, 12-15; X, pp. 548, 549, 554, 555. *Repor. Paris.* I, 36, 2, n. 31-34; XXII, pp. 444, 445.

[16] Infra, Question II, p. 189. See Duns Scotus, *Repor. Paris.* I, 36, 2, n. 33; XXII, pp. 444, 445.

Each of the two Questions here edited is extant in one manuscript.

I. Utrum ad hoc quod Deus cognoscat alia a se oportet ponere in Deo relationes rationis ad absoluta cognita, quae sunt ideae. Cod. Vat. Borghese 171, fols. 12rb-13ra.

II. Utrum ad distinctam cognitionem quam habet Deus ab aeterno de rebus creabilibus requirantur in eo distinctae rationes cognoscendi, per quas cognoscit ipsas res creabiles. Cod. Worcester F. 3, fols. 187v-191v.

The manuscripts are written in neat hands but neither is excellent. The Vatican Ms is less faulty than the Worcester; in both, however, emendations had to be made. Diamond brackets < > indicate an insertion not found in the manuscript. I have tried to identify Harclay's citations and references, including the many anonymous ones, but I have not always been successful. No doubt the publication of the abundant manuscript literature on the divine ideas in the fourteenth century will bring many of them to light.

I

UTRUM AD HOC QUOD DEUS COGNOSCAT ALIA A SE OPORTET PONERE IN DEO RELATIONES RATIONIS AD ABSOLUTA COGNITA, QUAE SUNT IDEAE

Quod non, probo, quia relatio praesupponit illud ad quod est, nam definitur per terminum, et definitum praesupponit partes definitionis. Ergo tali relationi praesupponitur creatura cognita; ergo non requiritur ad ejus cognitionem.

In contrarium. Augustinus *83 <Quaestiones>*, q. 46 de ideis, dicit[1] quod sine ideis, quae sunt aeternae rationes et incommutabiles in mente divina, nullus est sapiens. Sed illae non sunt relationes reales, nec formae absolutae; ergo relationes rationis.

Ad quaestionem, primo videndum est quid movit Platonem primo, Augustinum secundo <ad> ponendum ideas; secundo quae est ratio[2] ponendi plures ideas.

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[17] Infra, Question II, p. 189.

[1] PL 40, 30. The edition reads: "Quod si hae rerum omnium creandarum creatarumve rationes in divina mente continentur, neque in divina mente quidquam nisi aeternum atque immutabile potest esse, atque has rerum rationes principales appellat ideas Plato..."

[2] Ms. ratione.

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Circa primum, res artificiales habent esse in artifice duplex: sicut in principio cognitivo, et sicut in principio activo vel effectivo. Sicut enim artifex[3] praebet formam arcae in mente, ita et ars in ejus mente est principium activum quodammodo artificiatorum. Illud est manifestum ex Aristotele etiam II *Physicorum* et[4] VII *Metaphysicae*.[5] Unde consilium et ars reducuntur ad genus causae efficientis. Cum ergo Deus est artifex omnium naturarum[6] aliarum a se, alia ab eo sunt in Deo sicut in cognoscente et sicut in principio activo. Ergo quaelibet res facta a Deo, et fienda vel possibilis fieri, habet in mente Dei aliquam similitudinem, ad cujus exemplum ipsa producitur in esse naturae. Et hujusmodi exemplar vocatur idea, ab *idos* graece, quod est forma et similitudo latine. Unde proprie *idos* non est forma absolute sed forma exemplaris.

Ista patent per Augustinum, per Dionysium, et per opinionem Platonis. Augustinus, *83 Quaestiones*, q. 46, dicit quod ideae continentur in mente divina, in his verbis:[7] "Rationes omnium creatarum creandarumque,[8] quas rationes rerum principales Plato appellat ideas, in divina mente continentur." Propterea Augustinus dicit quod illae rationes sunt aeternae et incommutabiles et formae exemplares, in tantum quod sine illis nihil oritur nec occidit. Unde dicit sic:[9] "Ideae sunt principales formae et rationes rerum, stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae formatae[10] non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae sunt, semper eodem modo se habentes, quae <in> divina intelligentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriantur, neque occidant, neque intereant, secundum ipsas tamen dicitur formari omne quod oritur vel oriri potest."

Praeterea, Dionysius quinto capitulo *De Divinis Nominibus*:[11] "Exemplaria dicimus substantificas rationes existentium in Deo uniformiter praeexistentes, quas theologia praedefinitiones vocat et divinas et bonas voluntates existentium praedeterminativas et effectivas, secundum quas supersubstantialis essentia omnia praedefinivit et produxit." Ex ista auctoritate habet quod sunt exemplaria, et quod sunt principium cognoscendi et fiendi. Unde dicit "praedeterminativas et effectivas," etc.

Praeterea, huic concordat Aristoteles in omnibus. Imponit enim Platoni quod ipse dixerit illa exemplaria esse et quod propter duo requiruntur, maxime propter cognitionem et propter generationem vel factionem. Illud patet ex VII *Metaphysicae*[12] et XIII.[13] Et quantum ad hoc omnes isti auctores imponunt veritatem Platoni, nam <quod> ita dixit patet recitando ejus verba. Intelligendum est ergo quod secundo libro *Timaei* Chalcidius, prima[14] pars libri, recitat de Platone sic: "Hoc quod deerat mundo addebat opifex Deus, atque ut mens, cujus visus est intellectus idearum genera contemplatur in intelligibili mundo, quae ideae illic sunt animalia: sic Deus in hoc opere suo sensili diversa animalium genera statuit esse debere." Unde omnes res in mundo hoc sensibili facta est ad similitudinem sui exemplaris in intelligibili mundo, et totus iste mundus sensibilis factus est secundum <similitudinem> mundi architypi, id est mundi intelligibilis in divina mente existentis.

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[3] Ms. corrupt.

[4] Ms. 6.

[5] *Physics* II, 3, 194b 30, 195a 5-8, 22; *Metaph.* VII, 7, 1032a 32.

[6] Ms. adds aliqua.

[7] PL 40, 30.

[8] que : Ms. quia.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ms. corrupt.

[11] *Dionysiaca*, ed. P. Chevallier (Paris, 1937) I, pp. 360-1. The text is closest to the translation of Johannes Saracenus.

[12] 1033b 26-1034a 8.

[13] 1078b 13-17; 1079a 1; 1080a 2.

Praeterea, in tertio libro *Timaei*, secundum Chalcidium, post medium dicit sic Plato:[15] "Operatur porro artifex et exornat omnia juxta vim rationabilem majestatemque[16] operum suorum. Opera vero ejus intellectus ejus sunt, qui a Graecis ideae vocantur. Porro ideae sunt exempla rerum naturalium."

Patet ergo quid est idea: similitudo in mente artificis. Patet etiam quid movit ad ponendum; quia cognitio rei fiendae et factio ejusdem. (12va).

2

Secundo, videndum est de pluralitate idearum, et utrum sint absolutum vel[17] respectivum.

Et contra haec sunt opiniones quod sunt tantum respectus rationis, quibus comparatur essentia divina ut imitabilis a creaturis ad ipsas creaturas imitantes.[18] Et quia diversimode imitantur creaturae Deum secundum diversum gradum perfectionis naturae, ideo illis in Deo correspondent diversae rationes et relationes rationis in Deo. Unde a parte creaturae est diversitas realis; a parte Dei rationis tantum.

Isti sic dicentes habent pro se unam rationem talem: Illud quod uniformiter et aequaliter se habet respectu multorum non potest esse principium cognoscendi illa distincte nisi determinetur ad illa. Modo essentia divina est absolutissima secundum se, et uno modo se habens respectu omnium cognoscibilium. Ergo non potest esse principium distincte cognoscendi illa nisi limitetur et determinetur. Sed non potest determinari per aliquid extra se; ergo per aliquid a parte sui. Illud nullo modo est absolutum, quia et illud est uniforme et indifferens sicut essentia respectu creaturarum. Ergo oportet hoc esse respectivum; sed non reale, quia Dei ad creaturam non est relatio realis. Ergo oportet quod sit relatio rationis. Sed relatio variatur ad variationem terminorum. Ergo multae relationes in Deo, sicut multa absoluta cognita.

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[14] Ms. in. The reading: "prima pars libri" is doubtful. Harclay seems to refer to the location of the text in the second book of the *Timaeus*, following the mediaeval division. The text occurs at the beginning of what several manuscripts call Chalcidius' commentary on the *Timaeus*. See *Platonis Timaeus interprete Chalcidio cum eiusdem commentario*, ed. J. Wrobel (Leipzig, 1876) p. 39, line 19 - p. 40, line 1.

[15] *Platonis Timaeus commentatore Chalcidio*, p. 333, lines 5-8.

[16] que : Ms. quia.

[17] Ms. et.

[18] See Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* V, 3 (Paris, 1518) 155v; *Quodl.* IX, 2, 344r-347v; *Summa Quaestionum* 68,5 (Paris, 1521) 229v-234v. Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* IV, 1 (*Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. M. de Wulf and A. Pelzer [*Les philosophes belges* II], Louvain, 1904, pp. 229-233).

Contra. Videtur mihi quod vanum est ponere in Deo relationes rationis ad creaturam propter cognitionem creaturarum.

Quod sic, probo. Primo declaro quid est ens rationis. Ens rationis est ens in anima tantum, quod non est nisi dum intellectus considerat. Quod sic intelligo : non quod sit in anima subjective sed objective. Nam in anima est vera res extra animam sicut albedo in pariete. Nam actus intelligendi species quaecumque ponitur vera res et natura, non dependens ex consideratione intellectus hoc modo. Sed ens rationis, recte intelligendo, est tale quod nusquam est in aliqua re sed tantum in consideratione. Unde est figmentum intellectus, sine tamen falsitate, sicut dictum in *Quaestione de Universali*.[19] Sicut enim mons aureus nusquam est <in re sed in consideratione> tantum, et virtus imaginativa potest imaginare montem aureum sine omni falsitate quia non componit vel dividit, ita potest intellectus simplex considerare aliquid quod tantum habet esse in intellectu et nusquam in re. Verbi gratia, distinctio quam considerat vel imaginatur intellectus inter idem et seipsum, cum facit identitatem relationem secundum rationem, nusquam est in re sed in mente tantum modo praedicto.

Praeterea, alia conditio: Quod est factum ab intellectu et non manet, intellectu cessante considerare illud, potest intelligi bene et male. Nam actus intelligendi fit[20] ab intellectu effective secundum unam opinionem, et non manet intellectu cessante considerare, sicut nec lumen in medio sole recedente; et tamen actus intelligendi est verum ens reale et non rationis existentis, vel in genere qualitatis secundum aliquos, vel in genere relationis vel actionis secundum alios.

Ideo oportet plus dicere ad hoc quod sit ens rationis, quod nusquam est in re plus quam mons aureus, sed tantum in acie mentis considerantis et imaginantis. Et ideo secundum Aristotelem IV et VI *Metaphysicae*[21] est ens diminutum et secundum quid, et in nullo de decem generibus. Unde excludit hujusmodi ens a sui consideratione in IV *Metaphysicae*.[22] Et illud est verum tam a parte Dei quam creaturae, nam distinctio quam Deus cognovit inter extrema relationis secundum rationem, quae est identitas, non magis est in re quam illa quam ego ibi considero. Unde relatio rationis, recte intellecta, est ens secundum quid <et> diminutum, in nullo existens.

Ex isto tunc arguo sic : Ista comparatio essentiae divinae ad creaturas imitantes non est actus intelligendi divinus comparans. Certum est tunc esset tantum una idea, sicut unus actus intelligendi. Ergo non potest esse aliquid nisi quod intellectus considerat essentiam divinam imitabilem diversimode, ac si esset diversitas graduum in ea secundum diversitatem graduum creaturae imitantis eam, cum tamen nulla sit diversitas. Eodem modo, sicut intellectus considerat idem ac si esset duo vel diversum, tamen non sit ita in re, nec mentitur dum intelligo, sicut dictum est *Quaestione de Universali*,[23] ergo ista idea, si sit ens rationis, est ens tantum diminute, in nullo habens esse. Sed nulla perfectio simplex in Deo, nec aliquid quod est in Deo ex natura rei, dependet ex ente secundum quid. <Sed> sapientia divina, propter quam ponis ideas, et cognitio Dei, sunt perfectiones simpliciter in Deo. Ergo nullo modo dependet ex actu rationis, id est relatione rationis.

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[19] Ms. Vat. lat. Borghese 171, fol. 11rb-va. See J. Kraus, "Die Universalienlehre des Oxforder Kanzlers Heinrich von Harclay," *Divus Thomas* (Freiburg) 11 (1933) 88, n. 3.

[20] Ms. sit.

[21] *Metaph.* IV, 2, 1003b 6-11; VI, 4, 1027b 30-34. For the term *diminutum*, see the Latin translation of the Arabic version of the *Metaphysics* in *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem Commentariis* (Venice, 1574) VIII, 152 B.

[22] VI, 4, 1028a 3.

[23] Ms. Vat. lat. Borghese 171, fol. 11va.

Tu dicis forte: Intelligere simpliciter non dependet ab eis, sed intellectio hujus vel illius, puta lapidis vel hominis, dependet. Contra: Intelligere lapidem est perfectio simpliciter, nam in creaturis melius est intelligere Sortem quam non intelligere. Ergo non dependet ex ente rationis.

Tu dicis: Ita dicam tibi, quia Sortes non est modo nisi ens rationis. Ergo intelligere Dei, quo intelligit Sortem, dependet ex ente rationis; et intelligere Sortem est perfectio simpliciter. Responsio: Dico quod intelligere Dei non dependet a Sorte in esse rationis, sed magis e converso Sortes in esse rationis dependet ab intelligere. Nam intelligere Dei facit ipsum esse ens rationis, nam eo ipso est ens rationis quia intelligitur. Modo secundum ipsam opinionem de ideis, illae relationes rationis magis sunt causa cognitionis creaturae quam e converso. Non ideo valet.

Praeterea, secundo arguo sic: Illi respectus rationis[24] aut intelliguntur esse posteriores secundum naturam et modum intelligendi nostrum actu intelligendi divino, aut non. Si posteriores, ergo non sunt causa intellectionis. Si priores, tunc arguo: Variatio in priori secundum naturam et formalem rationem facit necessario varietatem in posteriori. Ergo si ideae sunt priores actu intelligendi et quodammodo causa illius, necessario sicut sunt plures ideae ita plures actus intelligendi. Consequens (12vb) falsum, ergo antecedens.

Praeterea, omnis relatio de mundo, sive realis sive rationis, praesupponit suum fundamentum. Nulla enim relatio constituit fundamentum suum; immo magis oritur ex fundamento. Unde sicut relatio realis oritur ex fundamento reali, ita relatio rationis oritur ex suo fundamento, quodcumque sit, sive ens rationis sive ens reale. Modo sicut Deus refertur ad creaturam secundum rationem, quae relatio vocatur idea, ita certe e converso creatura ad Deum, nam relatio rationis semper est mutua. Ergo respectus rationis creaturae ad Deum, qui est respectus exemplationis passivae, praesupponit necessario ex parte creaturae fundamentum in quo fundetur. Aut ergo praesupponit creaturam in esse reali (quod est falsum, quia tunc esset aeterna secundum esse reale), aut praesupponit eam secundum esse cognitum, hoc est, non facit eam cognitam; et habetur propositum, quod non requiritur respectus rationis propter cognitionem, sed magis sequitur cognitionem et causatur et oritur ab illa.[25]

Praeterea, iste modus dicendi in nullo concordat cum dictis auctoritatibus loquentibus de ideis. Nam omnes consonant quod idea in mente divina est exemplar, ad cujus similitudinem fit res extra. Sed inter lapidem et angelum et aliam substantiam, et respectum rationis, nulla similitudo, minor quam inter hominem et asinum, vel hominem et lapidem, nihil potest esse tam diversum sicut respectus rationis et substantia, quia nec ejusdem generis naturae, nec aliquo modo conveniunt nisi in ente universalissimo communi enti reali,[26] quod est ens simpliciter, et enti rationis, quod est ens secundum quid.

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[24] Ms. rationes.

[25] Ms. illo.

[26] Ms. reale.

Dico ergo, secundum quod videtur mihi, quod omnes praedicti auctores qui loquuntur de ideis non intelligunt per ideas nisi ipsamet objecta secundum esse cognitum. Et hoc sic declaro. Nam sicut modo statua Herculis, quae est aliquid in re, est similitudo Herculis qui est homo, eodem modo secundum omnes in mente artificis est similitudo arcae vel statuae, ad quam artifex respicit in faciendo rem artificiatam. Unde statua in mente artificis et in re non differunt nisi sicut esse reale et esse cognitum. Et esse cognitum intelligo non unum esse reale aliud a re, sed illud esse quod <est> vera res cum intelligitur a mente est esse cognitum. Hoc dico pro tanto. Etsi enim forte in anima sit aliqua similitudo rei extra, puta species vel aliquid tale, non curo. Non est ad propositum; quia credo quod talis species, si poneretur in intellectu subjective, aequivocam similitudinem haberet ad rem extra cujus est ad illam similitudinem quae est unius hominis ad alium. Manifestum <est>. Sed ego loquor de propriissima similitudine. Et dico esse cognitum objective, non subjective sicut species, est in mente summa similitudo rei fiendae. Nam artifex, ante quam arcam faciat, eandem omnino secundum omnem conditionem ex parte rei praecognoscit, et hoc modo verisimile habet in mente similitudinem, non per speciem subjective entem in mente. Et secundum quod praecognoscit, ita postea in re producit. Modo eodem se habet Deus per artem et intelligentiam suam ad res naturales cognoscendas et faciendas, quomodo carpentator respectu rei artificialis. Et ideo lapis cognitus a Deo ab aeterno, qui est idem in re cum hoc lapide jam facto, est exemplar, ad cujus similitudinem Deus producit lapidem in genere. Non sunt ergo ideae aliud nisi objecta cognita ab aeterno, et ut cognita dicuntur contineri in intelligentia[27] divina, quia continentur objective in illa.

Et sine omni glosa illud dicunt omnes auctoritates allegatae: Augustini, Dionysii, Platonis, et similiter Aristotelis.[28] Quod sic volo probare. Nam Aristoteles, non est dubium, diceret quod in mente artificis est ratio et similitudo rei artificiatae, et eodem modo in speculabilibus. Nam geometer in scientia sua vel habitu scientiali considerat triangulum et habet apud <se> rationem trianguli et similitudinem. Et quid est hoc? Numquid aliquid simile triangulo est in mente ejus subjective? Certum est quod non plus quam syllogismus est in aqua. Ergo illa similitudo est ratio ipsa trianguli cogniti objective. Et hanc similitudinem vocat Aristoteles "ideam," quando dicit primo *Ethicorum*[29] quod substantiae et accidentis non est communis quaedam idea. Quod non est verum de aliquo subjective in mente, nam omnis species in mente existens est accidens, si sit ibi subjective. Quid ergo idea? Aristoteles continue ostendit:[30] quorum est una ars est una idea, et quorum est alia scientia alia idea. Ponit exemplum sic: quia alia ars est militaris et alia medicinalis, et ideo alia idea belli et aegritudinis. Unde non cognoscuntur secundum eandem ideam, id est, non secundum eandem rationem definitivam. Quare, quia cognoscuntur secundum naturam propriam quam habent, et quia habent diversas rationes quidditativas, ideo taliter cognoscuntur. Et medicus, volens inducere sanitatem, respicit <ad>

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[27] Ms. intellectiva.

[28] Ms. Augustini.

[29] *Ethics* I, 6, 1096a 23-29.

[30] Ibid. 1096a 30-33.

ideam suam, et miles ad suam, secundum Aristotelem ibidem.[31] Unde ipse utitur nomine "ideae" sicut Plato et Augustinus.

Dices: In quo ergo discrepat Aristoteles a Platone, et quare improbat ideas positas ab ipso tam diligenter in VII *Metaphysicae*?[32] Hic dico quod Aristoteles imponit Platoni quod posuit formas rerum separatas secundum esse reale extra animam; et ita improbat. Sed hoc non facit ista opinio. Et videtur mihi quod opinio Platonis, si Aristoteles (13ra) aliquid arguit contra eum, est eadem omnino cum opinione ponentium quidditates aeternas, propter hoc quod sint objectum intellectus divini.

Probo quod haec fuit opinio Aristotelis sic: Plato posuit ideas, ut nunc patet, sed Aristoteles tantum posuit eas in mente objective. Quid Plato? Certum est quod Plato non posuit eas extra mentem divinam, ut patet per auctoritates allegatas Augustini, Platonis. Et iterum nullus possit cogitare quod Plato, tantus philosophus, posuerit ideam extra mentem divinam habitantem in loco per se, quia non posuit eam nisi ut esset exemplar rei fiendae. Modo non potuit credi quod fuisset tam rudis quin potuisset scire quod sola conceptio mentis et excogitatio apud mentem posset esse causa novitatis creaturae. Hoc potuit experiri in homine, qui multa nova operatur secundum quod excogitavit in mente. Nec imponit igitur Aristoteles hoc nisi tantum quod posuit eas existere separatim. Ergo si Aristoteles habuit aliquid contra eum, oportuit eum dixisse quod idea in mente Dei habuit verum esse reale secundum quidditatem, sicut isti ponunt quidditates aeternas. Et directissime contra hoc invehitur Aristoteles XIII *Metaphysicae*, quod tunc Socrates esset perpetuus, illo capitulo, "Omnium autem maxime, etc."[33] Probat enim ex hoc quod Socrates esset perpetuus. Unde dicit: "Dicere autem exemplaria esse et participare ipsis alia est dicere metaphoras poeticales. Quid enim est operatum ad ideas respiciens?" Quasi diceret, nihil; nam ante fuit Socrates quam fuisset productus. Unde Aristoteles:[34] "Quare ente Socrate et non ente, fiet utique quale Socrates. Quare utique erit Socrates perpetuus." Et omnia ista argumenta procedunt contra istam opinionem, sicut contra opinionem Platonis recte intellectam.[35]

Praeterea, alia ratio Aristotelis ibidem:[36] "Impossibile est esse substantiam seorsum ab eo cujus est substantia." Ergo ideae non possent esse seorsum si sint substantiae rerum. Et illud argumentum vadit contra illam opinionem eodem modo, quia dicit quod quidditas Sortis fuit ab aeterno; ergo substantia Sortis seorsum a Sorte.

Intelligendum tamen quod Aristoteles non imposuit falsum Platoni, ut multi dicunt. Posuit enim ad litteram Plato ideas esse animalia, ut patet in auctoritate.[37] Item Ambrosius, homilia prima in *Hexameron*,[38] dicit de Platone, quod posuit tria principia distincta: Deum, exemplar, materiam; et habetur II *Sententiarum* de prima.[39]

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[31] Ibid. 1097a 8-12.

[32] 1039a 24-1041a 6.

[33] 1079b 25-27.

[34] 1079b 29-30.

[35] Ms. intellecte.

[36] 1079b 35.

[37] See supra, n. 14.

[38] St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* I, 1; PL 14, 133.

[39] Peter Lombard, *Libri IV Sent.* II, 1, 1 (Quaracchi, 1916) I, p. 307.

II

UTRUM AD DISTINCTAM COGNITIONEM QUAM HABET DEUS AB AETERNO DE REBUS CREABILIBUS REQUIRANTUR IN EO DISTINCTAE RATIONES COGNOSCENDI, PER QUAS COGNOSCIT IPSAS RES CREABILES

Quaestio ordinaria tertia fuit ista: Utrum ad distinctam cognitionem quam habet Deus ab aeterno de rebus creabilibus requirantur in eo distinctae rationes cognoscendi, per quas cognoscit ipsas res creabiles.

Quod sic, arguebatur principaliter. Primo sic: Omnis cognitio praesupponit rationem per quam cognoscit. Ergo distincta cognitio praesupponit in cognoscente distinctam rationem per quam distincte cognoscit. Antecedens videtur satis manifestum. Consequentia probatur per locum a proportione; quia sicut cognitio ad cognoscentem, ita distincta cognitio ad distincte cognoscentem.

Secundo sic: Per medium universale non potest haberi cognitio distincta. Hoc patet, quia universale non movet intellectum nisi mediante aliqua apprehensione particulari. Sed essentia divina sub unica ratione tantum est universale medium cognoscendi. Ergo per eam, ut sic, non habetur distincta ratio cognoscendi.

In contrarium arguebatur, quia non minoris potentiae est essentia divina in repraesentando quam intellectus divinus in intelligendo. Sed intellectus divinus unico actu simplicissimo sufficienter cognoscit omnia. Ergo essentia divina sub una ratione simplicissima divinae essentiae est sufficiens ratio cognoscendi et repraesentandi omnia.

Quaestio ista de ideis, eo quod secundum beatum Augustinum est maxime intellectualis, maximam habet difficultatem. Quapropter secundum beatum Augustinum, *De 83 Quaestionibus*, q. 46[1], loquens de ideis, dicit quod "multis conceditur appellare ideas quod libet, sed paucissimis videre quod verum est." Unde quod ibidem in eodem capitulo: "Ideas," inquit,[2] "interim videre posse negatur anima, nisi rationalis, ea sui parte qua excellit, id est ipsa mente atque ratione. Et ea quidem ipsa anima rationalis non omnis et quaelibet,[3] sed quae sancta et pura fuerit, haec asseritur illi visioni esse idonea, quarum visione fit beatissima."

Quia tamen ratio cognoscendi in Deo a sanctis et doctoribus communiter ponatur ratio idealis, ideo juxta tenuitatem intellectus mei primo videndum est quid sit idea; secundo de necessitate earum; tertio ad quaestionem.

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Circa primum, videlicet circa quidditatem idearum, considerandum est quod, secundum aliquos,[4] ad hoc quod intellectus noster intelligat res extra, requiritur species in intellectu, quae sit similitudo et forma rei intelligibilis; ita ad hoc quod Deus intelligat creabilia, requiruntur in eo ideae, quae sunt formae et similitudines rerum vel species, mediantibus quibus Deus intelligit res extra vel creabilia. Et secundum istos idea est aliquid simplex, ut forma. Unde secundum Platonem, qui primo instituit ideas, idea dicitur ab *idos* graece, quod est forma vel species latine, "ut verbum e verbo transferre videamur," secundum beatum Augustinum, ubi supra.[5] Ubi de ideis loquens, "Ideas", inquit,[6] "latine sermone formas vocare possumus, quas rationes licet appellare." Forma autem ve lspecies duplex est: vel ut natura, vel ut ratio, secundum quod duplex est genus principii rerum, scilicet natura et intellectus, secundum Philosophum II *Physicorum.*[7] Idea autem forma est ut[8] ratio, non ut natura. "Si eas," inquit,[9] "rationes vocemus, ab interpretandi quidem proprietate discedimus; rationes enim graece *logoi*[10] appellantur, latine non ideae. Si tamen quisque hoc vocabulo uti voluerit, a re ipsa non abhorrebit."[11] Ait ergo,[12] "Sunt namque ideae principales formae et rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac[13] semper eodem modo se habentes, quae <in> divina intelligentia continentur; et cum ipsae neque oriantur neque occidant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur interit, quarum visione anima sit beatissima. Et has rationes principales Plato vocat ideas." Et huic concordat Macrobius *De Somnio Scipionis.*[14] "Mentem," inquit, "divinam originales rerum species quae ideae dictae sunt continentem."

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[1] PL 40, 31.

[2] Ibid. 30. The edition reads: "Anima vero negatur eas intueri posse nisi rationalis..."

[3] Ms. qualibet.

[4] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, 15, 1; ed. Leonine (Rome, 1888) IV, pp. 199-201.

Supponendo quod definitio beati Augustini de idea vel descriptio vel vocificatio vel quomodocumque vocetur, sit talis quod per eam quidditas definiri cognoscatur et ab ea removeantur opposita, considerandum est quod primum quod explicatur in hac definitione beati Augustini est quod ideae sunt quia sunt formae rerum principales et rationes earum stabiles. Et ideo necesse est eas ponere, quia nihil potest esse sine ratione sua principali. Unde beatus Augustinus ubi supra,[15] "Quis autem religiosus et vera religione imbutus, quamvis hoc nondum possit intueri, negare tamen audeat, immo non profiteatur omnia quae sunt, id est quaecumque in suo genere propria quadam natura continentur, ut sint, auctore Deo esse procreata, eodemque auctore omnia quae vivunt vivere, atque universalem rerum incolumitatem, ordinemque ipsum quo ea quae mutantur, suos temporales cursus certo moderamine celebrant, summi Dei[16] legibus contineri et gubernari? Quo constituto atque concesso, quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse? Quod si dici recte vel credi non potest, restat ut omnia ratione sint condita. Nec eadem ratione homo qua[17] equus: hoc enim absurdum est aestimari.[18] Singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus." Oportet igitur quod Deus habeat proprias (188r) rationes ipsarum.

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[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid. 31.

[7] 192b 8-32.

[8] Ms. nec.

[9] Ibid. 30.

[10] Ms. logos.

[11] Edition has "aberrabit," with the note that most mss read "abhorrebit."

[12] Ibid. 30, 31.

[13] Ms. hac.

[14] Macrobias, *Commentaria in Somnium Scipionis* I, II, 14; ed. F. Eyssenhardt (Leipzig, 1893) p. 482, lines 12-14.

[15] Ibid. 30.

[16] Ms. dicti.

Secundum quod explicatur in praedicta definitione est quales sunt, quia ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae, in quo distinguuntur a rationibus seminalibus, quae conformantur rebus. In quo et, ut videtur, repellitur opinio dicentium quod ad ideam requiritur proportio creaturae ad ipsam, ita quod idea dicit respectum ex parte creaturae, non ex parte essentiae divinae; sed ipsa essentia divina est ratio repraesentandi omnia, sive ut distincta sive non. Unde imitabilitates istae se tenent ex parte creaturae, ita quod prius Deus intelligat essentiam creaturae quam rationem idealem. Unde primo ordine objectorum, non ordine intellectionis, Deus intelligit essentiam suam absolute. Secundo intelligit eam ut continet omnia. Tertio intelligit eam secundum determinatas proportiones rerum creatarum ad ipsam, secundum quam una res magis imitabilis ab illis, ita quod diversitas ex parte creaturae realiter est, secundum rationem in Deo.

Ista positio deficit. Primo quidem quia omnis creatura formabilis est, vel formata et variabilis; idea autem nec formabilis, nec formata, nec variabilis. Immo sunt "formae rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae et semper eodem modo se habentes."[19]

Secundo, quia respectus creaturarum non pertinent formaliter ad ideam intrinsece, nam respectus creaturae variatur secundum actum et potentiam. Actus et potentia sunt omnium creaturarum, nam actus et potentia evacuant totam naturam entis creati. Ideae autem sunt omnino invariabiles, ut dictum est.

Tertio, quod ideae sunt rationes causales respectu creaturarum; non solum id quod materiale est in eis sed secundum formale, quod est respectus. Sed respectus creaturae non est causa formalis respectu suae cognitionis neque productionis. Ergo etc.

Quarto, quia sic dicentes nimis mensurant Deum per creaturas. Nos enim, quia intellectus noster passivus est, secundum Philosophum III *De Anima*,[20] procedimus in intelligendo de potentia ad actum mediante aliquo activo. Et ideo intelligimus primo aliquid extra quod est causa nostrae cognitionis. Deus vero actus purus est, nec[21] sic procedit de potentia ad actum in intelligendo ut primo cognoscat aliquid extra, ita quod cognoscendo proportiones creaturarum ad eum, eas habeat in se. Immo e converso magis, quia enim in se habet tales proportiones creaturarum, eas causaliter producit.

Tertium quod explicatur in praedicta definitione est ubi sunt istae ideae, quia in divina intelligentia continentur. Unde beatus Augustinus ubi supra:[22] "Has autem rationes ubi esse arbitrandum est, nisi in ipsa mente Creatoris? Non enim quidquam extra se positum intuebatur, ut <secundum> illud constitueret quod constituebat; hoc enim opinari sacrilegum est." Deus enim virtualiter continet omnia, et naturae suae necessitate simul omnia intelligens. Et ideo necesse est rationes quibus intelligit in se esse.

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[17] Ms. quam.

[18] Ms. existimari.

[19] St. Augustine, ibid. 30.

[20] 429b 30-430 a 9.

[21] Ms. ut.

[22] St. Augustine, ibid. 30.

Et advertite quam significanter dicit beatus Augustinus quod praedictae rationes ideales continentur in divina intelligentia et non in divina essentia, licet idem sint essentia divina et ejus intelligentia, quia essentia et intelligentia, licet sint idem realiter, differunt tamen multiplici connotatione. Primo quidem, quia ea quae in essentia sunt distinctionem non habent, nec habere possunt; in intelligentia vero possunt esse plura ut plura sine imperfectione. Secundo, quia in essentia divina intelligibilia[23] sunt aliqua secundum rationem dicta. Sicut enim in Deo secundum esse reale omnia transeunt in unitatem et identitatem realem, sic in eo secundum esse intelligibile vel rationis omnia transeunt in pluralitatem et distinctionem. Propter quod dicit beatus Augustinus,[24] "Has autem rationes ubi esse arbitrandum est," etc. Et accipit mentem pro intelligentia.

Per hoc autem quod additur[25] in fine istius definitionis, quod visione istarum idearum anima fit beatissima, excluditur positio dicentium[26] ideam nihil aliud esse quam essentiam creaturae constitutam a Deo in esse intelligibili per divinum intellectum,[27] ita quod ideae sunt ipsamet objecta cognita ab intellectu divino in quantum cognita, et illa objecta sunt similiter ratio causandi ipsas res in esse reali extra animam. Nam secundum Aristotelem VII *Metaphysicae*,[28] omnia quodammodo fiunt ab univoca. Unde arca in re extra fit quodammodo ab eadem arca prout habet esse cognitum in mente artificis; et illa est idea arcae. "Ab arte," inquit Philosophus,[29] "fiunt, quorum species in anima; speciem autem dicit[30] substantiam et quod quid erat esse." Et idea isto modo sumpta non differt ab ideato realiter, sed est quod quid est ideati; alioquin iste artifex, prout haberet ideam artificiati in se, ipsam rem artificiatam secundum se non cognosceret sed aliquid aliud, et per consequens per illud quod cognosceret de re non produceret rem in esse, juxta illud beati Augustini *Super Johannem*, sermone primo,[31] "Faber cum facit arcam primo in arte habet arcam. Si enim in arte arcam non haberet, non haberet unde illam fabricando proferret."

Non est tamen intelligendum quod ars in anima sit quod[32] quid erat esse artificiati ut est[33] res naturae in genere entis, cum sit accidens in genere qualitatis, sed prout est res in genere intelligibilis, quia in ipsa arte objective relucet quidditas artificiati. Nec aliud praetendit verba Augustini, nec aliqua veritas isti repugnat. Ad hoc est Boethius *De Trinitate*, cap. 3.[34] "Ex his," inquit, "formis quae praeter materiam sunt, istae formae venerunt quae sunt in materia et corpus efficiunt; nam ceteras quae in corporibus sunt abutimur, formas vocantes, dum imagines sunt; assimilantur enim formis his quae in materia non sunt constitutae." Unde in quodam commento dicitur sic:[35] "Quemadmodum cera subjecta sigillo non formam recipit sed imaginem, ita nec nos formas vere habemus sed imagines; imago enim est similitudo quae aliunde deducitur." Eodem modo humanitas in materia est imago humanitatis in mente divina, et hominis forma in materia a forma hominis in mente divina, sicut forma domus in materia a forma domus in anima. Quidditates igitur creaturarum cognitae a Deo ab aeterno sunt ideae et rationes cognoscendi rerum extra, ita quod ipsum intelligere sit ipsum producere.

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[23] Ms. intelligentia.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid. 31.

[26] Duns Scotus, *Opus Oxon.* I, 35, 1, n. 10, 12-15 (Paris, 1893) X, pp. 548-9, 554-5. *Repor. Paris.* I, 36, 2, n. 31-4; XXII, pp. 444-5.

[27] Ms. intelligunt.

[28] 1034a 22.

[29] 1032a 32.

[30] Aristotle's text reads "dico."

[31] *In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus CXXIV*, I, 1, n. 17; PL 35, 1387.

[32] Ms. quid.

[33] Ms. cum.

[34] PL 64, 1250 D.

Sed si sic dicentes loquantur de idea prout communiter loquuntur doctores de ea, ista positio stare non potest. Primo quidem quod secundum Lincolniensem, capitulo quinto *De Divinis Nominibus*,[36] "Ideae sunt rationes aeternae distinctivae et factivae omnium rerum ad earum imitationem fiendarum; quae cum non sint aliud a Deo, ipsae sunt adorandae; sed non essent adorandae nisi essent idem quod essentia divina." Secundo, quia beatus Augustinus dicit[37] quod ipsarum visione anima fit beatissima; quod non esset nisi essent idem quod essentia. Tertio, quia nec intelligere est producere, ut alias in *Quaestione* latius dictum est,[38] quia nec intellectio est terminus productionis; etiam in creaturis cognitio non est terminus productionis. Cum enim motus non sit motus, nec mutationis mutatio secundum Philosophum,[39] intellectio non est productio formaliter licet concomitetur. Similiter in divinis intelligere non est producere.

Dices: omne realiter contentivum aliquorum, quorum naturam ipse est productivum non naturae necessitate sed libere, prius producit illa in re in esse intelligibili quam in re extra. Deus est hujusmodi; ergo etc. (188v).

Item, Johannes 1 dicitur,[40] *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt.* Sic videntur omnia in ipso facta, quia sibi omnia communicantur non secundum esse naturale; igitur secundum esse intellectuale.

Ad primum. Propositio illa falsa quae assumitur. Verum est quod nihil producit nisi quod praeintelligit, sed illa intellectio non est productio, nec intellectum productum proprie loquendo, quia productio proprie est ad aliquod reale esse distinctum. Sed creaturae, ut intellectae a Deo ab aeterno, non habent distinctum esse a Deo.

Ad aliud. Prima productio est Verbi et in illo, quia alia simul producta ideo facta dici possunt, non tamen proprie.

Quaeritur: cum beatus Augustinus videtur innuere essentiam divinam et quidditates rerum intellectas a Deo ab aeterno habere essentiam ideae (cum enim Philosophus increpet[41] Platonem ponendo ideas esse quidditates separatas, et beatus Augustinus eum ex hoc commendet,)[42] videtur secundum mentem beati Augustini quod quidditates intellectae sint ideae. Multa etiam attribuit ideis, ut quod sunt factrices, quod eis anima sit beata, etc.,[43] quae non possunt convenire nisi essentiae divinae. Ideo distinguendum est quod idea potest accipi principaliter aut minus principaliter; quidditas secundo modo dicitur idea. Quod probatur ex hoc, quia quando aliquid convenit duobus et non ex aequo, convenit uni principaliter et altero minus principaliter vel secundario. Sed esse ideam convenit essentiae divinae et quidditatibus rerum intellectis a Deo ab aeterno et non aequo, quia nihil potest ex aequo convenire Deo et creaturae. Igitur esse ideam convenit principaliter essentiae divinae et creaturae minus principaliter.

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[35] John Scotus Erigena, *Commentum Boethii de Trinitate*, ed. E. K. Rand, *Johannes Scottus* (Munich, 1906) p. 37, lines 30-1; p. 38, line 7. The authenticity of this work has not been established. See E. K. Rand, "The supposed Commentary of John the Scot on the 'Opuscula Sacra' of Boethius", *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* 36 (1934) 67-77.

[36] Ms. Vat. Chigi A.V. 129, fol. 349va (new numbering).

[37] *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*, q. 46; PL 40, 31.

[38] See infra, pp. 190-1.

[39] *Physics* V, 2, 225b 15; *Metaph.* XI, 11, 1068a 15.

[40] John I, 3.

Ex his quae dicuntur apparere potest quodammodo quid sunt ideae, quia non sunt aliqua perfectio absoluta tantum. Si enim idea sit ratio, juxta quam vel secundum quam fit omne quod fit, oportet ipsam ideam repraesentare ipsum factibile secundum omnem rationem factibilis. Cum igitur determinatus gradus essendi pertineat ad factibile secundum quod factibile, si secundum ideam Deus faciat rem limitatam, quae quidem limitatio in absoluta ratione essentiae cadere non potest, manifestum est quod idea non poterit esse tantum essentia; nec potest esse nudus respectus, tum quia respectus soli formae principales esse non possunt, tum quia respectus non potest esse principium cognitionis neque productionis. Ergo idea includit essentiam cum respectu. Et istud tenetur communius.[44]

Propter quod dicunt alii quod idea dicit quid compositum rationis; et cum illis magis teneo quam cum illis qui dicunt quod sit forma vel species tantum.

Sed isti diversificantur, nam quidam dicunt quod idea constituitur ex essentia divina ut materiali, <et ex> quodam <respectu> rationis ad creaturas ut formali. Alii dicunt quod est quid compositum rationis ex utroque latere, ita quod tam formale quam materiale in idea est ens rationis. Dicunt enim quod essentia divina, non ut essentia absolute sed ut intellecta, fundamentum est respectus idealis. Essentia autem intellecta ens rationis est. Essentia igitur, secundum istos, intellecta non quocumque modo sed intellecta ut imitabilis sub determinato gradu perfectionis, est idea, ita quod essentia est fundamentum remotum istius respectus idealis sed imitabilitas proximum.

Sed cum ideae, secundum doctores et sanctos,[45] communiter ponantur propter cognitionem et productionem, cum etiam nullus respectus Dei ad creaturam sit prior respectu ideali, quis sit iste respectus primus qui est de formali constitutione ideae et primus quo Deus respicit creaturam, dubium est. Cum enim secundum communiter loquentes[46] duplex distinguatur idea, scilicet speculativa et practica, ad perfectam rationem ideae concurrit respectus similis, et est originalis; secundo respectus repraesentativi, et pertinet ad ideam ut speculativa est. Respectus vero imitativitatis et exemplaritatis et productivi pertinent ad rationem ideae practicae, si qua sit. Ut autem respectus iste habet rationem similis et repraesentativi convenit cum primo genere relationis sed longe; ut autem induit respectum imitabilis et exemplaris convenit cum ultimo genere relationis, quod est modo mensurae. Sed ut induit respectum productivi, convenit cum secundo modo, qui est modo potentiae. Quod autem respectus productivi non pertineat ad ideam speculativam patet per Philosophum III *De Anima*,[47] ubi dicit quod intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de agibili vel fugibili.

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[41] *Metaph.* I, 9, 990a 33-993a 10.

[42] See St. Augustine, ibid, 29, 30; *De Civitate Dei* VII, 28; PL 41, 218.

[43] *De Diversis Quaest. 83*, q. 46; PL 40, 30, 31.

[44] See St. Albert, *Sent.* I, 35, E. 7; ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1893) XXVI, pp. 189-192; 9, pp. 192-5. St. Bonaventure, *Sent.* I, 35, 1, 3 (Quaracchi, 1882) I, p. 608. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, 15, 2; IV, pp. 201-2; *De Veritate* 3, 2; I, pp. 64-7. Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* V, 3 (Paris, 1518), fol. 155v; *Quodl.* IX, 2, fols. 344-347v; *Summa Quaestionum* 68,5 (Paris, 1520) fols. 229v-234v. Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* IV, 1; ed. M. de Wulf and A. Pelzer *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines* (Louvain, 1904) pp. 229-233. Richard of Mediavilla, *Sent.* I, 36, 2, 2-3 (Brescia, 1591) I, pp. 312-5. Giles of Rome, *Sent.* I, 36, 2, 2 (Venice, 1521), fols. 187v-188r. Thomas of Sutton, *Quodl.* IV, 4, Ms Merton College, Oxford 138, fols. 212v-213r.

[45] See St. Augustine, *De Diversis Quaest. 83*, q. 46; PL 40, 30, 31. Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* 5; *Dionysiaca*, ed. P. Chevallier (Paris, 1937) I, pp. 360-1. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, 15, 1; IV, pp. 199-201.

Sed utrum respectus productivi sit prior idea practica respectu imitabilitatis vel similis, dubium est. Quibusdam videtur quod iste respectus primus non potest esse respectus similis, quia similitudo aequaliter denominat utrumque extremum. Propter quod si unum extremum est in actu, et aliud. Sed manifestum est quod aliquis est respectus Dei ad creaturam antequam creatura actualiter existat. Ergo etc. Secundo, quod[48] respectus imitabilitatis non constituat ideam videtur, quia imitati correspondet imitativitas; imitativitas autem duo dicit, scilicet esse ab alio et esse simile altero. Quod autem imitativitas dicat esse ab alio patet, quia quod a nullo est nihil imitatur, et nullo modo posset dici imago, licet posset dici simile. Ideo Pater in divinis non dicitur imitans Filium, nec ejus imago, sed e converso; dicitur tamen ei similis, licet forte non proprie. Secundum patet, scilicet quod imitativitas dicit esse simile altero, nam licet stamnum sit a potentia agentis, non dicitur imitari potentiam agentis propter ejus dissimilitudinem, sed tantum formam agentis propter ejus similitudinem.

Sed inter esse simile et esse ab alio est ordo, quia esse ab alio est primum, esse simile secundum. Cum enim actio in creaturis non terminetur ad respectum sed ad absolutum (respectus enim actionem consequitur, quia primo est actio sicut via, secundo natura sive forma sicut terminus viae, tertio respectus sicut proprietas consequens) ens igitur primo convenit creaturae,[49] actioni illi primo convenit terminare respectum ideae. Sed esse simile praesupponit naturam, et per consequens praesupponit esse ab alio sicut ipsa natura est ab alio; non enim est natura nisi quia est ab alio. Ergo prius est esse productum naturaliter quam esse simile. Natura enim imitans nec est, nec similis est, nisi per productionem. Ergo necessario res imitans praesupponit rationem[50] principii productivi ipso imitato. Sicut enim esse simile in imitante praesupponit esse productum in eodem, sic esse simile in imitato praesupponit rationem effectivi principii in eodem. Quare cum eadem natura sit producta et similis, prior erit ratio productiva quam ratio similis. Et sic ratio principii productivi erit prior quam ratio imitabilitatis.

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[46] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, 15, 3; IV, p. 204.

[47] 432b 27.

[48] Ms. quia.

[49] Ms.? The meaning of this sentence is obscure.

[50] Ms. rem.

Tertio, quod ratio exemplaris non constituit <ideam> videtur, quia de ratione formae exemplaris est quod sit[51] illud ad cujus imitationem[52] fit aliud ab intellectualiter operante; et de ratione ejus est respectus similis et aliquo modo factio, non quaelibet sed intellectualis. Quantumcumque enim intellectualiter operans intelligat aliquid[53] quod sit simile illi quod intendit facere, nisi attendat facere simile illi non est forma exemplaris in actu sed solum[54] in potentia, prout accipi potest, ut juxta illud aliquid fiat. Ut si artifex videat unam domum in Francia, aliam sibi similem in Anglia, prioris domus oblitus est, et faciat domum non oblitam; tunc illa domus erit exemplar domus factae, non autem domus oblita; et tamen est ei aequaliter similis. Intentio igitur faciendi est ratio formalis constitutiva formae exemplaris, sicut respectus constituit ideam; et sic addit ratio exemplaris super rationem similis intentionem operandi.

Talis ergo erit ordo, quod primo (189r) est idea, secundo ratio imitabilis, tertio exemplar; ita quod ratio ideae et imitabilis magis pertineant ad ideam speculativam, exemplar autem ad rationem practicam propter intentionem ad opus. Et istud est intelligendum de exemplari in actu. Unde exemplar est proprie productorum, sed idea et imitabilitas potest esse non productorum.

Ad hoc sunt auctoritates. Primo beati Dionysii quinto capitulo *De Divinis Nominibus*,[55] ubi vocat ideas rationes substantificas, praedeterminativas, et effectivas, secundum quas supersubstantialis essentia omnia praedefinivit et produxit. Secundo, ad hoc est auctoritas Senecae, *Epistola 68*,[56] ubi, definiens ideam, dicit quod idea est ad quam "respiciens artifex, quod destinabat, effecit."

Sed videtur mihi quod ratio principii productivi sequitur rationem similis in idea practica. Et hoc potest probari primo in generatione naturali. Agens enim naturale non agit nisi ut praehabet in se similitudinem passivi formaliter vel virtualiter; est enim tale in actu, quale passivum in potentia. Sed passivum ad nihil aliud est in potentia nisi ut assimiletur activo, nec agens agit nisi ut passivum sibi assimilet. Et cum non agat nisi prout est in actu, sequitur quod intentio assimilandi prior est intentione producendi, sicut agens a proposito prius habet in se similitudinem producti quam producat, quia potest numquam producere, sed non potest quin forma sua sit similis et ab alio imitabilis. Similiter agens naturale prius habet in se similitudinem producti, ut productum est, quam producat. Non ergo quia productum ideo assimilatum, sed e converso, quia assimilatum ideo productum.

Dices quod respectus producti non est respectus producentis, sicut nec respectus generati est respectus generantis. Ratio autem procedit de respectu producentis; ideo non valet.

Contra. Sicut producens sonat in actum producendi, sic productum sonat quod potentia potest producere. Sicut igitur in agente a proposito potentia activa non procedit in actum nisi a forma praeconcepta a producente, quae prius habet rationem similis vel imitabilis, ergo similiter in producto[57] respectus similis erit prior.

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[51] Ms. sicut.

[52] Ms. imitatur?

[53] Ms. aliquis.

[54] Ms. unde.

[55] *Dionysiaca* I, pp. 360-1.

[56] *Seneca ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales* 65; ed. R. M. Gummere (London, 1925) I, p. 448.

Secundo, hoc idem patet in productione artificiali. Intendit enim artifex causare in materia extra rem similem conceptui in mente sua. Et ideo aliquid producit simile in materia quia habet simile in mente, non autem e converso. Non autem poterit habere rationem productivi artificialiter nisi reguletur a forma praeconcepta ut est similis formae producendae.

Tertio, hoc idem patet in generatione naturali spirituali. Species enim in anima habet rationem similis et rationem repraesentantis; et prius quidem habet rationem similis quam repraesentantis. Licet enim prius inhaereat quam repraesentet in comparatione ad intellectum, hoc est propter ejus imperfectionem. Si enim esset forma subsistens, tunc repraesentaret et non inhaereret. Nec est simile quia repraesentat sed e converso. Omne enim repraesentativum est simile, non tamen e converso; sicut patet de ovo, quod est simile, non tamen ipsum repraesentat. Cum ergo illa species sit quodammodo intellectui ratio agendi, ratio similis erit prior.

Sed dices: productum est prius productum quam sit simile; ergo prior est ratio productivi quam ratio similis. Dici potest quod verum est quod productum prius est productum quam sit productum simile, tamen in producente prior est ratio similis quam productivi, et prius intendit simile quam producere, quia non intendit producere nisi ut assimilet. Quod autem est primum in intentione est ultimum in executione.

Quarto, quia idea habet duplicem faciem: unam ad producentem, secundum quam dicitur exemplar; aliam ad rem fiendam, secundum quam dicitur simile. Cum igitur in Deo ponantur ideae magis ut juxta eas res producat quam ut ad eas respiciat in producendo, respectus similis erit prior respectu productivi.

Quinto, sic: Illud non est de formali constitutione alicujus quod aliquando praecedit constitutum et aliquando sequitur, quia[58] causa in actu et effectus in actu simul sunt, II *Physicorum*.[59] Sed productivitas quandoque praecedit ideam et quandoque non, ut inferius dicetur.[60] Ergo etc.

Dices: intellectus practicus habet operabile pro objecto, speculativus non. Nihil enim dicit de agibili et fugibili secundum Philosophum III *De Anima*, ut superius allegatum.[61] Igitur respectus productivi est prior respectu similis.

Dici potest quod operabile potest esse objectum practici intellectus et speculativi indifferenter; nec ex objecto habet intellectus quod sit practicus vel etiam habitus sed aliunde, ut inferius in alia *Quaestione* dicetur amplius.

Ad aliam rationem de similitudine, cum dicitur quod similitudo <est> consequens rem productam et hoc praesupponit utrumque extremum in actu — alia est similitudo concepta in mente alicujus respectu alicujus fiendi, et haec praecedit rem productam, et non praesupponit utrumque extremum in actu, cujus similitudo est idea.

Ad secundum, cum dicitur imitativitas non dicit esse ab alio sed possibilitatem essendi ab alio — et tamen ratio imitabilitatis prior est quam ratio pro-

[57] Ms. productio.

[58] Ms. quod.

[59] 195b 18.

[60] Infra, pp. 190-1.

[61] Supra, note 47.

ductivitatis; non enim producit nisi quia imitabile; potest tamen esse imitabile et non producere; immo etsi numquam producat.

Per haec ad alia. Quia ad auctoritatem Senecae et Lincolniensis, dicendum quod propter factionem non dicitur aliquid practicum, ut inferius dicetur in alia *Quaestione*.

Ad illud de exemplaritate dici potest quod ratio exemplaris non constituit formaliter ideam, licet quidam videantur dicere quod praecedat rationem ideae, quia ratio exemplaris posterior est quam idea; quia non quodlibet exemplar est idea, sed est exemplar intra licet ad extra. Ergo addit super rationem ideae, et per consequens posterior est ea, quia omne se habens per additionem ad aliud principalius est eo. Nullum autem posterius est de ratione formali constitutiva prioris. Secundo, quia idea solum invenitur in natura intellectuali; ratio vero exemplaris invenitur in carentibus ratione; sicut oves Jacobi, aspicientes virgas varias tamquam exemplares, conceperunt fetus varios sicut et virgae variae fuerunt, a quibus talia exemplaria contraxerunt.[62]

Sic igitur patet quod ratio imitabilis facit respectum ideae, ex quo cum essentia sit unum compositum rationis suppositive secundum aliquos, ita quod respectus idem qui est in essentia ut imitabilis, nec in fundamento, constituat aliquid unum cum eo suppositive, sicut ex potentia et actu fit unum.

Alius doctor dicit quod idea dicit quiddam unum compositum objective. Et ponit ad hoc exemplum. Nam scientia in intellectu denominat scientem et scitum ipsum sed diversimode. Nam scientem denominat efficienter et non formaliter, sed rem scitam formaliter denominat. Scientia autem et respectus scientiae subjective est in sciente secundum ipsum, et non in re scita. Et ideo non constituit unum suppositive cum re scita. Quia ad hoc quod constituat unum cum aliquo suppositive, oportet quod sit unum cum eo subjective, quia cum rem scitam denominat, oportet quod constituat unum cum ea. Sed hoc erit tantum objective, non subjective; ita quod ex re extra et respectu scientiae constituatur unum non formaliter, nec ex materia et forma, vel accidente et subjecto, sed tantum objective; et est iste respectus subjective in intellectu et in objecto objective; sicut si habeam fidem de Christo, fides est in Christo objective et in me (189v) subjective.

Sed quod idea dicat quid compositum rationis objective, ita quod respectus iste idealis sit quid subjective in intellectu, et ipsa essentia, quae materialis est, sit extra intellectum, non videtur verisimile. Nam quando aliqua referuntur ad invicem, licet fuerit possibile quod respectus quo unum ad aliud refertur possit esse in uno tantum vel in alio tantum, sicut secundum aliquos[63] <respectus> scientiae ad scibile est tantum in sciente, tamen quod respectus iste sit in neutro relatorum sed in aliquo tertio non videtur verisimile; nec est ita quod idea refertur ad ideale, ita quod si idea sit essentia imitabilis, refertur ad creaturam et non ad essentiam. Igitur cum iste respectus non sit subjective in idea, nec in re ipsa extra sed in essentia divina, non potest per illud ad aliud referri.

Sed dicit quod non est inconveniens respectum quo aliquid refertur ad alterum esse in neutro relatorum sed in aliquo tertio, quemadmodum scientia refertur ad scibile, et tamen respectus scientiae non est in scibili subjective neque in scientia sed in sciente, et tamen scientia refertur ad scibile.

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[62] See *Genesis* 30, 37-42.

[63] St. Thomas, *De Veritate* I, 5, ad 16m; I, p. 13.

Sed contra. Scientia proprie non refertur ad scibile, quia absolutum quiddam est; est enim qualitas quaedam absoluta. Unde non refertur ad scibile sicut nec respectus ad referibile, sed sciens mediante scientia refertur ad scibile, quod tamen non accipit scientia. Dato quod scientia proprie referetur ad scibile, adhuc non haberet propositum. Quia respectus ille scientiae non distinguitur subjective a scientia, quia iste respectus est in sciente sicut et scientia; sed respectus idealis non est in ideali nec in idea subjective secundum ipsum, nec <in> intelligentia quae est materiale sed in intellectu divino. Et ita, ut videtur, exemplum non est ad propositum.

Item, quod respectus <est> in uno et fundamentum respectus in alio subjective est contra Avicennam in *Metaphysica* sua, capitulo *De ad aliquid*,[64] et similiter II *Physicae* suae,[65] capitulo uno, ubi recitans opinionem de motu dicit sic, quod respectus motus ad moventem est dispositio motus et non moventis. Similiter respectus motus ad mobile est dispositio motus, et respectus e converso dispositio mobilis est, ita quod respectus non distinguitur subjective ab eo quod refertur.

Idem dicit in *Metaphysica* sua, capitulo *De ad aliquid*,[66] ubi dicit quod paternitas est in patre et non in filio. Dicit enim sic: Pater habet relationem quae est dispositio habens esse in solo patre. Si igitur habeat fundamentum, in eodem erit fundamentum et respectus subjective.

Item, nihil subjective distinctum ab alio formaliter denominat illud a quo subjective distinguitur. Quod tamen aliquid effective denominet illud a quo subjective distinguitur possibile est, ut sol est calidus. Respectus igitur ille idealis vel non constituet unum formaliter cum essentia, vel si sic, erit in ea subjective.

Dico igitur, distinguendo inter subjectum suppositive et existenter, sicut aliqui distinguunt, quod idea est in intellectu existendo, non tamen suppositive, ita quod intellectus referatur, sicut intentio logicalis quam format intellectus meus est in intellectu meo, et similiter relatio super ipsum fundata ; non tamen intellectus refertur ad speciem. Similiter nec essentia divina refertur propter respectum in ea fundatum, sed ipse Pater proprius refertur. Unde Pater est Deus per essentiam; sed est proprius Deus per notionem. Similiter idea fundatur super essentiam divinam ut ratio est. Ideo essentia ut intellecta idea est. Idea autem ratio est, quia ratio essentiae, ut ratio est, est de intellectu ideae. Unde et ratio propria idea est. Unde idea formaliter refertur et aggregat in se essentiam divinam, ut ratio est, et respectum qui est in intellectu existendo et in idea suppositive. Unde quot sunt ideae in Deo, tot sunt supposita rationis. Quod autem in aliquo sint plura supposita realia inconveniens est.

Ex quo apparet, ut videtur, quod non bene dicitur, quod dicunt aliqui, quod isti respectus sunt in intellectu divino subjective. Primo quidem quia idea est in intellectu divino sicut illud ad quod intellectus divinus intuetur ad constituendum res in esse existentiae. Unde, ut videtur, per hoc probat Augustinus *De 83 Quaestionibus*, q. 46,[67] rationes ideales esse in mente creatoris, quod non accipit hujusmodi rationes ab extra. "Non enim," inquit, "quidquam extra se positum intuetur, ut secundum illud constituat quidquid constituit; nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est." Igitur secundum ipsum, ut videtur, idea est forma exemplaris objecta divino intellectui, ad quam inspicit producendo res in esse existentiae extra, sicut forma domus in mente aedificatoris est aliquid objective ab eo intellectum, ad cujus[68] similitudinem format domum in materia.

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[64] Tract. III, 10 (Venice, 1508) fol. 83rC.

[65] Fol. 24vT.

[66] Ibid.

[67] PL 40, 30.

Secundo, quia si ideae erunt in divino intellectu quasi in subjecto, tunc intellectus divinus quasi informaretur distinctis imitabilibus quasi quibusdam conceptibus distinctis. Nullus enim actus informat intellectum, secundum quod intellectus est, nisi actus cognitionis; et ita pluralitas idearum in Deo non staret cum simplicitate divini conceptus.

Tertio, quia rationes ideales se tenent ex parte Verbi in divinis, dicente beato Augustino VI *De Trinitate*, capitulo ultimo:[69] "Verbum est ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei, plena omnium rationum viventium et incommutabilium." Ergo in Verbo Dei sunt istae rationes ideales. Verbum autem Dei conceptus quidam est in divina mente; conceptus quidem non inhaerens menti tanquam subjecto sed potius per se subsistens; et per consequens magis competit sibi esse objectivum respectu divini intellectus quam esse subjectivum.

Sed contra istud objicitur multipliciter. Nam secundum Augustinum[70] ideae sunt in mente divina et sunt aeternae. Aut ergo Augustinus accipit esse informative aut objective: non objective, quia multa non aeterna, ut corruptibilia, sunt objective in Deo; ergo accipit esse informative.

Item, quod est formaliter extra et objective non est "in" simpliciter sed "extra" simpliciter, ut patet de lapide in anima. Illud autem quod est formaliter "in," simpliciter est "in." Si igitur sunt "in" objective, non sunt simpliciter "in."

Ad primum istorum dici potest quod beatus Augustinus accipit ibi "in" objective. Et cum dicis multa non aeterna, ut corruptibilia, sunt objective in Deo, verum est; tamen ut cognita sunt, corruptibilia non sunt, quia ut sic ab aeterno fuerunt.

Ad secundum, cum dicitur quod est "in" objective non est "in" simpliciter, dici potest quod ista propositio in Deo, cujus intellectus est causa omnium rerum, falsa est, quia in intellectu suo multo verius sunt res quam in seipsis; in nobis vera est, ubi res sunt causae intellectionis.

2

Sic igitur dictum est quid sunt ideae et ubi. Sequitur videre de earum necessitate.

Circa quod sciendum quod, secundum aliquos,[71] ad hoc quod Deus omnia cognoscat distincte, non oportet ponere distinctas rationes cognoscendi in eo, eo quod essentia divina per se considerata est sufficiens ratio repraesentandi et se et omnia alia. Deus autem per essentiam suam intelligit omnia factibilia quia essentia sua tamquam supereminens continet omnia. In hac autem continentia supereminenti, a parte essentiae, nulla est omnino distinctio. Distinctio tamen est a parte objectorum cognitorum. Unde secundum istum imaginandum (190r) est quod in primo signo essentia divina, continens omnia, unitem se et omnia per unicam rationem, quae ipsa est, repraesentat intellectui. Sed in secundo signo, quando intellectus intelligit eam imitabilem sub hoc gradu certo ab hac creatura, et sub alio gradu ab alia, tunc incipit essentia primo habere rationam ideae et non prius, quia in primo signo intuetur essentiam suam, et intuendo eam intuetur omnia alia ab ea, quid sunt et quomodo fieri possunt, sed speculative tantum. Et quia non possunt fieri nisi inspiciendo, ideo inspicit ad essentiam et quales mensurae fuerint in ea, ut ad ejus imitationem faciat creatura, ut saltem fieri possit. Et istae mensurae in essentia divina non sunt nisi perfectiones principales et determinatae creaturarum, correspondentes rationibus perfectionalibus creaturarum quae sunt in Deo. Exemplari vero sicut inspecto, inspicitur ut finis, et tunc habet principium cognitionis practicae; nam finis in operabilibus est sicut principium in speculabilibus. Et quia iste finis est extra, ideo in ista intuitione idea est tantum objectum cognitum. Ultimo autem dirigitur in operando et applicat se ad opus, et in ista directione et applicatione idea est ratio cognoscendi; et in ista applicatione consistit idea formaliter et completive, quia sic est illud per quod fit quod fieri potest.

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[68] Ms. ejus.

[69] *De Trinitate* VI, 10, n. 11; PL 42, 931.

[70] *De Diversis Quaest. 83*, q. 46; PL 40, 30.

[71] A marginal note by a later hand appears to read: Parisius Quodlibet primum.

Exemplum ad hoc: Ecce aliquis carpentator habet artem aedificandi, et etiam habet apud se species plurium domorum aedificandarum. Quoniam autem cogitat quod bonum esset quod talis domus fieret, et tamen adhuc non disponit deliberata voluntate ad faciendum quod cogitat, talis quidem scientiam habet domus, sed quia habet eam sine notitia exsequendi quod scit, adhuc non habet ideam pro eo, quia utitur specie domus quam habet tantum speculative. Quando autem voluntas adest faciendi domum a materia et formare in mente sua determinate unum exemplar juxta quod vult producere, jam habet principium cognitionis practicae, quia illud exemplar adhuc tantum inspicitur ut finis. Postea vero, cum juxta illud exemplar applicat se ad opus, et in operando se dirigit, tunc primo habet ideam, quia in illa applicatione et directione consistit idea formaliter.

Unde et idea propriissime dicta nihil aliud est, secundum sic dicentes, quam forma exemplaris rei factibilis, in quantum factibilis est, intellecta et concepta a factore, qui ad ejus imitationem rem a materia facere proponit vel quam fieri posse videt, per cujus applicationem ad opus dirigitur in faciendo aliquid vel videndo quomodo fieri potest. Quod autem idea sit forma, patet per Augustinum *De 83 Quaestionibus*, q. 46:[72] "Ideas latine possumus formas dicere." Quod autem sit forma separata a re manifestum est, quia non dicimus quod forma rei in re sit forma exemplaris ejus, ut patet de anima in corpore. Iterum est forma exemplaris rei factibilis, scilicet rei producibilis per viam voluntatis ad differentiam rei naturalis. Nam artifex non habet ideam filii sui sicut arcae; sic nec in Deo Pater respectu Filii, rei inquam factibilis in quantum factibilis, quia nullus habet ideam domus quia scit domum definire, sed quia habet mensuram domus in quantum factibilis est concepta et intellecta non absolute, quia tunc omnis domus esset idea. Sed debet esse sic intellecta ut sit exemplar rei factibilis, ad cujus imitationem rem a materia facere proponit, ad differentiam ejus quod Deus videt multa, quae tamen non fient per ejus applicationem ad opus dirigitur in faciendo et videndo quomodo fieri potest. Et nisi ita esset, propria res non haberet propriam ideam.

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[72] PL 40, 30.

Ista descriptio patet per Augustinum *83 Quaestiones*, q. 46[73], quod idea est forma, pro prima conditione, quae in divina intelligentia continetur; non enim extra se aliquid positum intuetur ad faciendum, pro secundo conditione; secundum quas formari dicitur omne quod oritur vel interire potest, pro tertia conditione; et sequitur: restat ut omnia singulis rationibus condita sint, pro quarta conditione. Sic ergo patet quod artifex primo intelligit quid est domus; secundo ex hoc movetur ad agendum; et quia facere non potest nisi inspiciendo ad exemplar, ideo inspicit ad exemplar, cujus mensurae fuerit, ad faciendum domum ad ejus imitationem. Et tunc inspicitur exemplar ut finis solum, ut praedictum est. Et postquam sic inspexerit, jam habet rationem cognitionis practicae. Postea vero, si perseveret in voluntate faciendi et applicet se ad opus, et secundum illud exemplar dirigatur in operando, jam habet ideam. Unde secundum istos, non ponuntur ideae propter cognitionem, sed sufficit essentia sub ratione essentiae, sed tantum propter operationem.

Pro ista opinione sunt rationes multae probantes quod per solam essentiam omnia distincte repraesentantur, et quod non requiritur alia ratio distincta nisi illa tantum. Prima talis: Illud quod est imperfectionis in nobis non est Deo attribuendum. Sed imperfectionis in nobis est hoc, quod non possumus uno plura intelligere. Ergo hoc non debemus Deo attribuere, scilicet quod nec possit una ratione plura intelligere; immo magis oppositum, quod est perfectionis.

Item, quanto intellectus est majoris virtutis, tanto potest plura uno intelligere, quemadmodum acutus ingenio plura videt in uno principio quam obtusus. Sed Deus in infinitum excellit omnem perfectionem humanam et omnem intellectionem suam. Ergo sufficit ei una sola ratio.

Item, essentia divina continet unitive omnem perfectionem et omnem essentiam quantum ad perfectionem suam omnem. Sed illud quod continet potest repraesentare. Ergo potest repraesentare omnem perfectionem et omnem essentiam. Ergo non requiritur aliqua alia ratio repraesentativa nisi illa tantum.

Item, Commentator super decimam propositionem *De Causis*[74] dicit quod intelligentiae superiores per unam formam plura cognoscunt, et tamen inferiores non. Sed manifestum est quod Deus in infinitum plus excedit omnem cognitionem superioris intelligentiae quam intelligentia superior excedat <cognitionem> inferioris se. Ergo tantum sufficit una ratio.

Secundo, probatur quod ideae non sunt rationes per quas Deus cognoscit, quia ratio quare ponitur species rei in intellectu nostro tamquam ratio et principium intelligendi a parte potentiae est quia virtus nostra intellectiva est passiva et non activa. Propter quod oportet quod reducatur ad actum ad hoc quod agat, cum nihil agat nisi secundum quod est in actu. Sed intellectus divinus est actus purus, nullam habens potentialitatem; nec ex hoc quod est imitabilis a creatura aliquam recipit actualitatem nec perfectionem. Ergo non oportet ponere ideas tamquam rationes intelligendi.

Item, quando similitudo rei est illud per quod res intelligitur, tunc illud quod intelligitur per illam similitudinem potest esse, et est, primarium objectum intellectus, sicut cum intelligo per similitudinem lapidis lapidem, lapis est primarium objectum intellectus (190v) mei. Si igitur creatura intelligitur per suam ideam tamquam per rationem per quam, ergo creatura est primarium objectum intellectus divini; at hoc falsum.

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[73] Ibid.

[74] O. Bardenhewer, *Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift Ueber das reine Gute bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de Causis* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1882) pp. 173-4.

Item, si idea sit illud per quod Deus cognoscit, tamen sapientia et ars non plurificantur in divinis; ergo sicut est una ars et una sapientia, ergo et una idea tantum; quod falsum est.

Item, si Deus cognoscit per ideam, et hoc ut idea dicit essentiam divinam ut imitabilem a creatura, cum idea non sit imitabiliter relata ad creaturam, sic quidem respectus et cognitio respectus necessario praesupponit cognitionem utriusque extremi. Ergo idea necessario praesupponit cognitionem essentiae divinae et etiam creaturae. Sed in illo priori creatura non cognoscitur a Deo per ideam, cum idea sequatur ejus cognitionem praesuppositam. Igitur sine omni idea cognoscit. Ad hoc est Dionysius *De Divinis Nominibus*, cap. 7:[75] "Deus non est secundum speciem singulam contemplans", ubi habet translationem Lincolniensis[76] "secundum ideam omnia contemplans." Et postea dicitur ibi,[77] "quod per divinam essentiam est omnia et sciens et continens."

Ista, licet bene dicantur, non tamen bene intelligo ea. Primo quidem quia omnis cognitio fit per assimilationem. Idem autem omnimode indistinctum non assimilatur contrariis. Ergo si Deus debeat contraria intelligere, oportet hoc esse secundum aliquam rationem distinctam.

Secundo, quia intellectus in actu per actum intelligendi est quodammodo ipsum intellectum, quemadmodum dicitur III *De Anima*,[78] quod intellectus[79] per intellectum est quodammodo omnia intelligibilia. Hoc etiam patet per Alpharabium *De Intellectu et Intelligibili*.[80] Si ergo creabilia fuerint[81] intelligibilia, et distincte intelligibilia et ab aeterno, ergo intellectus divinus fuit ab aeterno quodammodo haec distincta. Aut ergo fuerit omnino distincta per distinctum aut per indistinctum. Non per indistinctum quia hoc est oppositum in adjecto. Si fuit illa distincta per distinctum, habetur propositum.

Confirmatur, quia quando aliqua cognoscuntur in aliquo repraesentativo primo non cognoscuntur nisi eatenus quatenus repraesentantur intellectui cognoscenti mediante illo repraesentativo. Creabilia ergo, quae cognoscuntur ab intellectu divino distincte mediante essentia objective cognita, ut tu dicis, aut repraesentantur intellectui divino mediante essentia divina objective cognita distincte aut indistincte. Si indistincte (et non cognoscuntur nisi ut objiciuntur vel repraesentantur), ergo indistincte cognoscuntur; quod non dicis. Si distincte objiciuntur, et haec distinctio non est ex parte rerum, ergo est ex parte primi cogniti, scilicet essentiae.

Tertio, quia quod habet suam rationem in intellectu, per quam potest ab ipso intellectu distincte cognosci, tale potest esse primum objectum intelligibile, ut etiam ipsi assumunt. Si igitur essentia divina, ut est quasi forma divini intellectus, sit repraesentans creaturam tamquam ratio ducens intellectum divinum in distinctam cognitionem creaturarum, creatura est primum objectum divini intellectus; at hoc falsum. Nec istud repugnat divinae perfectionis, quemadmodum videntur dicere ponentes quod ideae sunt necesse propter cognitionem, non tamquam rationes per quas Deus cognoscit sed tamquam rationes in quibus cognoscit; nam illa ratio per quam Deus omnia cognoscit tantum est essentia divina. Si enim illa non sufficeret sed requirerentur aliae plures, aliquid imperfectionis esset in Deo, quod non est verum.

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[75] *Dionysiaca* (Paris, 1936) I, p. 398. Grosseteste's translation is: "secundum ideam singulis apponens."

[76] Ms. corrupt.

[77] Ibid.

[78] 431b 21.

[79] Ms. add. est.

[80] *Liber Alpharabii De Intellectu et Intellecto*; ed. E. Gilson, "Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant," *Archives d'histoire doct. et litt. du moyen âge* 4 (1929) 119, line 161.

[81] Ms. fuit.

Istud non concludit. Primo quidem quia illud quod consequitur naturam rei simplicis, in quantum simplex est, non repugnat perfectioni talis rei. Sed habere plures rationes in se consequitur naturam rei simplicis in quantum simplex. Ergo etc. Major videtur satis manifesta. Minor probatur per auctorem *De Causis*[82] decima et [decimaseptima propositione, ubi dicitur quod omnis virtus superior in plus est et plures habet ràtiones. Secundo, quia simplicissimum in genere quantitatis continuae, puta punctus, significanter habet plures rationes sub quibus intelligitur, vel saltem natum est intelligi in ordine ad diversas lineas in quantitatibus. Etiam <in> discretis unitas intelligitur in ordine ad plures numeros; nec hoc repugnat perfectioni et simplicitati puncti et unitatis, quod sic intelligantur in ordine ad plura et diversa. Nam si punctus et unitas intelligerent[83] se, oporteret ad perfectam cognitionem sui cognoscere omnes lineas sub rationibus illis quibus illas[84] nuntiat et terminat.[85] Ergo similiter in proposito non repugnat divinae simplicitati et perfectioni quod per essentiam divinam, cognitam sub diversis imitabilibus creaturarum, cognoscat Deus per eam creaturas diversas.

Nec valet quod dicunt, quod ideae requiruntur non propter speculationem sed propter productionem tantum. Primo quidem, quia non minoris simplicitatis est essentia divina, sub ratione qua est ipsi Deo ratio operandi, quam sub ratione qua est sibi ratio cognoscendi. Si vero est ratio operandi, non repugnat sibi quod sit in ea pluralitas rationum ut ideae. Ergo similiter nec repugnabit sibi ut est ratio cognoscendi talis pluralitas. Secundo, quia intellectus speculativus et practicus non differunt realiter secundum Philosophum.[86] Sive autem speculativus fiat practicus extensione ad opus, sicut communiter ponitur,[87] sive[88] quamvis alio modo, hoc tamen semper verum est, quod sunt idem intellectus realiter. Ergo eadem specie qua artifex cognoscit domum faciendam quando non vult operari, eadem specie utitur postea in operando. Non ergo requiritur quod in Deo sit aliqua nova ratio per quam producat alia a ratione per quam novit, sed sufficit quod illa ratio fiat practica aliquo modo. Cum igitur essentia, sub ratione essentiae, sit tantum ratio illa qua novit, sufficit ut sit illa qua producit. Et sic destrueretur idea; quod est contra beatum Augustinum, *De 83 Quaestionibus*, q. 46, ubi dicit:[89] "Tanta," inquit, "siquidem <in eis> vis constituitur, ut nisi eis intellectis[90] sapiens nemo esse possit." Ad hoc est auctoritas beati Augustini, libro primo *Retractationum*, cap. 3:[91] Plato, qui proprie "mundum intelligibilem nuncupavit ipsam rationem sempiternam atque incommutabilem, qua fecit Deus mundum. Quam qui esse negat, sequitur ut dicat, Deum irrationabiliter fecisse quod fecit; aut cum faceret, vel antequam faceret nescisse quid faceret, si apud eum ratio faciendi non erat. Si vero erat, sicut erat, ipsam videtur Plato vocasse mundum intelligibilem."

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[82] Ed. cit. props. 9 and 16; pp. 173, 174, 179.

[83] Ms. intelligent.

[84] Ms. illa.

[85] See Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* 5; *Dionysiaca* I, pp. 343-6. Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theol.* I, n. 166 (Quaracchi, 1924) I, p. 249. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, 14, 6; IV, p. 176.

[86] *De Anima* III, 10, 433a 14.

[87] See St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, 79, 11; V, pp. 278, 279; *De Veritate* 2, 8; I, pp. 44-5.

[88] Ms. sic.

3

Dico igitur ad articulum quaestionis quod ad distinctam cognitionem quam habet Deus ab aeterno de creabilibus requiruntur in eo distinctae rationes cognoscendi, quae vocantur ideae. Sed aliquid requiri<tur> ad distinctam cognitionem Dei quam habet de creabilibus neque sicut objectum actus, neque sicut ratio cognoscendi sed sicut sine quo non.[92]

Dico igitur quod in actibus intelligendi possumus intelligere quod primus actus ejus est quo cognoscit essentiam suam, et objectum istius actus est essentia sua, et principium intelligendi elicitivum est intellectus divinus. Sed de isto modo intelligendi (191r) non quaeritur, sed quaeritur de modo intelligendi ut species est principium intelligendi. Et si sic quaeratur quid est principium hujus actus, dico quod ipsamet essentia. Postea sequitur actus quo cognoscit essentiam suam esse intellectam. Et iste non est actus primus, quia praesupponit actum priorem. Iste autem actus, licet non sit conversivus, includit tamen conversionem in se. Et in isto actu essentia, ut intellecta, est objectum actus et ratio principii actus elicitivi.[93]

Dico et similiter: Cum <Deus> intelligit essentiam suam ut imitabilem, hoc totum "essentia intellecta ut imitabilis" habet rationem objecti et principii, ut prius. Sed essentia sic intellecta habet rationem fundamenti ipsius respectus idealis. Fundamentum vero prius est respectu. Sed utrum essentia, sic intellecta, sit fundamentum respectus ut habet rationem objecti vel ut est principium actus intelligendi, nescio. Credo tamen quod magis ut est objectum ad quod aspicitur; tamen considerando essentiam divinam ut imitabilem,[94] sive ut objectum sive ut principium, semper ratio fundamenti prior est ratione respectus. Et ideo Deus, considerando essentiam ut imitabilem, simul intelligit creaturam quam habeat ideam. Unde idea, secundum istum modum intelligendi, nec est objectum, nec ratio intelligendi quo cognoscit creaturam per se sed sicut sine quo non. Sicut enim existentibus duobus albis, ita quod, uno existente albo, nascatur alius albus, istum secundum album consequitur vel concomitur respectus ad album primum, ita essentiam intellectam, ut imitabilem, concomitur respectus ad creaturam ut sine quo non.

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[89] PL 40, 29.

[90] Ms. intellectus.

[91] PL 32, 589.

[92] sicut sine quo non: ms reads "secundo modo." For this emendation see infra, pp. 189, 191.

[93] Ms. corrupt.

[94] Ms. imitabilis.

Sed quid de productione dicemus? Quidam dicunt quod <ideae> ponuntur propter cognitionem et propter productionem, quia, ut praedictum est, cognoscens et producens cognoscendo habet penes se similitudinem rei producendae, quam vocamus ideam. Et isti ponunt quod non possit esse aliqua productio Dei ad extra nisi per intellectum. Unde licet essentia divina sit prior secundum rationem intelligendi intellectu divino, in comparatione tamen ad tertium, ut[95] ad creaturam producendam, intellectus est prior ipsa essentia divina. Cum igitur intellectus sit prior respectu productionis, ipsa essentia divina non potest habere actum respectu productionis, intellectu circumscripto.

Quomodo idea requiritur ad actum intelligendi dictum est, quia tamquam causa sine qua non. Quantum ad productionem, non videtur quod necessario requiratur actus intelligendi. Si enim per impossibile poneretur quod Deus non esset intelligens nec volens, et cum hoc quod esset aliquid ens in actu, cum omne ens habeat operationem in actu propriam sibi debitam, non video, si hoc poneretur, quin posset producere sine intellectu. Si enim intelligamus ignem secundum intellectum et voluntatem producere calorem, talis productio esset libera, non naturali necessitate. Sed si circumscriberetur ab eo intellectus et voluntas, adhuc posset producere extra, circumscribendo intellectum et voluntatem quia prius Deus est productivus quam intelligat se esse productivum. Ergo, circumscripto intellectu, adhuc est productivus.

Item, secundum modum intelligendi prior est divina natura, ut natura, quam[96] ut intellectualis. Cum ergo idem sit ordo in essendo et intelligendo, actio potest convenire Deo, ut natura quaedam est, quae non convenit sibi ut intellectualis est.

Contra. Si Deus posset producere aliquid extra se, circumscribendo intellectum, tunc produceret creaturam naturae necessitate, et esset relatio realis Dei ad creaturam, quia esset ibi relatio producentis ad productum etiam sine actu intellectus. Secundo, quia quando est agens aliquod quod non subditur voluntati, si ponatur in habente voluntatem, potest agere actum suum sive voluntas velit sive non. Patet hoc de <potentia> vegetativa. Eo enim quod non subditur imperio voluntatis, nutrit sive voluntas velit sive non. Si ergo Deus produceret ut natura est, cum natura, ut natura, non subdatur voluntati, produceret sive vellet sive non. Tertio, quod in artificialibus idem est necessarium ad productionem absolute et ad productionem artificialem. Si igitur idea requiratur necessario propter productionem Dei intellectualem et propter productionem simpliciter, ponentes Deum posse producere aliquid extra se, circumscribendo intellectum et voluntatem, concederent illud quod prima rationum istarum concludit, videlicet quod Deus producat creaturam naturae necessitate, et quod esset relatio realis Dei ad creaturam.

Et propterea ratio deficit aliter, quia ratio procedit imaginando quod relatio producentis ad productum esset ex hoc quod producens est producens naturaliter vel intellectualiter; quod non est verum, quia essentialiter est relatio realis ignis producentis ad ignem productum, cum producit naturae necessitate, et hominis cum producit aliquid voluntarie.

Secunda ratio deficit, quia non est simile de vegetativa potentia et natura divina, quia natura divina a voluntate sola ratione distinguitur, secundum communiter ponentes.[97] Et ideo productio divina absolute et intellectualis non distinguitur realiter. Sed in homine potentia vegetativa et voluntas realiter distinguuntur; et ideo potest nutrire sive voluntas velit sive non.

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[95] Ms. nec.

[96] Ms. quaque.

[97] See St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, 13, 4; IV, pp. 144-5.

Tertia ratio accipit falsum, scilicet quod unum et idem requiritur ad productionem simpliciter, etc., quia secundum Aristotelem[98] idiota syllogizat et sapiens similiter, et tamen in sapiente requiritur ars, in idiota non. Dico igitur quod idea non requiritur propter productionem absolute sed propter productionem intellectualem, nec ut causa per se sed ut causa sine qua non.

Primum patet per praedicta, quia si intelligeremus Deum neque intelligentem neque volentem, et tamen entem in actu, sibi potest competere productio. Et propter hujusmodi productionem necessaria est idea, quia idea non est nisi in natura intellectuali. Sed jam per hypothesim a Deo circumscribitur intellectus. Ergo etc. Istud patet de productione ad extra; de productione vero ad intra non est ad propositum. Requiruntur tamen propter productionem effectus ab agente secundum intellectum. Patet hoc per beatum Augustinum libro primo *Retractationum*, cap. 3, ut supra allegatum est,[99] scilicet quod qui negat ideas dicit Deum irrationabiliter, etc.

Item, ideae ponuntur, secundum eum, in mente divina.[1] Ergo illud producens, a quo circumscribitur intellectus, non producit per ideam. Sed qui negat ideas negat productionem rationalem; et tamen Augustinus dicit[2] quod non habet negare productionem simpliciter. Stant igitur simul quod Deus produxit res, sed tamen irrationabiliter. Sicut ergo productio interimitur, interempta idea, et haec est productio rationalis, solummodo ad productionem rationalem requiritur; ergo non propter productionem simpliciter.

Contra istud tamen est illud Senecae in *Epistola 96*, quae sic incipit: "Quanta nobis verborum paupertas," etc. Dicit[3] enim quod Plato posuit sex genera entium, et in tertio genere posuit ideas; et dicit quod idea, secundum Platonem, est exemplar aeternum eorum quae secundum naturam fiunt. Igitur, secundum eum, agens secundum naturam indiget idea, sicut agens per intellectum.

Sed istud solvitur per hoc quod ipse exponit se ibidem, per naturam intelligendo artificem. Dicit enim sic:[4] "Propria <Platonis> supellex est; ideas vocat, (191v) ex quibus omnia quae videmus fiunt et ad quas cuncta formantur. Hae immortales, immutabiles, inviolabiles sunt. Quid autem sit idea, secundum Platonem, id est, quid Platoni esse[5] videatur audi. Idea est eorum quae natura fiunt, exemplar aeternum." Et exponit definitionem sic:[6] "Volo imaginem tuam facere. Exemplar picturae tuae habeo, ex quo capit aliquem habitum mens nostra, quem operi nostro inponat. Ita illa, quae me docet et instruit facies, a qua petitur imitatio, idea est. Talia ergo exemplaria infinita habet[7] rerum natura, hominum, piscium, arborum, ad quae quodcumque[8] fieri debet ab illa exprimitur. Quartum locum habet idos. Quid autem sit,[9] attendas.[10] Paulo ante pictoris imagine utebar, scilicet, ille cum redere Virgilium coloribus vellet, ipsum intuebatur. Idea erat Virgilii facies, futuri operis exemplar. Ex hoc[11] quod artifex trahit et operi suo imposuit, idos est. Quid intersit, quaeris? Alterum exemplar est, alterum forma ab exemplari sumpta et operi imposita. Alteram artifex imitatur, et alteram facit. Habet aliquam faciem statua; haec[12] est idos. Habet aliquam faciem exemplar ipsum, quod intuens opifex statuam figuravit; haec idea est. Etiam nunc si aliam desideras distinctionem, idos in opere est, idea extra opus, sed ante opus." Haec Seneca.

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[98] *Politics* III, 11, 1282a 1-12.

[99] Supra, note 91.

[1] PL 40, 30.

[2] PL 32, 589.

[3] *Seneca ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales* 58; ed. R. M. Gummere (London, 1925) I, n. 8, p. 390; n. 18, 19, pp. 396-8.

[4] Ibid. n. 18, 19, pp. 396-8.

[5] Ms. tunc.

[6] Ibid., n. 9, 21, pp. 398-400.

[7] Ms. harum.

[8] Ms. quaecumque.

Ex quibus sequitur quod idea requiritur propter artificialem productionem. Et *Epistola 103* dicit[13] quod "His" (scilicet decem generibus causarum quas posuit Aristoteles et Stoici) "quintam Plato adjicit exemplar, quam ipse ideam vocat. Hoc est enim, ad quod respiciens artifex, id quod destinabat, effecit. Nihil autem ad rem pertinet utrum foris habeat exemplar, ad quod referat oculos, an intus, quod ibi ipse concepit et posuit. Haec exemplaria rerum omnium Deus intra se habet numeros universorum quae agenda sunt, et modos mente complexus est; plenus his figuris est, quas Plato ideas vocat, immortales, immutabiles, infatigabiles. Itaque homines quidem pereunt; ipsa autem humanitas, ad quam homo effingitur, permanet, et hominibus laborantibus, intereuntibus, illa nihil patitur."

Sic igitur patet quod idea requiritur, non tamen sicut per se causa, sed sicut causa sine qua non. Eorum enim quae fiunt, alia fiunt a natura, alia ab arte, alia a casu et fortuna. Causae per se sunt natura et ars. Ars per se causa est, quia quando artifex producit, artem in se includit. Sed ad hoc quod artifex producat, requiruntur multa quae non sunt per se causae sed per accidens. Similiter Deus artem habet quae per se causa est. Sed idea non est ars sed instrumentum magis quo artifex producit, quemadmodum artifex habet formas suas quae eum dirigunt in operando, ponendo eas super lapides vel ligna; differenter tamen in Deo et in nobis, quia in Deo ars et idea sunt intra: ars intra, formae extra.

Istud patet per Senecam *Epistola 103*, quae sic incipit: "Hesternum diem," etc. Ubi dicit[14] quod "Quinque[15] sunt causae alicujus effectus, secundum Platonem: id ex quo, id a quo, <id in quo>, id ad quod, id propter quod. Novissime id quod ex his est. Tamquam statua: id ex quo est aes, id a quo artifex est, id in quo forma est quae aptatur illi, id ad quod exemplar est quod imitatur his qui[16] facit, id propter quod facientis propositum est, id quod ex istis est statua ipsa <est>. Haec omnia mundus quoque, ut ait Plato, habet: facientem, hic Deus est. Ex quo fit: haec[17] materia est. Formam: haec est habitus et ordo mundi quem videmus. Exemplar: vel ad quod Deus hanc magnitudinem operis pulcherrimi fecit. Propositum: propter quod <fecit>. Quaeris quid sit propositum Deo? Bonitas. Ita certe Plato ait: 'Quae Deo faciendi mundum causa fuit? Bonus est; bono nulla cujusquam boni invidia est. Fecit itaque quam optimum potuit.' "

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[9] Ms. sicut.

[10] Edition adds: "oportet et Platoni inputes, non mihi, hanc rerum difficultatem. Nulla est autem sine difficultate subtilitas." Ibid, n. 20, p. 398.

[11] Ms. hac.

[12] Ms. hoc.

[13] *Epistle 65*, n. 7, p. 448.

[14] Ibid. n. 8-10, pp. 448-450.

[15] Ms. Quaecumque.

[16] Ms. quae.

[17] Ms. hoc.

Istae sunt causae secundum Aristotelem et Platonem. Et postea accusat utrumque et dicit[18] quod "Haec, quae ab Aristotele et Platone ponitur, turba causarum aut nimium multa aut nimium pauca comprehendit." Quia loquendo de causis per se, forma non est causa sed pars causae, extendendo causam ad id sine quo non insufficienter ponunt. Unde dicit Seneca:[19] "Nam si quocumque remoto quid effici non potest, id causam judicat esse faciendi, pauca dixerunt. Ponant inter causas tempus: nihil sine tempore potest fieri. Ponant locum. Si non fuerit, ubi fiat aliquid, ut fiet quidem. Ponant motum. Nihil sine hoc nec fit nec perit. Nulla sine motu ars, nulla mutatio est. Sed nos nunc primam et generalem causam quaerimus. Haec[20] simplex esse debet, nam et materia simplex est. Quaerimus quid sit causa? Ratio, scilicet, faciens, id est Deus. Ista enim, quaecumque retulisti sunt, non sunt multae et singulae causae, sed ex una pendent, scilicet, ex ea quae faciet. Formam dicerent causam? Hanc imponit artifex operi; pars causae est, non causa. Exemplar quoque non est causa, sed instrumentum causae necessarium. Sic necessarium est exemplar artifici, quomodo scalprum, quomodo lima. Sine his procedere ars non potest. Non tamen hae partes artis aut causae sunt. 'Propositum,' inquit,[21] 'artificis propter quod ad faciendum aliquid accedit, causa est,' sed superveniens." Haec Seneca. Unde Aristoteles, negando ideas, habet intelligi per se.

Contra. Seneca dicit[22] quod ideae sunt instrumentum. Dicendum quod non dicit hoc, quod idea mediet ut instrumentum, sed quia est causa sine qua non, nec instrumentum, ut praedictum est.

Ad rationes principales. Cum arguitur primo: Omnis cognitio praesupponit rationem cognoscendi, verum est. Ergo distincta cognitio distinctam rationem, et hoc est idea, responsum est.

Ad secundum. Medium universale non facit cognitionem distinctam. Concedatur. Et cum dicitur: Essentia divina, in quantum essentia, est medium universale, dicendum quod non est universale medium intellectui cognoscenti per eam, quia medium universale ducit tantum in cognitionem confusam et non distinctam, sicut argumentum assumit. Sed essentia unica divina, existens in se, non tantum continet omnem rei entitatem quae pertinet ad naturam rei communem, sed etiam ad particularem rei entitatem. Et ideo non sequitur conclusio. Et propter hoc dicit Commentator XII *Metaphysicae*,[23] et Avicenna VIII *Metaphysicae* suae,[24] quod scientia Dei non debet dici universalis nec particularis: universalis non, quia extendit se ad particularitatem, nec particularis quia extendit ad universalia.

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[18] Ibid. n. 11, p. 450.

[19] Ibid. n. 11-15, pp. 450-2.

[20] Ms. hoc.

[21] Ibid. n. 14, p. 452.

[22] Ibid., n. 13, p. 450.

[23] Averroes, *In XII Metaph.* t. c. 51 (Venice, 1574) VIII, fol. 337 B-C.

[24] Avicenna, *Metaph.* VIII, 6 C (Venice, 1508), fol. 100rb.

The Arts of Discourse, 1050-1400[1]

JAMES J. MURPHY

IN he first sentence of his *De doctrina christiana,* Saint Augustine makes a distinction between learning and expressing — between *modus inveniendi* and *modus proferendi.*[2] Any study of this second process, the Art of Discourse, will surely give us additional insights into medieval habits of minds concerning the composition of sermons, letters, fictional works, didactic treatises — in short, insights into any type of verbal operation which involves communication of one mind with another.

I would like to comment briefly on some special problems in this kind of exploration. At the outset, it might be well to note that from the beginning of Western culture the problem of communication has been approached in several different ways. In the ancient world there was *rhetorica* (Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, the sophists), as well as *grammatica* (Donatus, Priscian) and *poetica* (Horace, Aristotle, the Alexandrians). A rudimentary kind of literary criticism (Pseudo-Longinus, Demetrius) also appeared, in addition to certain branches of *logica* (*Topica*, *Elenchi*). All of these in some way dealt with the theory of discourse, whether written or spoken.

So it is immediately apparent that in a real sense it may be more proper to speak of a pluralistic problem — to speak of "Arts," not of "An Art" which is singular and common. This is especially true after Rhabanus Maurus in the ninth century, who was the first medieval writer known to select from ancient rhetorical lore only that which suited his present need. This pragmatic principle became a dominant medieval criterion.[3]

Consequently we are dealing with a subject area of some complexity, and no doubt some valuable contributions would be made by a careful investigation of almost any one of the subjects connected with any of the medieval arts. Here, nevertheless, I would like to identify some special problems.

The first, and most serious problem, is one of basic historiography. That is to say, there is no comprehensive modern study which treats the whole field in a definite manner. As a symptom of this lack, note that Charles Sears

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[1] An address delivered before the Medieval Interdepartmental section of the Modern Language Association meeting held in Philadelphia, 1960.

[2] *De doctrina christiana*, I, i.i.

[3] Rhabanus Maurus, *De clericorum institutione. Patrologia Latina* CVII, col. 294-420. See below: Appendix I, Section III, "The Central Middle Ages."

Baldwin's *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic* (1928)[4] has just been reprinted, and will probably enjoy again a wide sale. The only other comparable book — J. W. H. Atkins' *English Literary Criticism: The Medieval Phase* (1943)[5] — purposely omits a treatment of logic, and deals mainly with the single field of *ars poetria.* While basic medieval logic is well covered elsewhere,[6] there is no definitive history of medieval grammar.[7]

Closely connected with this problem is that of bibliography. Anyone beginning a study of the medieval arts of discourse must be struck immediately by the constant repetition, in footnotes and other source citations, of a very few items: Louis Paetow, *The Arts Course at Medieval Universities* (Urbana, 1910); Eduard Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa* (Leipzig, 1898); Paul Abelson, *The Seven Liberal Arts* (New York, 1906); John M. Berdan, *Early Tudor Poetry, 1485-1547* (New York, 1920); Harry Caplan's articles on preaching theory (1925-1933);[8] Father Th. Charland, *Artes praedicandi* (Ottawa, 1936); Edmond Faral, *Les arts poétiques du XII et du XIII siècles* (Paris, 1924). This list could perhaps be doubled, but that is not the point — it is still a very small number of works, and most of the studies were completed before World War II. This does not seem to be the sign of a healthy scholarly tradition.

To complicate this situation there are literally hundreds of unedited or even unidentified manuscripts in European libraries which could perhaps shed light on this important phase of Western intellectual history. Professor Caplan, for instance, has located some 300 manuscripts of medieval preaching manuals, of which only a handful — fewer than 25 — have been printed for further study.[9] The Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, as a single example, contains 23 anonymous rhetorical works composed before 1450, plus nine manuscripts of *ars dictaminis* which are either untitled or ascribed to authors not recognized by the ordinary bibliographies of that subject. A different kind of problem occurs in a library such as that of the Württenburg Landesbibliothek at Stuttgart, which contains a six-volume catalogue of theological and sermon materials — but no index to that catalogue. The Pope Pius XII Microfilm Library at Saint Louis University has made more accessible the vast resources of the Vatican Library, but even the Saint Louis holdings have not yet been investigated. It seems obvious that much pioneering work remains to be done, to provide more accessible texts on which to base our ultimate judgments.

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[4] Charles Sears Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York, 1928; Reprinted by Peter Smith, 1959).

[5] J. W. H. Atkins, *English Literary Criticism: The Medieval Phase* (New York, 1943).

[6] *E.g.* Philotheus Boehner, *Medieval Logic: an Outline of Its Development from 1250 to c. 1400.* (Manchester, 1952); and Carl Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik.* Four vols. (Leipzig, 1927).

[7] Attention should be called to the comparative age of some of the studies in this area: for instance, Charles Thurot, "Notices et extraits de divers manuscrits Latins pour servir à l'histoire des doctrines grammaticales au moyen âge", *Notices et extraits* XXII (1868), deuxième partie.

[8] For example, *Speculum* II (1927), 285-94; IV (1929), 282-90; and *Classical Philology* XXVIII (1933), 73-96.

[9] Cf. Harry Caplan, *Medieval Artes Praedicandi: A Hand-List* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1934) and *A Supplementary Hand-List* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1936).

Some beginnings have been made in another direction — the relation of logic to rhetoric and grammar. Baldwin, for instance, outlines the basic opinions of such writers as John of Salisbury, Hugh of Saint Victor, and Vincent of Beauvais, who emphasize one or another part of the *trivium.* But their pronouncements merely state relationships, and do not necessarily reflect the actual practice of composition in the twelfth or thirteenth century. Of far more significance to the actual composition of oral or written discourse would be a clear understanding of the precise classroom studies undertaken by the medieval student. For example, in what ways did the study of Aristotle's *Topica* and *De sophisticis elenchis* prepare the student for the problems of communication? The *De sophisticis,* for instance, condemns *imitatio* as a method of teaching; Donatus and Priscian, the preceptors of medieval grammar, both encourage *imitatio.* Did this pose problems for the student leaving Grammar to go into Logic at Oxford or Paris?

Or again, precisely how was the student prepared for the disputations which played such a large part in his university life? We know from their notebooks that students kept long lists of questions which might come up in a disputation,[10] but we really know very little about the actual disputations themselves. Nevertheless we do know that a common textbook in logic was Aristotle's *Topica,* whose eighth book consists entirely of rules for disputation.[11] Perhaps a careful study of Book Eight would reveal much about the actual teaching of oral argument in the medieval university. The so-called "scholastic method," after all, may well have been the Middle Age's most pervasive influence on composition, and knowing more about university disputations would no doubt tell us a good deal about the attitudes implanted in student minds by their study of *dialectica.*

For that matter, very little attention has been paid to one of the most obvious facets of medieval culture — that is, to the *oral* nature of most medieval discourse. Almost every modern student notes the phenomenon, but as yet we have seen no serious attempt to study systematically all its manifold implications. Perhaps a good start in this direction might be made by a study of the dialectical disputation.

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[10] Cf. A.G. Little and F. Pelster, *Oxford Theologg and Theologians c. A.D. 1282-1302* (Oxford, 1934), pp. 219-362.

[11] The *Topica,* it should be noted, held an honored place both in the Old Logic (through Boethius) and in the New Logic through the translations of the complete *Organon.*

The relation between rhetoric and grammar, on the other hand, is probably the most important and the most neglected aspect of the whole field. First of all, it should be recognized that the medieval teacher of grammar customarily included *all* forms of writing and speaking under his jurisdiction. We find four types of grammatical documents: first of all, the basic doctrine of rules (syntax), or what was called *ars recte scribendi et loquendi.* Typical texts are those of Priscian,[12] Donatus,[13] and Alexandre de Villedieu.[14] But there was no breakdown of the art into arts of writing and arts of speaking as this definition might suggest; rather, the grammarian took all forms of discourse as his own. Consequently the divisions of *ars grammatica* are based upon the form of the language used, not upon the method of delivery of the piece composed. This of course is a departure from classical practice, and is a development which Quintilian had feared when he warned that the grammarian would try to take over the function of the rhetorician.

Besides the *ars recte*, then, medieval grammarians wrote and taught about three types of composition: first, *ars prosaicum* or *ars dictandi*; second, *ars rithmica*; third, *ars metricum.*[15] (Sometimes a fourth type is mentioned — *prosimetricum* — but this was merely a mixture of alternately metrical and prose passages, as in Boethius, and not a separate form of composition.) Given this division of the art, the grammarian felt that he had reason to concern himself with *any* type of discourse. For instance, the composition of hymns fell under *rithmus*, as did the theory of the *cursus* used in *ars dictaminis.* And of course there was some overlapping of doctrine between *ars prosaicum* and *ars rithmica* when a piece of epistolary prose had to be put into a rhythmical form. Even the sermon's style could be shaped rhythmically.[16]

Because of this quadripartite division, medieval grammatical treatises tend to fall into the various specialized divisions of the subject.[17] Nevertheless there are two unifying aspects which have so far been neglected. The first of these is the life and work of John of Garland, author of *De arte prosayca et metrica et rith-*

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[12] *Institutionum grammaticarum*, ed. Henry Keil in *Grammatici latini* (Leipzig, 1853-80), II-III. 1-377.

[13] *De partibus orationis* and *Ars grammatica, Ibid.*, IV, 355-66 and 367-402.

[14] *Doctrinale*, ed. Th. Reichling in *Monumenta Germaniae paedogogica* (Berlin, 1893), Band XII.

[15] Sponcius thus provides the following division: *Dictaminum... tria sunt genera a veteribus diffinita, prosaicum ut Cassiodori, metricum, ut Virgilii, et rithmicum, ut Primatis.* Cf. Thurot, *op. cit.*, p. 418.

[16] Cf. Thomas of Todi, *Ars sermocinandi ac etiam faciendi collationes*, ed. June Babcock (Unpublished Cornell thesis, 1941), in which twelve rhythmical patterns are discussed.

[17] See below, Appendix I, section III F.

mica. Here is one medieval work which attempts to cover almost the whole field, but we find that Mari publishes separately the section on *prosayca et metrica*, after an earlier edition of excerpts from the section on *rithmus*, so that the work's unified nature is seldom appreciated.[18] It might well be that a careful study of Garland's career, together with a definitive analysis of this work, would provide us with a much clearer idea of the impact which the teaching of grammar had on literary Europe of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

Another unifying fact is that each one of the four divisions of grammar provided for a study of *figurae* or *exornationes* or *colores* — the tropes and figures used to adorn language. The importance of this fact can hardly be overestimated. For the past three decades, for instance, students of Chaucer have engaged in what might be called the "cult of Vinsauf," in which numerous efforts have been made to identify rhetorical figures which that poet might have learned from Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria Nova.*[19] These efforts have simply failed to take into account the ubiquity of these figures in medieval grammatical texts. The primer itself — Donatus — describes more tropes than even Vinsauf does, and the next most popular elementary text (the *Graecismus* of Evrard of Bethune)[20] treats some hundred *figurae*, the *Doctrinale* of Alexandre de Villedieu seventy-eight. These are basic textbooks, not *artes poetriae.* When Robert of Basevorn wishes to commend the figures to readers of his *Forma praedicandi* (c. 1322), he says that the list found in *Rhetorica ad Herennium* will be "adequate" — the same 65 figures Vinsauf uses — but implies that the interested reader can of course go further if he wishes to.[21] The point is that any educated reader was expected to have learned for himself the lore of *figurae*, and a glance at any standard grammatical textbook of the Middle Ages will show us where he could have learned them. Perhaps a study of this problem of the figures would shed more light on the medieval arts of discourse.

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[18] Numerous manuscripts of this work attest to its popularity, both in England and on the continent. The first two parts are edited by Giovanni Mari in *Romanische Forschungen* XIII (1902), 885-950; for selections from Garland's discussion of *rithmus*, cf. Mari, *Il Trattati Medievali di Ritmica Latina* (Florence, 1899).

[19] More than forty studies have appeared since the publication of John M. Manly's *Chaucer and the Rhetoricians* ("Warton Lectures on English Poetry," Vol. XVII; London, 1926). Manly's lecture was inspired by the earlier edition of the *Poetria Nova* by Faral in *Les arts poétiques* (1924). None of the contributions in this area yet has offered a substantial challenge to Manly's main thesis that Chaucer's stylistic education is due primarily to his study of Vinsauf.

[20] *Graecismus*, ed. John Wrobel (Corpus grammaticorum latinorum medii aevi, Vol. 1; Wratislava, 1887).

[21] *Forma praedicandi*, L. Edited by Charland, *op. cit.*, and translated by Leopold Krul (Unpublished Cornell thesis, 1950).

Despite these two centralizing factors, of course, there still exists the need for study of the specialized branches of the arts of discourse. Take *dictamen*, or letter-writing art, for instance: the brief sketches of such writers as Charles Homer Haskins and Louis Paetow, written between 1910 and 1930, still furnish us with our best general historical outlines of this subject.[22] Some writers have gone as far so to say that the history of rhetoric in the Middle Ages is the history of *dictamen*. This is an indefensible statement, it seems to me, but for the lack of an accurate history of the subject it is still repeated from time to time. Such generalization occurs only in a field where there is no governing exposition of facts. Let me pose an hypothesis for an historical sketch of *dictamen* — one which could perhaps be tested for accuracy, against what is now known.

I would say that two dominant points of view concerning epistolary composition run side by side throughout the Middle Ages. The more spectacular but perhaps less important one is the influence of Ciceronian rhetoric on the arrangement and style of letters.[23] The six parts of a Ciceronian speech became the five parts of a medieval letter, while the periodic style of Cicero's *Orator* was refined to a rhythmical style colored by the same figures and tropes recommended by *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Thus by about 1150 the structure and style of the letter had become stereotyped.[24] This is not to say that new manuals were not composed, but very little new substance was brought into the art after that date.

The second dominant influence was that of the copyist. Beginning with the *formulae* of Marculf in the seventh century, in which the writer merely inserted appropriate facts and dates into a prepared form, we find a strong element of model-copying in European letter-writing practice. This should not be confused with *imitatio*, which implies the free duplication of a thing by introducing new material under the general semblance of an old form. The almost innumerable collections of model letters in European libraries have quite a different function. For lack of a better word, we might suggest the term *reproductio* as a contrast to the concept of *imitatio*. For the model letter ordinarily attempts to supply an exact sample for a given case, a sample which can be copied verbatim except for the insertion of the appropriate proper names and dates. Thus we have model letters asking for benefices, letters thanking superiors for benefices, letters complaining about delays in securing benefices, and of course letters complaining about the amounts of money involved. These were not exercises in composition, in any sense of the word. They are examples of *reproductio*, and no more original with the writer than the checking of one message from a list of singing telegrams to be sent on a nephew's birthday.

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[22] Charles Homer Haskins, *Studies in Medieval Culture* (Oxford, 1949); Paetow, *op. cit.*; this is not to deny the importance of the special studies made by Noel Denholm-Young, Ernst Kantorowicz, and more recently by such writers as Helene Wieruszowski, but of course much remains yet to be done in that area. I am indebted to Professor Wieruszowski for the information that Professors Veccki and Pini of the University of Bologna are involved in a projected twenty-volume series of modern editions of Italian *dictatores* to be entitled *Corpus Dictatorum Italicum*.

[23] Cf. Appendix II.

[24] The anonymous *Rationes dictandi* (c. 1135) and Bernard of Bologna's *Introductiones prosaici dictaminis* (c. 1145) indicate clearly the triumph of the five-part letter format. Buoncompagno later proposed a three-part format omitting the *captatio benevolentiae* and *conclusio* sections, but his lead was not generally followed. Insofar as the *cursus* was original with the Middle Ages it might be regarded as an innovation, but its roots were of course laid down even earlier than 1150, especially in the bulls of Gelasius II.

The important point is that model letter collections outnumber the theoretical *dictamen* manuals four or five to one, depending upon the country involved. Why, for instance, did the Germans rely so heavily on model letters, while the Italians preferred the manuals? Why did the French absorb *dictamen* into the grammar curriculum while the English relied upon model collections and did not even produce a native author of a manual until almost the end of the fourteenth century?[25] These are matters for investigation, in my view, and matters which would assist us to understand better the literary milieu of some medieval nations. The career of a *dictator* like Buoncompagno is spectacular, of course, and much has been made of him, but it is significant to note that when he died the importance of *dictamen* in the curriculum was lessened and the notarial element swiftly ushered in, even at Bologna, the age of the copyist.

The question of *dictamen* brings up the whole matter of the doctrine of *imitatio* in the Middle Ages. Much has been made of Saint Augustine's argument in Book Four of his *De doctrina christiana* that a speaker or writer can learn best from reading of good models, but it is often forgotten that elsewhere in that same work he declares that teaching from precepts is necessary.[26] Certainly the formulation of highly-detailed rules or precepts is a hallmark of medieval rhetoric and criticism, but it is also true that even a so-called "rhetorician" like Geoffrey of Vinsauf supplies, not only definitions of figures and tropes, but *examples* of their use.[27] This ambivalence has its roots in ancient educational practice, of course, for the Roman schools employed both *praecepta* and *imitatio*. Perhaps a comprehensive history of the encyclopedic movement — from Martianus Capella to Vincent of Beauvais, for instance — would tell us a good deal about this matter, for the encyclopedists almost by definition were forced to rely on compends, or brief collections of precepts, rather than on collections of models. Unfortunately we do not possess such a history.

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[25] Even Thomas Sampson (fl. c. 1380) was not very original in his writings; the same can be said of Thomas Merke (d. 1409). Cf. Denholm-Young, *Collected Papers on Medieval Subjects* (Oxford, 1946), pp. 52-53; and H. G. Richardson, "Letters of the Oxford *dictatores*," in *Formularies Which Bear in the History of Oxford* c. 1204-1420, ed. H. E. Salter, W. A. Pantin, H. G. Richardson (Oxford, 1942), II, 331ff.

[26] *De doctrina christiana* II. xxxix. 58.

[27] And John of Garland, in his *Ars de himnis usitatis*, treats nineteen methods of construct-

Or again, how influential was the Ciceronian concept of *dispositio* or arrangement in the Middle Ages? As may be seen from the brief sketch in Appendix II, there are some apparent parallels which might fruitfully be investigated.

Finally, as a last "problem" in this brief list, let me ask why a vernacular rhetoric should have appeared as early as the thirteenth century in France and Italy, but not until the sixteenth century in England?[28] Or, indeed, why there should be a vernacular rhetoric at all when medieval culture was so patently a Latin culture? We might learn much from a close examination of Brunetto Latini's career, his associations with Dante, and his motives in composing vernacular compends of Ciceronian rhetoric.[29] The same might be said of Guilhelm Molinier and the Provençal *Las Leys d'Amors* composed at Toulouse in 1356.[30]

In conclusion, then: there are a number of major gaps in our knowledge of the ways in which medieval man learned to write and to speak. It is not enough to say that the *trivium* taught him these things, when we do not know in every case just which parts of the *trivium* were stressed, or how each subject was taught, or to whom, or at what period. We assume all too often that the Middle Ages was culturally homogeneous to such an extent that we can safely generalize five hundred years of living practice from any one example. The example of Chartres is a case in point, as is that of John of Salisbury.

If I were asked to name the most urgent of the tasks before us, I would have to say that we now have sufficient material available to permit the writing of at least an outline survey of the arts of discourse in the period. This is a work to be approached with some temerity, perhaps, but it is one necessary as an aid to further detailed study. At present the specialized studies of small

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ing rhythmical hymns solely by providing nineteen hymns as examples. Cf. Mari, *op. cit.*, p. 60-80.

[28] *E.g.*, Jean d'Antioche de Harens, *Rettorique de March Tulles Cyceron* (1282), ed. Leopold Delisle, *Notes et extraits* XXXVI (1899), 207-67; and, in Italy, Guidotto da Bologna, *Fiore di Rettorica* (before 1266), (Venezia, 1821).

[29] Latini composed an Italian version before 1260: his *Rettorica*, ed. F. Maggini (Florence, 1915). A more widely circulated version of Ciceronian rhetoric appears in his Provençal *Li livres dou tresor*, ed. F. J. Carmody (University of California Press, 1948), Book III.

[30] One verse and two prose versions are extant. But see Joseph Anglade (ed.), *Las Leys d'amors, manuscrit de l'Academie des Jeux Floraux* (four vols.; Paris, 1919-40).

segments of the field may suffer from the lack of an accurate overview of the whole.

It seems paradoxical that we need a statement of the whole before taking up the parts, but in such a complex field as the theory of medieval discourse, nothing but an imbalance is likely to result from premature excursions into detail without an adequate comprehension of the whole. What I called earlier "the cult of Vinsauf" in Chaucer studies is a prime example of this peril.

If this seems too large a task at the moment, surely great benefit could be derived from a comprehensive bibliography of useful materials. What Paetow did in 1910 with his bibliography of *dictamen* should now be done for the whole field. If this also is a task too great for one individual, two or more collaborators might produce such a collection.

And if the task of investigating the role of *verbum* during a thousand years from Augustine to Poggio now seems too difficult and too onerous an undertaking, we might remind ourselves, that this was an age which respected the *Logos*, the *word*, very highly, both as a secular and as a religious concept.

Fittingly enough, the first discussion of rhetoric in the English language begins with a paean of praise for "word":

> Above alle erthli creatures
> The hihe makers of natures
> The word to man hath yove alone...
>
> For word the techer of vertus
> Is cleped in Philosophie.[31]

It is almost an index of the period to say that it was one in which men freely used the Latin word *verbum* both with and without a capital letter. Surely then, improving our knowledge of the medieval arts of discourse must inevitably improve our knowledge of medieval culture as a whole.

APPENDIX I

Outline for a Projected Study of the Arts of Discourse in the Middle Ages

I. The Ancient Background.
    A. Works of rhetoric
        1. Aristotelian
        2. Ciceronian
            a. Cicero
            b. Quintilian
            c. Pseudo-Cicero
        3. Sophistic

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[31] John Gower, *Confessio Amantis*, ed. G. C. Macaulay (Oxford, 1902), VII, vv. 1507-09 ; 1520-21.

- B. Works of grammar
    - 1. Donatus
    - 2. Overlapping with rhetoric
- C. Literary Criticism
    - 1. Pseudo-Longinus
    - 2. Demetrius
- D. Arts of Poetry
    - 1. Horace
    - 2. Aristotle
    - 3. 'Priscianic' analyses
- E. Works of Logic
    - 1. Aristotle
    - 2. Stoics

II. The Age of Transition (400 A.D. - 1050 A.D.)

- A. Works of rhetoric
    - 1. Alcuin
    - 2. Notker Labeo
- B. Works of grammar
    - 1. Priscian
    - 2. Bede
- C. Encyclopedists
    - 1. Martianus Capella
    - 2. Isidore of Seville
    - 3. Cassiodorus
- D. Rhetoric applied to preaching theory
    - 1. Augustine
    - 2. Rhabanus Maurus
- E. Works of logic
    - 1. Boethius
    - 2. Porphyrean analyses

III. The Central Middle Ages (1050 - 1400)

- A. Vernacular renderings of Ciceronian rhetoric
    - 1. Guidotto da Bologna
    - 2. Jean d'Antioche
    - 3. Brunetto Latini
    - 4. Guilhelm Molinier
- B. Rhetoric applied to letter-writing
    - 1. Theoretical treatises outlining doctrine
        - a. Alberic of Monte Cassino
        - b. Guido Faba
        - c. Bernard de Meung
        - d. Buoncompagno
        - e. Numerous others
    - 2. Collections of model letters
- C. Rhetoric applied to preaching in the thematic sermon
    - 1. Robert of Basevorn
    - 2. Thomas Waleys
    - 3. Thomas of Todi

D. Rhetoric applied to preaching in homily-style sermons
    1. Alain de Lille
    2. Guibert de Nogent.

E. Literary Criticism
    1. Dante
    2. Boccaccio
    3. Eustace Deschamps

F. Works of Grammar
    1. *Ars grammatica proper* (*ars recte*)
        a. Alexander de Villedieu
        b. Evrard de Bethune
    2. Treatises dealing with *ars rithmica*
        a. Sion of Vercelli
        b. Thomas of Capua
        c. John of Garland
        d. Overlapping with *ars dictaminis* (*cursus*)
    3. Works dealing with *ars prosaicum*
        a. Gervais de Melkley
        b. John of Garland
        c. Overlapping with *ars rithmica*
    4. Works dealing with *ars metricum*
        a. Theoretical treatises outlining doctrine (*ars poetria*)
            I Geoffrey of Vinsauf
            II Matthew of Vendôme
            III John of Garland
            IV Evrard the German
        b. Treatises devoted to *figurae*
            I Marbodus
            II Geoffrey of Vinsauf
            III Treatise of Ste.-Omer

G. Works of logic
    1. The scholastic tradition
    2. Non-Aristotelian positions

H. The re-introduction of classical rhetoric
    1. Rediscovery of Quintillian's *Institutio* (1416)
    2. Rediscovery of Cicero's *De Oratore* (1432)
    3. Printing of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1475)

APPENDIX II

THE MEDIEVAL INFLUENCE OF CICERO'S THEORY OF "DISPOSITIO"

Ciceronian rhetoric was divided into five parts: *inventio*, or the discovery of materials; *dispositio*, or the proper arrangement of discovered materials; *elocutio* (style), or the accomodation of suitable words to the discovered materials; *memoria*, or the firm retention of materials, their order, and their phrasing; and *pronuntiatio*, or oral delivery of the retained matter.

The second of these, *dispositio*, laid down the following pattern for the typical oration:

1. *exordium*, or introduction
2. *narratio*, or explanation of background
3. *partitio*, or preliminary outline
4. *confirmatio*, or proof of the speaker's case
5. *refutatio*, or destruction of the opposing case
6. *digressio*, or emotional relief (sometimes omitted)
7. *peroratio*, or concluding plea

Some interesting parallels may be observed in the medieval period:

Ars dictaminis (letter-writing) (1050-1550)

Cicero	*dictamen*
Exordium	*salutatio*, or formal greeting
	captatio benevolentiae, or introduction
(partitio)	(omitted)
narratio	*narratio*, or narration of circumstances
confirmation	*petitio*, or presentation of requests and arguments
(refutatio)	(omitted)
peroratio	*conclusio*, or ending

Ars praedicandi (preaching) (1230-1600)

Cicero	*ars praedicandi*
(no counterpart)	*thema*, or quotation of Scriptural passage
exordium	*prothemata*, or introduction for the theme itself.
exordium	*introduction*, or introduction of the sermon proper
partitio	*divisio*, or partition of theme, usually into three
partitio	*subdivisio*, or partition of each of the above three parts
confirmatio	*amplificatio*, or dilation upon each of the above parts.

Some Remarks on the Analogy of God and Creatures in St. Thomas Aquinas

M. S. O'NEILL

SINCE Cajetan wrote his short treatise, *De Nominum Analogia*, probably the majority of scholastic writers have agreed with him that proper proportionality alone deserves the name analogy; that anything else commonly referred to as such is only abusively so-called. Etymologically at least, Cajetan is correct; *analogia* for the Greeks, derived as it was from mathematical proportion, referred strictly to a four-term identity of proportions of the form $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{C}{D}$. For Aristotle, the analogous was one division of the equivocals, which also included equivocals by chance or pure equivocals and equivocals by reference, *πρὸς ἕν*. In mediaeval usage, both the analogical and the *πρὸς ἕν* equivocals of Aristotle came to be grouped together under the one name "analogy," since they have a common *ratio* as means between univocation and pure equivocation.[1] The presence of four terms was of the very essence of the Aristotelian analogical equivocals,[2] and it continued to be so in their mediaeval counterpart, which was eventually known as analogy of proportionality.

In recent years, however, the general position if not the etymological claims of Cajetan has been subject to persistent and often severe criticism. From scholars within the scholastic tradition have come defenses of the so-called analogies of genus and of proportion or attribution as also properly metaphysical.[3] From without, Hampus Lyttkens, after a painstaking historical study of the meanings of analogy before and after St. Thomas, concluded that for St. Thomas himself its chief importance was only as a "logical aid" in the God/world predication.[4] These studies have shown the need for further careful textual analysis in specific areas of the Thomistic use of analogy, to establish and perhaps make more precise some of the criticisms leveled at traditional interpretations. One such problem area, and perhaps still the most important one, is the use St. Thomas makes of analogy of one kind or another to predicate various perfections of God and creatures — and in particular the "perfection" of being.

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[1] Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *In XI Metaph.*, lect. 3, n° 218; ed. Cathala-Spiazzi (Turin and Rome, 1950); also, *ST*, 1, 13, 5 (ed. Leonine).

[2] "Likeness should be studied first in the case of things belonging to different genera, the formulae being 'A:B = C:D'..., and 'as A is in B, so is C in D'..." *Topics*, I, 17, 108a6ff; Oxford tr. "Proportion is equality of ratio and involves at least four terms." *Ethics*, V, 3, 1131a32ff; Oxford tr.

[3] For the first, see A. Maurer, "The Analogy of Genus," *The New Scholasticism*, XXIX (1955), 127-144. For analogy of proportion, see Sister Thomas Margurite Flanigan, C.S.J. "The Use of Analogy in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXV (November, 1957), 21 ff; and Ralph J. Masiello, "The Analogy of Proportion According to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas", *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXV (January, 1958), 91 ff. Since this article was written, Fr. Klubertanz' admirable collection of texts and scholarship on the subject of analogy has appeared, confirming and developing the lines of criticism of these last two articles. See *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy* (Chicago, 1960).

In the *De Nominum Analogia*, Cajetan had maintained that it is by analogy of proper proportionality alone that we can truly indicate the sameness and difference in being of all things. Being is not a genus, so it cannot be predicated univocally; but because of the fact that each and every thing has a proportion to its own existence, all of them can be said to be, without equivocation. This is the analogy of being which founds the analogical predication of being; and in one instance the two examples Cajetan gives of the analogical division of being are, first, substance and accident (each has a mode of existence proportioned to what it is) and, second, God and creature.[5] In a formulation parallel to that employed in the case of substance and accident, this second case might then be stated, God: His Esse = creature: its esse.

There would seem to be little to object to in the first application of proportionality, to show an analogical realization of being in each of its instances within created, categorical being. This is not an Aristotelian use of proportionality, but it is mentioned explicitly at least once by St. Thomas.[6] But Cajetan's other application of proportionality to the predication of being is perhaps more open to question. Not only is it being used for an un-Aristotelian purpose — but does it even remain a proportionality? If it is agreed that this sort of analogy is defined as having four terms related in a likeness of proportions, how can this requirement be met when two of the terms, God's Essence and Existence, are strictly identical? Can God be said to be related to His Esse as creatures are related to theirs?

This difficulty was posed, for instance, by Fr. P. Descoqs:

> Sans aucun doute, la relation de la créature à son *esse* ou à quelqu'un de ses attributs est une relation fondée et objective; mais, sans nul doute aussi, la relation de Dieu à son être est purement verbale...

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[4] Hampus Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World* (Uppsala, 1952), 574.

[5] *De Nominum Analogia*, ch. 9, n° 101; ed. Zammut-Hering (Rome, 1952), p. 76.

[6] "... quia sicut se habet substantia ad esse sibi debitum, ita et qualitas ad esse sui generis conveniens." *In III Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1; ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929).

> D'où cette conséquence obligée: dans la proportion classique:
>
> $$\frac{\text{Dieu}}{\text{son être}} = \frac{\text{créature}}{\text{son être}}$$
>
> le premier rapport étant nul, la proportion elle-même sera purement logique, sans aucun fondement, purement fictive.[7]

J. F. Anderson replied to these arguments of Fr. Descoqs as follows:

> The charge that the relation of God to His being is "nul" is groundless for although there is no real relation here there is a logical one... and this purely logical distinction is sufficient to found a relation.... In fact, the following proposition clearly implies that for St. Thomas, the identity of two of these terms, coupled with a real distinction between the other two, does not prevent the setting up of a proportion. "God is related to being (se habet ad esse) in a way other than any creature, for He is His own being and of no creature is this true."[8]

Dr. Anderson's quotation is from *De Potentia*, VII, 7, and it can well be closely examined. In fact, before we can come to any conclusions about the point at issue, the principal texts in which St. Thomas is claimed to have used an analogy of proper proportionality for the God/world relation must be carefully looked into, to see if he is teaching such an analogy; and if so, what import it can have in Thomistic natural theology. The passages most often quoted in support of proportionality besides that from the *De Potentia* just cited are the following: *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1; *In I Eth.*, VII, 95-96; *De Ver.*, XXIII, 7, ad 9; and *De Ver.*, II, 11. First, let us examine the *De Potentia* text: "Diversa habitudo ad esse impedit univocam praedicationem entis. Deus autem alio modo se habet ad esse quam aliqua alia creatura; nam ipse est suum esse quod nulli alii creaturae competit."[9] Taken from the body of the article, this sentence is used to show that St. Thomas did speak of a relation in God between essence and existence, since the works "se habet ad esse" are used of Him. It is true that such a phrase is strongly suggestive of relation. But there is no question here of showing any similarity, of proportions or otherwise; what is being stressed is the utter difference between the way God is and the way creatures are. And in the whole context of the article what is being proved at this point is the negative fact that being cannot possibly be said univocally of God and creatures. Later in the article St. Thomas will show that there is a way in which being can be predicated of both by some mean between univocation and pure equivocation, but he is not ready for that step yet; and the analogy he will end up using to show this is not proportionality at all, but a two-term analogy by reason of a relation, in this case causal, between the two. There is no proportionality in the passage quoted; in fact if anything there is its explicit denial; what is said really amounts to, God is *not* to His *Esse* as any creature is to its *esse.*

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[7] *Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis* (Paris, 1925), p. 270.

[8] *The Bond of Being* (St. Louis, 1949), p. 292.

[9] *De. Pot.*, VII, 7c. in *Quaestiones Disputatae* (ed. R. Spiazzi, Turin: Marietti [1949]), II, 204a.

In the next text to be considered (*I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1) there is again no explicit mention of proportionality. This is the famous tripartition of analogy, (the basis for the Cajetanian classification), into (1) analogy in concept (*intentionem*) but not in being (e.g. healthy, said of diet and animal according to priority and posteriority but really existing only in one); (2) analogy in being but not in concept (as when many share a common, i.e. generic, concept but realize it in differing degrees of perfection); (3) analogy in both concept and being (*secundum intentionem et secundum esse*), when neither a common meaning nor a common existence is shared, which is for instance the case with *being* predicated of substance and accidents. In such cases the common nature must exist somehow in each of the things of which it is said, differing, however, in each according to a degree of greater or lesser perfection. And so, truth, goodness, and all other similar terms are said analogically of God and creatures; they are in God according to His own *Esse* and in creatures according to a *ratio* of greater and lesser perfection.

This third sort of analogy, explicitly affirmed to allow the predication of various pure perfections of God and creatures, is usually taken, since Cajetan, as a description of proper proportionality (while the first sort is referred to as analogy of attribution or of merely extrinsic denomination, and the second is often called analogy of genus or of inequality). The reason for the identification of analogy *secundum intentionem et secundum esse* with analogy of proper proportionality is that in both cases an essential requirement is that the analogated perfection intrinsically and formally be present in each member of the analogy. However, if it could be shown that this characteristic is not unique to analogy of proportionality, the identification might be questioned, especially since it is hardly supported by anything else in the text: there is no more indication of the typical likeness of proportions in this third than in the first kind; the example given, substance and accident, is far more frequently used by St. Thomas to illustrate a two or three-term analogy than a four-term proportionality; and finally, the phrasing of the last sentence seems to indicate not so much that a common perfection is realized proportionately in God and creatures, but that it is in God absolutely (*secundum suum esse*), and in creatures proportionally (*secundum rationem maioris perfectionis et minoris*).

And further, there is strong evidence that the characteristic of intrinsic realization of the analogated perfection in each member is not, for St. Thomas, confined solely to analogy of proper proportionality. It is well known that

Suarez, in fact, claimed that the only significant metaphysical analogy was not proportionality but one of intrinsic attribution, based on the existence of an analogous property present in each of the two terms, absolutely in one and by a relation to this in the other.[10] This Suarezian analogy, with all its presuppositions and implications, is rightly termed un-Thomistic; but that is no reason to suppose that St. Thomas did not make good use of an intrinsic two-term analogy of his own. It seems absurd to be forced to believe that in his many applications of an *analogia unius ad alterum* in the two *Summae, De Potentia*, etc. to this problem of predication of God and the world that the perfection is only present formally in one and by extrinsic denomination or reference only in the other, as the Aristotelian examples he usually employs misleadingly seem to suggest. The Cajetanians speak in these cases of a hidden analogy of proper proportionality guaranteeing the intrinsicality, but their case for this is not very well supported by the texts.[11] And in any case, in a passage in the *De Veritate*, St. Thomas explicitly states that, given an analogy of the form "one-to-another" (i.e. not a proportionality), one of the terms may be denominated with respect to the other in two ways; sometimes the only reason for the denomination is the fact of the reference, as would be the case with health predicated of animal and complexion, in which case it is not denominated by any form inhering in it but by something extrinsic to which it refers. But a thing can also be denominated with respect to another when the relationship (*respectus*) is not just the meaning (*ratio*) but the very cause of the denomination, as when air is said to be bright because the sun is the cause of its brightness. And it is in this latter way that a creature is called good with reference to God, i.e. according to a goodness formally present within it.[12] This second sort of analogy, which is clearly not one of proportionality, does fulfill the requirement that what is said analogously be somehow intrinsically present in each of the members; so, if the only criterion is intrinsicality, it simply cannot be asserted that the third mode of analogy in the text from the *Commentary on the Sentences* refers uniquely to analogy of proper proportionality.

So far, we have not considered a text in which St. Thomas really mentions or makes use of an analogy of proper proportionality. There are some in which he does, but they are not at all as common as those in which he treats of analogies more like in form to the Aristotelian πρὸς ἕν. However, in three places where he does clearly refer to proportionality, it is true that he seems to prefer it, for various reasons, to a two-term direct proportion. The first of these is in the *Commentary on the Ethics*, VII, 95-96, in which he is dealing with the analogicity of the good. All things are called good in one way because of their reference to a separate first principle of goodness, but in another way according to a proportion, e.g. sight: body = intellect: soul; and he says that Aristotle prefers this mode of analogy because it is taken according to the goodness inhering in things. This is all quite clear, although it seems to contradict what has just been said about proportionality not being the only mode of analogy which is according to something intrinsic or inherent in each of the members. But it is important to note that in this text St. Thomas is commenting on Aristotle and not necessarily presenting his own views; and that in any case he is not concerned, nor in fact was Aristotle, with predicating goodness of God and creatures, but only of various things *within* categorical being. So this passage cannot be taken to prove that St. Thomas would also prefer proportionality for this reason in the former case.

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[10] *Disp. Metaph.*, XXVIII, sec. III, nº 14; ed. Vivès (Paris, 1887).

[11] Cajetan himself was not always so insistent on restricting intrinsic analogy to proper proportionality; cf., for instance, his *In ST*, I, 6, 4 (III-VIII, in ed. Leonine).

[12] "Alio modo denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum, quando respectus non est ratio denominationis, sed causa sicut si aer dicitur lucens a sole; non quod ipsam referri aerem ad solem sit lucere aeris, sed quia directa oppositio aeris ad solem est causa quod luceat. Et hoc modo creatura dicitur per respectum ad bonum." *De Ver.*, XXI, 4, ad 2; ed. Spiazzi, I, 382-383a.

In the *De Veritate*, we can finally discover texts which definitely refer to proportionality as a help in understanding the presence of certain perfections in both God and created beings. In *De Ver.*, XXIII, 7, ad 9, concerned with the possibility of conforming our will to God's, St. Thomas meets the objection that since God is infinitely distant from man, there can be no proportion between them, by stating that although this is true if proportion be taken in the strict mathematical sense of a certain measure of two quantities compared to each other, it is not true if proportion be taken in a general sense as signifying any relationship of one thing to another, or else if we have rather a proportionality, i.e. a likeness of two proportions. He gives a mathematical example of this, and then continues:

> ...similiter finitum et infinitum, quamvis non possunt esse proportionata, possunt tamen esse proportionabilia quia sicut infinitum est aequale infinito, ita finitum finito. Et per hunc modum est similitudo inter creaturam et Deum, quia sicut se habet ad ea quae ei competunt ita creatura ad sua propria.

Here, then, we do seem to have an explicit statement of a proportionality between God and creatures: God: things proper to Him :: a creature: things proper to it. But just what is meant by "things proper to God"? Obviously one of them should be will, since that is what the present article is concerned with. If so, will the objection raised with regard to a relation between God and His being, that it is merely verbal since they are strictly identical, also apply to the relation between God and His will? Is the relationship any less logical and any more founded in reality in the latter case? Clearly, for St. Thomas, anything which is in God is one with the Divine Nature; and yet, as he frequently indicates, our various names for God are not synonymous, and although the chief reason for this is our imperfect mode of knowing, there is in a way a basis in God because He contains eminently all the perfections which we see as distinct in creatures.[13] Such hints were developed by later scholastic writers into a complex system of distinctions varying in degree of basis in reality.[14] According to such a schema, the distinction between the attributes of God or between God and His operation would be more than a purely conceptual distinction, i.e. of *ratio ratiocinantis*, and would be a species of *ratio ratiocinatae*, to be precise, a minor virtual intrinsic distinction — that is, there would be some foundation in reality, although an imperfect one, for our considering the attributes as distinct; their objective concepts are essentially diverse, although they only differ as explicitly and implicitly considered. On the other hand, in God, essence and existence are only distinguished by a distinction of *ratio ratiocinantis*, without any intrinsic foundation *in re*, because the Divine Essence and the Divine Existence are formally identifiable. The only basis for making it is that we see essence and existence distinguished in creatures and cannot think of them as otherwise; so if we want to give a name to it, this would be called a virtual extrinsic, or, just a verbal distinction.[15] Thus it is arguable that there may be some justification for admitting a relation sufficiently grounded in fact to set up two terms for a proportionality in the case of the Divine attributes, such as will, power, knowledge, though still not in the case of the Divine Essence and Existence.

And so far we have not found St. Thomas teaching any such analogy of *being* in regard to God and creatures. But there remains one text to be examined, *De Veritate*, II, 11. In the text we have just finished considering, the concern was not, in any case, to show that will is predicated without equivocation of God and man, but only that there is a relation between the two, however distant, on the basis of which man's will can be and can become like God's. But in *De Veritate*, II, 11, St. Thomas is concerned precisely with *predicating* something of God and men; in this case, the attribute of knowledge. This is the principal text dealing with analogy of proportionality, so it should be examined fairly closely. St. Thomas begins by showing that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures, because things which are one in nature are yet diverse in existence; but whatever is in God is His very existence; and since the act of existence proper to one thing cannot be communicated to another, no other thing can ever attain to the possession of anything in the way God has it, just as it is impossible for it to attain the same act of being as that which God has. But still it cannot be said that whatever is predicated of God and creatures is done so equivocally, for if there were not at least some real agreement (*convenientia*) between God and creatures, His essence would not be the likeness of creatures, and then in knowing His own essence He would not know creatures; nor could we then apply to Him one of the names taken from creatures more properly than any other. So we must say that knowledge is predicated of God and us neither equivocally nor univocally, but analogously, i.e. according to proportion. But there are two kinds of agreement according to proportion, the first between things whose proportion to each other is from the fact that they have a determinate distance between each other, like that which the number two has to unity, i.e. double. The second kind of agreement is between two related proportions, and once again the example is mathematical: six has something in common with four because six: three = four: two. Nothing can be predicated analogously of God and creatures according to the first mode; for no creature has such a relation to God that it could determine the divine perfection. But in the second type of analogy, no definite relation is involved between the things which have something in common; the distance between them is preserved; so there is no reason why some name cannot be predicated of God in this manner. St. Thomas goes on to disallow improper proportionality or metaphor by showing that not all names taken from creatures can be properly predicated of God, but only those which imply nothing in their principal meaning which would prevent their being attributed to God. Such are, for instance, all those attributes which neither include any defect in their notion nor depend on matter for their act of existence, for example being, the good, and the like.

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[13] Cf. *ST*, I, 13, 4, and, *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.

[14] For a good outline of the various sorts, see Joseph Gredt, *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae* (Freiburg, 1932), II, pars 2, pp. 200-201.

[15] Fr. Descoqs also comes to the conclusion that the relation between God and His attributes is not quite so "fictive" as that between His essence and existence; his reason is that the foundation for a relation of God to an attribute such as wisdom is the knowledge we have of the effects of that wisdom, which corresponds to the knowledge we have of the effects of human wisdom. Cf. *Institutiones*, p. 270.

St. Thomas has here plainly spoken of an analogy of proportionality, proper proportionality in fact, although he does not use these names for it. He has not made explicit the way he would set up the terms in such an analogy, but it seems likely he meant something of the form, God is to His knowledge as we are to our knowledge; or possibly, God's knowledge is to His essence as our knowledge is to our essence. He has also, in the last sentence, casually mentioned that being and good are terms which qualify to be predicated of both God and creatures in a not improper way. Does this mean that we do finally have St. Thomas teaching, in this one instance, an analogy of proportionality in being between God and creatures?

This is indeed the obvious interpretation of the text. It can, however, be questioned; doubts may be raised, for instance, as to whether the paradigmatic inclusion of *ens* in the list of pure perfections at the end of the article automatically implies that it is also to be predicated proportionally. Such doubts are not really convincing, but they do indicate that this is no open and shut case. And even if the text is accepted at face value, as implying proportionality in being, difficulties do not disappear. We still must wonder why St. Thomas never again, as far as we know, made use of this particular analogy. And we can and should speculate on what exactly such an analogy can import in the whole framework of Thomistic natural theology. It is a dubious procedure to assert, "St. Thomas *should* have meant such-and-such in order to be consistent"; but neither can such considerations be summarily dismissed. Assuming then, (although not without hesitation) that St. Thomas in *De Ver.*, II, 11, is definitely teaching an analogy of proportionality in being between God and creatures; that he had a particular reason for preferring it at this time; but that he was not necessarily contradicting any of his most fundamental teachings expressed elsewhere on this subject; with such assumptions, a few final conjectures may be made.

First of all, if St. Thomas did intend to set up a proportionality of the form, God: His being : : creature: its being, it could not mean at all the same thing or serve the same purpose as a formally similar proportionality that stays within created being. The latter would state that this is the way categorical being *is*, i.e. diversely and proportionally participated in each instance because of the real distinction in every case between the essence and the act of being which is received in it. Such a proportionality indicates the ontological structure of created reality; being is always diverse yet is somehow common because it is always found according to a similar proportion of potency to act. But God is not a part of this ontological structure; He does not participate being; He is its principle, its cause. The proportional relation in created being is exactly the effect of its being created. We do predicate being "analogously" of God and creatures; but the basis for this is simply the causal relation between them; we are, and are said to be, because as effects we are somehow like our cause, Who Is. No creature can be, or be said to be, except as deriving from and imitating the First Being. "Creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit nec nominatur ens nisi inquantum ens primum imitatur."[16] This is the only metaphysical foundation for the predication of anything commonly of God and creatures; and thus it is perhaps clear why St. Thomas preferred, almost invariably, a "two-term analogy" i.e., one "according to the relation of a creature to God as its cause, in whom all the perfections of things exist pre-eminently"[17].

Then why could St. Thomas introduce an analogy of proportionality at all for the God/world predication, and in fact indicate clear preference for it, as he indisputably does in *De Ver.*, II, 11, if its logical form does not really indicate its ontological basis, which can still only be the direct causal relation? We can only surmise, but some reasons suggest themselves. Analogy stated as of two terms, one of which has reference to the other, is not without its own drawbacks; and one of these is that even when determinate distance between the two is denied and the *ratio* of proportion is extended to include any kind of relation whatsoever (a precaution which St. Thomas usually takes when he advocates *this* analogy for the God/world predication), the human mind finds it hard to keep this in clear focus. Stating the "agreement" between God and creatures in the logical form of a likeness of proportions safeguards our grasp of the infinite distance between the two members of the analogy. This is exactly the reason, and the only reason, which St. Thomas gives for preferring proportionality in *De Ver.*, II, 11, and also (although not in these places concerned with problems of predication) in *De Ver.*, II, 3, ad 4, and *De Ver.*, XXIII, 7, ad 9.

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[16] *In I Sent.*, prol., a. 2, ad 2; ed. Mandonnet.

[17] *ST.* I, 13, 5.

It may be noteworthy that he never gives as a reason for employing proportionality for the God/world predication that this shows that the analogated perfection is intrinsically present in each; this may be the reason why proportionality is preferable to express the real sameness-in-difference within created being (it is the reason St. Thomas gives why Aristotle preferred it in the case of the transcendental good); but such a consideration does not enter the picture here, where the inherent likeness based on the relation of effect to cause is already assumed. It is, I think, a fairly safe conclusion that St. Thomas was never fully satisfied with any one kind of analogy to express that limited something which we have in common with God, which prevents all our names for him from being purely equivocal. A look at the various and scattered texts dealing with this problem confirms this impression: in case after case, a different reason is given for rejecting one sort of analogy and making use of another. What he wants to express is inexpressible and logic and language go just so far.

Finally, then, to return to that aspect of the problem with which we began, this much may perhaps be said. If an analogy of proportionality when used to predicate being of God and creatures is only logically set up as a likeness of proportions in order to help us overcome certain of the problems involved in such predication, then the fact that the distinction which must be made on God's side of the analogy is only logical is not so great a difficulty; this proportionality is not like any other. We realize that the relation on God's side is only based on a distinction which our mind forces us to make; but we do not concentrate on the fact of the relation. We bear in mind constantly that all our proportionality can tell us is that God is in His own way, absolutely, infinitely, *per se*, *a se*, as cause of all being, and we in ours, by participation, finitely, proportionally.

The Ambiguities in Langland's Rat Parliament

ELISABETH M. ORSTEN

THE episode in which rats and mice fruitlessly decide to bell a cat, as incorporated into the Prologue of the B Text of *Piers Plowman*,[1] for long has been one of the great puzzles that Langland scholars encounter. Today it is still most commonly assumed that under guise of this old fable, the poet is actually writing about the Good Parliament of 1376. Whether or not this is so, it certainly seems obvious that his references point to some contemporary political events. Dr. Owst first drew our attention to the close connection between *Piers Plowman* and the pulpit literature of mediaeval England.[2] Following in the footsteps of Cardinal Gasquet, who had already called attention to Bishop Brinton's sermons,[3] Owst noted specifically a kinship of ideas between Langland and that outstanding fourteenth century preacher. This possible connection was further worked on by Sister Mary Aquinas Devlin[4] and by Miss Eleanor Kellogg.[5] Bishop Brinton seems to have had some influence on the political events of his time and, interestingly enough, he himself uses the fable of belling the cat when referring to the Good Parliament of 1376. Yet although the discovery of this sermons gives us a likely source for Langland's own use of the traditional story, it only deepens the puzzle. For if we interpret Langland's allegory as it is generally read, then the poet appears to say the direct contrary of that which the preacher implies. The present paper attempts to solve this dilemma by suggesting a different interpretation of the given material.[6]

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[1] B Prol. 146-209.

[2] G. R. Owst, *Preaching in Medieval England*, Cambridge, 1926; *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, Cambridge, 1933.

[3] F. A. Gasquet, 'A Forgotten English Preacher', Essay III in *The Old English Bible and other Essays*, London, 1908.

[4] Sister Mary Aquinas Devlin, 'Bishop Thomas Brunton and his Sermons,' *Speculum* 14 (1939) 324-44.

[5] Eleanor H. Kellogg, 'Bishop Brunton and the Fable of the Rats', *Mod. Lang. Pub.* 50 (1935) 57-68.

[6] Though I have arrived at these conclusions independently of Bernard F. Huppé's article on the date of the B-text (*Studies in Philol.* 38, 1941), I was greatly encouraged to discover belatedly that at least one authoritative voice had already been raised, calling attention to the wise mouse and relating him to John of Gaunt and the events of 1377. Prof. Huppé, however, is primarily concerned with the date of the text and hence does not go into the implications to be drawn from his interpretation in any great detail. Nor can I accept completely his view of the contemporary political events, as will become evident in my discussion of various individual items.

Considering our state of knowledge, it is impossible to decide what author, if any, led Langland to make use of the Rat Parliament fable. Bozon, Bromyard and Brinton are all possible choices. It is worthwhile to look at them once again, if only to get a certain perspective. However, the real key as to what Langland means must be sought in his own words. Perhaps a closer scrutiny of the poetic rhetoric can throw some interesting light on his concealed meaning as well as demonstrate that he is a far better craftsman than is commonly supposed.

The Rat Parliament is part of a lengthy interpolation into the original prologue. A better understanding of its meaning can be reached if we consider it first of all in the light of the whole interpolation. The dreamer, let us recall, finds himself in "a faire felde ful of folke" between "a toure on a toft" and "a depe dale binethe." In the earlier version of the A-text, Langland had devoted the rest of his prologue to a description of all the manner of men who inhabit this field. In the B-version later to be copied by C, he interrupts his roll-call just after having listed those members of the clergy who have deserted their cures and are serving wealthy lords in various administrative positions. He adds that he fears that Christ in His consistory will damn many of them. The word "consistorie" appears to be responsible for the turn the interpolation now takes. Langland talks first of all about the cardinals and *their* consistory to elect a pope. "This is a matter about which I could say a great deal more, but I'd better not", he concludes. His brief discussion of spiritual authority naturally leads him into a digression on temporal authority. According to his vision, there now comes a king on to the field, led by knights and commons. This king is given some very cryptic advice concerning the source of his power by a lunatic, an angel and a buffoon, and the Commons sum up the whole situation with an equally ambiguous outcry in which they insist that[7]

Precepta Regis sunt nobis vincula legis.

and of which the poet says "construe ho-so wolde." At this point the rats and mice run out to form their parliament but fail to achieve anything concrete. "What all this may mean", Langland comments, "I leave to you men who are merry to guess, for I dare not" — a statement not unlike the ones with which he has just concluded his observations on the cardinals and the outcry of the Commons. And having invited his audience to solve the riddle, Langland returns to the point at which he had departed from the A-version, to finish his enumeration of the folk in the field.

The questions that come to mind as one reads the account of the Rat Parliament are manifold. Huppé considers the B-text to date from 1377-78 and explains the irony and pessimism which he finds in it by the fact that the high expectations all England held in 1376 had by now shown themselves to be vain.[8] But if Langland, along with the rest of his countrymen, hoped for so much from the Parliament of 1376, why then, in relating what happened, would he end his fable in a way which seemed to condemn, *not* its subsequent failure, but rather its incipient actions? Is the cat John of Gaunt or Edward III? The point is relevant. If the cat is Edward, then Langland might well have had reservations about the Parliament of 1376, since attack on an anointed king was a very different matter from attack on anyone else, no matter how closely connected to the blood royal. Is the wise mouse who ends up by giving the Commons such very pragmatic and even cynical advice actually Langland himself, as has sometimes been thought? And if, as appears on the surface, there is really a contradiction involved in the whole account, is this intentional or a slip on the part of the poet?

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[7] B Prol. 145.

The historical events to which reference is being made here, can be summed up quite briefly. Edward III, having reigned almost fifty years, had become a helpless dotard, entirely under the thumb of his mistress, Alice Perrers. From 1369 on, the war with France had been going from bad to worse, and the Commons, who were getting very tired of supporting it, were looking for a scapegoat. The country, already overburdened by the cost of this useless war and further impoverished by several severe outbreaks of the plague, was being systematically plundered and exploited by a court party, a sort of inner clique, composed of Edward's favourites, who were supported by Alice and from 1375 on, were led by John of Gaunt. At any rate, this was the way in which the Commons viewed the matter. On 28th April 1376, Parliament met and sat until 11th July 1376. Under pressure from the Commons, who had secured sufficient support for themselves from the magnates, Latimer and Lyons, whom they considered the worst offenders, were impeached, and Alice Perrers lost her pension and was dismissed. Furthermore, a council was appointed by the House to direct the king. The leading part in all this unprecedented action was taken by Peter de la Mare, Speaker of the House and steward to the Earl of March. The latter, together with the King's eldest son, the beloved Black Prince, were regarded as the leaders of the popular movement, whatever little historical evidence there is for this view today. The Black Prince had already been rendered ineffective by illness and in the midst of the parliamentary debates, on the 8th of June, he died. Despite feeling that this weakened their cause considerably, the Commons pushed ahead and for the time being carried the day. Their attempt at reform was ambitious but unfortunately did not last. As soon as the House rose, there was no longer any enforcing body to carry out their policies. Factions quickly sprang up among the magnates. By the time that the next Parliament assembled on 27th January 1377, the work of its predecessor had already been undone, though John of Gaunt's responsibility for this remains a debated question. A few months later, on the 21st June 1377, Edward III died and left his throne to Richard II, the ten-year old son of the Black Prince. With a long minority in sight, the situation looked grim indeed. Matters did in fact get worse, until they culminated in 1381 with the Peasants' Rebellion. Yet we must not forget that for those who lived close to these events, there were breathing spaces and periods of renewed hope. Peter de la Mare, for instance, was released from prison as soon as Richard II ascended the throne, the occasion being celebrated with shouts of triumph.[9] And though January 1377 had marked the destruction of the 1376 ideals, by October of that same year, another Parliament was repairing the damage. In the light of these shifting events, one wonders just exactly at what date Langland felt impelled to set down his account of 1376 and how much of what occurred subsequently his reader needs to keep in mind.

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[8] Bernard F. Huppé, 'The Authorship of the A and B Texts of *Piers Plowman*', *Speculum* 22 (1947) 616.

The story, as it is told in lines 145-209, seems straightforward enough. The rats decide to bell the cat. Their courage is not equal to their inventiveness and no one can be found to carry out the proposed plan. Thereupon a mouse points out to the assembly that this is just as well, since without the cat to control them, matters would really be much worse. What we get then, is the fable of belling the cat extended into the sort of moral that might be drawn from the familiar proverb "When the cat's away, the mice will play."[10] On the surface, both elements are traditional and homely. But their juxtaposition does not make for a simple allegorical interpretation and Langland himself invites us to decipher some further ambiguity by his challenge "Guess what this means." For it is one thing to refrain from further expounding the failings of the cardinals who have power to elect a pope, if faith moves a man to accept this power, regardless of possible abuses. But it is quite another matter to express disapproval of a political institution which in any case has already fallen into disfavour — the position of the 1376 Parliament by 1377 — and then to claim "I dare not tell you what I mean." The phrase hints that the poet is voicing something other than the current sentiment.

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[9] Videres populum per civitates et vicos cum summo gaudio egredi in occursum ejus, et non minori plausu quam olim Beato Thomae, ab exsilio revertenti, dicere 'Benedictus qui venit in nomine Domini!' Londonienses autem et ipsi eum suscipientes, alacriter in donis variis et exenniis respexerunt. *Chronicon Angliae*, 150-51.

[10] S. Singer, in *Sprichwörter des Mittelalters*, Bern, 1944, vol. I, pp. 69-70, lists a number of Latin and French proverbs that express this particular idea and cites two English parallels: 'The Mows lord chypyth, per a cat ys nawt' (Förster Anglia 42, 201) and 'The mowse goth abrode, wher þe cat is not lorde' (Hills Commonplacebook 132). The proverb, with its basic folk wisdom, is obviously a very common one.

Unfortunately a rejection of the surface explanation plunges one immediately into a maze which is surely more intricate than Langland intended it to be. No doubt he was exploiting a definite political episode. But though it was a fairly common device to substitute animals with suitable charactistics for leading personages best left unnamed, the references did not tend to be so obscure that the point would be missed: sometimes quite the opposite effect could be achieved. In *Mum and the Sothsegger*, for example, the leading protagonists are usually named after the animals associated with their badges. We find the same device employed in a great many of the political poems collected by Wright. If the allusions seem obscure to us today, this is only because we are no longer familiar with the contemporary heraldry involved. Some such lack of knowledge may account in part for our inability to decipher Langland's meaning in the Prologue. Basically, however, we are troubled by the fact that he uses a common fable and attaches an entirely different moral to it. In every other account, the rats and mice are blamed for their lack of foresight; but that they are justified in seeking relief from an intolerable situation seems to be taken for granted. Langland alone questions their right to devise a plan for this purpose.

Though its origin is uncertain, the Rat Parliament fable was common enough throughout Europe. It seems to have made its earliest literary appearance in the work on the Phaedrus done by Walter of England and Odo of Cherington — both of them Englishmen. Walter, who wrote in the twelfth century, claimed to draw his Latin elegiac verses out of the tenth century prose fables of the mythical Romulus. In his poem, the parliament is composed entirely of mice. The poet heaps scorn on them for failing to achieve anything and adds sting to the mockery by incorporating Horace's well-known "Parturiunt montes: nascetur ridiculus mus" into his conclusion.[11] Odo of Cherington, in the early thirteenth century, tells the same story in prose. He too uses mice, but characteristically adds an anti-clerical moral to his tale.[12] It is possible that Langland became familiar with one or the other of these through some contemporary collection of fables. Baum suggests, for example, a fourteenth century version of the Ps. Gualterius Anglicus.[13] However, since we do not know what texts were available to Langland, such assumptions are entirely speculative. Considering the nature of the material, any popular vernacular version to which he might have had ready access is as likely a source as any.

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[11] L. Hervieux, *Les Fabulistes Latins, depuis le siècle d'Auguste jusqu'à la fin du moyen âge*, Paris, 1884, vol. 2, p. 425.

[12] *Ibid.* p. 633.

[13] Paul Franklin Baum, 'The Fable of Belling the Cat', *Mod. Lang. Notes*, 34 (1919), 464.

The earliest vernacular version of the Rat Parliament that we know comes from the pen of the Franciscan Nicolas Bozon and is dated shortly after 1320. It belongs to a series of moralised tales, written in the bad French prose then current in England. Bozon entitles this tale "Contra pusillanimes subditos et prelatos." As is his habit, he discusses first of all the moral which here concerns those, whether common people (les gentz cominaux) or prelates, who do not dare to stand up to their lords (les mestrez qe ont les autres engard) when their general welfare or religious matters are at stake. Then follows the fable. In Bozon's version, the mice hold their council much as in all the other accounts, except for the addition of one charming detail. The mouse who suggests that a bell be hung around Sir Bad's neck claims that thus they will honour him with an ornament as well as receive information of his coming.[14]

> Fet un: "Nous mettrons un campernole entour son col, q'il nus puisse par ceo garnir, e nus par taunt li honeroums e par ceo seroms de sa venue garniz."

The conclusion fits in with Bozon's previously developed moral reflections and is clearly applicable for political purposes.[15]

> Auxint plusurs en compaignie promettent de amender les outragez des sovereynz, més quant veient lur presence: "Clym! Clam! cat lep over dam!"

Now Nicolas Bozon is an Anglo-Norman poet whose spiritual duties kept him in the North of England, most likely in Nottinghamshire. On the surface, there seems to be no connection between him and Langland. However, quite unexpectedly, I have come upon an interesting link. Sister M. Amelia Klenke, who has made the most recent study of Friar Bozon, points out that Roger Conway, a Franciscan of the Worcester Convent and D.D. of Oxford, during the time that he was Minister General (1358-60), gave the Franciscans of Chester (who also belonged to his custody of Worcester) a manuscript containing the *Moralities* of Nicolas Bozon.[16] Sister Amelia mentions this fact to strengthen her own supposition that Bozon studied theology at Stamford and Oxford. This is no of concern to us here. The fact that the stories were to be found around Worcester is, however, interesting because of Langland's connection with the area. Hewlett assumes that Bozon's collection embodies the kernel of sermons which were actually preached in English, claiming that the text, with its liberal sprinkling of English proverbs, rhymes, jokes and slang, clearly proves this.[17] Thus, in the Worcester diocese, Bozon's stories might well have been retold orally or even have become known to Langland through some local manuscript copy. While in general Langland despises all friars, he would be sympathetic to Bozon who holds an outlook on life that is very similar to his own. The friar shows great sympathy for the poor and oppressed, though he too does not approve of those who are constantly trying to change their master. He believes that almsgiving in itself is insufficient, and that it must be coupled with bearing hardships for Christ. This is surely in harmony with the doctrine of suffering patiently as stressed in the *Vitae de Dowel* and *Dobet*. Also he shows the same distrust of the bourgeoisie as does Langland. It is certainly curious that the ornamental value of the cat's collar, of which Bozon alone seems to make use[18] turns up again in Langland's lines, as follows.[19]

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[14] *Les Contes Moralisés de Nicole Bozon*, ed. by Lucy Toulmin Smith and Paul Meyer, Société des Anciens Textes Français, Paris, 1889, pp. 143-45.

[15] *Ibid.* p. 145.

[16] *Three Saints' Lives by Nicholas Bozon*, ed. by Sister M. Amelia (Klenke) O.P., 1947, p. XXIX.

> "I haue ysein segges" quod he "in þe cite of London
> Beren biȝes ful briȝte abouten here nekkes,
> And some colers of crafty werk;"

Recalling these decorative necklaces leads the "raton of renon" to devise something for the cat which, though primarily useful, yet contains an element of the ornamental. For the bell is to be made of brass, or else "of briȝte siluer." Even if the evidence is not conclusive, the theory that Langland might be remembering this little detail from Friar Bozon is a tempting one.

Jusserand illustrated his discussion of the Rat Fable with the picture of some outsize rats hanging a cat, as taken from the misericord of a stall at Great Malvern. The location is interesting, since Langland opens his poem "on Maluerne hulles." However, the misericord dates from the fifteenth century, and in any case seems to point to a different fable, probably the one in which the cat pretends to hang himself so as to trap the cautious rats. The most that we can gather from it is that animal fables of this type were popular in Langland's native district.

The impact of mediaeval preaching is difficult to assess accurately today, but it appears to have been considerable, at least in the larger towns. Outlying country districts might not draw any well-known preacher, yet would depend on any wandering friar for news and views. That is why a work like the *Summa*

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[17] Maurice Hewlett, 'A Mediaeval Popular Preacher', *Nineteenth Century* XXVIII (1890), 473.

[18] See footnote 14.

[19] B Prol. 160-62.

Praedicantium by the English Dominican, John of Bromyard, is so influential. In this massive collection, a vast amount of homiletic and doctrinal material, profusely illustrated with suitable fables and anecdotes, is alphabetically arranged under subject headings for the use of preachers. Dr. Owst dates the *Summa Praedicantium* around 1360 and considers it a standard textbook of the period which "presents us with the gathered fruits of Mendicant preaching in England throughout the fourteenth century and even earlier."[20] Interestingly enough, when Bromyard uses the Rat Fable, he applies its moral somewhat differently, though in a way which is still in harmony with the story as a whole. The fable occurs in a discussion of clerical orders, under article VIII, entitled *Male ordinatorum vel ordinem exequentium periculum.* Bromyard complains that penances for clerics are not properly enforced and writes: "Comparing then, the decrees and sanctions of the fathers with our modern ones which are not put into effect, this situation is similar to what the old mouse said to the mice returning home from their parliament."[21] He then tells the story of a parliament composed entirely of mice. In this version, everyone is departing very pleased until an old mouse who had remained at home asks what has been decided and points out that no one has been appointed to carry out the proposed plan.[22] Thus Bromyard stresses the uselessness of making laws without providing for their execution but suggests that the laws are good in themselves. Considering that much of Langland's thought is drawn from contemporary sermons, it seems likely that a vernacular version based on Bozon or Bromyard is the source through which the poet became familiar with this particular animal fable and its moral application. However, there is still a wide gap between the use to which Langland put the story and the customary manner in which the fable was exploited.

Of all possible sources, the most interesting is surely the sermon by Bishop Brinton in which he seems to have applied the Rat Fable to the Good Parliament of 1376. Though attaching a different moral to his tale, Bishop Brinton seems to borrow the story itself from Bromyard, because he too talks of an old mouse who only learns what has happened when meeting everyone else on their way home. He differs from Bromyard and from all earlier writers in this, that whereas they all mention only *mice* in the parliament, Bishop Brinton speaks of both rats *and* mice, gathered together against a common enemy.

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[20] Owst, *Literature and Pulpit*, pp. 300-301.

[21] Comparans ergo antiquorum patrum decreta et sanctiones ad modernas que non fiunt executiones, congrue dici potest de his quod dixit antiquus mus muri de parlamento murium redeunti. *Summa praedicantium*, Nuremberg, 1485, O. VI, Ordo clericalis, art. VIII.

[22] Ergo parlamentum vestrum nihil valet: quia licet statutum illud ad perpetuam rei memoriam in se rationabile et nobis utile sit propter tamen executionis peribit defectum. *loc. cit.*

Langland does the same. Can any particular significance be attached to this distinction? Skeat thought that the rats — obviously larger and more powerful — stood for the burgesses and more important men comprising the Commons, whereas the smaller mice would be the less influential among them.[23] Some such division might seem reasonable, though there is no clear evidence that Langland made it. The distinction between magnates and Commons would be the most pleasing one, were it not for the fact that the "raton of renon" is presumably Sir Peter de la Mare, Speaker for the Parliament, who, though a distinguished figure, remains a member of the Commons. Is there any reason why he should be a rat rather than a mouse? Langland is unlikely to have had any pejorative purpose in mind, since derogatory meanings for the word "rat" curiously enough do not seem to appear before the sixteenth century.[24] The concept of an assembly presupposes variety and justifies the introduction of several different participants. Bozon, it is to be remembered, attempted to draw out of an assembly composed of only one species a moral which he wished to attach to two very different sorts of people. This is not altogether satisfactory. Presumably Bishop Brinton mentions rats and mice together because he instinctively recognises this. Langland, whether or not familiar with the Bozon version, would obviously prefer to follow the bishop's lead.

A further proof that Langland's juxtaposition of rats and mice need have no significance is found in the lack of distinction between them in various other mediaeval writers. An example of this is Odo of Cherington's fable concerning the cat who pretends to have reformed and puts on a religious habit. Odo launches into his tale with these words:[25]

> In quodam refectorio fuit quidam Murilegus, qui omnes Mures, excepto uno magno Ratone, cepit et interfecit.

This manner of considering rats and mice in one and the same category can also be seen very clearly in Vincent of Beauvais' *Speculum Doctrinale*, when he attempts to describe the animal world. In the chapter entitled "De Mure et Mustela," he begins by saying that the larger mice are called rats.[26]

> Est quoddam murium genus multo ceteris maius quos rattos appellamus.

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[23] Walter W. Skeat, ed., *The Vision of William Concerning Piers the Plowman in three parallel texts*, Oxford, 1886, vol. II, p. 17.

[24] The N.E.D. gives the earliest derogatory remark on rats in the phrase "to smell a rat" for 1550, and its earliest use as an opprobrious or familiar epithet for 1594. vol. VIII, p. 160.

[25] Hervieux, vol. II, p. 598, Odonis de Ceritona, II (XXXVII), "De quodam Murilego et Ratone."

[26] Lib. XVII, cap. 96.

Even Bromyard, whose parliament is composed entirely of mice, in one breath speaks of the "antiquus mus" and in the next of "glis" when describing the old mouse who was unable to attend the meeting.[27] Obviously, the writers of mediaeval fables did not go in for scientific niceties. Thus, though the fact that Langland uses both rats and mice in his parliament is of no particular significance in itself, it is interesting insofar as it reflects a likely borrowing from Bishop Brinton and provides a concrete reason for our assumption that he was familiar with the bishop's sermon.

Bishop Brinton's general character, the influence he exercised and the sermons he preached have been fully discussed by Sister M. Aquinas Devlin and by Eleanor H. Kellogg. Owst's equation of the bishop with Langland's angel who comes down from heaven and speaks Latin[28] strikes us as somewhat untenable and exaggerated today. However, we still recognise that Brinton is a most unusual and ideal prelate whose opinions coincide closely with those of Langland. Both think alike on matters pertaining to social justice, corruption in the government and in the Church, the duty of the clergy, the need for penance and reformation among all classes of society, and the cause of the poor. Bishop Brinton preached on a great many public occasions and kept more or less verbatim notes of what he said.[29] The sermon of particular interest to us here is no. 69, entitled "Dominica Quinta post Pascha." Miss Kellogg in her detailed study,[30] establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that this particular sermon, which contains the reference to the Rat Parliament, was preached on Sunday, May 18th 1376, while the deliberations of the Good Parliament were taking place. In it, Bishop Brinton denounces the corrupt state of the country with special reference to the misuse of secular and clerical authority, and praises Parliament for bringing this state of affairs to public notice.[31] He repeats Bromyard's warning that the creation of laws without providing sanctions is useless.[32]

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[27] Hoc igitur consilio inito et diffinito, muribus ad loca sua secure et gaudenter redeuntibu contigit quemdam redeuntem obviam habere glirem antiquum qui pre senectute ad consilium venire non potuit. Bromyard, *loc. cit.*

[28] R. G. Owst, 'The "Ange" and the "Goliardeys" of Langland's Prologue', *Mod. Lang. Rev.* 20 (1925), 270-79.

[29] These have been edited and published in the Camden Series under the title *Sermons of Thomas Brinton, Bishop of Rochester (1373-1389)* by Sister M. A. Devlin, 2 vols. in the Camden 3rd Series, vol. 85 and 86, London, 1954.

[30] See footnote 5.

[31] Secundo inter opera cetera in regno Anglie in retroactis temporibus attemptata iam pendet in manibus opus arduum et excellens ex eo quod ad parliamentum sunt vocati prelati, domini et communes ad tractandum et declarandum de regimine bono regni. *The Sermons of Thomas Brinton*, vol. 2, p. 316.

[32] *Op. cit.* p. 316.

> Sed quid proderit puncta parliamenti tractare et facta transgressorum publice declarare nisi post declaracionem sequatur penalis execucio debita in hac parte, cum frustra sint iura nisi sint qui iura debite exequantur?

Prelates, temporal lords, confessors and preachers, all are afraid to speak the truth and fail to support the kingdom and the parliament. Obviously referring to what has just occurred in the latter, the bishop notes that the Commons alone can not carry the burden of reform.[33] "Non sic, domini reuerendi," he cries out, "lest our parliament become comparable to the fabled parliament of rats and mice."[34] According to Miss Kellogg, this sermon was presumably preached in London, according to Sister M. Aquinas Devlin probably to a convocation of clergy. Previous to the bishop's address the Commons — through Sir Peter de la Mare — had already denounced the existing corruption in full Parliament and had forced the King to grant them a council of peers to advise with them. They met again the day after his sermon and within the following week banished Alice Perrers, removed the guilty officials, and chose a council for the king.[35] No one suggests that Bishop Brinton is responsible for these actions. But it cannot be denied that he encouraged them and that he held an influential position at the time.

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[33] Sister M. Aquinas Devlin, discussing the importance of Bishop Brinton's sermons in her introduction to the printed edition, especially notes Sermon 69. *Op. cit.* vol. I, p. xxvi.

[34] ...ne parliamentum nostrum comparetur fabuloso parliamento murium et ratonum, de quibus legitur quod cum in parliamento suo precipue ordinassent quod campanella cato cuilibet ad collum imponeretur vt mures ad campanelle sonitum premuniti ad sua possent confugere foramina satis tute, cuidam muri de parliamento reuertenti rato antiquissimus obuiauit. Cui noua inquirenti, cum mus veritatem negocii intimasset, intulit ille rato,'Ista ordinacio est optima si quis in parliamento est constitutus vt sit tanti negocii executor.' Et ille respondisset, 'Hoc non fuisse in parliamento diffinitum, et per consequens inualidum erat et inane.' *Op. cit.* vol. 2, p. 317.

[35] For a table giving the correct chronology, see E. H. Kellogg, *op. cit*, p. 65.

It should be noted here that Huppé interprets this matter somewhat differently. He writes: "But the Good Parliament, although it enthusiastically adopted the proposals of reform moved by the Speaker, Peter de la Mare, did not follow Bishop Brunton's advice and failed to make adequate provisions for the continued enforcement of its acts after its dissolution. Of this failure John of Gaunt, promptly upon its adjournment, took advantage." Huppé, 'The Date of the B-Test of *Piers Plowman*', p. 36.

According to Huppé, Langland, in reminding his audience of the bishop's unheeded warning, is underlining his ironic commentary.

How far John of Gaunt is to be blamed for everything and whether the 1376 Parliament could in fact have provided more adequate sanctions is a question for historians to settle. The point here is surely that Brinton addressed himself to prelates and clergy and stated specifically that the Commons could not manage on their own. He was *not* addressing himself to the Commons, and his warning was not intended for them. Langland, however, *is* discussing action taken by the Commons and would scarcely have thought reference to the Bishop's warning relevant at such a point.

Considering subject matter, place and speaker, it is clear that Bishop Brinton's sermon must have created a considerable stir, not necessarily commensurate with its direct political influence. Since Langland probably lived in London, he could easily have heard of it. All that we have so far discovered indicates that he takes his inspiration from the bishop. Yet, disconcertingly, despite their common sympathies, Langland's conclusion to this same tale bears a totally different moral application. Bishop Brinton had said in effect, "Let this be a lesson to you and *act*"; and Langland says, "Let this be a lesson to you and *don't* act." Now obviously, there is no positive proof that Langland really borrowed the story from the bishop, and even had he done so, this would not have obliged him to use the story in the same way. But a comparison of Langland's sentiments with extracts from the *Rotuli Parliamentorum* makes plain that he too was in sympathy with the reforms desired by the Good Parliament. Therefore it seems odd that his conclusion disapproves of the Commons' attempt to achieve this end.

> For-þi I conseille alle þe comune to lat þe catte worthe...
> For had ȝe rattes ȝoure wille ȝe couth nouȝt reule ȝoure-selve,

says the mouse,[36] who has the last word in the fable. We find ourselves protesting, "Langland can't mean what he says here!" And this brings us right back to the beginning of this paper and to the question of what Langland means.

There are two points which must be established if we wish to solve this problem. First, is Langland definitely talking about the Good Parliament of 1376, and secondly, is he in sympathy with what the mouse says? To the first question, only an affirmative answer seems historically possible. The rats and mice in council to limit someone's power, are obviously concerned with royal authority. The only concerted action of this kind can be attributed to the Parliament of 1376. It is not quite fair to say that it failed to bell the cat. Perhaps, more accurately expressed, the chain which it contrived, broke too easily. Still, a traditional fable that would fit the situation more precisely would be hard to come by, and the poet used what was at hand.

My second and chief point, that Langland's mouse is *not* his spokesman, I shall endeavour to establish in what follows. To do this, I am first considering the tenor of the remarks made by the rat who represents the opposition. Proposing his sovereign remedy, the "raton of renon" says that "reson me sheweth"[37] a course which will help and will be "for oure comune profit."[38] These terms are also used by the whole assembly. They hold a great deal of significance for Langland. Reason, for him, means more than the intellective faculty of the human mind; he considers it the guiding principle.[39]

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[36] B Prol. 187, 200.
[37] B Prol. 167.
[38] B Prol. 169.

> For riȝtful reson shulde rewle ȝow alle

Holy Church explains to the Dreamer in Passus I. The adjective "riȝtful" is here used for instruction and emphasis rather than with any intent of qualification. For Langland, reason is always "riȝtful." Those who do not live in accordance with its precepts, may lack reason or may deliberately disobey it, but they can not have *wrong* reason. The importance Langland attaches to reason is brought out very clearly in the trial scene of Lady Meed. Here we find Wit, Wisdom, Conscience and Reason. Wit and Wisdom have already been swayed over to Lady Meed's side. The King, owing to misguided direction, then orders Conscience to make his peace with the accused. Conscience refuses to do this, unless advised thereto by Reason. The King sends for Reason to rule the realm and to govern Conscience in accordance with his own wishes. Reason, however, stands firm. Thereupon the King finally sees his way clear through the maze, gives just judgement, and begs Reason to remain with him ever.[40] Langland's exaltation of reason seems here to be based on that mediaeval explanation of natural law which regarded it as a *lex indicativa* and held that God was a teacher, working by means of reason. Since natural law expressed itself predominantly through positive law, reason assumes an important role in the whole structure of society. I am not attempting here to make Langland into an out and out Realist. However, it seems reasonable to assume that, as in most matters, he accepts the current conservative position. In the scholastic controversy whether the essence of Law is Will or Reason, the prevailing opinion was of a mediating kind, such as is expressed by Thomas Aquinas and his school. This middle of the road view acknowledges the role of the will, but also places considerable emphasis on reason.[41] The raton, therefore, when enlisting the support of reason, is claiming the strongest possible sanction.

Of similar importance is the expression "comune profit," more happily rendered today as "common weal." It bears two interpretations in mediaeval thought, both of them relevant here. The more technical meaning is that of the body politic, the community. Thus we find that when Higden writes in his

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[39] B I, 55.

[40] B IV.

[41] An excellent discussion of the mediaeval concept of law is to be found in O. Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, edited and translated by Maitland, Cambridge, 1913. I have made particular use of pp. 73-87 and of footnote 256.

Polychronicon, "Cum instituisset Romulus rem publicam," Trevisa translates this as,[42]

> Whan Romulus hadde ordeyned for the comoun profiȝt...

The fifteenth century *Boke of Noblenes* is even more explicit on this point. Its author says[43]

> The terme of *Res publica* whiche is in Englisshe tong clepid a comyn profit.

In its wider interpretation, common profit stands for the general good or public welfare. We find this usage, for example, in the *Canterbury Tales*, when we learn that not only did Griselda discharge her wifely duties well,[44]

> But eek, whan that the cas requyred it,
> The commune profit coude she redresse.

In the proem of *The Parlement of Foules*, which deals with society as a whole, though not from Langland's point of view, Africanus tells Scipio that any man who "loveth comun profit" shall have eternal bliss.[45] Gower's use of the term fits both interpretations. Discussing the application of rhetoric, Genius says that when Catiline's treason was discovered in parliament,[46]

> Cillenus ferst his tale tolde
> To trouthe and as he was beholde
> The comun profit forto save...

Lastly, to link reason and common profit, we have Thomas Aquinas' well-known definition of law[47] which states that

> ...[lex] nihil est aliud quam quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata.

The raton of renon, then, in appealing to reason and claiming to work for the "comune profit," is using phrases calculated to win our approval. But can we give it, knowing that the rat is "most renable of tonge"?[48] Nowadays, with our distrust of the orator's skill, we tend to translate this phrase as "glib of tongue." "Eloquent," however, would be a more accurate rendering. In an age which laid great stress on good rhetoric, this was considered an accomplishment. Myrc asks his penitent,[49]

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[42] Higden, *Polychronicon*, Rolls Series 41, I, pp. 244-45.

[43] The above quotation is listed in the N.E.D. as occurring in the Bk. Noblesse 68 (*vide* "Common", 5b). Unfortunately I have not been able to verify it in Wyer's printed edition of 1550, *The boke of Noblenes*, which is the only version available to me.

[44] *The Clerkes Tale*, 430-31.

[45] *The Parlement of Foules*, 43-49.

[46] *Confessio Amantis*, Book VII, 1607-1609.

[47] *Summa Theologiae* I-II, 90, 4c.

[48] B Prol. 158.

> Hast þou also prowde I-be
> Of any vertu þat god ȝaf þe?
> ... for þow hast a renabulle tonge...

In *Ywaine and Gawaine*, Sir Colgrevance described the lady whom he met on a strange adventure in the following terms:[50]

> Hir maners might no man amend;
> Of tong she was trew and renable
> And of hir semblant soft and stabile.

Furthermore, renable and reasonable seem to be interchangeable words. Higden describes Henry II as "eloquens et litteratus", which Trevisa translates as[51]

> ...resonabel of speche and wel i-lettred

though there are manuscript variants which read "renable" and "renabel." The same is true of the Myrc text already quoted, as Skeat was quick to point out in his note on the B Prologue. He notes likewise that the C-Text of *Piers Plowman* has "resonable" in place of the "renable" found in our redaction.[52] From all this, we can deduce that the raton's personal character is not under question in any way. It should also be noted that before he had begun to speak, the rats and mice had already gathered[53]

> And comen to a conseille for here comune profit.

Hence he is not the first to raise the issues and can be cleared from the imputation of being a mere rabble-rouser.

To say that we can approve of the raton and his attempt to work for the common good is not synonymous with approving of the actual means which he proposes. In other words, was the so-called Good Parliament of 1376 really good? Would a man like Langland criticise it or accept it? A detailed analysis of the first question is best left to the constitutional historian. The following considerations, however, might be helpful here. Whatever view one takes of the whole proceedings, it is impossible to deny that the Commons took the initiative. Sir Peter's refusal to make his complaint before the House until the Commons had taken their rightful seat in it, and his insistence that he and his fellows would maintain the charge against Lord Latimer, clearly point to this.[54] Were they justified? Prof. Wilkinson feels that more than the question of proceedings and procedure was involved. He writes,[55]

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[49] Myrc, *Instructions for Parish Priests*, E.E.T.S., O.S. 31, ll. 1115-1120.

[50] *Ywaine and Gawaine*, as printed in J. Ritson, *Ancient English Metrical Romances*, E. & G. Goldsmid, Edinburgh, 1884, vol. I, ll. 208-210.

[51] Higden, *op. cit.* VIII, pp. 24-25.

[52] Skeat, *William Langland's Piers the Plowman in three parallel texts*, Oxford, 1886. Vol. II, p. 17, note 176.

[53] B Prol. 148.

> The immediate issue between John of Gaunt and Peter, we may perhaps guess, was not whether the Commons had a right to initiate these proceedings, or what particular form of procedure should be adopted, but whether the trial of the king's ministers on accusations of grave delinquency in their duties, was the concern primarily of the king (or his lieutenant) and the council, or whether it touched the welfare of the whole kingdom and was therefore the concern of all the assembly of parliament, representing in the words of Chief Justice Thorpe, "the body of the realm."

The Commons, of course, maintained that the matters they had raised did in fact pertain to the welfare of the whole realm — an instinctive reaction when public funds are involved. We can sympathise with John of Gaunt's anxiety for the prestige of the Crown. But it does not seem as if public opinion had supported him. Furthermore, it would have been impossible for the Commons to achieve their aim, had they not had strong backing from the lords. Tout wrote of the Good Parliament as follows,[56]

> It is immaterial to be meticulous as to the share which lords and commons took in its acts. It is vital to emphasize the solidarity of the whole parliament in the common cause of restoring order and sound rule.

This may overstress the opposite view, particularily because of the speed with which some of the magnates subsequently changed sides. Nevertheless, the basic assumption stands.

The 1376 Parliament, then, can claim to be as legal as any other. True, its successor held that it had prosecuted Latimer "par meins vrai suggestion & sanz due proces", that Lyons was sent to the Tower "par hastive proces", and that Alice Perrers was "par grante malice empeche al derrain Parlement."[57] But modern historians are much more inclined to find some grain of truth in this charge than Langland's contemporaries ever were. Indeed, the Parliament that followed in October 1377 reconfirmed some of the 1376 sentences. Langland, then, is being neither conservative nor revolutionary in his estimate of the situation, but reflects the average view which saw the Parliament of 1376 as Good, and the Parliament of January 1377 as Bad. Tout quotes the Anonimalle Chronicler, "Tiel parlement ne fuist unques oye avaunt" and adds,[58]

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[54] Among many other authorities, these points are briefly discussed by May McKisack, *The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399*, Oxford, 1959, pp. 389 and 390.

[55] Bertie Wilkinson, *Constitutional History of Medieval England 1216-1399*, London, 1952, vol. 2, p. 209.

[56] *Collected Papers of Thomas Frederick Tout*, Manchester, 1934, vol. 2, p. 180.

[57] *Rot. Parl.* LI Edward III, 1376-7; vol. 2, p. 374.

> To most men it was the "good parliament."

He mentions, too, the testimony of John Malvern as to Peter de la Mare's popularity and says,[59]

> It was always the popular favourite that was commemorated with song. Sir Peter is the first representative of the Commons in parliament on whom this honour has been bestowed. It shows that popular opinion was behind the Good Parliament, and that the commons' leader was its hero.

When men like Bishop Brinton, or that most conservative of monastic chroniclers, Thomas of Walsingham, could find no fault with the position of the Good Commons, it is unlikely that Langland would differ. Lastly, if we are presuming — as we must — that the poet lived much of his life in London, and recall the strained relationship that frequently existed between John of Gaunt and the Londoners, we need not wonder that Langland favoured the Commons against Gaunt.

What now of the cat, whom the Commons wish to bell? As Prof. McKisack writes,[60]

> The commons throughout maintained their role of prosecutors, though always careful to insist that they were acting on behalf of the king.

Claiming the king's authority is, of course, partly a useful pose. But it also made plain that despite this assault on the prestige of the Crown, no direct attack on the person of the king was intended. Therefore, if Langland is to reflect the attitude of the Good Parliament, then the cat obviously cannot be Edward III. Huppé observes furthermore that the cat is described as coming *from* the court; and such a phrase would not fit the person of the king. He writes,[61]

> Abstractly, [the cat] refers to the administration of the court's power, and from the time of the Good Parliament's dissolution, the actual possessor of that power was John of Gaunt.

The identity of Gaunt cannot be definitely established because Langland obviously felt that ambigity was the wiser course. Nevertheless, there is nothing against this theory. The later juxtaposition of cat and kitten does not necessarily imply a relationship of grandfather and grandson, i.e. Edward III and Richard II. It might equally well point to uncle and nephew. We must not forget that John of Gaunt was repeatedly suspected of seeking the crown for himself, however little foundations in fact these accusations held.

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[58] Tout, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

[59] Tout, *op. cit.* p. 180.

[60] McKisack, *op. cit.* p. 391.

[61] Huppé, "The Date of the B-Text of *Piers Plowman*," p. 38.

This brings us to the mouse, and to the question whether or not Langland sympathises with his opinions. Now the description of the rat had been quite objective. He was "a raton of renon most renable of tonge."[62] The mouse is presented much more subjectively; the Dreamer claims that he himself believed this mouse to be very wise.[63]

A mous þat moche good couth, as me thouȝte.

Langland, however, has been at pains to impress on us that the Dreamer is an unreliable person. We have only just met him,[64]

In habite as an heremite vnholy of werkes.

No one, as yet, has enlightened his ignorance. If we read on in the poem, we shall shortly find that he is still a long way from understanding the law of charity. The Dreamer's personal approval, therefore, may hint that the poet himself, in the light of his later, more profound, knowledge, disagrees.

As pointed out earlier in this paper, at the time Langland wrote, no pejorative connotations were attached to the word "rat." The same, however, is not true of the word "mouse." There were plenty of current proverbs which included the phrase "drunk as a mouse," or, as we find from a use of *circa* 1310, "drunk as a drowned mouse." Horace's "Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus" had even been expanded into a brief fable or two. In the *De Consolatione*, Fortune, wishing to make power-hungry man appear ridiculous, compared him to a power-hungry mouse. In Chaucer's translation, these lines read,[65]

> Now yif thow saye a mous amonges oother musus þat chalengede to hym selfward ryht and power ouer alle oother mysus how gret scorn woldistow han of hit.

Boethius was commonly known and popular during the Middle Ages. Consequently it is quite possible that Langland might have been acquainted with the text in question. His mouse who addresses an assembly of rats and mice on the subject of power politics fits in neatly with the above picture. Under guise of making a courageous stand, he really advises the course of least resistance, the coward's way out. This too is in accordance with the mediaeval image of the mouse as a symbol of little courage. We find, for example, that Chaucer writes in *Troilus and Criseyde*,[66]

Quod Pandarus thow wrecched mouses herte
Art þow a-garst so þat she wole þe byte?

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[62] B Prol. 158.
[63] B Prol. 182.
[64] B Prol. 3.
[65] Chaucer, Boethius, II, Pr. VI, 4.
[66] Chaucer, *Troilus and Criseyde*, III, 687.

Is Langland exploiting all these associations and commenting ironically on the mouse when he makes the creature,[67]

Stroke forth sternly and stode biform hem alle?

The mouse, then, might well be chosen very deliberately to oppose the raton of renon. What his mediaeval reputation suggests, his speech reveals. It is a good thing that your plan has been unsuccessful so far, says the mouse, and agitates for a strong rule, lest[68]

...many mannus malt we mys wolde destruye,
And also ȝe route of ratones rende mennes clothes.

Superficially, this is an argument for peace; but the peace for which the mouse appeals is slothful peace, willingness to compromise with evil through fear of the world. As Robertson and Huppé, who are the first to have recognised this, point out,[69]

> It is the peace which Christ denied when he said (Matt. 10,34), Non veni pacem mittere, sed gladium. The *Allegoriae in sacram scripturam* defines it as the peace of carnal consent: inordinate, false, wrongful and wicked... The mouse's appeal is based entirely on a concern for *temporalia*, food and clothing. He is willing to forget the principles of natural and Divine Law so that the rules may do "as hym-self wolde to do as hym liketh." The king may be placated with "venesoun." As for the mice and rats, they should forget the principle of charity, each devoting himself to *amor sui.*

The mouse argues further,[70]

For-thi vche a wise wiȝte I warne wite wel his owne.

Surely, "wite wel his owne", as used here, stands in direct contrast to the "comune profit" of the raton's speech. True, somewhat earlier, Langland had used almost the identical phrase in another context. When the hierarchical state was being established and each man had been allotted his task in it,[71]

þe kynge and þe comune and kynde witte þe thridde
Shope lawe & lewte eche man to knowe his owne.

But here it had been a question of recognising what one's duty was, in order to fulfill it. In the mouse's speech, to know one's own means to run no risks, to bury oneself in one's own comfortable little hole, disregarding the needs of all one's fellow creatures. As long as the cat is busy catching rabbits, argues the mouse, he will not bother us. Let the rabbits look after themselves![72]

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[67] B Prol. 183.

[68] B Prol. 197-98.

[69] D. W. Robertson, Jr. and Bernard F. Huppé, *Piers Plowman and Scriptural Tradition*, Princeton, 1951, pp. 31-32.

[70] B Prol. 207.

[71] B Prol. 121-22.

> Þe while he cacche conynges he coueiteth nouȝt owre caroyne.

The mouse delivers his speech in pompous, common-sense terms, well designed to hide the fact that he is a coward. To bolster his case, he appeals to authority.[73]

> ...I herde my Sire seyne

and again,[74]

> Þat witnisseth holiwrite who-so wil it rede.

Furthermore, he knows that a platitude which slips out casually, can make anything sound eminently sensible and true. Thus, he says glibly,[75]

> ...better is a litel losse þan a longe sorwe,

conveniently ignoring the fact that under his system there is no guarantee that the cat will not suddenly decide to switch his attention from rabbits to rats and mice. Who the rabbits are, we have no way of telling. My own guess is that they may represent the foreign merchants and craftsmen favoured by Edward III, or even the French with whom he was at war. Platitudes and proverbs are always useful to anyone who wishes to gloss over an unpleasant truth. The mouse pretends to be working for a sensible compromise while really advocating complete capitulation. With some justice, he claims that one cat would only be followed by another, who in his turn will[76]

> ...cracchy vs and al owre kynde.

Is he casting a long look back at Edward II's end? Probably this is merely the spiritless acceptance, characteristic of his generally pragmatic outlook: there will always be someone to rule the roost, and whoever is in power will abuse his privileges. The reference to the kitten which follows does not seem to fit entirely with the mouse's argument here nor to be very relevant. Why should belling the cat have evil consequences once the kitten assumes power? At the back of the mouse's mind may be the fear that Edward III cannot live much longer. Should Richard come to the throne as a child, then John of Gaunt would be the real ruler. And John would surely take this opportunity to avenge himself on the Good Commons. Such fear would certainly be in the air after the death of the Black Prince. Furthermore, the mouse's[77]

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[72] B Prol. 193.

[73] B Prol. 189.

[74] B Prol. 191.

[75] B Prol. 195.

[76] B Prol. 186.

> Þere þe catte is a kitoun þe courte is ful elyng

sounds like another piece of folkwisdom, and gives him an excuse for quoting scripture.[78] Since he has mentioned the kitten here, later on the mouse can make another reference to him, with less likelihood that it will be challenged. He protests that he wishes to hurt neither cat nor kitten.[79] This outcry is entirely gratuitous, because no one intended harm to the boy Richard. It is, however, a useful rhetorical device. The helpless kitten appeals to the council's sense of pathos and diverts their attention from the figures with whom they are really concerned. It is significant that precisely the same thing had occurred in the 1376 Parliament. In an effort do distract their attention, John of Gaunt had asked the Good Commons to discuss young Richard's right of succession. Even though this took place after the death of the Black Prince, the Commons paid no attention to John's red herring. Their reply was that this was none of their business and that that particular matter was in order and needed no discussion.[80]

The mouse ends his speech with a very effective gesture or largesse, saying,[81]

> "I sey for me," quod þe mous "I se so mykel after,
> Shal neuer þe cat ne þe kitoun bi my conseille be greued,
> Ne carpyng of þis coler þat costed me neuere
> And þouȝ it has coste me catel biknowen it I nolde,
> But suffre as hymself wolde to do as hym liketh.

The implied criticism is that anyone who refuses the new plan, will do so only because in his mean-minded way, he feels cheated of his money. The mouse, incidentally, leaves it somewhat uncertain whether or not he himself had contributed to the cost — a nice point, because very likely he had not. A bald lie would leave him too open to attack, whereas deliberate ambiguity serves his ends.

The mouse's aim is plain enough. But why allow him to have so much to say? This becomes easier to understand when we consider one other characteristic of his speech, not yet mentioned, namely the skillful exaggeration. The mouse's opening remark is, "Thouȝ we culled þe catte", when, in fact, there had been no previous talk of killing. Huppé argues that because of this, the mouse could not be speaking of the 1376 Parliament, but must be thinking of the storming of the Savoy Palace, when John of Gaunt would have lost his life, had the enraged crowd been able to lay hands on him.[82] Considered in isolation, this sounds plausible. But when the mouse's whole fabric of rhetoric is examined, one sees that it is decidedly to his advantage to paint the course of action against which he is arguing in as black a light as possible. This applies equally to the vehemence with which he declaims against the anarchy that would result, had rats and mice no cat to control them. Self-rule had never been the aim of the Good Commons, though the mouse pretends that this is what must be feared. Whatever other undercurrents are present, in terms of Langland's own disapproval of violence and knowledge of later events, the mouse's remarks, in terms of his whole speech, only make sense if we see in them criticism of the 1376 events. The mouse represents the 1377 view of 1376. He is a Gaunt-figure, out-Gaunting himself; as a Gaunt-figure with a justified grievance, he would lose his raison d'être.

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[77] B Prol. 190.

[78] B Prol. 192. In this connection, it is interesting that Sigrid Undset makes a similar use of this scriptural text when referring to the accession of a minor to the thrones of Norway and Sweden. In one of her historical novels, speaking of Magnus VII (1319-43), a character warns, "*Vae terrae, ubi puer rex est.* Which in the Norse tongue is: 'No resting o' nights for rats in the house where the cat's a kitten'." *Kristin Lavransdatter*, New York, 1946, vol. I, part III, p. 183.

[79] B Prol. 202.

[80] *Chronidon Angliae*, Rolls Series 64, pp. 92-93.

[81] B Prol. 201-205.

The above conclusion can all be clearly read out of the text. Skeat misread it, when he thought that the mouse stood for Langland himself. Not only would the poet be unlikely to praise his own wisdom, but the sentiments, as we have seen, are in conflict with his known beliefs. Skeat is obviously impressed by the force with which the mouse protests against self-rule, and later critics have followed in his wake. Even as eminent a scholar as Donaldson falls into this same trap. Trying to disentangle Langland's political views, he writes,[83]

> The only reason that may be sensibly assigned to B's insertion, and C's retention of the Rat Parliament in the Prologue is a dislike on their part of the idea of rule *by* the people — in the sense in which President Lincoln used the phrase.

As has already been pointed out, though all the vehemence can be explained in terms of the mouse's game, it is also quite true that the poet may be personally implicated in the energetic denunciations of violence. In view of the political unrest of the period, it seems quite possible that Langland's mind, as distinct from the mouse's, is in fact concerned with a genuine political uprising, such as the Londoners' attack on John of Gaunt in 1377, or the far more serious rebellion of 1381. The latter was in the air long before it actually took place. A man as generally sympathetic to the popular cause as was Bishop Brinton, vigorously denounced its participants for usurping to themselves a role that was not theirs. Everything that we know about Langland indicates that he would have taken the same line. There is no need to suppose that he is writing *after* 1381. All Londoners would have been aware of the political unrest and dissatisfaction in the city that led up to the Peasants' Rebellion. Presuming that Langland wrote after 1376 but before 1381, his words may contain a general warning.

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[82] Huppé, 'The Date of the B-Text of *Piers Plowman*', pp. 36-38.

[83] E. Talbot Donaldson, *Piers Plowman: the C-Text and Its Poet*, New Haven, 1949, p. 94.

Whatever wider concerns Langland may be touching upon incidentally, the main issue is between the rat and the mouse, and the latter's attitude to the events of 1376. On the surface, then, we have a fable directed against the ambitions of the Good Parliament. But a closer look at the mouse reveals that this is really a thinly veiled attack on John of Gaunt and on his Parliament of 1377. Such an interpretation might prove unsatisfactory to the historian. He may well object that the alleged villainy of John of Gaunt is a debatable matter and that the Commons of 1376 were really rather high-handed in their methods. But Langland is not writing history. He reflects the popular view of the period. It was Langland's fellow-citizens who dubbed the Parliament of 1376 the "Good", and who laid the blame for all of England's ills at the door of John of Gaunt.

From the historical point of view, one last matter needs consideration here. Too much can be made of the downfall of the Good Parliament. True, after it had dissolved on July 11th 1376, in the autumn of that same year John of Gaunt called a meeting of the Great Council to undo its work. And he was able to continue that same policy in the Parliament which met in January 1377, whose Speaker, Sir Thomas Hungerford, was one of Gaunt's officials. But this was only a temporary state of affairs. The next Parliament, which met on 13th October 1377, once again had Sir Peter de la Mare as its Speaker. Feeling against John of Gaunt had been running so high, that he took this occasion to stage a dramatic refutation in full Parliament, of all the accusations that were being spoken or whispered against his person. Furthermore, if we look at the council which was appointed during Richard's minority, we find that even the first council, appointed July 1377 by a meeting of the magnates, included the Bishop of London and the Earl of March, both considered supporters of the popular cause.[84] Presumably, it is during the brief period when Gaunt's power seemed in the ascendancy, that Langland wrote the whole interpolation of the B-Prologue, or at any rate, got his inspiration for it. But as Huppé so justly notes,[85] one should not forget that the complete poem is a very long one and must have taken a considerable time to write. Even if it was not completed by October 1377 — Huppé suggests the autumn of 1378 as the earliest *terminus ad quem*[86] — Langland might still have felt that his point was valid. Considering the shifting sands of English politics, there was no assurance the the so-called popular party had really achieved a lasting triumph, or that the 1376 reforms would be fully carried out. Though John of Gaunt's influence might be temporarily eclipsed at the time Langland completed his poem, he remained a figure to be reckoned with, and one feared by the common people. Langland's championship of the 1376 Parliament and his warning against opportunists who followed the principle of "amor sui", thus still held good. Running concurrently with this condemnation of bad authority, and equally needful in a fallen world, is the poet's personal caution that an abuse of power does not justify the opposite extreme of dispensing with authority altogether. As Holy Church teaches the Dreamer,[87]

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[84] N. B. Lewis, 'The "Continual Council" in the Early Years of Richard II, 1377-80', *E.H.R.* 41 (1926), 246-51.

[85] Huppé, 'The Date of the B-Text of *Piers Plowman*', pp. 40-41.

> Whan alle tresores aren tried...trewthe is þe best
> I do it on *deus caritas*.

Langland's truth is contained in a most closely woven web of poetic rhetoric and is intended for the reader who knows that he must seek it in charity.

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[86] *Ibid.* p. 44.

[87] B I, 85-86.

Unity and Essence in St Thomas Aquinas

JOSEPH OWENS, C. Ss. R.

I

THE transcendent properties of being, as is well enough known, follow for St Thomas Aquinas upon anything that can be conceived by the human intellect: "... every other object of the intellect is conceived as a being, and therefore as one, true and good."[1] Yet in his explanations the sequence of these properties upon the entitative constituents of a thing does not seem at first sight to be regarded in a uniform way. The entitative constituents are two, essence and existence. Both serve to denominate the same reality. What is signified by "being" (*ens*) in the concrete, coincides with what is signified by "thing."[2] As a being, the thing is denominated from its existential act (*esse*). As a thing, it is denominated from its essence. Both these constituents are present in every finite reality. Upon the existence of a thing, and not upon its essence, follow the transcendental properties of truth and goodness. In this teaching St Thomas is definite.[3] But is he so in regard to unity? Is he

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[1] *De Pot.*, IX, 7, ad arg. in contr.; tr. Dominican Frs. (London, 1934), III, 146. The full sentence in the Latin text reads: "Cum autem ens sit primum quod in intellectu concipitur oportet quod quidquid in intellectum cadit, intelligatur ut ens, et per consequens ut unum, verum et bonum". Ed. P. M. Pession (Turin, 1953), II, 244b.

"Transcendental" is a sixteenth century term; see Louis-Marie Régis, *L'Odyssée de la Métaphysique* (Montreal & Paris, 1949), p. 39, n. 47. As it is convenient, readily understood, and occasioning no difficulties, it may be used without scruple in a discussion of Thomistic problems.

[2] "Et ideo hoc nomen Ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia". St Thomas, *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, ed. Cathala-Spiazzi (Turin, 1950), no. 558. On signification *in abstracto* and *in concreto*, see *In Boeth. de Trin.*, c. II; ed, P. Mandonnet, *Opusc.* (Paris, 1927) I, 171. Adjectival forms like "white" signify in the concrete. Nouns like "whiteness" signify in the abstract. "Being" can signify either way. A discussion may be found in my article "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies*, XX (1958), 8-19.

[3] "...ratio veritatis fundatur in esse et non in quidditate,..." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. ad 7m; ed. Mandonnet, I, 489. Cf. *De Ver.*, I, 1, ad 3m in contr.; ed. Spiazzi (Turin, 1953), I, 4a. "...intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens; esse enim est actualitas omnis rei,..." *ST*, I, 5, 1c. "Essentialis enim bonitas non attenditur secundum considerationem naturae absolutam, sed secundum esse ispius; ... " *De Ver.*, XXI, 5c (2); ed, Spiazzi, I, 385a.

Similarly the beautiful may be understood as following upon existence: "The relational character of beauty is thus rooted in existence, in being." G.B. Phelan, "The Concept of Beauty in St. Thomas Aquinas," in *Aspects of the New Scholastic Philosophy*, ed. Charles not, rather, quite emphatic in saying that a thing is one through its substance,[4] or through its essence?[5] Does he not find a sharp difference between unity and goodness exactly from this viewpoint? In contrast to the good, "it makes no difference to the one whether it be referred to essence or to existence. Hence the essence of a thing is one of itself, not because of its act of existing;..."[6] This text seems quite explicit in asserting a unity in the thing regardless of its existential act. The doctrine, it would appear, is that the essence of a thing is one just as an essence, even though just as an essence it could not be termed good.

On the other hand, actuation by existence seems required emphatically enough by St Thomas for the categorical assertion that an essence is one: "... it cannot be absolutely called one essence, except where there is one existence; and this is where it is numerically the same essence."[7] Restricted types of unity, for example unity in quantity and unity in a species, are allowed to real things irrespective of their multiplicity in being. But unity in essence as such, in essence that has existence as its proper act, seems denied them. An essence, according to this text, can be one as essence only through actuation by existence. Only through existential act, therefore, will it have any unity that could be called transcendental.

The difficulties increase when the doctrine of St Thomas concerning essence in abstraction from existence is taken into consideration. Without existence, an essence has no unity. The denial seems categorical enough: "If some one

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A. Hart (New York, etc., 1932), p. 131. Cf. Umberto Eco, *Il Problema Estetico in San Tommaso* (Turin, 1956), p. 62.

[4] "... quaelibet res est una per suam substantiam." *ST*, I, 11, ad lm. "... licet omne ens sit unum per suam substantiam,..." Ibid., 4, ad 3m. "...quod substantia rei sit una et ens per seipsam,..." *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, no. 555.

[5] "Cum enim unum sit quod est indivisum in se et divisum ab aliis, unumquodque autem creatum per essentiam suam distinguatur ab aliis; ipsa essentia creati, secundum quod est indivisum in se et distinguens ab aliis, est unitas ejus,..." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2m; ed. Mandonnet, I, 481. "... unaquaeque res per suam essentiam est una." *De Ver.*, XXI, 5, arg. 7; ed. Spiazzi, I, 384 b. "... ut scilicet ens ipsum dicatur unum per essentiam,..." *Quodl.* X, lc; ed. Spiazzi (Turin, 1956), 196 b. "... una per essentiam suam,..." *De Pot.*, IX, 7, arg. 8 in contr.; ed. Pession, II, 241b. "Dicendum quod unum non importat rationem perfectionis, sed indivisionis tantum, quae unicuique rei competit secundum suam essentiam. ... Et ideo oportet quod quaelibet res sit una per suam essentiam: non autem bona, ut ostensum est." *ST*, I, 6, 3, ad 1m; cf. 11, 4, arg. 3."... et sic unaquaeque res est una per suam essentiam,..." *In III Metaph.*, lect. 12, no. 501. "Est enim unum ens indivisum. Idem autem est quod habet essentiam et quidditatem per illam essentiam, et quod est in se indivisum." *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, no. 553. See also texts infra, n. 18.

[6] *De Ver.*, XXI, 5, ad 8m; tr. Robert W. Schmidt, in *Truth* (Chicago, 1954), III, 27. Latin text infra, at n. 34.

[7] *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 461. Latin text infra, at n. 12.

should ask, then, whether the nature so considered can be called *one* or *many*, neither should be granted, because both are outside the concept of humanity and both can be added to it."[8] Unity is not included in the essence. But it can be added to the essence, and so is not excluded. Of itself, then, an essence is neither one nor not one. Only when it receives existence, apparently, will the aspect of unity follow.

The two alternatives, accordingly, seem clear enough and at first sight contrary enough. On the one hand, essence alone seems sufficient to guarantee unity to a thing. On the other hand, existence seems required for the assertion of any transcendental unity whatsoever. The problem, moreover, is not without its importance. The issues involved in the question of essence and unity lie deep in Thomistic metaphysics. They are concerned with the point of radical divergence between St Thomas and Duns Scotus, on the metaphysical plane. For Scotus, every finite nature has a unity of its own. That unity is not individual unity. It is a lesser unity than numerical unity, but it is none the less real and present in things regardless of human consideration. It antecedes both the unity of the individual and the unity of the universal. It is the real foundation of the universal. It belongs to the thing's nature in priority to the nature's existence in the individual real thing and to the nature's existence in the mind as universal. It is a unity that prevents the common nature from being predicated of the individual in any way that would make the nature as such completely identical with the individual.

For St Thomas, on the contrary, the nature as such is predicated of each individual in strict identity. The one is the other. The essence considered just in itself is in no way set up as a unity. It can be many in different individuals, it can be one in the human intellect as a universal. But of itself it is neither one nor not one. In its absolute consideration it does not constitute a unit. If it had any unity of its own, it would inevitably have some being of its own, as the reasoning of Duns Scotus shows clearly.[9] It would require in the metaphysics of St Thomas an essential being (*esse essentiae*), distinct either really or conceptually from existence. Does not St Thomas' doctrine, however, repeatedly and unequivocally maintain that in creatures essence is other than being? To introduce any being into the essence just in itself would seem to undermine the whole metaphysical structure of St Thomas at its deepest foundations. Such "essential being" would seem to destroy completely what is most characteristic of his procedure in the science, and do away with its radical distinction from all other metaphysics.

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[8] *De Ente et Essentia*, c. III; ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, reprint (Paris, 1948), pp. 24. 10-13. Tr. A. Maurer, *On Being and Essence* (Toronto, 1949), p. 40.

[9] "Sicut unitas in communi per se consequitur entitatem in communi, ita quaecumque unitas per se consequitur aliquam *entitatem*;..." *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 3, q. 5 & 6, no. 9; ed. M. F. Garcia (Quaracchi, 1912-1914), II, 264 (no. 285a). "Contra, illud quo aliquod ens habet entitatem, eo, tamquam fundamento proximo unitatis, est unum unitate correspondente tali entitati,..." *Quodl.*, III, no. 5; ed. Vivès (Paris, 1891-1895), XXV, 122a. For a short sketch of the general problem and its Avicennian background, see my article "Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics," *Mediaeval Studies*, XIX (1957), 1-14.

The question of essence and unity, therefore, has its place in a study of the doctrine of St Thomas. The pertinent texts, however, are few and scattered, and on the surface they may perhaps seem none too definite. St Thomas did not live long enough to confront his metaphysics with the minor unity and corresponding entity of Duns Scotus. The question, accordingly, was not an issue with him. It would be too much to expect passages geared to meet the problem. But the importance of the topic suggests that the scattered texts concerning it be examined carefully. If their implications are followed out and weighed in the general context of St Thomas' basic principles, they should be sufficient to make manifest whether or not difference between unity and the other transcendentals plays any significant role in his general metaphysical procedure.

II

The *De Ente et Essentia*, as has just been noted,[10] is definite enough in denying both unity and plurality to essence considered absolutely in itself. This doctrine, however, is developed quite closely against an Avicennian background. In Avicenna, the unity denied to essence as such had, according to the Latin translation, the status of an accidental property. The possibility that a generic or specific unity might be involved in that essence, does not seem to have troubled the Arabian philosopher. But after the awakening of interest in the transcendent properties of being during the thirteenth century, it was a question that could hardly be avoided. Duns Scotus did in point of fact develop the Avicennian doctrine along the lines of a specific unity that necessarily followed upon the reality and entity proper to the essence as such.[11] Why could not St Thomas have interpreted Avicenna in the same way? Could he not have meant that numerical unity was denied to essence as such, without at all excluding a specific unity really present in things? Could not he too, like Scotus, allow the essence a formal unity of its own, even while asserting against the same Avicennian background that essence absolutely considered is neither one nor many?

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[10] Text supra, at n. 8.

[11] "Qualiter autem potest hoc intelligi, potest aequaliter videri per dictum Avicennae, V. *Metaph.*, ubi vult quod *equinitas sit tantum equinitas, nec ex se una, nec plures, nec universalis, nec particularis.* Intellige, non est ex se una unitate numerali; nec plures, pluralitate opposita illi unitati; nec universalis actu, eo modo quo aliquid est universale factum ab intellectu, non ut obiectum intellectus; nec est particularis de se;... in rerum natura secundum illam entitatem habet verum esse extra animam reale; et secundum illam entitatem habet *unitatem* sibi proportionabilem,..." *Op. Ox.*, II, d. 3, q. 1, no. 7; ed. Garcia, II, 228-230 (no. 235).

An immediate difficulty in limiting this denial of unity to numerical unity is that St Thomas himself, as the text in the *De Ente* continues, is understanding the denial in a broader sense. His argument indicates that he means unity without any restriction. The reason why universality does not belong to essence as such, he explains, is that neither community nor unity can belong to essence in its absolute consideration:

> Non tamen potest dici quod ratio uniuersalis conueniat nature sic accepte, quia de ratione uniuersalis est communitas et unitas, nature autem humane neutrum horum conuenit secundum absolutam suam considerationem (c. III; ed. Roland-Gosselin, pp. 26.11-27.2).

The unity denied to a nature in this reasoning is not just individual unity, but the unity that belongs to a universal as such. The reasoning is that essence as such cannot be universal, because a universal has a unity of its own. The essence absolutely considered has no unity. Therefore it cannot be universal. The demonstrative force of the argument rests on the tenet that essence as such has no unity of any kind. Therefore any unity, for instance that of the universal, can be straightway denied it. Unity in all its generality has to be meant for the cogency of the argument. Even though essence in point of fact is common, since it is shared by many individuals, community does notbelong to it as such. It would remain unchanged in itself, even though in point of fact it were possessed by only one individual and so lacked community. Correspondingly, even though the essence in point of fact is always found with some kind of unity, for it has numerical unity in individuals and the unity of a universal in the mind, in its absolute consideration no unity whatsoever seems allowed to it in the reasoning of St Thomas in the *De Ente et Essentia.*

Does the text cited above from the commentary on the *Sentences* require the same interpretation? Does it exclude all unity, or just numerical unity? Can it be understood in a way that would allow a lesser unity than individual unity to an essence shared by different individuals? The text reads:

> In aliis enim aequalibus non est eadem quantitas secundum essentiam, sed solummodo secundum commensurationem; et similiter una qualitas secundum speciem; quia in eis est aliud qualitas et essentia, quae respicit esse sicut actum proprium. Qualitas autem vel quantitas non dicitur per respectum ad esse, sed tantum dicunt quidditatem alicujus generis. Unde potest dici una quantitas ubi non est unum esse; sed non potest dici una essentia absolute, nisi ubi est unum esse; et hoc est ubi est eadem essentia secundum numerum. Et inde est quod ad rationem aequalitatis, unitas secundum numerum non requiritur;...[12]

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[12] *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 461.

The reference is to equal things outside God. Because equal, such things may be termed the same in quantity. In that sense they have the one quantity. But that does not at all mean that there is present a quantitative essence that is one. The unity does not apply to the essence of the quantity as such. It does not mean that the many equal things are actuated by one and the same accidental essence in the category of quantity. It does not involve any transcendental unity that would follow upon essence as such. It expresses rather a type of unity peculiar to one category of being. It is merely a unity of quantitative measurement, and not at all a unity of essence. It is a predicamental unity, not transcendental unity.

Like considerations hold in regard to the category of quality. Similar things, as similar, share the same specific quality. All red things, if an example may be supplied, can be regarded as one in their redness. Specifically, there is only the one quality, redness, involved. But again, this unity in quality is not a unity in essence. From the viewpoint of essence, the proper potency to existence, arises the question of a unity that is transcendent. That viewpoint is not found in a unity based on quantity or on the specific character of a quality. From the standpoint of quantity or quality there is only a type of unity peculiar to a definite category, and so not transcendental unity. Specific unity, this reasoning implies, is not enough to require any proper unity in an essence as such.

The result is, then, that in an absolute sense there can be a unity of essence only where there is one existential act. The existential act will make the essence one, and will always bring with it a numerical unity, or at least an individual unity.[13] Any unity of essence as essence, accordingly, seems excluded by this text. Besides the unity that comes with existence, only accidental types of unity, and not transcendental unity, are allowed to essence as such. A formal unity of essence, even though lesser than numerical unity, would make the essence one in abstraction from existence. But any unity that is independent of unity in existence seems denied to essence by the text of this article from the commentary on the *Sentences*.

In the reply to one of the arguments in the article, the accidental unity implied by equality, and by similarity and specific identity in the real world, is distinguished even more clearly from unity in essence or existence:

> ... et quia in rebus creatis ... unitas essentiae non est nisi in eodem supposito; ideo identitas nullam importat distinctionem in supposito, sed

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[13] Cf.: "Unde manifestum est quod esse cuiuslibet rei consistit in indivisione. Et inde est quod unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam unitatem." *ST*, I, 11, 1c. I have gathered and discussed Thomistic texts on the composing or unifying function of existence, in "Diversity and Community of Being in St Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies*, XXII (1960), 282-297. On the being acquired by a nature in the intellect, see St Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia*, c. III; ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 28, 11-15.

> magis unitatem... Aequalitas vero et similitudo, quae important unitatem quantitatis vel qualitatis non secundum essentiam vel esse, quantum est de sui significatione, non important unitatem quantitatis vel qualitatis in numero; sed sufficit quod sint idem specie. Haec autem unitas est in diversis suppositis:... (ibid., ad 2m; p. 462).

Any unity of essence, according to this reply, has to be found in the same supposit. Outside individual unity there is no room for any real unity of essence as such in created things. Unity in quantity or quality, on the other hand, is neither a unity in essence nor a unity in existence. Rather, it involves different supposits, and so does not satisfy the requirement for unity in essence.

A specific unity of real things, accordingly, is not a unity of essence as such. The real things coincide not in transcendental unity, but merely in a unity of real similarity or equality. They are not really united in essence, even though they participate the same essence absolutely considered. The real unity in which they coincide is reduced to certain accidental categories, and not to essence in its generality. The same essence, though participated by many individuals, has apparently no unity of its own that it would confer upon its subjects.

But how is the thoroughgoing lack of unity in essence as such to be understood? Does it mean that the characteristics in the essence "three sided plane figure" enjoy no greater unity than those in the combination "square circle"? Have the notes "animal" and "rational" no more unity in the essence "man" than have "horse" and "man" in "centaur"? Apart from existence in individuals and existence in the mind, do not the notes in an essence give rise to a specific unity that blocks off and distinguishes one essence from another? Does not the one definition, which expresses the essence, imply a unity of essence as such?

The objections to any unity at all in the essence considered just in itself, that is, in abstraction from existence in individuals and existence in the mind, spring from the consideration of its total lack of being. Without one or the other of those existences the essence would be actually nothing. There would be nothing there to have unity. "Man" and "horse" considered just in themselves as essences abstract from any being and from any not-being. They are open to either. Of themselves they do not actually determine whether or not each is the other. In abstraction from being, the essence "man" does not make manifest whether it is or is not "horse." No "is" or "is not" is attached to it. But once something *is* a man, it cannot be a horse. The essence "square," considered just in itself, does not actually determine whether it is or is not circular. Once being is added to it, however, it lines up definitely on one side of a contradiction. Existence will compose the two characteristics "three sided" and "plane figure." But no existence will compose in an essence the notes "two sided only" and "plane figure." Rather, existence separates them.

Nor will any existential act, either real or intentional, compose the characteristics "man" and "horse" into a real thing. Centaurs, square circles, plane figures with only two sides, just are not essences.[14] They are not potencies to real existence.

An essence, on the other hand, is a potency to real existence. By the same token, it is a potency to real unity. In that way an essence is distinguished from all combinations of notes that can never come into real existence. The latter combinations exclude real being. An essence as such does not exclude real being, even though as such it does not include being. It is able to be. Just as it is able to be, so is it able to be one. But absolutely considered, it has no being, either real or cognitional. In itself, likewise, it has absolutely considered no unity. It has no real unity, like the unity of the individual. It has no cognitional unity, like the unity of the universal. Nor has it any further type of unity that would be different from both the unity of the individual and the unity of the universal, according to the doctrine of the above texts.

The difficulties in grasping this doctrine arise from unwitting attempts to give the essence in its absolute consideration some being of its own. An effort is almost unavoidably made, unless you are on guard against it, to represent the essence absolutely considered as though it were an object directly present before the mind's gaze. So to represent it is of course to regard it as enjoying some kind of being. The effort tries to give it a type of being that would abstract from both existence in reality and existence in the mind. That means conferring upon it an "essential being" (*esse essentiae*) distinct from any existence. But for St Thomas the essence in its absolute consideration explicitly abstracts from all being (*esse*) whatsoever. The essence just in itself is merely a consideration, not a being. It is a consideration arrived at as a conclusion from understanding that the essence known in one individual is the specific essence that is known in another individual and that is also present in the mind's cognition. Since this essence as such can be in reality without being in the mind, and can be in one individual without existing in another, it is understood as not tied down to any one existence whatsoever. In that way it is considered in abstraction from all existential act. But that does not in any way mean that it can ever be except by virtue of one or the other existential act. As found in reality, it is individuated. As found in the mind, it is universalized. In each of these cases it has a unity corresponding to its respective existence. But considered in itself it has no being and no unity whatsoever.

These considerations reinforce the emphasis on the inevitable concomitance of unity and being. Wherever there is unity, there will a corresponding being upon which the unity follows. To make the essence absolutely considered a direct object of human intellection is of course to confer a unity upon it. In representing it thereby as though it has a unity of its own, the mind cannot avoid endowing it with "essential being" (*esse essentiale*). If the essence in abstraction from all existence has unity of its own, it will by the same token have being of its own.

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[14] See *De Ente et Essentia*, c. I; ed. Roland-Gosselin, pp. 3.7-11. From this viewpoint contradictions come under negations, since in them one note negates the other.

III

But if this is his authentic teaching on essence as such, why did St Thomas say even once that "the essence of a thing is one of itself, not because of its act of existing"? What was the meaning of that assertion in its own context? What was its purpose? It was made in connection with the traditionally authoritative teaching that finite things are good not through their essence but only by participation. In the tradition of Aristotle and Averroes a thing is one, on the contrary, not by any participation in a unity other than its substance but rather through its very essence. Concerning the good, St Thomas is reasoning against the background of three authoritative traditions, coming down respectively under the names of Augustine, Boethius, and the Neoplatonic *Liber de Causis*. All three maintain in one way or another that no creature is essentially good. If a creature is in fact good, it is not through essence but through some kind of participation. In three ways, St Thomas himself argues, an essence requires participation in order to be good. First, it has to have its accidents. Although a thing is absolutely being through its substance, it is not absolutely good unless it possesses its required accidents. This, he claims, is what St Augustine appears to mean. Secondly, the actuality implied by goodness demands existence, but in creatures existence is a participated act. This seems to be the meaning of the *Liber de Causis*. Thirdly, goodness in creatures has the aspect of final causality exercised in subordination to God as ultimate end, and so involves participation. This seems to be the meaning of Boethius.[15] All three types of participation are required for the goodness, in an absolute sense, of a creature. In this context the possession of accidents is tacitly regarded as a participation in them.

In the reply to this article's second argument, St Thomas asserts that a thing has a restricted type of goodness from the same source through which it has its existence. According to the argument, a thing has both existence and goodness from the same source. But it has existence through its essence. Therefore it should be good through its essence.[16] The reply grants without embarrassment that through having existence a thing is good, and that consequently it has this goodness through its essence. But such goodness is only the goodness consequent upon substantial being. It is not goodness in an absolute sense, but merely in a restricted way (*secundum quid*). From a *formal* viewpoint, therefore, a thing does not have being and goodness from one and the same source; it does not have them both from its essence.[17]

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[15] *De Ver.*, XXI, 5c. Cf. *ST*, I, 6, 3c; *CG*, I, 38; *Compend. Theol.*, I, 109.

[16] "Sed creatura habet esse per suam essentiam. Ergo est bona per suam essentiam." *De Ver.*, XXI, 5, arg. 2. For other texts stating that existence is had through the form, see infra, n. 18.

This reply helps to locate the present discussion against its proper background. It is in a setting in which existence is had through a thing's essence — an authentic enough Thomistic teaching.[18] The goodness that is involved in substantial existence is accordingly had through the essence. Indirectly, that is, through existence, it follows upon essence. To this extent St Thomas has no hesitation in admitting that a thing is even good through its essence. But that is not, for a creature, goodness in an absolute sense. It does not suffice for a straightforward answer to the unqualified interrogation "Is the thing good?" A horse, though blind and with broken wind and lame legs, is substantially good as long as it is alive. But it would hardly merit an affirmative answer to the query "Is it a good horse?" From a formal viewpoint, then, a thing is not said to be good through its essence. It has to have the superadded perfections of the required accidents and a reference to God as first principle, a reference that is other than itself.[19] The traditional way of declaring that a creature is good not through its essence but by participation, is therefore safeguarded in a doctrine according to which existence is had through essence.

Moreover, even the goodness that is involved in a creature's substantial existence has to be viewed as participated, since the existence itself is participated.[20] As a creature has existence by participation, so is it substantially good by participation.[21] Even when regarded as following upon substantial existence, the restricted type of goodness that is had through essence may be understood as a participated aspect. Existence, in this setting, may be looked upon indifferently as had by a thing through its essence or as had by participation. But goodness, except in the one restricted and indirect sense, is regarded as had through participation only. In the restricted sense in which it is involved in substantial being, goodness is a positive aspect that follows upon the existence a thing has through essence. But this viewpoint is patently indirect. Only because the thing's existence is had through its essence may substantial goodness be regarded as flowing from the essence. This is not because of any formal requirement that pertains directly to goodness. Understood in itself, without qualification, goodness allows only the assertion that it is had by participation. The traditional way of speaking is accordingly upheld in the metaphysics of St Thomas.

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[17] "... ab eo a quo res habet esse, habet esse bonum *secundum quid*, scilicet secundum esse substantiale; non autem ab eo formaliter habet esse *simpliciter*, et esse bonum *simpliciter*,... *De Ver.*, XXI, 5, ad 2m. Cf. ad 1m.

[18] "Ab eodem aliquid habet esse et unitatem:... Cum a forma unaquaeque res habeat esse, a forma etiam habebit unitatem." *CG*, II, 58, Praeterea. "Ab eodem aliquid habet esse et unitatem: ... Sed unumquodque habet esse per suam formam." *CG*, II, 73, Amplius. "Nihil enim est simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet res esse; ab eodem enim habet res quod sit ens, et quod sit una; ..." *ST*, I, 76, 3c. "Cuius ratio est, quia sic dicitur aliquid unum, quomodo et ens. Forma autem per seipsam facit rem esse in actu, cum per essentiam suam sit actus; nec dat esse per aliquod medium." *ST*, I, 76, 7c. "... esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito tamen influxu Dei:..." *ST*, 104, 1, ad lm. "... essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse." *De Ente*, c. I; ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 4.15-16. "... essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur. ...quamuis huius esse suo modo forma sit causa." *De Ente*, c. II; p. 10.4-7. "Esse enim rei... quasi constituitur per principia essentiae." *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, (ed. Cathala-Spizzi) no. 558.

[19] "... secundum perfectiones superadditas, in quibus consistit bonitas absoluta... Et praeterea ipse respectus quo essentia rei refertur ad Deum ut ad principium, est aliud quam essentia." *De Ver.*, XXI, 5, ad 5m. "... praesupposito ordine ad primum esse per se subsistens." Ibid., ad 1m.

In the replies to the last two arguments (ad 7m, ad 8m) the express contrast with unity enters the discussion. The seventh argument, with explicit reference to Averroes, claimed that everything is one by its essence. Therefore a thing should be good through its essence. The reply to this argument asserts that transcendental unity adds only the aspect of a negation to being. The good, on the other hand, does not add a negation but consists in a positive aspect. Therefore the two cases are not parallel.[22] That everything is one through its essence, accordingly, does not imply that everything is good through its essence.

What is the background against which this argument is drawn up? Averroes is mentioned, both here and in the reply to the eighth argument, in the setting of a controversy that goes back to Aristotle. In Book Gamma of the *Metaphysics*, the Stagirite had taken the position that "the substance of each thing is one in no merely accidental way, and similarly is from its very nature something that is" (2,1003b32-33; Oxford tr.). Everything is essentially a being and is essentially one, in this Aristotelian doctrine. Avicenna, according to the Latin translation and the interpretation of Averroes,[23] had on the contrary maintained that being and unity were accidents superadded to the thing's essence. In opposition to the Avicennian doctrine St Thomas joins with Averroes in asserting that everything is by its essence a being, and by its essence one.[24] He finds that Avicenna was deceived by the equivocity of being, for being can signify either existential act or a subject possessing existential act.[25] With regard to unity, he follows Averroes in claiming that Avicenna is confusing transcendental unity with unity in the category of quantity and thereby making all unity in creatures an accidental characteristic.[26]

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[20] "Et praeterea ipsa bonitas quae attenditur secundum esse substantiale, non est ipsa essentia rei, sed esse participatum; ..." *De Ver.*, XXI, 5, ad 1m.

[21] "... sicut habet esse per participationem, ita et bona est per participationem." *De Ver.*, XXI, 5, ad 6m.

[22] "... unum quod convertitur cum ente, dicitur secundum rationem negationis, quam addit supra ens; bonum autem non addit negationem super ens, sed eius ratio in positione consistit: et ideo non est simile." *De Ver.*, XXI, 5, ad 7m.

[23] "Avicenna autem peccavit multum in hoc, quod existimavit, quod unum et ens significant dispositiones additas essentiae rei. ...Et etiam, quia existimavit, quod unum dictum de omnibus praedicamentis, est illud unum quod est principium numerorum. Numerus autem

This background shows that St Thomas is understanding the assertion "Everything is one through its essence" in the same way he takes the statements that every nature is a being through its essence or has existence through its essence or form. The teaching is not concerned with essence in abstraction from all existence, but with essence that already possesses existential act of some kind. It is maintaining that in an existent essence the existence follows upon the essence in the order of formal causality. From this standpoint it is viewing unity in the same way. It does not mean, consequently, that a finite essence, absolutely considered, actually possesses unity of itself, any more than that it actually possesses being of itself. Rather, the essence is a potency to unity, just as it is a potency to being.

But is it not also in the same way a potency to goodness? Yes. In the restricted and indirect way already noted, a thing may be said to have goodness through its essence. But in the case of unity the viewpoint has been set up differently. Unity is a negative aspect.[27] Once the existence is there, no further positive characteristic is required to make a thing one. Unity follows as a negation of division, once a thing exists. There is no participation in any new positive aspect. But goodness requires relation to appetite,[28] the addition of accidents, and reference to God as source. These are all new positive aspects. Existence also is a positive perfection, found as a nature in God but as a participated act in creatures. The result is that a thing is existent both by essence and participation. It has to be regarded as good by participation

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est accidens. Unde opinatus fuit iste, quod hoc nomen unum significat accidens in entibus: ..." *In IV Metaph.*, comm. 3; (Venice, 1574), fol. 67r (BE).

[24] *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, (ed. Cathala-Spiazzi), nos. 556-560.

[25] *In X Métaph.*, lect. 3, no. 1982.

[26] *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, nos. 559-560; *In X Metaph.*, lect. 3, no. 1981.

[27] Supra, n. 22. "... unum... est propinquissimum ad ens, quia addit tantum negationem: verum autem et bonum addunt relationem quamdam;..." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 200. "... non dicit nisi negationem tantum." Ibid., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; I, 582. Cf. *De Ver.*, I, 1c; *De Pot.*, III, 16, ad 3m; IX, 7c; *ST*, I, 30, 3c; *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, no. 560; etc.

[28] "Convenientiam vero entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen *bonum*,..." *De Ver.*, I, 1c; ed. Spiazzi, I, 3a. Cf. first text from *In I Sent.*, supra, n. 27.

only, not through essence. It has to be looked upon as one by essence only, and not by participation, for nothing positive is thereby participated.

But why cannot unity, even though a negative characteristic, be regarded as participated with the existence upon which it follows, just as substantial goodness could in a restricted sense be understood as flowing from essence? Surely against a Neoplatonic background there should be no difficulty in looking upon unity as participated.[29] Yet the reply to the eighth argument in the present article states that there would be an infinite regress if a thing were one by participation. The mention of the infinite regress in this topic, with explicit reference to Averroes, keeps the reasoning located against the background of the Arabian controversy. Averroes had taken issue with Avicenna on the latter's stand that unity is accidental to a thing's essence. He saw the reason for Avicenna's error in an identification of transcendental unity with quantitative unity. Since quantity is an accident, the unity that follows upon a thing's being is therefore an accident.[30] Such was Averroes' interpretation of Avicenna.

St Thomas generalizes this background, finding the same division of opinion about unity among both theologians and philosophers as a whole.[31] He places the question accordingly in an historical framework in which there are only two ways of considering unity — either as essential to things or as a quantitative accident. Existence, as has been seen, is essential to things in a way that allows it to remain other than their essence without thereby becoming a predicamental accident.[32] Existence, though other than essence, is constituted by the principles of the essence. But unity, if other than essence, would have to be a quantitative accident. No third possibility seems allowed for St Thomas by the historical position of the question. Existence, consequently, may be essential to a thing and still be regarded as participated. But unity, if participated, would have to be taken as a quantitative accident. Again, the result is that a thing has being both through essence and by participation. But it has unity not by any participation, and so only through essence. The one doctrinal reason given is that being is a positive perfection or act. Even though a thing has being through its essence, it is thereby participating a positive perfection. But transcendental unity is negative. It is merely lack of division. It adds no positive perfection. If any positive perfection is granted it, it is thereby confused with quantitative unity and made into a predica-

[29] Cf.: "...illa quae *magis* participant ipso *Uno*,..." *In De Div. Nom.* c. V, lect. 1, ed. C. Pera (Turin, 1950), no. 617. "Dicit enim Dionysius... quod non est multitudo non participans uno;..." *ST*, I, 11, 1, ad 1m.

[30] Text supra, n. 23.

[31] *De Pot.*, IX, 7c. Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 581.

[32] *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, (ed. Cathala-Spiazzi), no. 558.

mental accident. No other choice, then, seems to have been offered in the background against which St Thomas approached the question. The topic of goodness had to be treated against a Neoplatonic background, while the topic of unity had to be dealt with in an Averroistic setting.

Averroes, in defending the strictly literal meaning of the Aristotelian text, had argued that if a unity other than the thing's essence were required to make it one, a further unity would be required to make that unity one, and so on ad infinitum.[33] His reasoning presupposes that unity, if accidental, would have to be a predicamental accident. The reasoning would not hold in regard to an additional aspect participated by essence but not restricted to any one category. From St Thomas' viewpoint, existence is accidental to created essence without becoming a predicamental accident. A thing can therefore be existent by a participated act, without thereby involving an infinite regress. Correspondingly, a thing may be good by participated act, and still not be subject to Averroes' critique. In neither case is a predicamental accident involved. The "infinite regress" objection applies only in the case of something added by way of a predicamental accident, that is, an accident subsequent to substance. It does not apply in the case of properties that transcend all categorical limitations, nor in the case of an accident that is prior to substance, that is, in the case of existence. Accordingly St Thomas can write:

> Unde, sicut non sequitur quod ipsa substantia rei non dicatur per esse aliquod quod ipsa non sit, quia eius essentia non dicitur ens per aliquod esse aliud ab ipso: ita praedicta ratio non sequitur de bonitate. Sequitur autem de unitate, de qua introducit eam Commentator in IV *Metaphysic.*: quia unum indifferenter se habet ad hoc quod respiciat essentiam vel esse; unde essentia rei est una per seipsam, non propter esse suum: et ita non est una per aliquam participationem, sicut accidit de ente et bono.[34]

The background of this reasoning is expressly Averroes' interpretation of the Aristotelian dictum that everything is essentially a being and essentially one. St Thomas is in wholehearted agreement with the teaching that a thing is one through its essence just as it is existent through its essence. There is no difficulty for him, then, in saying that a creature looks to its essence for its unity. Likewise there is no difficulty for him in saying that a creature looks to its existence for its unity, since existence is the composing that makes a thing undivided.[35] He can therefore say without any qualms that unity may indifferently "be referred to essence or to existence" (ad 8m; tr. Schmidt). But the consequence drawn from this observation is a bit strange: "Hence the essence of a thing is one of itself, not because of its act of existing" (tr. Schmidt). The first part of the statement offers no difficulty, in the light of the teaching that everything is one by its essence. But what is the force of the second part: "not because of its act of existing?" Does it mean that unity is not given a thing by its existential act? Hardly, in view of the immediately preceding statement that unity may be referred to existence as well as to essence. Does it mean, then, that the essence has a unity of itself regardless of the unity conferred upon it by existence? That seems the only alternative interpretation. Against the general background of the reasoning, it should have the same force as the statement that an essence is of itself a being.[36] An essence is potentially a being. Correspondingly, it is potentially one. It is one as essence, and so as potency. Essence is of itself a potency to being, and so is a capacity to be something one.

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[33] "Quoniam, si res esset unum per aliquam rem additam suae naturae, sicut credit Avicenna, tunc nihil esset unum per se, et per suam substantiam, sed per rem additam suae substantiae. Et illa res, quae est una, si dicitur, quod est una per intentionem additam suae essentiae, quaeretur etiam de illa re, per quam fit una, et per quid fit una: si igitur fit una per intentionem additam illi, revertitur quaestio, et procedetur in infinitum." *In IV Metaph.*, comm. 3; (Venice, 1574), fol. 67va. Cf. supra, n. 23. For this "infinite regress" argument in St Thomas, see *Quodl.*, X, 1c; *De Pot.*, IX, 7, arg. 8 in contr.; *ST*, I, 11, 1, ad 1m; *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, (ed. Cathala-Spiazzi), no. 555; *In X Metaph.*, lect. 3, no. 1976; etc.

[34] *De Ver.*, XXI, 5, ad 8m; ed. Spiazzi, I, 386a. Cf. *ST*, I, 6, 3, ad 1m, 2m, & 3m.

But does not the conclusion immediately drawn stand in the way of so simple an explanation? Does it not separate transcendental unity from existence, instead of from quantity, as Averroes had done? The immediate consequence reads: "and so it is not one by any participation, though it is a being and good in this way" (tr. Schmidt). It is a being by participation. It is a being through participation of existential act. Yet, though it is both a being and one through essence, it is not one by participation. The parallelism with being does not follow here. Why? The preoccupation is strongly with the main theme of the article, that in creatures goodness is had through participation and not through essence. Goodness, as positive act and perfection, is based directly upon the act proper to essence. It is based directly upon existence. It cannot, like unity, be referred indifferently to essence or to existence. It has to be referred directly and definitely to existence, not to essence. In a restricted sense it follows upon substantial existence, in a full sense upon the accidents that are possessed in real existence. In this way it is quite different from unity. As the negative aspect of existence, unity in an unqualified sense flows like existence immediately from essence. Against the Aristotelian background, a thing may therefore be characterized as one through its essence, and not — like goodness — on account of its existence. In St Thomas' own doctrine, existence as a positive perfection is had by participation as well as through essence. But goodness, as a positive perfection that follows upon existence, has to be regarded against the Neoplatonic background as possessed not through essence but only by participation.

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[35] See supra, n. 13 .

[36] *De Ver.*, XXI, 4, ad 4m; I, 383. Cf.: "... in omni autem creato essentia differt a suo esse et comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum." *ST*, I, 54, 3c.

For the point at issue in the problem of unity and essence, the most pertinent feature in this reply to the eighth argument is that it is nowhere concerned with essence as absolutely considered. The absolute consideration of essence was mentioned in the body of the article, but the reply to the eighth argument is from start to finish treating of essence as existent. It is dealing with essence that is already existent and already good. It is treating of a substance that has existence.[37] It does not bear upon essence absolutely considered, therefore, but upon essence actuated by existence. In that existent substance it is asking whether goodness like unity can be referred directly to essence, allowing the assertion that a creature is good through its own essence. The discussion concerns already existent essence, not essence absolutely considered.

In a word, actuality is required for goodness, as it is for truth. Being and goodness, accordingly, have to be viewed as participations. Unity, on account of its negative status, may be regarded merely from the standpoint of potentiality in an essence. But that does not mean that an essence in its absolute consideration has actually any unity, any more than it has any existence. Tacitly, the "infinite regress" objection is allowed to hold against unity on the Averroistic ground that any participated unity would be a quantitative accident. But in the present context that ground is not emphasized, nor is the "regress" applied, as elsewhere,[38] to the aspect of being. The concern is with safeguarding selected items from different traditions. No doctrinally pertinent difference emerges in the sequence of the transcendental properties upon being, for substantial goodness, like unity and existence, is had by a thing through essence.

IV

The *De Natura Generis*, a work doubtfully ascribed to St Thomas, grants a nature absolutely considered a proper unity, but just to a certain extent.

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[37] "... quia per hoc esse res esse dicitur, et quia hac bonitate res dicitur bona." *De Ver.*, XXI, 5, ad 8m. The reference is to actualized essence; see Régis, *L'Odyssée*, pp. 54-55. In *De Ver.*, XXI, 1, ad 1m, "essentia rei absolute considerata," paralleling "ens... absolute," means essence considered without relation to other things. Cf.: "... it is only by the real concrete essence that a being could be said to be ontologically one." M. J. Farrelly, "Existence, the Intellect, and the Will," *The New Scholasticism*, XXIX (1955), 150.

[38] *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, n°. 555; *In X Metaph.*, lect. 3, n°. 1976. The regress is denied in regard to essence at *De Ver.*, XXI, 4, ad 4m (ed. Spiazzi, I, 383b), as it is for existence (*esse*) at XXI, 5, ad 8m.

The reason it has a unity of its own is that its definition is one, and its name is one.[39] Insofar as it can be expressed in a definition, therefore, the nature absolutely considered has its own unity. Yet this unity does not descend to the supposits of which the nature is predicated, for it does not include the whole of the predicated nature but only a part. It does not include the nature's most fundamental note, substance. Nor does it include the nature's capacity to serve as the foundation of the universal. But both of these features belong to a nature in its absolute consideration, according to the *De Natura Generis*. Taken as a whole, therefore, the nature absolutely considered has no unity at all.[40]

The reason why the unity of the nature in its absolute consideration does not extend to the basic genus, substance, is that substance cannot be defined.[41] Definition was the ground for requiring unity in a nature absolutely considered. The unity assigned to the absolute nature by *De Natura Generis* is in consequence surprisingly restricted. It does not reach to the nature's basic feature, its substance. In its most fundamental characteristic, as substance, the nature has no unity in itself. What is still more astonishing, the unity assigned the absolute nature, that is, the unity of definition, does not accompany the nature to its inferiors. Yet the whole reason for the absolute consideration of a nature for St Thomas is to isolate what is both predicated of the individuals and contained in the universal. From that content the restricted unity allowed the nature in its absolute consideration is expressly excluded. Whatever unity is granted by *De Natura Generis* to the nature in its absolute consideration is, in consequence, quite beside the point in the present discussion.

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[39] ... est tamen in ipsa natura absolute accepta, secundum quod non est in inferioribus considerata, quaedam unitas; cum definitio ejus sit una, et nomen suum, ut patet." *De Natura Generis* c. VII; ed. Mandonnet, *Opusc.* (Paris, 1927), V, 232. For a discussion on the authenticity of this treatise, see Martin Grabmann, *Die Werke des Hl. Thomas von Aquin*, 3rd ed. (Münster, 1949), pp. 354-357.

[40] "In istis igitur est duplex unitas. Una scilicet in natura absoluta, quae natura convenit singulis suppositis; sed haec unitas non descendit ab ipsa natura ad sua supposita: sicut de natura animalis absoluta est substantia animata sensibilis, ut dictum est; sed hoc non dicit totam naturam ejus absolutam, sed aliquid ejus. In natura enim sua absoluta est, quod possit substerni intentioni universalitatis, quia solum natura absoluta hoc potest, et etiam omnis natura absoluta. Comprehendendo ergo totam naturam ejus absolute, dicendo naturam animalis absolutam esse substantiam animatam sensibilem aptam natam substerni intentioni universalitatis: non est de intellectu ejus unitas aliqua, nec etiam pluralitas;..." *De Natura Generis*, c. VII; p. 232.

[41] "In substantia autem quae est genus primum, non est recipere aliquam unitatem a parte ipsius rei: unde non est aliqua definitio ejus, per quam illa unitas ostendatur. ... Remanet igitur in substantia sola unitas quam facit intellectus, et nulla alia: cujus actio fundatur non super aliquam rem quocumque modo unam, sed super naturas penitus diversas,..." Ibid.

The teaching of *De Natura Generis*, nevertheless, became for Cajetan[42] a ground for assigning the nature absolutely considered a proper unity of its own, now without restriction or qualification. This unity was named by Cajetan "formal unity." Formal unity is not specific nor generic, but is the foundation of specific and generic unity. The denial of unity to the nature in its absolute consideration by St Thomas in the *De Ente et Essentia* is explained by Cajetan as referring to numerical unity,[43] as it had been explained in Duns Scotus. In real things it is for Cajetan truly and properly a real unity that always accompanies the nature in individual things, because unity and nature come under the same norms.[44] Since the essence has a unity of its own, there need be little surprise in finding that Cajetan regards the essence in itself as a reality with a being of its own. It has essential being (*esse essentiae*)[45].

V

The problem of unity and essence emerges in fairly clear lines from the above considerations. For St Thomas every nature is of its essence an existent and is of its essence one. Existence is regarded as flowing from the essence in the order of formal causality. By the same token unity, as negative concomitant of existence, flows from essence. A thing therefore may be regarded as one by its essence, just as it exists by its essence. When it has any kind of existence, the essence may accordingly be regarded as of itself an existent and of itself one. Absolutely considered, on the other hand, it has no actuality at all, no being and no unity. It is potentially a being and potentially a unit. Actually, being is participated by it when it exists, and thereby it actually has unity. Unity therefore may be said to come with existence. Accordingly a thing may be understood as one on account of its essence, or one on account of its existence. Unity may be referred to either essence or existence, indifferently.

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[42] "... dico quod natura absolute sumpta habet unitatem quamdam: ut efficaciter concludit ratio adducta quae est S. Thomae in tractatu de natura generis. Et quando quaeritur aut illa unitas est numeralis aut specifica, dico quod est unitas formalis quae alia est a numeali, sicut divisio formalis alia est a materiali. Nec illa unitas formalis est specifica aut generica formaliter, sed est fundamentum unitatis specificae et unitatis genericae." *In De Ente et Essentia*, c. IV; ed. M. H. Laurent (Turin, 1934), p. 94 (no. 61). Five years later, in 1499, Cajetan, *De Subjecto Naturalis Philosophiae*, in *Opuscula Omnia* (Lyons, 1581), p. 211b 40-45, declared that St Thomas perhaps never saw the *De Natura Generis*, as the style was not his and the doctrine is in disagreement on many points.

[43] "Quod autem in littera dicitur quod natura absolute sumpta, nec est una, nec est plures, ntelligendum est de unitate et pluralitate numerali." *In De Ente et Essentia*, loc. cit. Cf. Duns Scotus, text supra, n. 11.

[44] "... unitas illa quae semper naturam comitatur in particularibus, posita est realis vere et proprie. Idem enim est judicium de natura et ejus unitate." *In De Ente et Essentia*, loc. cit. Cf.: "Therefore it is not individual unity which is possessed by human nature-as-such, but neither is it a purely conceptual unity, it is a unity that is in some way real, for it does not belong alone to the inferiors, but it belongs also to the common subject." C. E. Kinney, "The Meaning of Transcendental Unity," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XXVIII (1954), 155-156.

[45] *In De Ente et Essentia*, c. V; ed. cit., p. 158 (no. 101, ad quartum). On the introduction of *esse essentiae* into the Thomistic tradition, see N. J. Wells, "Capreolus on Essence and Existence," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXVIII (1960), 1-24.

For the purposes of the moment St Thomas can therefore say that a thing is one on account of its essence, or that the essence of a thing is one of itself not on account of its existence. The purposes of the moment in this particular article of *De Veritate* were to safeguard the traditional position that a creature is good not through its essence but only by participation, and at the same time to uphold the Aristotelian view that a thing has being and unity through essence. Against this twofold background St Thomas has to show that a created thing has unity without receiving the unity by any participation. It receives its being by participation, since it is created. Being is a positive perfection, and goodness is a positive perfection. Both being and goodness, then, have to be understood as participated. They require perfection and actuality. The merely potential does not suffice. So, while an essence is potentially existent and potentially good as well as potentially one, the reference to essence is not enough to term it good. Good can from a formal viewpoint be referred only to the participated existence. Unity, as negative concomitant of existence, calls for no positive characteristic in which it might be considered to participate, and so may be referred without qualification to essence.

There still remains the Averroistic objection of infinite regress, which applied equally to being and unity, if these were understood as accidents. With regard to existence, the situation is not too difficult. Existence is for St Thomas an accident that is prior to substance. It can accordingly be participated as an accident by essence, and still avoid the status of a predicamental accident, an accident that would induce an infinite regress. But can unity be viewed in the same way? Against the background established by Averroes, unity would if participated have the status of a positive characteristic and so be identified with a predicamental accident in the category of quantity. In this setting St Thomas refuses to allow any aspect of participation in the case of unity. The Neoplatonic teaching that unity is participated tacitly drops out of the picture, even though the tradition that goodness is participated stems from Neoplatonic sources. Correspondingly, the Averroistic application of the "infinite regress" argument to being is not mentioned.

Certain items, then, are accepted by St Thomas from the Neoplatonic and from the Averroistic currents. Other items, necessarily accompanying them in the solidarity of their original settings, are completely disregarded. The selectivity can hardly have been without motive. Participation of unity, in a Neoplatonic setting, would tend strongly in the direction of a unity above existence. The "infinite regress" argument, though applicable in a strict interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine, does not bear upon being in St Thomas' own teaching, because of the priority of existence to essence. His assertions on the unity of essence, made against this combined Neoplatonic and Averroistic background, do not at all imply that essence absolutely considered has a unity of its own. Later attempts to assign a unity of its own to essence absolutely considered involve the granting of a non-existential being to created essence. Unity of essence just in itself, these attempts make clear, has to follow upon essential being (*esse essentiae*), a type of being that is distinguished from existence.

A close study of the texts of St Thomas upon unity shows accordingly that they uphold the necessary concomitance of the transcendental properties of being. Wherever there is any kind of unity there will be corresponding being. Where there is no "formal unity," in Cajetan's sense, there will be no essential being that is distinct in any way except verbally from existence. All being will necessarily be existential. Understood in the abstract, "being" and "existence" will coincide. In the doctrine of St Thomas there is no non-existential being upon which a unity proper to essence in its absolute consideration could follow.

The Calendar, Martyrology and Customal of the Boni Homines of Ashridge

ELEANOR SEARLE

THE small house of the Boni Homines of Ashridge has, since the sixteenth century, presented a mystery which has puzzled historians of English monasticism and has given rise to speculations, the variety of which provides in itself a cautionary lesson in historiography. Quite simply, the mystery is: who were these Boni Homines? To what monastic Order did they really belong?

Their name, Boni Homines, was for long the chief source of mystification. For although thirteenth century Ashridge[1] and the even smaller, later Edington in Wiltshire were the only houses of these Boni Homines in England, yet the name was given to brethren of continental Orders, particularly that of Grandmont.[2] Holinshed's statement that Ashridge was the home of "monks of the order of Bonshommes, being the first that ever had been seene of that order in England"[3] was strictly true, but its unambiguous implication that the Boni Homines had come into England from abroad was long accepted as fact.[4] From this starting point theories were elaborated, and the question became: from which continental Bonshommes had the Ashridge monks sprung? They were labelled Friars of the Sack, brethren of Grandmont, Augustinians[5], until in the eighteenth century it was said, with an insouciant neglect of confirming evidence, that "...they were brought out of the south of France; in which country a sect then prevailed who called themselves Boni Homines... they were a sect of mystics; approaching, as some thought, to Manichaeism, and by some confounded with the Albigenses; but in truth a remnant of the ancient Paulicians;"[6] and that the English Boni Homines were certainly of this sect. This view was accepted in the next century by their best known historian, the only one, oddly enough, to have used their manuscript.[7]

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[1] Ashridge was a manor lying close to the town to Berkhamsted in Buckinghamshire. That part of the county is now included in Hertfordshire.

[2] R. Graham, *English Ecclesiastical Studies* (London, 1929), 214.

[3] R. Holinshed, *Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland* (London, 1807), 475.

[4] See the 1723 edition of the *Monasticon*, ii, 276: they "came into England in the year 1290; when Edmund of Cornwall built them a monastery at Esserug...", and Chauncey, *Antiquities of Hertforshire* (London, 1700), 553.

[5] See H. F. Chettle, The Boni Homines of Ashridge and Edington, *Downside Review* LXI (1943), p. 43. *Monasticon* (1723) ii, 277.

[6] P. Newcome, *The History of St. Albans* (London, 1793), 300.

More recently these theories of their continental origin have been examined and disproved,[8] leaving the question of their origin and Order still considerably in doubt. Miss Graham would have had them "brethren of the Order of S. Augustine,"[9] which is impossible in a strict sense, since they had no connections with any General Chapters of that Order. Their latest historian, H. F. Chettle, after a balanced consideration of their history and *ordines* concludes that they can be described only as a *novus ordo*, a satisfactory conclusion, but one which has left historians still puzzled, probably because it appears not to explain why a group of monks should suddenly appear, unconnected with any of the great Orders, with no clearly discernible source for their monastic piety, and with no forceful leader to be, himself, the source for his brethren.[10] Knowles has recently called Ashridge a "small... institute, of undiscoverable provenance, which established itself... After a considerable interval they sent a colony to Edington in Wiltshire."[11]

It has seemed therefore appropriate to look carefully at the only manuscript left by the Boni Homines which reveals anything of their Rule and life, and to review yet once more their quiet history. There is no need to recount here that history in detail, since Maj. Chettle has presented it fully, but there is an aspect of it which has gone almost unremarked, and which may provide a resolution to the mystery of the *novus ordo*. This aspect of the history of Ashridge involves the initiative of the Boni Homines at their foundation and throughout their life. Did Ashridge in fact "establish itself", did the brethren choose their own wellspring of piety, was it they themselves who "sent a colony to Edington in Wiltshire"? In the light of their history and of their own words it appears that the answer to these questions must be a negative one, and that if Ashridge must be categorized, it must be as a home of royal chaplains, an *Eigenkirche* of the duchy of Cornwall, a house whose lay patron determined, from foundation to dissolution, its quality and activity. One does not of course expect *Eigenkirchen* in the thirteenth century. Cluny, Citeaux and the spirit of the Gregorian Reform had introduced an era in which the laity had assumed a more passive role in the *ecclesia*; in which existing monasteries had bound themselves together in general, supervised Orders, and new houses were usually founded as colonies of an Order or mother house. Monasteries of this period, it can then be assumed, are amenable to categorization. But perhaps in understanding medieval piety, categorization can be misleading. It is precisely the attempt to apply it to Ashridge which created the mystery; for we are here, I would suggest, dealing with a house which, in its early days, was in many ways more comparable to Alcuin's Tours than to contemporaneous English Orders. Because its founder was a man of thirteenth century England and genuinely concerned for the spiritual welfare of his foundation, Ashridge was, paradoxically, an *Eigenkirche* in the spirit of the Gregorian Reform.

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[7] H. J. Todd, *The History of the College of Bonhommes at Ashridge in the County of Buckingham* (London, 1823), 1, 2.

[8] Graham, 230 and Chettle, *op. cit.*

[9] Graham, 230. Miss Graham is referring to the *Calendar of Papal Registers* ii, in which they are indeed called (p. 73) "the Augustinian house of Asserugie." On p. 43 they are more accurately referred to as the "rector and brethren of the house of Hassherugge in the diocese of Lincoln, commonly called *boni homines*." They were Augustinians only in the sense that they were bound to keep the *regulam beati Augustini*, as were the secular canons.

[10] L. M. Midgley, *Ministers' Accounts of the Earldom of Cornwall*, 1296-1297 (Camden Soc., third Series, vol. LXVI, London, 1942), xiii, n. 2. D. Knowles and N. Hadcock, *Medieval Religious Houses in England and Wales* (London, 1953), 179: their Order is here listed as the Order of Boni Homines.

[11] D. Knowles, *The Religious Orders in England* (Cambridge, 1948), 202.

Ashridge was founded in the 1280's by Edmund, earl of Cornwall, son of Richard of Cornwall, king of the Romans; first cousin to Edward I. His character seems to have been an unusual one in a man of his station and time. Born in 1250, Edmund was not yet a knight when at the age of 22 he succeeded to his father's English title. In the year of his succession, however, he was both knighted and married to Margaret, sister of Gilbert of Clare, earl of Gloucester and Hertford.[12] The marriage failed; eventually the couple parted.[13] His close relationship to the king made state duties incumbent upon Edmund, and these he fulfilled, if with little vigour. In 1279 he, with Henry Lacy, earl of Lincoln, Godfrey Giffard, Bishop of Worcester, and Thomas de Cantelupe, Bishop of Hereford, took the king's place while Edward was in France[14] and "there is a complete absence of evidence of any activity of these regents, either singly or as a group."[15] His regency of 1286-1289 was, however far he was personally responsible, a fiasco.[16] Indeed, as Miss Midgely points out "what is surprising is that a man of his eminence... should have made so little mark upon the kingdom and so little impression upon contemporary chroniclers."[17]

In one activity Edmund was actively interested — monasticism. He founded or aided Hailes,[18] S. Nicholas in Wallingford,[19] the Cistercian Rewley Abbey[20] and the Trinitarian brethren of Knaresborough.[21] But Ashridge was peculiarly his foundation. Within a mile of his chief place of residence, Berkhamsted Castle, he built a church and house for *quidam capellani*, to whom he gave a uniform habit and six marks a year each.[22] The foundation was in honour of the blood of Christ which he had obtained in Germany, and in honour of the Virgin.[23] There were to be twenty brethren, of whom thirteen at least were to be priests. To these *capellani*, whom he called *boni homines*, he granted the manor of Ashridge, in which their house stood, and which was part of his honour of Berkhamsted. Later he granted three other nearby manors and various rights. The *boni homines* were, then, to be independent of his direct support, but far from wealthy, possibly poor, without it.[24] They had little to fear during his lifetime; Edmund kept very close to them. He had had his own special apartments built as part of the house,[25] one room of which was large enough to contain the Parliament of 1290-91, held by the King who was spending Christmas with his cousin at Ashridge.[26] Quite evidently, from his own records, Edmund lived with his good men much of the time.[27]

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[12] Midgley, viii.

[13] *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1292-1301, 63.

[14] *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1272-81, 309.

[15] Midgley, ix.

[16] *State Trials of the Reign of Edward the Frist* (1289-1293). T. F. Tout and H. Johnston (Camden Soc., third Series, vol IX), xi.

[17] Midgley, viii.

There is even strong reason to suppose that it was the earl himself who gave them their *consuetudines*. One hundred years later the *boni homines* of the day thought that he had done so, for their Rector presented their lay patron with "the ordinances which the earl laid down to be observed in the house forever."[28] If it was not actually Edmund who gave them their rule, it is at least significant of the fourteenth century relationship between monastery and lay patron that the brethren so believed. Indeed the Bishop of Lincoln himself was of the same opinion concerning the origin of the *consuetudines.* They were the *constitutiones et observationes antiquae per prefatum fundatorem... institutae*; Edmund had, he said in 1380, *eis imposuit observanda* rules which must now be brought more in keeping with present circumstances.[29]

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[18] *VCH Gloucestershire* ii, 97.

[19] *VCH Berkshire* ii, 104.

[20] *VCH Oxfordshire* ii, 81.

[21] *VCH Yorkshire* iii, 296-98.

[22] *Annales Monastici* iii (Rolls Series), 305.

[23] *Monasticon* vi, 515; Holinshed 475.

[24] *Ann. Mon.* iii (R.S.), 305: "Sed non fuit spes, quod posset illa ordinatio diu stare, propter debile fundamentum." Some years after Edmund's death, the *boni homines* applied to the king for his license to lease some of their land, "as they have not the means to cultivate...", *Cal. Pat. Rolls* 1334-8, 239. Bishop Oliver Sutton considered them too poor, even in 1297, to bear the expense of sending a representative to Lincoln. *The Rolls and Register of Bishop Oliver Sutton*, 1280-1299, R.M.T. Hill, ed., (Lincoln Record Society, 1954), lxii. See *Cal. Charter Rolls* 1257-1300, 331-2 for the original grant, and *ibid.*, 383-6, 405, 463 for Edmund's enlargements.

[25] Midgley, xiv.

[26] Todd, 9; Gough, *The Itinerary of King Edward I* (Paisley, 1900), 76-77; *Ann. Mon.* iii. 363.

[27] See Midgley, *passim.*

[28] *Register of Edward the Black Prince* (London, 1933), iv, 105.

What these rules were originally we do not know. Todd is mistaken in supposing that the *consuetudines* as we have them in the MS and as he has printed them, represent the original statutes. Historians since his time have repeated his error, but the fact is that there are few of the *consuetudines* which we can be sure are original[30].

The ordinances enjoin that *boni homines* of Ashridge shall observe the *regulam beati Augustini*, a rule so general as to porvide more of an exhortation to Christian communal brotherhood than a regulation of a routine life.[31] They are to follow Sarum usage for their liturgy. Beyond this, the ordinances shape more specifically the life of the house. Special daily prayers were to be offered at Chapter for the earl's soul, and special anniversary services sung for his family. These are stated in the *consuetudines* to have been at the order of the earl himself. Candidates for novitiate were required to be able to read, a regulation surprising in a monastery, but not at all for private chaplains. Further, while these candidates were to be of good repute, in good health and satisfactory to the brethren, they could not be magnates. It was perhaps appropriate that chaplain-monks of a royal earl be gentlemen, but not that they be his equals or superiors in rank. Three important liberties denied to most earlier *Eigenkirchen*, were allowed to Ashridge by the earl: they were to have freedom of election, with the right to present their candidate to the diocesan for confirmation even though the lay patron or his heirs had not previously presented him; they were to be under the disciplinary authority of the diocesan; and the lay patron was not to control the temporalities of the house by reason of voidance.[32] Thus did Edmund protect his foundation from exploitation by his own heirs; he was a child, insofar, of the Reform Movement.

Edmund died among his *boni homines*, October 1, 1300, and his heart was buried there with the heart of Bishop Thomas de Cantelupe.[33] For some years Ashridge seems to have been impoverished,[34] until its fate was decided by

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[29] *Lincoln Episcopal Register* 12, fol. 276^{v}.

[30] See below, in the description of the MS, for a discussion of this.

[31] J. C. Dickinson, *The Origin of the Austin Canons and their Introduction into England* (London, 1950).

[32] *Register of Edward the Blakc Prince* iv, 105.

[33] *Monasticon* vi, 517.

[34] *Cal. Pat. Rolls* 1334-8, 239, 461 (a lease and sale) possibly represent, as Chettle has suggested, their need of funds.

Edward III, who created his son Edward, Duke of Cornwall, granting with the duchy, "the castle, manor and town of Berkhamsted, with the park there and the honour of Berkhamsted... to hold to himself and his heirs, the eldest sons of the Kings of England and Dukes of Cornwall."[35] Within the honour of Berkhamsted, a mile from the residence of crown princes, stood Ashridge. A group of chaplains of, and dependent upon, a lesser house could well have disintegrated with the extinction of the patron house, but Ashridge was now secure.

The Black Prince, from his early manhood, protected and enriched the *boni homines*, and he was in no doubt about their relation to him — they were "the prince's chaplains."[36] In 1353 he issued a notification that, "at the instance of William, rector of the church and house of Ashridge, *of which the prince is patron*, and of *his brethren the other chaplains there*, the prince has caused to be examined divers charters (confirmed by certain of his progenitors and by the king) whereby Edmund, earl of Cornwall, founder of the house, endowed it and the brethren with various faculties and liberties, and also the ordinances which the earl laid down to be observed in the house for ever,"[37] and that he too granted these liberties to his chaplains.

It was during this period of attentive patronage that the second house of *boni homines* was founded. But it was founded on the initiative of the Black Prince, not of the Ashridge brethren. The Chancellor, Bishop Edington of Winchester, had established a chantry in the church of his home in Wiltshire, and in 1358 he obtained a charter from the Bishop of Salisbury converting his foundation into a house of *boni homines* on the model of Ashridge at the desire of Prince Edward.[38] During this period too, the MS we are to describe was begun, containing among other things, their remarkable Martyrology.

The last patron of Ashridge was not notable for his defense of the house. Although Henry VIII is said to have called the Rector "his gentleman priest,"[39] and although the Rector and brethren quietly accepted the oath of Supremacy, the house was dissolved in 1539. The Rector was pensioned on £ 100 and fifty loads of wood per annum, and the sixteen remaining brethren — one was a novice — were pensioned generously.[40] The last three brethren of whom the records give a glimpse were, long after, still receiving pensions and were serving as rectors of nearby churches. Two of the three had married.[41]

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[35] *Cal. Close Rolls* 1354-1360, 554. The honour of Berkhamsted escheated to the king at Edmund's death without issue.

[36] *Register of the Black Prince* iv, 64, 184, 199.

[37] *Ibid*, iv. 105. The italics are mine.

[38] *Cal. Close Rolls* 1354-1360, 102-108, *Monasticon* vi, 536, Leland vi, 48.

[39] Chettle, 54, quoting Cobb, 76.

[40] Willis, *Mitred Abbeys* (London, 1718), 10, 11.

Since the initiative throughout their life seems to have been provided from their royal patrons, any categorization of these *boni homines* should begin with the unenviable task of categorizing the piety of a royal layman, Edmund of Cornwall. As for the brethren themselves, they were explicit about what Order they belonged to, and they were *not* of the Order of Boni Homines. There is no suggestion anywhere that the term had more signification to them than when it was applied to their patron's juries of inquest. They were, as they say, only a group of *boni homines* living under the *ordinem domus sanguinis Jesu Christi de Assherugge*,[42] praying for the Christian dead and particularly, as is appropriate in an *Eigenkirche*, for the royal dead of the duchy of Cornwall.

The Manuscript

The manuscript is in the Henry E. Huntington library, San Marino, California, and is catalogued as Ellesmere 9. H 15. It was acquired by the Library in this century, and had long been part of the library of the Earls of Ellesmere, whose seat, Ashridge, is on the site of the medieval monastery.[43] Although the scripts throughout are, with one exception, in set monastic bookhands, difficult to date or locate specifically, internal evidence and the history of its ownership indicate that it is an English manuscript, begun in the last half of the fourteenth century and added to until the mid-sixteenth century.

The text is written on vellum 27½ × 18 mm, in one column 19 × 12 mm, normally of 30 lines. There are 120 folios, ruled in ink, with sexternio gatherings. The folios have been numbered on the recto side in a modern hand. The binding is of the eighteenth or nineteenth century. Black ink is used throughout with blue ink used for capitals. When the capital is an initial letter of a section or paragraph, it is placed on a red ground, square with stiff foliage patterns. The lettrines form the basis of the illumination; the Gothic foliage grows out of the lettrine, sometimes (especially where, as in the martyrology, there are several decorated capitals on each page) bordering the entire left-hand margin, or (as in the calendar) the upper margin of the page. Some important words are in red, particularly the principal feasts and those of nine lections in the calendar, the headings of each day in the martyrology, and prayers and incipits of prayers in the customal. Erasures, undoubtedly of the sixteenth century, occur throughout the calendar and martyrology, expunging the word *papa* almost wherever it occurs, and erasing some entries concerning S. Thomas of Canterbury. The longest of these is the erasure of some nine lines in the martyrology under Dec. 29, Becket's feast day.

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[41] *The State of the Ex-Religious and Former Chantry Priests*, G. A. J. Hodgett, ed. (Lincoln Record Society, 1959), 89, 96. The unmarried rector, one Richard Hanger of Souldrop, although he is entered as "formerly a Bonhomme of Ashridge" does not appear among the brethren listed as subscribing to the oath of Supremacy or those receiving pensions. His pension is here (p. 89) stated to be £ 6. Possibly his entry as "of Ashridge" was a mistake.

[42] Huntington Library, *Ellesmere* 9. H 15, fol. 104^r.

[43] The Egerton family, earls of Ellesmere, aquired the manor in 1601. *VCH Herts* ii, 209.

The hands of several scribes are found in the manuscript. All, except that of the sixteenth century Annals, are in carefully executed Gothic bookhands, with cursive influence apparent only in the later entries. The Calendar and martyrology, evidently the earliest entries in the volume, are in the same hand, one which appears to be of the fourteenth century.

CONTENTS

1. Calendar. folios 3^r-8^v. Hand A.
2. Martyrology. folios 9^r-98^v. Hand A.
3. *Consuetudines.* folios 99^r-105^r. Hand B. These *consuetudines* are to be found also, with certain differences, in the *Register* of Lincoln Cathedral, which, however, adds a preamble and a postscript not included in the Ashridge MS. The episcopal preamble states that the *observationes antiquae* of Ashridge are being reissued in a more up to date and slightly altered version, and mentions the recent enrichment of the House by Edward, Prince of Wales, as the reason for the reform. The postscript appends the date of the episcopal approbation, 20 April, 1376. It seems likely, then, that the manuscript was begun as a result of the interest and munificence of the Black Prince sometime prior to that date. A short description of the *consuetudines* may be of value, since they are not printed in their entirety in Todd, which is the source of subsequent statements about them, and there is in Todd a serious misstatement which should be corrected.

Fol. 99^r-102^v: These *consuetudines* begin with a description of the customs of the monastic day. A description of liturgical procedure follows, of fasting, the reception of new brethren, and of the gray habit. The customs concerning the Rector, including a few general rules for his advice in governing the brethren, are then succeeded by the procedure concerning election to the chief office, and by the procedure to be followed at the death of brethren. The section ends with a list of anniversaries to be specially celebrated: anniversaries of the death of the founder's family, his father Richard *rex allemanie*, his mother, Sanchia, Peter, Count of Alencon, and Beatrix, Countess of Richmond, his cousins, and of the founder's own death, all which, the customs say, Edmund himself laid down to be observed. These are the customs copied in the Episcopal Register and dated 1376, except for a misplacing of some eleven lines concerning procedure in Chapter, in which is discussed confession, correction, prohibition of strife and special daily prayers for the earl. Todd states incorrectly that these injunctions are omitted from the episcopal copy; in fact they are inserted somewhat later.[44] Todd's conclusion concerning this supposed omission, led him to a serious misunderstanding of the *consuetudines*, which has been perpetuated since his time, historians being dependent upon him rather than upon the MS. He concluded that fol. 99r-102v contain the original thirteenth century *consuetudines*,[45] and that the episcopal copy represented a revision of them, a very small revision indeed, the procedure in Chapter alone having been unacceptable to the Bishop.[46] This, as we have seen, is quite incorrect; the episcopal copy is a faithful copy of the *boni homines*' rules, different only in that the scribe misplaced the lines in question and quoted in full an oath of which the *incipit* alone is given in the Ashridge MS. The conclusion must be drawn that these *consuetudines* are the *new* Rule, the reform of an original Rule we do not possess and cannot reconstruct with certainty.[47]

Fol. 102v-105r: detailed ordinances concerning the reception of new brethren. On folio 102v, lines 14-28 are an exact repetition of folio 101r, lines 1-16, concerning the qualifications and first reception of novices. But where this first version states that the Rector is to place novices under a year's probation (*statuat eis annum probationis*) the second is a repetition only through *eis* (line 28), and in this version the Rector is to appoint a day (*statuat eis diem*) on which they can be received into full brotherhood. It seems to be understood later, however, that this day of reception is to follow a year's probation, so the probation period may not have been an episcopal reform. Throughout this whole second section occur sentences found verbatim in that part of the *consuetudines* copied into the episcopal register, but it is a version much expanded by description of ceremony and prayers for the day of reception.

Fol. 105r-106r: an entry which is a copy of an ordinance of the first known Rector, Richard de Watford, dated 1291, concerning customs to be followed on the death of a brother and on the anniversary of his death. The procedure is very like that of Barnwell Priory.[48]

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[44] *Lincoln Episcopal Register* 12, fol. 277v, line 9 ff.

[45] Todd, 14.

[46] Todd, 15, note r, where Todd says that the reform which the bishop speaks of as having been effected, "alludes to what respects confession, etc., from *In capitulo* to *comite fundatore*, which directions are expunged by the Bishop."

[47] The election of the Rector at least seems to have been the same in the old and new Rule. See *Register of the Black Prince*, iv, 105.

[48] J. W. Clark, *The Observances in Use at the Augustinian Priory of S. Giles and S. Andrew at Barnwell, Cambridgeshire* (Cambridge, 1897), 216.

The inclusion in the Ashridge MS of the section not copied into the episcopal register would lead to the tentative conclusion that this section was part of the *antiquae observationes* of Ashridge, mentioned by the bishop, and that the *boni homines* had distilled out of it only the essence of their usage at the reception of novices for the records of the diocesan, still retaining in use much further detail of ceremonial. A full edition, however, of the MS *consuetudines*, and an analysis of their contents when compared with contemporaneous customs elsewhere in England is needed before any further conclusions can be drawn.

4. Ordinances by the Rectors respecting the obits and exequies of various benefactors and the foundations of chantries (folios 106^r-116^v). These are begun by hand B and added to by various hands.

Fol. 106^r-107^r: a perpetual chantry for John Ludham, canon of the Cathedral of London and rector of the church of Trenge, and for the soul of the Black Prince and for John de Grey, knight. Dated 4 July, 1379.

Fol. 107^r-110^r: ordinance concerning a chantry endowment for the health during the life, of Thomas de Hatfield, bishop of Durham, and for his soul after his death, and for the soul of Edward III, *nuper regis Anglie sub cuius alis dictus venerabilis pater se asserit a iuventute fuisse nutritum*. It is dated 24 February, 1380, and the episcopal approbation is appended, witnessed by John Bathre of Lincoln and William de Wengrave, clerk of the diocese of London.

Fol. 110^r-110^v: ordinance of a perpetual chantry for Henry, bishop of Lincoln, dated 1336. The hand is strongly cursive.

Fol. 111^r-111^v: ordinance in favor of Magister John Thorp, priest, dated *secundum cursum et computationem ecclesie Anglicane*, 2 February, 1488.

Fol. 111^v-112^r: record of the confraternity of Robert Newton. Dated 14 July, 1489.

Fol. 112 recto and verso: record of the confraternity of Magister Thomas Brampston, *pro beneficiis caritative nobis inpensis ceterisque humanitatis officiis per ipsum in doctrina tam fratribus quam pueris nostre domus clericulis*. Dated 6 October, 9 Henry VII.

Fol. 112^v-113^r: ordinance of Rector John Whytton, setting aside the income of Ashridge's *molendino inferiori* to be used for an annual distribution on the obits of Thorp, Newton and Brampston.

Fol. 113^v-114^v: blank.

Fol. 115 recto and verso: ordinance concerning prayers for Richard Peteworth, *clericus servitorque... domini Henrici Cardinalis Anglie et Wyntoñ Episcopi*. Dated 1445.

Fol. 116 recto and verso: ordinance concerning prayers for the soul of Henry Beaufort himself, *tituli Sancti Eusebii Cardinalis de Anglie vulgariter nuncupatus Wintoñ Episcopus*. Dated 7 July, 1447.

5. Annal. folios 117^r-119^r. The Annal, of the sixteenth century, was evidently meant to fill the available folios, for they are ruled and prepared for yearly entries. Only in fol. 117^r, however, were entries made. The date 1525 is entered on the first line in Roman numerals, and on the first line of fol. 117^v the date 1561 is entered in Arabic numerals, followed by the rulings only. Between these two dates notes were inserted for twelve years in several cursive hands. Among them are: 1529, the death of Rector John Moldon and the election of the last Rector, Thomas Waterhouse. In 1536 it is noted that *hoc anno decollata fuit regina Anna in turri londini cum fratre suo...*, and that there had been an *insurrectio vulgi in partibus borealibus*. In 1537 the birth of Prince Edward is noted.

For 1539 is entered, *Hoc anno nobilis domus de Asseherugge destructa fuit et fratres depulsi in die Sancti Leonardi...* Entries continue however, noting among other events that in 1540 *decapitatus fuit ille eximius hereticus et proditor Thomas Crumwell qui causa fuit destructionis omnium domorum religiosarum in Anglia...*; that in 1546 occured the death of Henry VIII and the coronation of Edward VI; and in 1548, that *omnes sacerdotes qui voluerint acceperint uxores per dispensationem regis et episcoporum.* Evidently the manuscript was retained by some of the dispersed *boni homines* for some years after 1539, most probably by Rector Thomas Waterhouse who seems to have remained in the locality, first at Berkhamsted and later at Hemel Hempsted on an annual pension from the Crown.[49]

6. Fol. 119^v is slightly damaged and is empty except for a date, 1465, written cursively in Roman numerals at the top of the page, and for a doggerel quatrain written twice. Beneath the number and partially illegible because of the damage, the quatrain appears first in a hand very like hand A, but carelessly written, as if the scribe were perhaps testing his pen. Perpendicular to this, the quatrain is entered again, somewhat more carefully, and this time almost certainly in hand A:

> Dic lector nonas. sic idus atque kalendas.
> Cum praeeunt festa. que recitantur eis.
> Sic dicas nonis. sic idibus atque kalendis.
> Quando sanctorum festa. coluntur in hiis.

7. Fol. 120 recto and verso records an abbreviated version of the chantry endowment in favor of Thomas de Hatfield and Edward III. It is undated and is in hand A, the earliest hand in the manuscript.

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[49] Willis, 10, 11.

The Calendar

Since the Calendar is entered in the hand of the scribe who copied the martyrology, the quatrain and the ordinance found on the last folios of the volume, it was, we can say with some certainty, copied by an Ashridge brother in the late fourteenth century.

The Calendar is a usual "perpetual" calendar of the Middle Ages, entering, in columns from left to right, the Golden Numbers, ferial letters, the Roman divisions of the month, the saints honored on the various days, and, in the last column, the number of lections for each feast. This last column is occasionally preceded by the notes, *cum regimine chori*, *invitatorium duplex* and *invitatorium triplex*, referring to choral and liturgical procedure. The Calendar contains no astrological notes, indications of the relative lengths of day and night, nor any other information extraneous to its purpose as a liturgical calendar. Each month is completely contained on one side of one folio; the decoration is limited to the stiff foliage decoration in red on which is placed at the head of each month, the contraction-capitals KL. All feasts of three lections are in black ink; all of nine lections, and Principal feasts, are in red. A full edition of the Calendar is not presented here, but it is hoped that a list of feast days and their liturgical notes may be of interest and value. Those names which appear to have been added in a later hand are in italics.

January

1.	Circumcisio domini		duplex festum
2.	Oct. sci Stephani	cum regimine chori	III lc.
3.	Oct. sci Johannis	cum regimine chori	III lc.
4.	Oct. Innocentium	cum regimine chori	III lc.
5.	Oct. sci. Thome		III lc.
6.	Epiphania domini		duplex festum
7.			
8.	Sci. Luciani sociorumque eius		III lc.
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.	Oct. Epiphanie		IX lc.
14.	Sci. Felicis epi. et martyris		III lc.
15.	Sci. Mauri abbatis et conf.		III lc.
16.	Sci Marcelli martyris		III lc.
17.	Sci. Sulpicii epi. et conf.		III lc.
18.	Sce. Prisce virginis et martyris		III lc.
19.	Sci. Wlstani epi. et conf.		IX lc.
20.	SS. Fabiani et Sebastiani martyrum		IX lc.
21.	Sce. Agnetis virginis et martyris		IX lc.
22.	Sci. Vincencii martyris		IX lc.
23.			

24.			
25.	Conversio sci. Pauli		IX lc.
26.			
27.	Sci. Juliani epi. et conf.	Invit. duplex	III lc.
28.	Sce. Agnetis secundo	Invit. duplex	III lc.
29.			
30.	Sce. Batildis regine		III lc.
31.			

February

1.	Sce Brigide virginis et non martyris		III lc.
2.	Purificatio Beate Marie		duplex festum
3.	Sci. Blasii epi. et martyris	Invit. duplex	III lc.
4.			
5.	Sce. Agathe virginis et martyris		IX lc.
6.	SS. Vedasti et Amandi epor. et conf.		III lc.
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.	Sce. Scolastice virginis non martyris		III lc.
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.	Sci. Valentini martyris		III lc.
15.			
16.	Sce Juliane virginis et martyris	Invit. duplex	III lc.
17.			
18.			
19.			
20.			
21.			
22.	Cathedra sci. Petri	Invit triplex	IX lc.
23.			
24.	Sci. Mathie apli.		duplex festum
25.			
26.			
27.			
28.			
29.			
30.			
31.			

March

1.	*Sci. David epi. et conf.*		*IX lc.*
2.	*Sci. Cedde epi. et conf.*		*IX lc.*
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.	SS. Perpetue et Felicitatis		III lc.

8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.	Sci. Gregorii		*duplex festum*
13.			
14.			
15.			
16.			
17.			
18.	Sci. Edwardi regis et martyris		IX lc.
19.			
20.	Sci. Cuthberti epi. et conf.		IX lc.
21.	Sci. Benedicti abbatis et conf.		IX lc.
22.			
23.			
24.			
25.	Annunciacio dominica		duplex festum
26.			
27.	Resurrectio domini		Principalis
28.			
29.			
30.			
31.			

April

1.			
2.			
3.	Sci. Richardi epi. et conf.		IX lc.
4.	Sci. Ambrosii epi., doctor et conf.		duplex festum
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.	SS. Tyburcii et Valeriani	sine regimine chori	III lc.
15.			
16.			
17.			
18.			
19.	Sci. Alphegi epi et martyris	sine regimine chori	III lc.
20.			
21.			
22.			
23.	Sci. Georgii martyris	duplex festum	III lc.
24.			

25.	Sci. Marci evangeliste		duplex festum
26.			
27.			
28.	Sci. Vitalis martyris	cum regimine chori	III lc.
29.			
30.			

May

1.	Apostolorum Philippi et Jacobi		duplex festum
2.			
3.	Invencio sce. Crucis		duplex festum
4.			
5.			
6.	Sci. Johannis ante portam latinam.	cum regimine chori.	III lc.
7.	*Sci.Johannis de Beverlaco epi. et conf.*	*cum re. chori*	*III lc.*
8.			
9.			
10.	Sci. Gordiani et Epimachi	sine regimine chori	III lc.
11.			
12.	SS. Nerei et Achillei atque Pancratii		III lc.
13.			
14.			
15.			
16.			
17.			
18.			
19.	Sci. Dunstani arepi. et conf.	cum regimine chori	III lc.
20.			
21.			
22.			
23.			
24.			
25.	Sci. Aldhelmi epi. et conf.	cum regimine chori	IX lc.
26.	Sci. Augustini anglorum apostoli		duplex festum
27.			
28.	Sci. Germani.epi. et conf.		III lc.
29.			
30.			
31.	Sce. Petronille virginis non martyris		III lc.

June

1.	Sci. Nichomedis martyris		III lc.
2.	SS. Marcellini et Petri martyrum	Invit. duplex	III lc.
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.	Sci. Bonifacii epi .et martyris.	Invit. duplex	III lc.
7.			
8.	SS. Medardi et Gildardi epor. et conf.		III lc.
9.	Translacio Sci. Edmundi.archepi.		duplex festum

10.
11. Sci. Barnabe apli Invit. triplex IX lc.
12. SS. Basilidis, Cyrini, Naboris et Nazarii Invit. duplex III lc.
13.
14. Sci. Basilii epi. et conf. III lc.
15. SS. Viti, Modesti et Crescencie Invit. duplex III lc.
16. Translacio Sci. Ricardi epi. et conf. IX lc.
17.
18. SS. Marci et Marcelliani martyrum Invit. duplex III lc
19. SS. Gervasii et Prothasii martyrum Invit. duplex III lc.
20. Translacio Sci. Edwardi regis et martyris IX lc.
nisi fuerint in XL. tunc fiant hic. III lc. Invit. duplex
21. Sci. Albani protomartyris anglorum IX lc.
22. Sce. Etheldrede virginis non martyris III lc. cum Nocturno.vig.
23. Nativitas.Sci.Johannis baptiste duplex festum
24.
25. SS. Johannis et Pauli martyrum Invit. duplex III lc.
26.
27. Sci. Leonis conf. III lc. cum Nocturno vig.
28. Apostolorum Petri et Pauli duplex festum
29. Commemoratio Sci Pauli Invit. duplex IX lc.
30.

July

1. Oct. Sci. Johannis baptiste Invit. duplex III lc.
2. SS. Processi e Martiniani mart. Invit. duplex III lc.
3.
4. Translacio Sci. Martini IX lc.
5.
6. Oct. Apostolorum Petri et Pauli Invit. triplex IX lc.
7. Translacio Sc. Thome Cantuar. archepi. duplex festum
8.
9.
10. SS. Septem fratrum martyrum Invit. duplex III lc.
11. Translacio Sci. Benedicti abbatis et conf. IX lc., nisi
12. fuerint in XL. tunc fiant hic III lc. In. duplex
13.
14.
15. Translacio Sci. Swithuni epi. et conf. IX lc.
16. *Translacio Sci. Osmundi epi. et conf.*
17. Sci. Kenelmi regis et martyris Invit. duplex III lc.
18. Sci. Arnulphi epi. et martyris III lc.
19.
20. Sce. Margarete virginis et martyris IX lc.
21. Sce. Praxedis virginis non martyris III lc.
22. Sce. Marie Madgalene Invit. triplex IX lc.
23. Sci. Appollinaris epi. et martyris III lc.
24. Sce. Cristine virginis et martyris III lc. cum Nocturno vig.
25. Sci. Jacobi apostoli duplex festum
26. Sce. Anne matris Marie virginis Invit. duplex IX lc.

27. SS. Septem dormiencium Invit. duplex III lc.
28. Sci. Sampsonis epi. et conf. Invit. duplex III lc.
29. SS. Felicis, Simplicii, Faustini et Beatricis Invit duplex III lc.
30. SS. Abdon et Sennis martyrum Invit. duplex III lc.
31. Sci. Germani epi. et conf. III lc.

August

1. Ad vincula Sci. Petri IX lc.
2. Sci. Stephani martyris Invit. duplex III lc.
3. Invencio Sci. Stephani prothomartyri sociorumque eius IX lc.
4.
5. Sci. Oswaldi regis et martyris Invit. duplex III lc.
6. SS. Sixti, Felicissimi et Agapiti mart. Invit. duplex III lc.
7. Sci. Donati epi. et martyris III lc.
8. Sci Cyriaci sociorumque eius martyrum Invit. duplex III lc.
9. Sci. Romani martyris III lc. cum Nocturno.vig
10. Sci.Laurencii martyris IX lc.
11. Sci. Tyburcii martyris Invit. duplex III lc.
12.
13. Sci. Ypoliti sociorumque eius martyrum Invit. duplex III lc.
14. Sci. Eusebii presbytrei III lc. cum Nocturno.vig.
15. Assumpcio sce. Marie virginis duplex festum
16.
17. Oct. Sci. Laurencii memorie
18. Sci. Agapti martyris memorie
19. Sci. Magni martyris memorie
20.
21.
22. Oct. Assumpcionis Invit. triplex IX lc.
23. SS. Tymothei et Appollinaris III lc. cum Nocturno vig.
24. Sci. Bartholomei apostoli duplex festum
25.
26.
27. Sci. Rufi martyris Invit. duplex III lc.
28. Sci. Augustini epi., doct., et conf. duplex festum
29. Decollacio Sci. Johannis baptiste IX lc.
30. SS. Felicis et Adaucti martyrum Invit. duplex III lc.
31. S. Cuthberge virginis non martyris III lc.

September

1. Sci. Egidii abbatis et conf. IX lc.
2.
3.
4. Translacio Sci. Cuthberti epi. et conf. IX lc.nisi fuerint in XL. tunc fiant hic III lc. Invit. duplex
5. Sci. Bertini abbatis cum Nocturno III lc.
6.
7.
8. Nativitas Sce. Marie Virginis duplex festum
9. Sci. Gorgonii martyris memorie

10.			
11.	SS. Prothi et Jacinti martyrum		memorie
12.			
13.			
14.	(erasure)		duplex festum
15.	Oct. Sce. Marie Virginis		IX lc.
16.	Sce. Edithe virginis non martyris		IX lc.
17.	Sci. Lamberti epi. et martyris		III lc.
18.			
19.			
20.			
21.	Sci. Mathei apostoli et evangelisti		duplex festum
22.	Sci. Mauricii sociorumque eius martyrum		IX lc.
23.	Sce. Tecle virginis non martyris	cum Nocturno	III lc.
24.			
25.	Sci. Firmini epi. et martyris		III lc.
26.	SS. Cypriani et Justine martyrum	Invit. duplex	III lc.
27.	SS. Cosme et Damiani martyrum	Invit.duplex	III lc.
28.			
29.	Sci. Michelis Archangelis		duplex festum
30.	Sci. Jeronimi presbyteri et conf.		duplex festum

October

1.	Sci. Remigii sociorumque eius conf.		IX lc.
2.	Sci. Thome Hereford epi.		IX lc.
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.	Translacio.Sci.Hugonis Lincoln epi.		IX lc.
7.	SS. Marci, Marcelli et Apulei martyrum	Invit. duplex	III lc.
8.			
9.	Sci. Dyonisii sociorumque eius martyrum		IX lc.
10.	Sci. Gereonis sociorumque eius martyrum		III lc.
11.	Sci. Nigasii sociorumque eius martyrum	Invit. duplex	III lc.
12.			
13.	Translacio Sci. Edwardi conf.		duplex festum
14.	Sci. Kalixti martyris	Invit. duplex	III lc.
15.	Sci. Wlfranni epi. et conf.		IX lc.
16.	Sci. Michelis in Monte Tumba		IX lc.
17.			
18.	Sci. Luce evangeliste		duplex festum
19.			
20.			
21.	SS. Undecim milia Virg.	Invit. duplex	III lc.
22.	*Dedicacio Ecclesie de Assheruge*	*IX lc. Principalis*	
23.	Sci. Romani epi. et conf.	cum Nocturno	III lc.
24.			
25.	SS. Crispini et Crispianiani martyrum	Invit. duplex	III lc.
26.			
27.			vigilia

28.	Apostolorum Symonis et Jude		duplex festum
29.			
30			
31.	Sci. Quintini martyris	III lc. cum Nocturno. vigilia	

November

1.	Festivitas omnium sanctorum		duplex festum
2.	Commemmoracio animarum		
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.	Sci. Leonardi abbatis et conf.		IX lc.
7.			
8.	SS. quatuor coronatorum martyrum	Invit. duplex	III lc.
9.	Sci. Theodori martyris		III lc.
10.			
11.	Sci. Martini epi. et conf.		IX lc.
12.			
13.	Sci. Bricii epi. et conf.	Invit. duplex	III lc.
14.			
15.	Sci. Machuti epi. et conf.		IX lc.
16.	Sci. Edmundi epi. et conf.		IX lc.
17.	Sci. Hugonis epi. et conf.		IX lc.
18.	Oct. Sci. Martini	Invit. duplex	III lc.
19.			
20.	Sci. Edmundi regis et martyris		IX lc.
21.			
22.	Sce. Cecilie virginis et martyris		IX lc.
23.	Sci. Clementis martyris		IX lc.
24.	Sci. Grisogoni martyris		III lc.
25.	Sce. Katerine virginis et martyris		IX lc.
26.	Sci. Lini martyris		III lc.
27.			
28.			
29.	SS. Saturnini et Sisinini martyrum cum Nocturno		III lc. vig.
30.	Sci. Andree apostoli	duplex festum	

December

1.		
2.		
3.		
4.	*Sci. Osmundi epi. et conf.*	*IX lc.*
5.		
6.	Sci. Nicholai epi. et conf.	IX lc.
7.	Oct. Sci. Andree apostoli	III lc.
8.	Concepcio Sce. Marie virginis	duplex festum
9.		
10.		
11.		
12.		

13.	Sce. Lucie virginis et martyris		IX lc.
14.			
15.			
16.		O Sapiencia	
17.			
18.			
19.			
20.			vig.
21.	Sci. Thome apostoli		duplex festum
22.			
23.			
24.			
25.	Nativitas domini Jesu Christi		Principalis
26.	Sci. Stephani prothomartyris		duplex festum
27.	Sci. Johannis apostoli et evangeliste		duplex festum
28.	Sanctorum Innocencium		duplex festum
39.	Sci. Thome martyris		duplex festum
30.			
31.	Sci. Silvestri	conf.	IX lc.

The Calendar is of the Sarum Use.[50] Since it omits the *Festivitas Reliquiarum Sarum*, usually included in Sarum use calendars, it almost certainly had no immediate connection with the Church of Salisbury, or at least Ashridge consciously omitted the reminder of such a connection. Also omitted is the feast of Corpus Christi, which arose in 1246. From 1262, the observance of the feast was encouraged by the institution of indulgences for those who kept it, and it was made compulsory in 1332.[51] Undoubtedly then, the exemplar of the Calendar was not later than the thirteenth century. Collation with the three calendars of *The Sarum Missal* shows that, while they and the Ashridge Calendar celebrate consistently the same saints and have almost exactly the same number of festal days, Ashridge has consistently fewer saints listed for each feast. Since it was probably the more common practice to add saints to calendars, and certainly not to subtract them as time went on, this characteristic of scarcity in the Ashridge Calendar, added to the fact that no late saints are found in the hand of its original scribe, gives us evidence for supposing that its exemplar was earlier than the Calendars edited by Legg. He appears, from his discussion of Missals and Calendars in his Preface to *The Sarum Missal*, to have known nothing of this manuscript, and it must henceforward provide at least a qualifying footnote to his opinion that MS. C, with its calendar, is the earliest of that rite known to us.[52] The distinction would at the moment appear to belong to the Ashridge Calendar.

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[50] It agrees closely with the three calendars, A, B, C, in *The Sarum Missal*, J. Wickham Legg, ed. (Oxford, 1916), xxi-xxxii, 499-510, and 511-518. For comparison with a contemporaneous calendar of Roman usage, see V. L. Kennedy, C. S. B., The Calendar of the Early 13th Century Curial Missal, *Mediaeval Studies* XX (1958), 113-126.

[51] *Sarum Missal*, vii.

The English saints in the hand of the original scribe, which are omitted from one or all of these Sarum Calendars are:

3 April. Richard of Chichester.
16 June. Translation of Richard of Chichester. C and A omit both references. B as in Ashr.
9 June. Translation of Edmund. C, A and B omit.
31 Aug. Cuthberge of Wessex. C omits.
2 Oct. Thomas of Hereford. A, B, C omit.
6 Oct. Translation of Hugh of Lincoln. A, B, C omit.
13 Oct. Translation of Edward the Confessor. C and A omit.
17 Nov. Hugh of Lincoln. C omits.

In the original hand, then, the saints who are unique to Ashridge are Edmund, Hugh of Lincoln and Thomas of Hereford. Their presence is easily explained: Edmund, Earl of Cornwall, founder of Ashridge, was named after S. Edmund; the founder obtained for his House as a relic, the heart of Thomas de Cantilupe, bishop of Hereford; and Ashridge was, after all, in S. Hugh's diocese of Lincoln. Because of the mention of Hugh's translation, the exemplar might seem to have been provided from Lincoln itself, but it will be noted that Ashridge and calendar B concur in including Richard of Chichester twice, Edward the Confessor and Cuthberge of Wessex (where A joins them), all of whom are connected with southern England, and two of whom (Richard and Cuthberge) were by no means so widely venerated as the famous S. Hugh. The provenance of the exemplar of the Ashridge Calendar can hardly, then, be estimated with any exactness. However, the connection between Ashridge and B is far closer than that between Ashridge and the two other Sarum calendars. Indeed, in only one case does Ashridge agree with A or C against B. B is thought to have been connected with Oxford, from the inclusion in it of S. Frideswide, omitted in Ashridge. Ashridge was situated not many miles from Oxford and it had connections with the College of S. Mary and All Saints there at least in the next century after the commencement of the manuscript.[53] It is not unlikely that a common exemplar in use in that area provided, at one or two removes, both Ashridge and MS. B with their calendars, and that Ashridge is somewhat closer to that exemplar. The provenance of that ultimate exemplar might be assigned tentatively, on the evidence of Richard, Cuthberge and Edward, to southern England.

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[52] *Ibid*, ix.

[53] Fol. 111^{r}: copies of the ordinance concerning the confraternity of John Thorp were to be kept at Ashridge and at S. Mary and All Saints, and whenever the *boni homines* failed to observe his anniversary, they were to pay £ 20 to the Oxford house.

The only entry in which Ashridge disagrees with B concerns S. Francis, omitted from Ashridge. Indeed, the Calendar nowhere mentions any of the popular Franciscan saints, and although it includes Katharine of Alexandria, a saint important to the Franciscans, it is likely that she had independently something of a *cultus* in England.[54] This neglect of the Franciscans, except for Francis, is not unusual in these early Sarum calendars, but the omission of the very popular Francis is strange. It can hardly be laid to a prejudice against the Preachers in general, for Dominic is mentioned in the martyrology, where Francis is again omitted. Whether it is another indication of the date of the exemplar, suggesting, as does the evidence above, a date in the thirteenth century before the devotion to S. Francis had reached its later proportions, or whether it indicates a prejudice against the Franciscans in general, must be left a moot point.

The liturgical observances of Ashridge as reflected in its calendar are modelled closely upon those of Sarum, but as might be expected in a monastic house, they are more elaborate than those of the Cathedral Church. Since the Boni Homines were connected with no Order and followed, as they state in the *Consuetudines*, the quite general *regulam beati Augustini*, they were in need of more detailed regulations for their observances and life, and these were found quite naturally in the Use of Sarum, for although there were other Uses available in England, that of Sarum had found general acceptance in the kingdom long before the foundation of Ashridge.[55] Their *Consuetudines* state specifically that the Use of Sarum shall be followed for the *officium divinum nocturnum pariter et diurnum.*

S. Osmund's *de officiis ecclesiasticis tractatus* divides the feasts into *duplicia* and *simplicia.*[56] The *duplicia festa* can be further divided: in some the choir is ruled by four clerics, of whom the two principal shall always be *de superiori gradu* and the two secondary sometimes of this higher grade and sometimes *de secunda forma.* On Christmas and the two following days, on Epiphany, Easter day and on the *secunda feria* of Easter, on the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin, on the day of the Ascension, on Whitsunday *et in secunda feria*, the secondary rulers of the choir were to be of the higher grade. On the rest of the *duplicia festa* the secondary rulers were *de secunda forma.* All feasts which were not double, but in which the choir was ruled, were *festa simplicia.*

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[54] I am indebted to V. L. Kennedy, C.S.B., for this opinion. Ashridge not only mentions S. Katherine in both its calendar and martyrology, its church had a chapel, evidently its only one, dedicated to her, a fact which provides further corroboration of Fr. Kennedy's opinion.

[55] R. Twysden, *Decem Scriptores* (London, 1652) i, 977. For the universality of the Use of Sarum, see also *The Register of S. Osmund* (RS 78, 1883) i, xiv; and D. Rock, *The Church of Our Fathers*, ed. G. W. Hart and W. H. Frere (London, 1905).

[56] *Register of S. Osmund* i, 36-43.

The Ashridge Calendar organizes the feasts somewhat differently. Three Principal Feasts, the highest grade, were: *Resurrectio domini*, entered on 27 March, *Dedicatio ecclesie de Assherugge* on 22 October (noted as *IX lectiones. principalis*), and *Nativitas domini Jesu Christi*. The next grade seems to be those feasts noted as *duplex festum*, and they are almost twice as numerous as those in the *tractatus*. These are followed by the five feasts of nine lections and *invitatorium triplex*. *Commemoratio sancti Pauli* alone is a feast of nine lections and *invitatorium duplex*. These are followed in importance by the feasts of nine lections, which complete the red-letter days. The feasts of three lections are subdivided into those *cum regimine chori*, those with *invitatorium duplex*, those *cum Nocturno*, those *sine regimine chori* and those with no qualifying note. Only three, the Octave of S. Laurence, S. Agapitus and S. Magnus, which fall consecutively in August, are given no indication of their category.

The only differences between the Ashridge Calendar and S. Osmund's *tractatus* to be remarked, then, are that Ashridge includes many more feasts celebrated as double, that it has rather more refined categories, and that it excludes the *Festivitas Reliquiarum Sarum*, celebrated not only at Salisbury itself but at other churches of the Sarum Use as well.[57] Ashridge had quite evidently created for itself a more elaborate yearly observance than that of the strict Sarum Use while staying within the Sarum tradition, and it had no strong attachment to the Church of Salisbury itself. Both these conclusions are also reached by a comparison of Ashridge's Calendar with the calendars of A, B and C.

MARTYROLOGY

The Martyrology is entered by the scribe of the Calendar, presumably therefore in the last half of the fourteenth century. It is basically a version of the ninth century martyrology of Usuard, to which have been added certain English saints. That it is such a version is in keeping with the tradition of Sarum, for, as the editors of *The Martiloge* write, "...we cannot determine that the Martyrologe of a church following Sarum use was required to be anything more than a variant of Usuard, with additions of English saints selected according to local circumstances."[58] But the text proves to be an interesting and altogether surprising one when compared with other English martyrologies of approximately the same date.[59] The many corruptions, especially of place names and personal names which had crept into versions of Usuard over five hundred years of copying, the many additions to Usuard's saints, are notably absent from Ashridge. It could, almost as it stands, have formed the basis of the Bollandist edition of Usuard.[60] More conservatively, it can be said that of English Usuard martyrologies either available in print, or described by the editors of *The Martiloge* in their survey of Sarum martyrologies, or used by the editors of the *Acta Sanctorum*, the Ashridge martyrology seems to be the closest to the reconstructed text of Usuard, and has by far the fewest additions to that text.

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[57] It might be added that neither the calendar nor martyrology notices the dedication of Salisbury Cathedral, also widely entered. See *The Tracts of Clement Maydeston*, Chr. Wordsworth, ed. (Henry Bradshaw Society, 1894), 133.

[58] *The Martiloge*, ed. F. Proctor and E. S. Dewick (Henry Bradshaw Society, London, 389), xi.

But it is in comparison with the *Varia Lectio* and the *Auctaria* of the Bollandist Usuard that the surprising tradition and provenance of the Boni Homines' martyrology is revealed. Almost at once a pattern emerges. In variations in the spelling of personal names, Ashridge is certainly in the tradition of those codices which follow the very early MS called by the editors of the *Acta Sanctorum*, Praten.[61] Of this MS, so called because it is a codex of the Paris monastery of S. Germanus a Pratis, Usuard's own monastery, the editors say, "... inter illos (i. e. codices Usuardinos manuscriptos)... omnes principatum apud nos semper tenuit, si non omnimodae puritatis, saltem vetustatis titulo... tamquam auctoris ipsius manu scriptus sive autographus, summo in pretio habetur."[62] Bollandus, following the opinion of Sirmondus, called it, "Eum codicem Usuardi aevo aut non multo post scriptum." And Mabillon, writing of it, said, "Et sane antiquissimum eius Martyrologii exemplar habemus, eo tempore (i.e., seculo nono) exaratum...", and judged that it had been written between 869 and 877.[63] The three codices which the Bollandist editors consider as peculiarly the Praten tradition are Antwerp-major, a MS which they take to be English from its many Bedan interpolations,[64] the Codex Rosweyd,[65] and the truncated codex Aquicinctum. Speaking of this text, the editors say that it "cum Antverpiensi majore et Rosweydino commune est, quod ubi Pratensis a reliquis deviat, hic cum duobus solitis sociis classem peculiarem constituat...."[66]

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[59] See *The Martiloge*, especially its notes, which represent collation with two Latin martyrologies of Sarum Use.

[60] J. B. Sollerius, ed., *Acta Sanctorum Junii Tomus Sectus* (Paris and Rome, 1866), henceforward abbreviated AASS.

[61] For a full discussion of this codex, see AASS, xlv-xlix. Some examples of spelling agreements are: 1 Jan. Praten, Ashridge, *Augendi*. Usuard, *Eugendi*; 8 Jan. U, Praten Ashridge *Eugeniani*. Varia lectio, *Egemonium*, *Egonomium*, *Eugenii*, *Aegemonum*, *Hegemonio*, etc.; 17 Jan. U, Praten, Ashridge; *Speusippi*, *Elasippi* and *Melasippi*. These names are a great source of corruptions, as may be imagined (see Varia lectio); 4 Feb. U, Praten, Ashridge, *Filoromi*. Varia lectio, *Filoronii*, *Phileromi*, *Florianum*, etc.; 11 Feb. U, *Agaunensis*. Praten, Ashridge *Acaunensis*.

[62] AASS, xlv.

[63] *Ibid*, xlvi.

[64] *Ibid*, li.

[65] *Ibid*.

Taking the editors' list of days in which Praten and the manuscripts in its tradition differ from the "original" Usuard (i.e. the consensus of the best texts), one finds that Ashridge stays faithfully within the Praten tradition. To cite a few examples:

15 June. Praten, Anwt-maj, Rosweyd and Ashridge interpolate, *Civitate Benevento sancti Mercurii martyris.*

23 Aug. Praten, Antw-maj, Rosweyd and Ashridge have a very long interpolation concerning nine saints of various places of martyrdom.

26 Aug. Praten, Aquicinct, Antw-maj, Rosweyd and Ashridge are unique in omitting S. Eleutherius and substituting *In territorio Lemovicensi, Sancti Aredii.*

5 Sept. Praten, Antw-maj alone read, *In pago Taurensi, Sancti Bertini abbatis.* Ashridge follows them exactly.

25 Sept. Praten, Antw-maj, Rosweyd and Ashridge add *Item Sancti Solanni episcopi.*

8 Oct. Praten and Ashridge are the same. Antw-maj adds the English S. Oswald, and Rosweyd varies independently.

1 Nov. Praten, Antw-maj, Rosweyd and Ashridge omit mention of S. Maria.

As with variants in the spelling of names, examples can be multiplied, but these indicate at least how closely Ashridge adheres to the Praten tradition. But although Praten is the ultimate source of Ashridge, Rosweyd and Antw-maj., the relationship between these descendants of the tradition is relatively distant. Rosweyd, the earliest, is by far the most inflated text, and the most corrupt.[67] Nor could Antw-maj have been an ancestor or close relative of Ashridge. Some examples of English saints in Antw-maj and in Ashridge will illustrate:

2 July. Ashr : In britannie, civitate Wintonie, depositio sancti Swithini episcopi et confessoris.
Antw-maj : Apud occidentales Saxones, civitate Wenta, depositio sancti. Suuithuni mirificae sanctitatis viri.

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[66] *Ibid.*, lii.

[67] *Eg.* Rosweyd adds: Maximus (18 Jan), Justinus (4 Aug), Afra (7 Aug), Werenfridus and an extra clause to the notice of Tiburtius (11 Aug), Gregorius abbas (25 Aug), none of which are found in Praten, Antw-maj or Ashridge. Rosweyd omits: Afra (5 Aug), Radegunde (13 Aug. entering her mistakenly on 12 Aug), Vigilia Assumptionis Sanctae Mariae (14 Aug.), Moseus and Ammonius (18 Jan). Its wording is often markedly different, while keeping generally within the Praten tradition, as on 21 Jan., *In Hispania*, etc. where Ashridge keeps exactly to the wording of Praten. See Varia lectio, 1 Aug., for a lengthy departure of Rosweyd from Praten and Antw-maj; here again, Ashridge stays exactly with Praten.

17 July. Ashr : In provincia Merciorum, monasterio quod vocatur Winchecumbe, passio sancti Kenelmi regis et martyris.
Antw-maj : Ipso die, sancti Kenelmi regis et martyris.

20 July. Ashr : Eodem die, depositio sancti Neoti sacerdotis, meritis ac miraculis insignis. Antw-maj : Eodem die, sancti Neotis presbyteris et confessoris.

24 Aug. Ashr : In Britannia sancti Patrici abbatis qui hiberniensium fertur fuisse magister, sed quia eos corrigere non potuit, de Hibernia recessit atque ad monasterium quod Glastingense nuncupatum pervenit. Ibique in optima conversatione, multis clarescens virtutibus, vitam finivit, quod et usque hodie mortua ipsius ossa contestari videntur.
Antw-maj : In Hibernia, sancti Patricii abbatis et Gildardis confessoris. Qui Patricius, primus Hibernorum fertur Magister. Sed quia nec ipsos correxisse potuit, in peregrinationem perrexit ; ad monasterium Glestingense pervenit ibique vitam virtutibus clarescens finivit, quod et usque hodie mortua ipsius ossa contestari videntur. Ashr. further, has at the end of that day : *Nivernis, sancti Patricii abbatis et Gildardi confessoris*, as have several U-Auct, but not Antw-maj.

Those saints in Antw-maj and in Ashridge prove then to be entered in wording which differs considerably in the two MSS. A comparison of Antw-maj with those British saints in Ashridge which are not shared by Usuard, nor by the thirteenth century martyrology of Christ Church, Canterbury, is much more striking. Of the 47 British saints in this sense "unique" to Ashridge, only nine are to be found in Antw-maj, and of these nine, only one entry is worded the same.[68] The conclusion is evident: the real family relationship between the two MSS is on the side of their French ancestors; on the English side they are very distant cousins.

Yet more interesting, however, is the fact that the evidence points strongly to Ashridge as a more faithful version of Praten than is Antw-maj. For example:

8 Jan. Praten and Ashridge agree. Antw-maj has a shorter account of S. Severinus (which it spells Sevi), a slightly different wording concerning Lucianus, Maximianus and Julian, and omits the final notice concerning Eugenianus. Rosweyd is quite independently different.

16 Jan. Praten and Ashridge include S. Titianus. He is omitted in Antw-maj and Rosweyd.

16 Jan. Praten and Ashridge have the same wording of the entry concerning S. Furseus. Antw-maj differs widely.

17 Jan. Ashridge follows Praten. Antw-maj and Rosweyd have very different wording in the entry of S. Antony.

20 Jan. Praten and Ashridge are exactly the same for the whole day,

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[68] *Apud Londoniam, depositio sancti Erkenwaldi episcopi et confessoris.* 30 April.

while Antw-maj and Rosweyd differ markedly for the day (see Auctaria).

21 Jan. Praten and Ashridge begin with Publius, treat Agnes second, the Spanish martyrs third, and Patroclus last. Antw-maj begins with Agnes, then interpolates Publius in very abbreviated form, omits the Spanish martyrs, and ends with a much elongated form of the Patroclus entry.

26 Jan. Praten and Ashridge differ from most other MSS, including Antw-maj and Rosewyd, in omitting S. Batilda from this day and celebrating her instead on 30 Jan.

31 Jan. Praten and Ashridge differ from Antw-maj and Rosweyd (and "pure" Usuard) in omitting S. Vigilius from this day and commemorating him instead on 26 June.

24 Feb. Antw-maj adds, *Eodem die, Sidrac, Misac et Abdenago*, omitted from Praten and Ashridge.

24 Aug. Antw-maj differs in the description of the martyrdom of Tertullianus from that of Praten and Ashridge, whose wording is the same.

27 Aug. Antw-maj omits fourteen words. This might, however, be a copying error on the part of the Antw-maj scribe.

There are certain entries in Praten, in which that ninth century codex seems to stand entirely alone, and others in which it is joined only by its sister Aquicinct. These entries provide the final, crucial test of the fidelity of Ashridge to Praten itself, rather than merely to the Praten tradition. Such is the notice concerning S. Arcadius on 12 Jan. "Pure" Usuard reads, *Eodem die, sancti Archadii...*, taken from many MSS, including Antw-maj, and Rosweyd. Praten, however reads, *In Caesarea Mauritanie, sancti Arcadii....*[69] In this Praten is followed only by Aquicinct - and by Ashridge! The editors draw the conclusion from this unique variant which is in the hand of the original scribe: since the variant occurs in no other version of Usuard, manuscript or otherwise, except in Aquicinct, then either the other codices were not copied from Usuard's autograph, or Praten is not that autograph, or one must admit that Usuard wrote more than one autograph, Aquicinct (and Ashridge) alone stemming from one, and all other codices from the other.[70] The conclusion is reasonable and particularly persuasive since it is bolstered by other unique variants in Praten. With Ashridge before us, following Praten exactly, we can only comment that, *ergo*, Ashridge was copied from a manuscript in the true tradition of Usuard's own autograph or one of his two autographs, or, if Praten is a corrupt text, Ashridge and Aquicinct alone of known Usuard MSS martyrologies follow that ninth century corruption.

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[69] Rejecting this variant, the editors say, "Hic solum agitur de positione in Pratensi et, qui eum sequitur, Aquicinct, adjecta 'In caesarea Mauritaniae'; sed quae in nullis aliis codicibus... apparet." AASS, 24.

[70] *Ibid.*, xlvii, "Toties appellatus et imposterum appellandus Pratensis codex, ad XII Januarii, sic secundam annuntiationem exprimit; 'In Caesarea Mauritaniae, sancti Archadii, etc.', nulla usquam litura, nulla superinductione apparente. Atqui ea positio, seu martyrii locus... in nullis aliis nostris codicibus, tum excusis, tum manuscriptis, praeterquam in extracto Aquicinctino occurrit; ergo codices alii ex autographo Pratensi descripti non sunt, ergo vel autographum non est, vel necesse est admittere, plusquam unum autographum exstitisse, aliosque codices ex uno, alios ex alio descriptos."

Again, on 14 Jan., Praten stands alone; on this occasion it is not followed even by Aquicinct, but it is followed exactly by Ashridge! In all MSS except Praten, S. Felix of Nola is called *presbyteri et confessoris*. Aquicinct adds in a later hand, *Posse episcopum dici*, but the Ashridge MS reads *episcopi* with Praten. At the end of the same day Praten again *a reliquis deflectit* in adding a second *Felicis presbyteri et confessoris*. Again Ashridge alone follows, although it calls this Felix *episcopus*. On 16 Jan., Praten alone deviates from the "pure" Usuard in its interpolation, between SS. Honoratus and Furseus, of *Item civitate Odobergia, sancti Titiani episcopi et confessoris*. Here again only Ashridge follows Praten exactly.

On 22 Jan., Praten is followed by Aquicinct, and by Ashridge, in describing the martyrdom of S. Vincentius quite differently from all other manuscripts. These three alone read, "...cuius certaminis triumphum, temporibus Diocletiani et Maximiani, post nimiam caedam ac gravia tormenta textus ipsius passionis sub Daciano praeside completum esse declarat."[71]

On 26 Jan., Praten is followed only by Aquicinct (and by a corrupt Paris edition, Belin) in placing the martyrdom of Theognis and thirty-six companions *sub Licino imperatore*, and here again Ashridge follows.

On 8 Feb., Praten and Ashridge alone note the martyrdom of S. Salomon as *In provincia Lusitana, civitate Corduba*, all other MSS reading simply *civitate Corduba*, except for Rosweyd, which alone reads *in provincia Lusitania*, without mention of the city.

On 17 Feb., Praten is followed only by MS Marchian in ending the day, *In pago Taruensi, sancti Silvini Tolosanae civitatis episcopi*. Ashridge again follows exactly.

On 16 March, Praten, followed by no codex except Ashridge, adds *Ipso die, sancti Attali abbatis discipuli sancti Columbani*.[72] On 18 March, Praten adds S. Gertrude, a mistake seemingly unique to the MS, and in a different hand from that of the original scribe. Ashridge alone follows this mistaken later addition. Another mistake, evidently an addition, in Praten, is on 27 March, where it includes *sancti Eucherii Turonensis episcopi*. As the editors point out, the correct reading should be *Aurelianensis episcopi*, and further, all other codices commemorating S. Eucherius do so on 20 Feb. Here once more Ashridge is the only known MS to follow Praten.

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[71] Ashridge differs only in placing his martyrdom *apud civitatem Valenciam*, rather than Praten's *apud Valenciam civitatem Hispaniae*.

[72] MSS Greven and Molan read *Luxovio monasterio, sancti Athali abbatis*.

Now, all these examples in which Ashridge concurs with Praten where Praten diverges from all other Usuard MSS are the strongest evidence for postulating a unique relationship between the ninth century putative autograph and the fourteenth century English MS. They would be less impressive if Ashridge included additions of many other saints from various sources. Such is not the case. Ashridge adds almost no commemorations to those in Praten, beyond its English saints.[73] The few differences — and they are very few – are largely scribal errors in spelling, and the use of *e* for the early dipthong; indeed, Ashridge retains the *antiquus et pravus scribendi modus*[74] of *hii* and *Affrica*. It would in fact appear that until and unless a new survey of Usuard MSS presents us with a different picture, Ashridge must be considered the version of the Praten tradition closest to the original exemplar. It is a surprising conclusion, since we know that the two are separated by five centuries and the English Channel, that Ashridge was a relatively poor provincial monastery which eschewed connections with international Orders, and that when the Ashridge martyrology was copied, England had long been at war with France.

But an explanation of the striking similarity can be offered, and I would suggest that the clue to the explanation lies in S. Radegunde. For there are two consistent and significant differences between Ashridge and Praten. First of all, Ashridge omits every commemoration peculiar to the monastery of S. Germanus a Pratis, such as the dedications of altars and chapels in the Paris house. Secondly, Ashridge adds two commemorations found in no other Usuard martyrology, French or English: commemorations, on 31. Jan., and on 11 Feb., of S. Radegunde of Poitiers. These are not only completely unique to Ashridge, they are also the only commemorations which are so. The saint's usual feast on 13 Aug. is entered as well. These two special commemorations would seem to indicate that the exemplar of Ashridge was copied for the monastery in Poitiers founded by S. Radegunde, or for a church of that city or its environs. The evidence of similarity would indicate that the Poitevins had copied their MS from that of S. Germain or from an extraordinarily pure version of it, leaving out the particularly Parisian references and inserting references to local venerations of the Royal abbess of whom Poitiers was so proud.

This ascription to Poitiers of the exemplar of a provincial martyrology copied in the latter half of the fourteenth century, at first sight improbable, is a reminder of one of the saddest of the many sad events of the Hundred Years' War. In 1345, Edward III appointed Henry, earl of Derby, his captain in Guienne.[75] In July of that year the earl landed at Bayonne and in the months that followed, carried out a spectacularly successful campaign against the French, taking castles and cities, and punishing as a warning all who held out against him.[76] In 1346 he reached Poitiers. The city resisted, but on October 4th it fell. For eight or nine days Derby remained in the city, pillaging and burning. Neighboring churches and monasteries had, upon the approach of the English, sent their valuables into the city for protection, so that besides the wealth of its own foundations, Poitiers held the books, records, relics and treasure of a region. All fell into the hands of the English. "Few cities," wrote Denifle, "had, within their walls or in their neighborhoods, such a large number of churches and monasteries. Books, chalices, ornaments, relics, plate, all were carried away by the enemy. The Chapter of the cathedral said in 1351: 'Our church was despoiled of all its ornaments'."[77]

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[73] Dominic is the only relatively late continental saint I have found.

[74] AASS, 140.

There seems little reason to doubt that the martyrology which was the exemplar for the Ashridge MS was part of this loot. In his preamble to his copy of the newly revised Ashridge *consuetudines*, the bishop of Lincoln says that the *boni homines* have been enriched "by the pious bounty of the Prince of Wales... both in their possessions and in their numbers", and that "from this greater affluence in the things of religion... they should exhibit *majores gratiarum actiones et laudes Deo*."[78] The Prince would have been able to find these liturgical gifts easily and probably cheaply in the middle years of the century, either in England or in Aquitaine, which he governed in the 1360's. Perhaps gifts from the spoils of Poitiers, as an oblique commemoration of his own brillant victory there in 1356, were far from displeasing to him.

To this extraordinarily pure Praten-Poitiers exemplar were added English saints at the end of many days' entries. Using the collations in *The Martiloge*,[79] and the readings of the Winchester codex, Altemps, in the *Acta Sanct-*

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[75] H. Denifle, *La Guerre de Cent Ans et la Désolation des Églises, Monastères et Hôpitaux en France* (Paris, 1899) t. ii, part 1, 24. The earl was styled "lieutenant and captain-general for the king in Aquitaine and Languedoc", *Cal. Pat. Rolls* 1345-48, 474. In June, 1345, the king ordered all men at arms, archers, etc., accompanying the earl to proceed to Southampton with speed. *Cal. Close Rolls*, 1343-45, 573.

[76] Denifle, 25.

[77] *Ibid.*, 30.

[78] *Lincoln Episcopal Register* 12, fol. cclxxiv^v and cclxxv^r. The bishop's words, *ex majoribus rerum affluentiis religionis*, surely refer to liturgical gifts.

[79] The MSS used are Syon (Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 22, 285) and Harleian (Brit. Mus., Harl. MS. 2785), and, for its extracts relating to British saints, the *Martyrologium* of Christ Church, Canterbury (Brit. Mus., Arundel MS. 68, a thirteenth-century MS; and Library of Lambeth Palace, Lambeth MS. 20, a sixteenth-century copy of the earlier text).

orum,[80], for comparison, one can perhaps reach a tentative conclusion concerning the provenance of the exemplar which provided the English additions. Of those saints in which Ashridge stands alone or almost alone, some account should be given. They are few, and it might be noted that none are Bedan.

> 6 Jan. In Britannia, civitate cancia, monasterio sancti Petri, depositio sancti Adriani abbatis, qui olim ab apostolica sede cum beato Theodoro est directus. eiusque in ecclesiasticis doctrinis cooperator existens. in optima conversatione morum. doctrina preclarens. ibidem vitam finivit in pace.

Ashridge is here followed by the later Harleian, and the wording of that MS is not quoted in full; the twelve opening words are, however, identical. In Canterbury, a short notice is given on 9 Jan.: *Cantuarie, sancti adriani abbatis*. Since 9 Jan. is the usual feast, Ashridge may be presumed to be following a mistaken tradition to which the scribe of Harleian also had access.

> 24 April. translatio sancti Wilfredi.

Of the sources considered, the Winchester codex, Altemps, alone is in agreement. The S. Wilfred who was apostle to the West Saxons died 24 April, 709.

> 3 May. In Britannia translatio beati Johannis episcopi. cuius gloriosa miracula fulgescunt in gente northamymbrorum. quam pontificali rexit dignitate.

This English notice is one of the two such which seem to be unique to Ashridge. Presumably he can be identified with S. John Beverley, whose feast is mentioned correctly on 7 May. Any connection with York or the monastery of Beverley through this notice is rendered unlikely, since the saint's important feast on 25 October goes unnoticed in Ashridge.

> 31 Aug. Eanswithe of Kent.

MS Syon adds Eanswithe in a later hand, and she appears in Altemps.

> 13 Sept. Ipso die translatio beatissimi anglorum augustini. et sanctorum archipresulum et confessorum. laurencii. melliti. iusti. honorii. deusde dit. theodori. et sancti adriani abbatis. ac[81] dilecte virginis mildrede.

Most interestingly, these Canterbury translations are omitted from Canterbury as well as from the later MSS. In Canterbury, the translation of S. Augustine alone is mentioned. Only Altemps agrees with Ashridge in the whole list.

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[80] AASS, lvi. The codex is in Rome. Although the editor says of it, "... nec de eius aetate scrupulosius inquirenda multum fui solicitus", it is obviously a much more inflated text than Ashridge.

[81] A later hand adds *deo* so that the phrase reads *ac deo dilecte*.

> 3 Dec. Ipso die apud Wintoniam. sancti Birini episcopi primi civitatis ipsius. qui missus a Roma. iussu Honorii (pape) venerabilis Britanniam et occidentales Saxones. sua predicatione. primus ad fidem Christi convertit.

While the English MSS exclude this entry, both Antw-maj and Rosweyd mention Birinus here; their notices, however, are very short and are different it wording.

> 21 Oct. Ipso die ordinacio sancti dunstani archiepiscopi.

This is the second of the two English notices which are unique to Ashridge. It presumably refers to the saint's ordination as Archbishop of Canterbury, although it should be remembered that he was first bishop of Worcester and then of London. It is not entirely impossible that the notice could be a Winchester memorial of his earlier conversion to the monastic life which took place during his period of refuge with his kinsman, bishop Elphege of that see.

This list hardly provides us with a coherent picture, but it is of interest that the geographical distribution is weighted towards the Southeast. While only one is a definitely northern saint, fourteen are of the Southeast. The second point of interest is the striking agreement with the Winchester Altemps.

Another indication of geographical distribution is to be found by a comparison of Ashridge and Canterbury. Despite a general similarity, there are 47 notices in Ashridge not found in Canterbury; the list of the Canterbury translations brings the number of saints to 55. Oddly enough, the largest number of "non-Canterbury" notices (16 in number) is from Canterbury itself,[82] or from Kent.[83] The next largest deputation is from Winchester[84] and its neighboring regions[85], with 13 notices. The area of the Fens is next, with six notices,[86] three of which are also in Altemps. Essex is represented by Erkenwald and Ethelburge of Barking and by Alban, also in Altemps. The North is represented only by John Beverley and Hugh of Lincoln; farther west are Oswald of Worcester, Thomas and Ethelbert of Hereford, Kenelm of Winchecumbe, and Aldhelm. Neot is a Cornish or Huntington reference; Edmund RM is mentioned, and there are a few Celtic saints, mainly Cornish.[87]

At the moment it does not seem that this list of English saints can be connected definitely with any particular place. Considering the geographical distribution and more especially the similarities between Ashridge and Altemps, it seems most likely that the source came from the region of Winchester, possibly from the city itself. It was certainly around the time of the production of the MS that Bishop Edington was interested in Ashridge, and the *boni homines* seem to have had a warmer connection with Winchester than with any other see for many years.[88] But the evidence for any strong orientation in this list is too slight even to suggest that a single source, rather that several, provided the English saints. That there is no saint canonized after the mid-thirteenth century indicates that the exemplar or exemplars were far from modern when copied at Ashridge.

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[82] Augustine, Melletus, Justus twice, Deusdedit, Theodore, Adrian twice, Mildred, Laurence twice, Dunstan, Honorius twice.

[83] Eadberg and Eanswithe.

[84] Judocus twice, Elphege, Ethelwolde twice, Birinus twice.

[85] Richard of Chichester, Edith of Wilton, Osmund of Salisbury, Wilfred of Sussex. Cuthberge of Dorset and Benignus of Glastonbury are far afield, but still Wessex saints.

[86] Withburge twice, Werburg, Etheldride, Guthlac, and Ivo of Ramsey.

[87] Petrocus and Melor.

The *boni homines* were most fastidious about their martyrology. Later hands added the *obits* of 62 benefactors, as well as those of *fratres* and Rectors, but the only saints added in later hands are:

16 July. Translation of Osmund of Salisbury.[89]
26 July. Anne.
3 Nov. Wenefrid.
4 Dec. Osmund of Salisbury.

The dedication of the church at Ashridge (22 Oct.), a popular sort of entry, finds no place in their martyrology. Nor, more surprisingly, does one find their two only prizes, the Holy Blood of Christ and the relics of S. Thomas of Hereford. The great saints of the high Middle Ages — the intellectual, the simple, the embattled; the naive multiplications of saints, products of mindless collation — all these whom monastic scribes added with joyous indiscrimination, are absent from the martyrology of Ashridge, the high and the non-existent alike. We are left with an ancient and somewhat austere text, aloof, discriminating and eminently sensible.

In considering the text as a whole, it is not, perhaps, impertinent to think once more of the few things known of the men who were *boni homines* at Ashridge. Against them it can be said that one bishop once advised them to keep their accounts more carefully and to discipline their young brethren more strictly.[90] But Polydore Vergil said, "Fuerunt in eo coenobio quocumque tempore, velut etiam sunt hodie, monachi et sanctitate vitae et doctrina praeclari."[91] They were, and never fought against being, an appanage, an *Eigenkirche* of the duchy of Cornwall. Yet throughout their history they kept to themselves, independent of laymen, monastic orders, politics, wealth and fame. Their *consuetudines* envisage a monastic life decorously ordered, stricter than that of the secular canons, but never rigorous. The martyrology they so beautifully copied and preserved is of a piece with all this. Its fastidiousness, its limitations are at one with all we otherwise see. It is a faint illumination of the quality of their life and piety, yet therefore another illumination of that most elusive and multiform thing, medieval piety.

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[88] The *obits* of four bishops are entered in the martyrology: Roger de Martivalle of Sarum, Thomas de Hatfield of Durham, John Hunden of Llandaff, and Henry Beaufort of Winchester, nephew of the Black Prince. Of these, there were particular prayers for Beaufort alone, who had been very generous to Ashridge, as had his *servitor*, Richard Peteworthe.

[89] Osmund was canonized in 1457 by Calixtus III, who fixed his canonization date as 4 Dec. His relics seem to have been translated to the cathedral on 23 July, 1457. Syon follows Ashridge in placing the date on the 16th.

[90] *Visitations in the Diocese of Lincoln* ii, 1517-1531, A. Hamilton Thompson, ed. (Lincoln Record Society, 1944) 71 ff.

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[91] Polydore Vergil, *Anglicae Historiae libri viginti-septem* (Basle, 1570), xvi, 402.

The Prologue of the Old-English "Guthlac A"

LAURENCE K. SHOOK, C.S.B.

THE manuscript arrangement of the Exeter Book clearly indicates that *Guthlac A*, that is, ll. 1-818[1] of the composite poem known as Saint Guthlac, was intended as a single unit of composition.[2] There has always, however, been some question as to whether the first twenty-nine lines really belong to the poem. Most scholars feel that they ought either to be attached to the end of *Christ*, the preceding poem in the manuscript,[3] or allowed to stand between *Christ* and *Guthlac A* as a short independent poem.[4] The present study is intended to show that these lines constitute a true Prologue to *Guthlac A* and that they were conceived as an integral part of that poem.

Whatever the limitations of the poetic inspiration and expression of the Guthlac poet (and these have been grossly exaggerated), he was quite at home with the materials which formed the subject matter of his work, and this to such an extent that he was much more concerned with manipulating, juxtaposing, balancing these materials than with the mere reporting of them. I have tried to show elsewhere what he was able to do with the burial mound or barrow, in which St. Guthlac established his anchor seat, both as a geographical reality and as a poetic symbol: how he assigned the mound a meaningful structural function in the poem and observed withal a basic accuracy of detail, adding significantly to our knowledge of the original barrow at Crowland.[5] I should like also to call attention to a comparable excellence in the handling of religious and theological themes: angelology, demonology, temptation, the Christian life, the anchoretic life, asceticism, divine election, and so on. These themes provide the meaningful and fruitful areas of investigation of his achievement because they alone affected him deeply enough to become the basis of anything approaching poetic experience.

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[1] This is the numbering in G. P. Krapp and E. V. K. Dobbie, edd., *The Exeter Book*, N.Y. 1936 (The Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records, III), pp. 49-72; all references are to this edition.

[2] On fol. 32b the beginning of a new poem is indicated by the use of Roman capitals SĒ BIĐ GEFĒANA FæGrast; there is no full stop of a kind indicating the beginning of another poem until fol. 44b where the Roman capitals: ĐÆT IS WĪDE CŪĐ introduce the poem commonly known as *Guthlac B*. See the facsimile edition: *The Exeter Book of Old English Poetry*, with introductory chapters by R. W. Chambers, Max Forster, and Robin Flower, London, 1933.

[3] C. W. M. Grein and R. P. Wülker, *Bibliothek der angelsächsischen Poesie*, III Band (ed. Bruno Assman), Leipzig, 1898.

[4] See the Table of Contents in R. W. Chambers, 'Modern Study of the Poetry of the Exeter Book,' being chapter III of the facsimile edition, p. 38. Krapp and Dobbie, *op. cit.*, p. xxx, following P. J. Cosijn, "Anglosaxonica IV," *Beiträge*, 23 (1898), 114, regard it as a separate poem, even though they print it as the opening of *Guthlac*.

[5] L. K. Shook, "The Burial Mound in *Guthlac A*," *Modern Philology*, 58 (1960), 1-10.

It has long been observed that this poet is not essentially either a biographer or a hagiographer. Gerould, for example, states that *Guthlac A* is "dependent upon the *vita*[6] for its substance though by no means for its form."[7] But there has been an exaggerated attempt to attribute the peculiarities of its form to the influence of heroic poetry. Thus Gerould writes, in another context, that the Guthlac poems are "the only examples preserved (however many may once have existed) of the epic legend with a native saint as hero."[8] Kurtz referring to the author of *Guthlac A*, speaks of "a mind that delights in epics of conflict and in the heroic ideal of the fighting champion."[9] Like so much Old-English poetry, the language of this poem recalls the vocabulary, the phrases, the poetic formulas of the heroic poems. But this is, at best, a surface resemblance. The heart of *Guthlac A* is to be found beating in the religious and theological notions which the protagonists debate or which the narrator dwells upon. It is not biography in the Antonian sense, nor heroic adventure in the Beowulfian sense, that inspired the poet to write, but the excitement of mind aroused by reflections upon the doctrines of the Christian Church.

A dominant theological theme running through *Guthlac A* is the function of angels in the salvation of man's soul. The angelology (including the demonology) of the poem is something quite different from what one meets in the usual Antonian *vita*. The traditional lives, including Felix's *Vita Sancti Guthlaci*, reveal a preoccupation with the trials experienced by hermits and anchorites from the assaults of demons and devils. *Guthlac A*, to be sure, is not wanting in this aspect of the anchoretic life; but it is strongly marked by a more positive interest in the world of spiritual beings. As one advances from one part of the poem to another, one finds the poet dealing with issues like the following: the angel as God's agent in dealing with men; the angel as guardian of the individual, preparing, protecting, instructing, enlightening its human charge; the angel as contender with the soul's demon; the power of the angel or demon over the bodies of men; the nature of demonic temptation;

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[6] *Vita Sancti Guthlaci* of Felix. See Bertram Colgrave. *Felix's Life of St. Guthlac*, Cambridge, 1956.

[7] G. H. Gerould, "The Old English Poems on St. Guthlac and their Latin Source," *Modern Language Notes*, 32 (1917), 84.

[8] G. H. Gerould, *Saints Legends*, Boston, 1916, p. 79.

[9] B. P. Kurtz, "From St. Antony to St. Guthlac: a Study in Biography," *University of California Publications in Modern Philology*, 12 (1925-26), 144.

the sufferings of demons. It is scarcely unfair to the poem to describe it as a kind of theological treatise on angels. Thus it is not surprising that, if the first twenty-nine lines of the poem are really the Prologue to what follows, they too should be primarily concerned with the theme of angels and should deal with this theme in a manner consistent with the rest of the poem. This appears to be the case. The main subject of these opening lines is the function of angels as heavenly psychopomps with the special duty of conducting the recently separated soul of a man (in this case, Guthlac) to paradise. This theme with which the poem opens recurs both in the middle and at the end of the poem, playing, accordingly, an important role in the over-all structure of the poem. Moreover, the theme is treated in a manner indicating some familiarity on the part of the poet with apocryphal materials. This too confirms the integral relation between the Prologue and the body of the poem. The following edition and translation of the Prologue provide a useful basis for the present investigation.

Sē bið gefēana fægrast   þonne hȳ æt frymðe gemētað,
engel ond sēo ēadge sāwl.   Ofgiefeþ hīo þās eorþan wynne,
forlǣteð þās lǣnan drēamas,   ond hīo wiþ þām līce gedǣleð.
Ðonne cwið se engel: "Hafað yldran hād."
Grēteð gǣst ōþerne,   ābēodeð him godes ǣrende:
"Nū þu mōst fēran   þider þu fundadest
longe ond gelōme.   Ic þec lǣdan sceal.
Wegas þe sindon wēþe   ond wuldres lēoht
torhte ontȳned.   Eart nū tīdfare
tō þām hālgan hām."   Þǣr naefre hrēow cymeð,
edergong fore yrmþum.   Ac þǣr bið engla drēam,
sib ond gesǣlignes   ond sāwla ræst.
Ond þǣr ā tō feore   gefēon mōtun,
drȳman mid dryhten,   þā þe his dōmas hēr
æfnað on eorþan.   He him ēce lēan
healdeð on heofonum   þǣr se hyhsta
ealra cyninga cyning   ceastrum wealdeð.
Ðaet sind þā getimbru   þe nō tȳdriað,
ne þām fore yrmþum   þe þǣr in wuniað
līf āspringeð,   ac him bið lenge hū sēl,
geoguþe brūcað   ond godes miltsa.
Þider sōþfæstra   sāwla mōtun
cuman æfter cwealme,   þā þe hēr crīstes ǣ
lǣrað ond lǣstað,   on his lof rǣrað.
Oferwinnað þā āwyrgdan gǣstas, bigytað him wuldres ræste.
Hwider sceal þæs monnes   mōd āstīgan,
ǣr oþþe æfter,   þonne hē his ǣnne hēr
gǣst bigonge,   þæt sē gode mōte,
womma clǣne,   in geweald cuman.   (ll. 1-29)

That is the fairest of joys when, at the "going out from the body" the angel and the blessed soul meet. The soul forsakes earthly joys, leaves

> behind fleeting pleasures and separates from the body. Then the angel says: "Receive ye higher rank". The spirit greets the other (*i.e.* the soul) and declares to it God's message: "Now mayest thou go whither thou hast been striving long and constantly. I shall guide thee. Your journey will be pleasant and the light of glory clearly granted. Thou art now travelling under summons to that holy home." There sorrow never comes; there is shelter from miseries. There is the joy of angels, peace and blessedness and rest for souls. There forever may they rejoice, exult with the Lord, they who carry out his commandments here on earth. He holds for them eternal reward in heaven. There the highest King of all Kings rules the City. Those are the buildings which do not decay; nor, for those who dwell in them, does life diminish in the face of miseries, but gets better and better, and they enjoy youth and the favour of God. Thither the souls of just men, those who here below teach and observe Christ's law and sing His praise, may come after death; they vanquish the accursed spirits, win for themselves heavenly rest. Thus shall a man's spiritual part ascend sooner or later when he so attends to his own soul that it may pass free from sins, into God's kingdom.

These opening lines of *Guthlac A* present dramatically the joyful meeting between (presumably) Guthlac's soul, which has just been released from its body, and an angel, apparently Guthlac's guardian angel (and also, if my interpretation developed below is correct, another spirit, possibly Guthlac's life-spirit). The angel, or the spirit, has a new function to perform: it is to guide the holy soul to heaven. The spirit speaks to the soul, calling it *t dfara* (l. 9), that is, one journeying under summons to the "holy home" (l. 10). This particular journey to the gate of heaven will be pleasant (*wēþe*, l. 8) because although the soul will encounter accursed spirits, it will overcome them (l. 25), its life on earth having been spent in teaching and observing Christ's law and singing his praise (ll. 22-24). The remaining lines of the passage describe the eternal delights of the heavenly city, contrasting them with the temporal and passing pleasures of this world.

The notion of an angel, or several angels, accompanying the soul to heaven is clearly stated in Sacred Scripture[10] and frequently mentioned by the Fathers.[11] Origen provides details of the angels' activities at the going out of the soul, and with particular pointedness in his Homily on Numbers.[12] The duties assigned to this angel, or psychopomp, in patristic tradition include the following: assisting the dying man during his agony, accompanying the soul to paradise, defending it from demons along the way, dipping it in the river of fire, examining it at heaven's gate, and turning it over to the angels of heaven.[13] It is this perilous journey of the soul with its angelic psychopomp which is the chief concern of the Guthlac poet at the opening of his poem, and the point he seems to be making is that a saint (Guthlac, for example) will negotiate this perilous journey pleasantly and triumphantly. Thus the spirit says to the soul: *wegas þe sindon wēþe* (l. 8); and the poet says of holy souls: *oferwinnað þā āwyrgdan gǣstas, bigytaþ him wuldres ræste.*

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[10] Luke, 16:22.

[11] See A. C. Rush, *Death and Burial in Christian Antiquity*, Washington, 1941, pp. 23-43.

[12] W. A. Baehrens, ed., *Homilien zum Hexateuch in Rufins Übersetzung* (Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der Ersten Drei Jahrhunderte: Origines Werke, VII), Part II, Hom. v. 3, pp. 29-30.

It is significant that at the close of *Guthlac A* the poet returns to this theme of the soul's journey to paradise:

> Swā wæs Gūðlāces gǣst gelǣded
> engla fæðmum in ūprodor
> fore onsȳne ēces dēman
> lǣddon lēoflice. (ll. 781-4)
>
> Thus was Guthlac's soul conducted in angels' embraces to heaven; they brought it lovingly into the presence of the eternal judge.

The poet also calls attention to the fact that the journey is one which holy souls make without interruption: *gongað gegnunga* (l. 813); cp. *wegas... wēþe* (l. 8). Moreover, just as in the Prologue it was a journey to the "holy home," to the "cities" ruled by the King of all Kings (ll. 10, 17), so at the close it is to the "holy city," to "Jerusalem:"

> Him þæt hrēoweþ æfter hingonge,
> ðonne hȳ hweorfað in þā hālgan burg;
> gongað gegnunga tō Hierusalem. (ll. 811-13)
>
> They have no regrets about this (*i.e.* their ascetic life) after their departure, while they are making their way to the holy city: they pass without interruption into Jerusalem.

Thus the poem opens and closes with the poet musing upon the angelic psychopomps and their function of conducting souls from their dead body to the gate of the heavenly Jerusalem.

Those scholars who would ignore the manuscript arrangement and attach the introductory passage to the preceding poem, *Christ*, are misled by the coincidental treatment of heaven in both poems. The real issue at the end of *Christ*, however, is doomsday (*dōmes dæg*) and Christ's final coming to conduct the just to heaven for all eternity. But the opening of *Guthlac A* is concerned rather with the day of death (*ende dæg*) when the psychopomps take charge of the soul and guide it to the holy city, there to await in joy the final coming of Christ. Those, on the other hand, who hold that the first twenty-nine lines of *Guthlac A* constitute a separate poem — a solution favoured by Krapp and Dobbie — fail to recognize the structural rhetoric underlying the poet's use of patristic angelology. Moreover, the particular aspect of heaven dwelt upon in this Prologue (ll. 10 ff.) is its everlastingness, which stands in contrast with the fleeting nature of earthly existence; and it is this same contrast to which the poet returns at the end of the poem:

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[13] Jean Daniélou, *Les Anges et leur mission*, Paris, 1957, p. 134.

Swā sōðfæstra   sāwla mōtun
in ēcne geard   ūp gestīgan
rodera rīce,   þā þe ræfnað hēr
wordum ond weorcum   wuldorcyninges
lāre longsume,   on hyra līfes tīd
earniað on eorðan   ēcan līfes,
hāmes in hēahþu.   (ll. 790-96)

> Thus the souls of the just can ascend to the eternal court, to the kingdom of the skies, if they carry out here in words and works the enduring teachings of the King of Glory, win during their life in time, on earth, a life eternal, a home above.

The further question to arise in connection with this twenty-nine line Prologue is that of the poet's indebtedness to apocryphal tradition. The opening scene depicts a little drama that can only be followed if the reader has in mind some popular account of the soul's departure from the body. Most useful here is the *Visio Sancti Pauli*, particularly the fourteenth chapter[14] in which St. Paul relates apocalyptically the detail of the death of a just man. At the moment of the just man's death, we read in the *Visio*, good and evil spirits hover over his body. As the soul issues from the body, the holy spirits receive it. They tell it to take a last good look at the body so as to be able to recognize it again on the Last Day. They then kiss the soul and praise it for having done God's will on earth. Thereupon the very angel which had guarded the soul during the lifetime of the body approaches the soul and speaks to it; immediately afterwards the spirit which had vivified the soul and body also comes forward to meet the soul, speaks to it confortingly and offers assistance. The soul, meanwhile, remains completely silent. Wicked powers try to get at the soul, looking to see if there is something of theirs in it; but the angel drives them away and carries the soul to heaven.

The striking and new element in this account is the distinction between the soul's angel and the soul's spirit. The *locus classicus* of this distinction is I *Thessalonians*, 5:23, where the commentators find themselves obliged to distinguish between *πνεῦμα* "human soul," *ψυχή* "principle of animal life" and *σῶμα* "body." St. Paul does not regard *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* as two entities, but the distinction has a history. It is found in Hebrew tradition which distinguishes between *nepheš* (soul) and *ruaḥ* (spirit),[15] and in the apocryphal books of Henoch, Jubilees and the Testaments and, in a developed form, in the distinction between *anima* and *spiritus* in hermetic writings.[16]

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[14] From the long Latin version: M. R. James, *Apocrypha Anecdota*, Cambridge, 1893. (J. A. Robinson ed., Texts and Studies: Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature II, No. 3), pp. 16-17.

The Prologue to *Guthlac A* preserves many of the elements of the dramatic scene depicted in the *Visio*, but not always distinctly. There is the joyful meeting of the angel and soul (ll. 1-2). Words are addressed to the soul by an angel, with the soul remaining silent. There is reference to the soul's striving for salvation (ll. 6-7), and to its having done God's will on earth (ll. 14-15), and probably also to its successful conflict with the wicked powers which beset it as it begins its journey to heaven (l. 25). One has to wait until the end of the poem — which thus becomes a long flashback on Guthlac's life and trials — for the final carrying of the soul to heaven by the psychopomps.

As editors punctuate the text, there appears to be no "spirit," as distinct from the angel and soul, among the *dramatis personae*. The poet, of course, could have quietly suppressed the spirit in the interest of orthodoxy. It is just, possible, however, that there is a cryptic reference to this spirit in the two lines (ll. 3-4) introducing the speech usually assigned to the angel; that is, that the *gǣst* of line 5 is not identical with the *engel* of line 4. Perhaps these lines ought to be punctuated and translated as follows:

Donne cwið se engel: "Hafað yldran hād:"
Grēteð gǣst ōþerne, ābēodeð him godes ǣrende:
"Nū þu... *etc.*"

> Then the angel says: "Receive ye higher rank!" The spirit greets the other (*i.e.* the soul), declares to it God's message: "Now thou... *etc.*"

This interpretation of the text presents two obvious difficulties: the use of the imperative plural *hafað* for the singular *haf*; and the apparent transfer of the function of psychopomp (*Ic þe lǣdan sceal*) from the angel to the spirit. These difficulties are sufficiently cogent to make one slow to insist upon the emended punctuation; yet it is far from unlikely that we have here to do with a version of the going out of the soul which retains, however faintly, some trace of the account found in the *Visio*. With this in mind, let us take a good look at the two important long Latin texts of the *Visio Sancti Pauli*, comparing them with the Old-English poem, and noting carefully the occasional coincidences of arrangement and expression. The following is the significant passage from the Paris text:

> Suscipientes ergo animam de corpore, statim osculati sunt eam quasi cotidie sibi notam, dicentes ei: Viriliter age, fecisti enim voluntatem dei

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[15] P. van Imschoot, *Théologie de l'ancien testament*, Tournai, 1956, vol. II, pp. 16, 28, 35.

[16] See in general B. Rigaux, *Saint Paul: Les Épîtres aux Thessaloniciens*, Paris, 1956, pp. 596-600.

> constituta in terra. Et venit ei in occursum angelus qui observabat eam singulis diebus, et dixit ei: Viriliter age, anima; ego enim gaudeo in te, quia fecisti voluntatem dei in terris: ego enim referebam ad deum omnia opera tua qualiter se abent; Similiter etiam et spiritus in occursum processit ei et dixit: Anima, ne verearis neque turberis quousque veneris in locum quem non noveras umquam, sed ero tibi adiutor: inveni enim in te locum refectionis in tempore quo habitavi in te dum essem in terra. Et spiritus eius confirmavit eam et angelus eius suscepit eam et deduxit in celo: et ait angelus: Ubi curris, anima, et audes ingredi coelum? expecta et videamus si est aliquid nostrum in te: et ecce nihil invenimus in te. Video etiam adiutorium divinum et angelum tuum, et spiritus congaudens est tibi quoniam fecisti voluntatem dei in terris.[17]

The other long Latin text of the *Visio*, the St. Gall text, actually begins with this scene of the going out of the just soul. The first four sentences of this text provide a brief account from which the entire Old-English elaboration could have been made. Since, however, there is ambiguity as to the grammatical number of *spiritus* in the opening lines, a few later sentences, where the ambiguity has been removed, must be added:

> Posthaec vidi animam iustam introeuntem in coelum. Et audivi voces angelorum dicentes, 'O anima, effugies quia fecisti voluntatem dei in terris. Et ecce nunc angelus tuus et spiritus congaudent tecum.' Et omnes potestates exierunt in occursum eius, et invenerunt nihil suum in ea. Respondit eis angelus, et spiritus dixerunt, 'Convertimini erubescentes, quia non valuistis decipere animam istam constitutam in carne.'... Precurrit autem angelus ante eam et indicavit dicens, 'Deus, memor esto laborum eius; haec est cuius tibi cotidiae opera referebam, faciens secundum tuum iudicium.' Et spiritus similiter ait, 'Ego sum spiritus vivificationis aspirans et habitans in ea....'[18]

A breakdown of the Prologue to *Guthlac A* and of the two longer Latin texts shows the following general correspondences:

1. There is a joyful meeting of soul, angel, spirits: sē bið gefēana fǣgrast þonne hy ǣt frymðe gemētað (ll. 1-2); statim osculati sunt eam... ego enim gaudeo in te (P); angelus tuus et spiritus congaudent tecum (St. G.).

2. The angel and the spirit speak to the soul: Donne cwið se engel, hafað yldran hād; grēteð gǣst ōþerne, ābēodeð him godes ǣrende (ll. 4-5); Suscipientes ergo animam... dicentes ei,... et venit ei in occursum angelus... et dixit ei... similiter etiam et spiritus... et dixit (P); et audivi voces angelorum dicentes; respondit eis angelus et spiritus dixerunt (St. G.).

3. The soul has observed God's will while on earth: þā þe his dōmas hēr æfnað on eorðan (ll. 14-15); fecisti enim voluntatem dei constituta in terra (P); quia fecisti voluntatem dei in terris (P, St. G).

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[17] M. R. James. *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

[18] Theodore Silverstein, *Visio Sancti Pauli*, London, 1935, p. 131.

4. The soul will be assisted on its journey: ic þec lǣdan sceal (l. 7), eart nū tīdfara tō þām hālgan hām (ll. 9-10); anima, ne verearis neque turberis quousque veneris in locum... ero tibi adiutor, angelus eius suscepit eam et deduxit in celo (P).

5. The soul's freedom from sin overcomes challengers: oferwinnað þā āwyrgdan gǣstas, bigytað him wuldres ræste (l. 25), *cp.* gongað gegnunga tō Hierusalem (l. 813); ait angelus:[19] ubi curris, anima, et audes ingredi coelum? expecta et videamus si est aliquid nostrum in te: et ecce nihil invenimus in te (P); et omnes potestates exierunt in occursum eius, et invenerunt nihil suum in ea (St. G.).

This episode of the departure of a just soul from its body exhausts the indebtedness of the Prologue to the tradition represented by the *Visio Sancti Pauli.* But the poet does not forget, as he moves on into the poem, that the apocryphal vision also relates the going out of a wicked soul. Naturally, he has neither cause nor opportunity to draw on this in connection with Guthlac's death either here in the Prologue or at the end of the poem; but he employs it very artfully in the body of the poem in relating the episode of Guthlac's Second Temptation in the course of which God permitted the demons to carry the anchorite off bodily to the gate of hell. This particular episode is related also in Felix's *Vita Sancti Guthlaci*, which the Anglo-Saxon poet apparently knew.[20] But there is a significant difference between the two accounts. Felix dwells pictorially on the torments of the damned as poor Guthlac could observe them through the gate; the Anglo-Saxon poet is reminded rather of the journey of the wicked soul from its body to the chasms of hell "deep down under the nesses." This is strong evidence of his consciousness of apocryphal materials which Felix either did not know or preferred not to employ. The very interesting passage in *Guthlac A* is as follows:

Hwæðre hine gebrōhton   bolgenmōde
wrāde wræcmæcgas,   wuldres cempan,
hālig hūsulbearn,   æt heldore,
þǣr firenfulra   fǣge gǣstas
æfter swyltcwale   sēcan onginnað
ingong ǣrest   in þæt atule hūs,
niþer under næssas   neole grundas.
Hȳ hine bregdon,   budon orlege,
egsan ond ondan   ārlēaslīce,

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[19] *Ibid*, p. 25: "The 'witnesses' become vaguely an angel, and the form of the challenge itself is highly condensed."

[20] Earlier opinion about the indebtedness of *Guthlac A* to Felix's *Vita* was divided; for summary see: H. Forstmann, "Untersuchungen zur Guthlac-Legende," *Bonner Beiträge zur Anglistik*, 12 (1902), 1-40; no one now doubts that there is indebtedness: see G. H. Gerould, "The Old English Poems on St. Guthlac and their Latin Source," *MLN*, 23 (1917), 77-89.

frēcne fore,   swā bið fēonda þēaw,
þonne hy sōðfæstra   sāwle willað
synnum beswīcan   ond searocræftum.   (ll. 557-68)

> Nevertheless, the wretches, angry and wrathful, brought him, the glorious champion, the holy "housel-child", to the gate of hell. *It is there that the condemned souls of sinners, after their death-agony, first seek entrance to that dread dwelling, the deep chasms down under the nesses.* They terrified him: they offered him battle, terror and shame in dishonourable fashion, and a perilous journey, as is the way with fiends when they wish to ensnare the souls of the just in sinfulness and cunning treacheries.

There is a further use of apocryphal material in the main part of *Guthlac A* in a passage in which the poet attempts to provide adequate motivation for the violent attacks of the demons on Guthlac in his barrow. Among other reasons for their hatred of the saint is his having deprived them of the occasional respite from hell-torment which the barrow had once provided them:

Wǣron tēonsmiðas   tornes fulle.
Cwædon þaet him Gūðlāc   ēac gode sylfum
earfeþa mǣst   āna gefremede,
siþþan hē for wlence   on wēstenne
beorgas bræce,   þǣr hȳ bīdinge,
earme ondsacan,   ǣror mōstun
æfter tintergum   tīdum brūcan,
ðonne hȳ of wāþum   werge cwōman
restan ryneþrāgum.   Rōwe gefēgon;
wæs him sēo gelȳfed   þurh lȳtel fæc.   (ll. 205-14)

> The forgers of suffering were full of wrath. They said that Guthlac (helped, indeed, by God himself) had alone inflicted on them the greatest of torment, from the time he, in his pride, had broken into the barrows out on the wastelands where hitherto they, miserable demons, had been able to enjoy for a time rest from their sufferings, when they, weary, returned from their wandering to rest betimes. They had enjoyed the calm which was permitted them for a little while.

This passage links *Guthlac A* with the respite theme which is fairly common in apocryphal writings. There seems to have been a rabbinical tradition, circulating as early as the third century, according to which even sinners in hell enjoyed the sabbath-day rest.[21] This tradition appears ambiguously in the longer Latin texts of the *Visio Sancti Pauli*. In the shorter redactions, however, it is clearly presented as a regular Sunday respite which Paul obtains for suffering sinners.[22] The Guthlac passage given above is concerned specifically with occasional rather than Sunday respite, and refers to demons rather than to the souls of those who have been sinners on earth. But it is clear, from the very presence of a respite passage like this that the Guthlac poet maintained in the body of his poem a contact with apocryphal themes similar to that which we have already noted in the Prologue.

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[21] Silverstein, *op. cit.*, p. 79 and note 96, p. 124.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 80. See also Shook, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

It would appear from the foregoing investigation that the twenty-nine line Prologue must be accepted as an integral part of the poem which follows it in the manuscript of the Exeter Book. The scribe or compiler certainly so thought of it in arranging the lines and pages of his manuscript. The poet, moreover, with some sense of structural order, succeeded in binding the two parts together by the following devices, meaningful to him in his character of theologian: the journey of the departed soul to paradise under the guidance of its heavenly psychopomps; the symbolic figure of the eternal city, the heavenly Jerusalem, as the final end of the Christian life; the sharp contrast between the temporal joys of earth and the eternal joys of heaven; and a mysterious, even apocalyptic atmosphere common to both parts of the poem and springing from an acquaintance with apocryphal materials.

Richard of Campsall's First Question on the "Prior Analytics"

EDWARD A. SYNAN

A SERIES of twenty *Questions* on the *Prior Analytics*, given by Richard of Campsall,[1] constitutes one section of a miscellaneous codex in the library of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge.[2] This fourteenth century collection contains thirteen works by various authors[3] and although eight of these texts are devoted to logic, the colophon that closes the collection, *expliciunt questiones locicales date a diversis magistris*, is too summary: it ignores one work on grammar, one on mathematics, and three on psychology.[4]

The *Logica Campsale Anglici valde utilis et realis contra Ocham* in the library of the University of Bologna[5] also links the name of this Oxford theologian with logic. The realism of this *Logica* may have been useful against the Venerable Inceptor, but more than one consideration impugns its attribution to Campsall[6] and none is stronger than this Cambridge text, the authenticity of which seems beyond question. In the first of the Cambridge *Questions*, Campsall deals in a conventional way with two problems on which the author of the Bologna *Logica* holds extraordinary opinions: to the three traditional suppositions, simple, material, and personal, the Bologna text adds a fourth termed "formal"[7] and, to the names of first and second intention that contented less creative logicians, the author of the *Logica* adds "names of third intention."[8] On both issues, the generosity of the *Logica* in expanding the customary armament of the logician corresponds to the general orientation of the work.[9] Campsall, on the other hand, explains suppositions and intentions in the course of determining "Whether syllogism is the subject of this (science)?" without recourse to, and indeed, without mention of these devices.

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[1] A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500* (Oxford, 1957) I, pp. 344, 345, and lix, s.v. Campsale, Richard de.

[2] Gonville and Caius MS 668*; v. M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Gonville and Caius College* (Cambridge, 1908) II, pp. 665, 666.

[3] Of these works, no. 1 is ascribed by the text to Magister Petrus de Bradsley, nos. 2 and 12 to Magister Adam Burley, nos. 3, 7, 9 and 13 to Magister Walterus de Burley who, on fol. 119v, is qualified as "Dominus," no. 4 to Magister Thoma de Chirmister, no. 8 to Ricardus de Camsale who, on fols. 101v, 103v, and 105v, is qualified as "Dominus," no. 11 to Magister Will(ielmus) de Duffeld; nos. 5, 6 and 10 are unascribed by the text but no. 10, *Algorismus*, Incipit: Hec algorismus ars presens dicitur in qua... is the *Algorismus* or *Carmen de Algorismo* of Alexander de Villa Dei; no. 5 is a series of *Questiones super librum II Priorum* Incipit: (C)irca librum priorum queratur unum commune quod videtur esse regula philosophi in Prioribus, istud, videlicet: Utrum, conclusione existente falsa, et premissis ejusdem syllogismi existentibus determinate qualitatis et non repugnantibus, necesse sit majorem esse falsam vel minorem?; no. 6 is a series of *Questiones de Sophisticis Elenchis*, Incipit: (Q)ueratur: Utrum syllogismus sophisticus sit subjectum hujus scientie?

[4] The work on grammar is no. 4, *Questiones date a M. Thoma de Chirmister super librum Preciani de Constructionibus*, the work on mathematics is no. 10, *Algorismus*, and the three on psychology are no. 3, *Questiones de potentiis anime...* Explicit: Notabilia de potentiis anime data a Mag. Waltero de Burley, no. 13, *Questiones circa tertium de anima*. Mag. Walt(erus) de Burley, and no. 12, *Questiones super libros I, II de anima*. Mag. Adam de Burley.

[5] MS Bologna, no. 2635, fols. 1r-99v; for an edition of 16 chapters of this work, v. E. A. Synan, "The Universal and Supposition in a *Logica* Attributed to Richard of Campsall," J. R. O'Donnell, C.S.B., ed. *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers: A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts* (Toronto, 1955) pp. 183-232; references here to edited material are by page number of this edition, to unedited portions by folio number of the manuscript.

A problem discussed before, notably by St Albert[10] and by John Duns Scotus,[11] syllogism as subject of logic affords the master who determines the question an opportunity to convey a wide range of doctrinal positions. A pedagogical exercise much more than an inquiry into a problem posed for its own sake, the present *Question* permits Campsall to suggest alternative solutions, not only to incidental difficulties, but even to the main issue he has determined with so much labor and to show that to accept or reject a position *de virtute sermonis* may keep a discussion alive when all else fails.[12] The incautious reader might suspect a certain simplicity in these procedures; in fact, they mask the sophistication of men who were persuaded that truth has nothing to lose in granting every plausible alternative its day in court.

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[6] E. A. Synan, "Richard of Campsall, an English Theologian of the Fourteenth Century," *Mediaeval Studies* XIV (1952) pp. 6-8; *Logica*, ed. cit., pp. 183, 184, 200, n. 50.

[7] *Logica*, ed. cit., p. 201.

[8] *Logica*, MS Bologna 2635, fol. 10v: Nomina autem tertiae intentionis se habent in duplici differentia quia quaedam significant tam primas quam secundas intentiones et pro eis possunt supponere, quaedam autem solum determinationes earum. Prima sunt *intentio* et hujusmodi; verum enim est dicere quod *Secunda intentio est intentio* et quod *Prima intentio est intentio.* Secunda vero sunt sicut *omnis, nullus* et hujusmodi; congrue enim additur *omnis* isti termino *species* ut dicatur: *Omnis species praedicatur de pluribus* et hujusmodi.

Ex isto vero statim concluditur quod illi qui dicunt quod secundae intentiones pro tanto dicuntur secundae intentiones quia primas significant, habent in intentionibus processum in infinitum ponere ut dicatur aliqua esse nomina tertiae intentionis et aliqua quartae, et aliqua quintae, et sic in infinitum. Eadem enim facilitate qua dicis quod *species* est nomen secundae intentionis quia significat primam, eadem facilitate et aeque rationabiliter dicam ego quod totum illud *secunda intentio* est nomen quartae intentionis quia tertiam intentionem significat et ita dicam procedendo semper in infinitum, nec unquam erit status.

[9] E. A. Synan, "The Universal in an Anti-Ockhamist Text," Charles J. O'Neil, ed., *An Etienne Gilson Tribute* (Milwaukee, 1959) pp. 290-308, espec. pp. 304-306.

[10] *Liber primus de praedicabilibus*, tr. 1, cap. 4, *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, A. Borgnet ed., (Paris, 1890) I, p. 6: De quo sit logica ut de subjecto? Cf. the same author's commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, ed. cit., I, pp. 459-809, espec. pp. 459-461, De subjecto et modo et nomine libri.

[11] *In Librum primum priorum analyticorum*, q. II, *Joannis Duns Scoti Omnia Opera*, Wadding, ed., (Paris, 1891) II, p. 81: Utrum de syllogismo simpliciter sit scientia? and p. 83: Utrum syllogismus simpliciter sit subjectum in Libro Priorum? It is to be noted that Duns concludes that the term *syllogismus* is the subject of the *Prior Analytics* and that so also is the term *argumentatio* (p. 86) whereas it is the term *instrumentum sciendi* and not the term *syllogismus* (p. 85) that is the subject of all logic.

The orthography of the single manuscript has not been preserved in this edition. Except for the number of the *Question*, all numerals are editorial additions: Roman numerals designate the "principal arguments" that Campsall records and to which he responds; Arabic numerals indicate the paragraphs into which I have divided the text and it is to these paragraphs that the Arabic numerals refer both in the notes and in this introduction; where they occur in the introduction, these numerals are enclosed in parentheses.

I

Nine principal arguments are marshalled to show that syllogism is not the subject of this science. The most extensively developed of these is the first, an objection based on the fact that a common term, as it functions in a proposition, must exercise one of several possible "suppositions." To say, for instance, that the subject of logic consists of a particular syllogism, composed of expressions to which one could point, is obviously false; whatever the subject of logic may be, it is not some individual syllogism (1). Besides, if that solution were conceded, an inescapable consequence would compound the absurdity: far from exhibiting the community characteristic of the subject of any science, the subject of logic would be structured according to one of the traditional three figures of syllogism and thus the subject of logic would be narrowed to one syllogism in one figure (2). These attacks assume that "syllogism" is taken as a verbal counter to represent singular instances of that form of argument; in technical language, the term "syllogism" is assumed to exercise personal supposition.[13]

An alternative hypothesis is that "syllogism" substitutes here, not for a particular syllogism, but for syllogism in general. This assumption, that the supposition of the term "syllogism" is simple, is said to entail another unacceptable consequence: "syllogism," a species inferior to the more general class "significant expression," *vox significativa*, would be identical with its own superior (5).

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[12] Infra par. 12, 49, 51, 59, 60.

[13] Cf. Scotus on this issue: loc. cit., II, p. 84: Quinto, quia nullus syllogismus est hujus subjectum. Tenet consequentia per locum a toto in quantitate ad suam partem; et antecedens apparet inducendo.

A variation on the reasoning that invokes personal supposition adduces the terms and propositions that constitute all syllogisms as well as the demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms that divide syllogism in general: the singularity inseparable from each of these components of syllogism in general, even though the term be taken in its simple supposition, is incompatible with the community required in the subject of a science.

Worse yet is the dilemma that, precisely because the expression asserted to be the subject of logic is inevitably either a universal or a singular one, it cannot be common to any and to all syllogisms. The subject of logical science, it is urged, must thus fulfill contradictory roles for it must be applicable to universals, the sole interest of science, and to singulars as well, for what a science states in universal propositions must be verifiable of singular things (11).

The opponent's second major theme is that only what is grasped in an act of simple, non-composed understanding can be the subject of a science. By its nature complex, syllogism requires a discursive advance from an understanding of the major premiss to an understanding of the minor and thus is precluded the unitary conception that is essential in the subject of a science (18, 20-23).

Another objection that derives from the Aristotelian conception of science is that the subject of science must be definable in terms of its proper attributes. The *Posterior Analytics* can be cited to show that Aristotle, for all his insistence that scientific knowledge proceeds from what is already known, was willing to concede that the student need not know in advance the immediate principles of demonstration, their essences manifested, as essences are, in definitions.[14] The reason for this, so the objection runs, is that the complexity of principles makes their definition impossible and the application is that *a fortiori* the possibility of defining the still more complex syllogism must be denied.[15] As indefinable, syllogism is not an appropriate subject of science (19,24; cf. 54).

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[14] *Posterior Analytics*, II, 3; 91a 1.

[15] Infra par. 19; cf. Scotus, loc. cit., II, p. 81: de Syllogismo simpliciter non habetur definitio: ergo nec scientia. Major patet: quia definitio est medium demonstrationis, ut patet 2. Post. text. com. 14 (*Posterior Analytics*, II, 3; 90b 24-27) et minor patet, quia Syllogismus simpliciter est quoddam complexum: modo solius incomplexi est definitio; cf. ibid., p. 212: An de dignitate possit praecognosci quid est. Videtur quod sic, tanta complexio est in Syllogismo, et unio, quanta est in Dignitate, sed de Syllogismo potest cognosci *quid est*, non obstante sua complexione (aliter de Syllogismo non posset esse scientia;) ergo de Dignitate potest praecognosci *quid est*, non obstante complexione: here Scotus argues that because syllogism can be defined, the less complex axiom can be defined whereas Campsall records the objection that because a principle is too complex to be defined the more complex syllogism must be indefinable.

The very being that a syllogism has suggests a further gambit: syllogism is but an accident that inheres *subjective* in an intellect and thus is necessarily a singular. Unexpressed is the conviction held by all Aristotelians: science is of the universal. Already used by his opponent, this is a proposition that Campsall too proclaims later (47). Thus is renewed, in yet another guise and at the price of conceding that the subject of logic is not composed of verbal elements, the argument inspired by the assumption that, as the *Question* is formulated, the term "syllogism" exercises personal supposition for its subordinate singulars, this time taken to be accidental determinations of the intellect rather than significant verbal expressions (25-27).

Because in every instance scientific knowledge is generated through a grasp of syllogistic demonstration, an affirmative solution of the *Question* is said to entail another strange consequence: knowledge concerning syllogism in general would be gained through prior knowledge of one of its own species, more precisely, through prior knowledge of the demonstrative syllogism.[16] The more determined inferior would be known before and better known than the more common superior; every Aristotelian is sure that the opposite is the truth (28, 29).

Related to this is the allegation that to make syllogism the subject of logic is to assert an identity between the subject concerning which knowledge is sought and the means employed to attain that knowledge. To acquire knowledge is to move from the known to the unknown: unless the goal of learning is unknown and the means known, the process is illusory (30).

If syllogism were the subject of logic in general, it could not be the subject of a part of logic. This objection proceeds from the fact that syllogism is the subject of a definite division of logic and it is the *Prior Analytics* that the opponent has in mind (31).

Nor is science concerned with the merely mental; science is possible only with respect to what is real. Since syllogism has no being, no *esse*, outside the soul, syllogism cannot be the subject of any science (32).

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[16] Here too comparison with Scotus is instructive: loc. cit., II, p. 81: Secundo, omnis scientia est notitia habita per demonstrationem: sed de Syllogismo simpliciter non habetur notitia per demonstrationem. Major patet, quia scientia est habitus per demonstrationem acquisitus, ut patet 2 Post. text. com. 10 (*Posterior Analytics* II, 3; 90b 9-10). Minor patet, quia tunc demonstratio ista, per quam de Syllogismo simpliciter habetur scientia, esset notior Syllogismo simpliciter, et per consequens scientia de demonstratione, praecederet scientiam de Syllogismo simpliciter, quod tamen est falsum. Duns' response to this, ibid., p. 83: Ad secundam concedo majorem, et nego minorem. Ad probationem concedo quod demonstratio illa est notior, quantum ad necessitatem illationis, non tamen quantum ad proprietates verificabiles de demonstratione. Verbi gratia, in syllogismo primum principium est evidentissime notum, scilicet quantum ad evidentiam: tamen est bene dubitabile quantum ad proprietates dicibiles de primo principio ut patet 4. *Metaphysicae* (*Meta.* IV, 3; 1005b; 5-34).

A last attack: syllogism is but one among many species of argument—enthymemes, for example, and inductions have as good a claim and indeed the same claim to be the subjects of special sciences, yet every one of them finds its place within the single science of logic. Syllogism deserves no privileged role (33).

Against this is the procedure of Aristotle: in the *Prior Analytics* he deals with syllogism as if it were his principal subject (34).

II

For all who acclaim Aristotle as the Philosopher, and Campsall is of their number, science is a habit acquired through demonstration; indeed, it is in the very act of demonstration that science achieves perfection. To be a possible subject of science, it is enough to be the subject of demonstration and syllogism is the subject of many a demonstration (35). The elements of demonstration are quickly stated: a subject of which something can be asserted or denied in scientific fashion; a proper attribute, a *passio*, that is thus demonstrable of that subject; a definition that can function as middle term in demonstrating that an attribute does or does not belong, necessarily and universally, to such a subject. As Campsall sees it, not one of these is lacking: syllogism is an apt subject, that syllogism possesses three terms is a proper attribute, and the *Prior Analytics* has not neglected to produce a definition of syllogism suited to the role of middle term. Further, because it is only in the *Prior Analytics* that Aristotle deals with syllogism in general, the unlikely alternative to Campsall's affirmation is that the Philosopher, master of logic that he is, has totally neglected the normative scientific argument — for what are all other forms of argument but deficient syllogisms? (36; cf. 62).

Syllogism is an instance of what are called "second intentions" and the term "second" implies that there must be others, appropriately named "first" intentions. If both exist, how do they differ and in what sense are they "first" or "second"?

Using language of the sort that Ockham complains he found on all sides,[17] Campsall asserts that there are things, *res*, of first and of second intention. A thing of first intention is a thing outside the soul, quite apart from any reference to an intellect; *man* and *animal* are realities of this class. A thing of second intention bespeaks a thing of first intention to be sure, but as qualified by the addition of a reference to the knowing intellect; *species* and *genus* are among the realities, *res*, of second intention (38). A first intention is thus-named because, in the development of knowledge, nothing on the side of what is known is prior to what such an intention grasps; hence it is with this that the intellect must make a start in knowing (39). To recognize the truth that a nature of this sort is common to a number of inferiors, *supposita*, and to assign the exact mode of that community — generic it may be, or specific — is a second step; thus what is known in this subsequent act is called a "thing of second intention." Familiar borrowings from Avicenna's *Logic*, Campsall has not failed to acknowledge their source (40).

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[17] That the reification of natures seemed omnipresent to Ockham, v. *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 7, B (Lyon, 1495): In conclusione istius quaestionis, omnes quos vidi concordant dicentes quod natura quae est aliquo modo universalis, saltem in potentia et incomplete, est realiter in individuo; that he judged this unfortunate, even where the realism admitted was minimal, v. *Summa Totius Logicae* I, 16; ed. Ph. Boehner, (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., Louvain, Belgium, 1951) p. 49, ll. 1-10.

Terms are a coinage minted to signify things and Boethius has long since consecrated the expression "names of second intention": these are the terms that signify things of second intention (41). Some names of second intention signify directly things of second intention whereas others, and it is to this class that the term "syllogism" belongs, signify directly other names that, in their turn, refer to things of second intention (42). Not a trace here of the expression "names of third intention" nor of the problematic that inspired it in the Bologna *Logica*.[18]

The logician is primarily concerned with things of second intention and, to use a simple illustration, although he knows well that man is both rational and an animal, mindful of logic's limits, he leaves the proper nature and principles of man to another investigator.[19] What interests a logician is rather that in virtue of which a reality is "universal" or "particular," "superior" or "inferior"; in a secondary way, he is concerned with those significant expressions that are the proper signs of such realities (4).

Another puzzle is to find sufficient unity in the necessarily complex and plural reality of syllogism for the intellect to grasp its intelligibility in a single representation, such as might be expressed in definition (cf. 18, 19, 22). For how could a syllogism, the very paradigm of discursive reasoning, be grasped by any but the "third operation of the intellect"? (20). At least when taken in its very complexity, syllogism is impervious to the simple understanding that is the seed of definition. Campsall's answer is to argue *a pari*: we can know *house* without understanding *stone* and, since proposition is to syllogism as stone is to house, we can understand the whole syllogism without an explicit grasp of its propositions. An understanding of the realities signified by the parts of a syllogism would indeed require a discursive progress from major to minor, but for syllogism as a whole to qualify as knowable through a single representation, *per unam speciem*, does not imply that it be free from all composition. Despite its complexity, the structure of syllogism remains a structure: hence it is marked by a unity and order of parts. This unity gives full satisfaction to the modest demand of the intellect that if a reality is to be known, in some sense it must be one (45). Syllogism is a thing, *res* (21), and has an order of parts, *ordinem partium* (23). As Campsall puts it roundly, it is "one being, distinct from any one of its own parts," *unum ens distinctum a qualibet sui parte* (53).

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[18] Text, v. supra, note 8; the author of the Bologna *Logica* deplores the notion that an intention is called "second" because it signifies one that is "first"; if such were the case, a "third," "fourth," "fifth," indeed recession into infinity would be possible and thus the analysis would dissolve in nonsense. Still, it is true to say that a second intention and a first intention are both "intentions" and the term that is predicated indifferently of them both ought to be confused with neither—hence let us call it a "third" intention. So too the syncategorematic terms "all" and "none" that are appropriately added even to second intentions — surely not first, no more are they to be identified with second intentions: thus are "third intentions" of two sorts, se habent in duplici differentia.

[19] *De Anima*, I, 1; 403a 29-30.

Finally, to follow the thread of truth through the labyrinthine objections raised in the name of supposition is to elucidate this function that names exercise in proposition. Campsall here uses the same headings as does Ockham: both classify suppositions as simple, material, and personal. But for Campsall, supposition is simple where a common term substitutes in discourse for the very thing it signifies, *pro re significata per ipsum*, not, as Ockham would have it, for an intention of the soul, *pro intentione animae, sed non tenetur significative.*[20] Material supposition is that of a term for itself and personal supposition is that of a common term for the concrete singulars of which that term can be predicated with truth (46). In the following propositions, the term "man" exercises simple, material, and personal supposition in that order: *Man is a species*, "*Man*" *is a common term*, and: *Some man is running* (47). Campsall admits that to make syllogism the subject of logic is defensible only if the term "syllogism" be taken for the reality signified by that term, that is, in its simple supposition (cf. 41, 54). Neither the term as a term, that is, in its material supposition, nor any concrete syllogism, object of personal supposition, could be the subject of logic. Not the term, for terms are the subject of the logician's inquiry only to the point that they signify the things of second intention that are his principal concern; not individual syllogisms, because science is "of the universal" (47; cf. 44). Still, the scientific statements of the logician, like those of all who cultivate techniques of this sort, *logicus et quilibet artifex determinans de communi* (50), have full value when applied to particular instances, inferior to his general conclusions.

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[20] Ockham, *Summa Totius Logicae*, ed. cit., I, 64; p. 178, ll. 27-33.

QUAESTIONES DATAE A RICARDO DE CAMPSALL SUPER LIBRUM "PRIORUM ANALYTICORUM"

Quaestio prima[1]

PRIMO OPORTET DICERE CIRCA QUID ET DE QUO ETC.[2]
<Q>uaeratur: Utrum syllogismus sit subjectum hujus?[3]

I

1 Quod non videtur quia, si sic, esset vox significativa et, per consequens, cum non sit vox incomplexa, esset vox composita ex vocibus incomplexis; consequens est falsum quia, quibuscumque vocibus demonstratis, haec est falsa: *Subjectum hujus est vox composita ex istis vocibus.*

2 Similiter, si subjectum hujus esset syllogismus, ex opposito conclusionis cum altera praemissarum sequeretur oppositum alterius; consequens est falsum quia tunc syllogismus, qui est subjectum hujus, esset in aliqua trium figurarum; consequens est falsum cum sit communis ad quemlibet syllogismum.

3 Dicitur hoc concedendo quod sit vox significativa et quod sit vox composita ex vocibus incomplexis, et ulterius conceditur quod, quibuscumque demonstratis, haec est vera: *Subjectum hujus non componitur ex istis vocibus*; nec ista repugnat alteri.

4 Ad aliud: Negatur tota consequentia *subjectum hujus est syllogismus; igitur, ex opposito conclusionis etc.* et hoc est quia praedicatum antecedentis habet suppositionem simplicem et supponit pro syllogismo in communi.

5 Contra respondetur: Si haec sit vera: *Syllogismus, qui est subjectum hujus, est vox significativa*, aut est vera secundum acceptionem simplicem vel personalem. Non est vera accipiendo praedicatum simpliciter quia, sic accepto praedicato, significatur quod subjectum hujus sit res significata per hoc quod dico *vox significativa* et hoc est falsum quia tunc inferius esset suum superius; nec est vera secundum acceptionem personalem quia nulla vox significativa est subjectum hujus; igitur, etc.

6 Praetera, si syllogismus, qui est subjectum hujus, sit compositum ex aliquibus partibus, quaerendum est de illis: Aut sunt propositiones aut termini; si sint propositiones, aut sunt negativae aut affirmativae, aut altera negativa et altera affirmativa; si sint termini, aut sunt termini communes aut singulares, aut alter communis et alter singularis. Et nullum istorum potest dari quia sequeretur quod subjectum hujus non esset commune ad quemlibet syllogismum quia quod componitur ex affirmativis non est commune ad quemlibet syllogismum quia aliquis syllogismus componitur ex altera affirmativa et altera negativa; et idem sequitur si detur alterum membrum.

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[1] This heading and the number of the *Question* have been written by a hand other than that which wrote the text; both appear to be English hands of approximately the same period; the MS spelling of Campsall's name, Camsal, with a stroke through the last letter that justifies the reading Camsale, is one of many familiar forms; v. A.B. Emden, op. cit., I, p. 344, s.v. Campsale, Richard de.

[2] This lemma, the first line of Aristotle's work, *Prior Analytics,* I, 1; 24a 10, has been written carefully in *lettres de forme.*

[3] A space left by the scribe for the initial letter has not been filled; "hujus" refers, not to the book of the *Prior Analytics,* but to the whole science of logic, v. 35, 36, and especially 47: Res significata per *syllogismum* est subjectum hujus scientiae, and 58 where, despite the privileged place of syllogism in the *Prior Analytics,* its position as subject of all logic is vindicated.

7 Praeterea, si sit compositum,igitur ex aliquibus est compositum; aut igitur ex propositionibus aut terminis et, quodcumque detur, habetur propositum. Nec est dicere quod consequentia non valet quia praedicatum accipitur simpliciter quia, si non componatur ex propositionibus nec ex terminis, nec habet aliquas partes ex quibus componatur, igitur non componitur ex aliquibus partibus et, per consequens, non est compositum.

8 Similiter, de subjecto hujus ostenditur quod habet tres terminos et duas propositiones[4] et quodlibet tale componitur ex propositionibus et terminis; igitur, etc.

9 Contra rationem ad aliud: Syllogismus, qui est subjectum hujus, cum sit vox composita ex propositionibus praemissis et conclusione, concludit conclusionem; sed in qualibet conclusione concludente aliquam conclusionem, ex opposito conclusionis cum altera praemissarum sequitur oppositum alterius; igitur, etc.

10 Et similiter, si ex opposito conclusionis cum altera praemissarum non sequitur oppositum alterius, et habet praemissas et conclusionem, igitur oppositum conclusionis stat cum praemissis et ultra; igitur, non infert aliquam conclusionem.

11 Similiter, si habeat conclusionem, igitur in illa concluditur praedicatum de aliquo subjecto; quodcumque detur, sequitur quod non sit subjectum hujus, quia illud subjectum aut est universale aut singulare; si sit universale, syllogismus cujus est pars non est subjectum hujus quia est communis ad quemlibet syllogismum; nec est singulare propter eamdem rationem; igitur, etc.

12 Ideo dicitur aliter ad argumentum, negando utramque istarum de virtute sermonis: *Subjectum hujus est vox significativa*, similiter: *Est vox complexa*, et: *Habet conclusionem*, et omnes consimiles quia tales nec possunt verificari, accepto praedicato simpliciter nec personaliter.

13 Contra istud, subjectum hujus est compositum et complexum quia non est incomplexum; et non est compositum nisi ex vocibus (76v a/b) significativis vel earum partibus; igitur, etc. Quod sit complexum patet quia aliter logicus non haberet demonstrare de aliquo complexo.

14 Similiter, subjectum hujus est institutum applicabile aliis scientiis ad quamcumque conclusionem ibi probandam et tale institutum non est nisi vox significativa et complexa; igitur, etc. Assumptum patet quia vox incomplexa non est institutum in medium quo aliquid probatur de alio.

15 Similiter, si haec sit vera de virtute sermonis: *Subjectum hujus non concludit conclusionem aliquam*, non duceret in cognitionem incogniti et, per consequens, non valeret ad finem in quem principaliter ordinatur logica; igitur, etc.

16 Similiter, sicut prius Aristoteles in nulla parte logicae determinaret de voce complexa quia, per rationem, de nullo subjecto alicujus partis logicae est verum dicere quod sit vox complexa et determinat de voce significativa; igitur, solum determinaret de voce incomplexa.

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[4] *Prior Analytics*, I, 25; 41b 36-42a 1 and 42a 30-35.

17 Similiter, si subjectum hujus non sit vox complexa et est vox significativa, igitur est pars vocis significativae complexae et ultra; igitur, est pars syllogismi et, cum sit syllogismus, sequeretur quod syllogismus esset pars syllogismi, et ita idem est pars sui ipsius. Nec valet dicere quod subjectum hujus sit vox complexa et compositum ex propositionibus quia commune componitur per accidens ex quibus componitur suum singulare per se, quia, sicut argumentatum est, sequeretur quod subjectum hujus esset syllogismus dialecticus vel demonstrativus quia, si esset compositum ex propositionibus, aut utraque est demonstrativa aut dialectica, aut altera demonstrativa et altera dialectica; quodcumque detur, subjectum hujus non esset commune ad syllogismum dialecticum et demonstrativum.

II

18 Aliud principale: Si syllogismus esset subjectum hujus, esset objectum intellectus simplicis et ultra; igitur, intellectus simul intelligeret ipsum; consequens est falsum quia intellectus primo intelligit majorem, deinde minorem.

III

19 Et similiter, haberet propriam passionem et definitionem per quam passio de ipso esset conclusa;[5] consequens est falsum quia, per Aristotelem, primo *Posteriorum*,[6] de principio non est praecognoscere quid est quia non habet quid. Et ratio hujus est quia principium est unum complexum; cum, igitur syllogismus sit magis complexum quam principium demonstrationis, non habebit quid nec definitionem.

20 Ad primum istorum dicitur quod syllogismus potest accipi sub ratione complexi, quo modo habet esse in tertia operatione intellectus, vel per rationem incomplexi; primo modo non apprehenditur ab intellectu simplici, sed secundo modo solum. Et per idem dicitur ad aliud, quod Aristoteles, primo *Posteriorum*, intendit principium demonstrationis non habere quid si accipiatur sub ratione complexi.

21 Contra istud: Dato isto, sequeretur quod res significata per hoc nomen *syllogismus* non esset apprehensa ab intellectu simplici et hoc accipiendo ipsum sub ratione complexi; consequens falsum quia quaelibet res una, per unam vocem significata, simul potest intelligi ab intellectu quia quaelibet talis res habet unam speciem et talis res simul intelligitur.

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[5] *Prior Analytics*, I, 27; 43b 1-5; cf. ibid., I, 7; 75a 39-75b 2, and I, 10; 76b 11-16.

[6] The passage Campsall has in mind seems to be *Posterior Analytics*, I, 2; 72a 14-17 in which Aristotle acknowledges that not every premiss required for a conclusion need be known beforehand, thus evoking I, 1; 71a 17-24 with its distinction between knowledge that is prior and knowledge that is grasped at the same time as the conclusion that derives from it; as he will say later in the same work, II, 3; 90b 24-27, the ultimate grounds of demonstration are definitions and to demand that the most basic ones be demonstrated would mean a regress that would be irrational because infinite. The notion that a principle is not a definable essence is to be found in the *Metaphysics*, VII, 4; 1029b 1-1030b 13 where definition in its primary sense is denied of composite items; cf. the use Scotus made of this reasoning supra, Introduction, note 15.

22 Praeterea, si res communis significata per *syllogismum* possit simul intelligi ab intellectu, igitur quodlibet suppositum illius communis simul posset intelligi, et ita, demonstrato quocumque syllogismo, simul intelligerentur omnes ejus partes.

23 Praeterea, quodlibet habens unam formam potest simul ab intellectu intelligi; sed, qualitercumque capiatur syllogismus, habet unam formam quia, qualitercumque capiatur, est una res et habet unum ordinem partium.

24 Contra rationem ad aliud: Ex ista ratione sequeretur quod res communis significata per *syllogismum*, vel principium aliquo modo, non haberet definitionem; consequens falsum quia, quocumque modo accipiatur, habet principia per quae definiri potest.

IV

25 Aliud principale: Syllogismus, qui est subjectum hujus, habet esse in intellectu et quodlibet tale[7] est singulare; igitur singulare est subjectum hujus. Assumptum patet quia subjectum hujus (76v b/77r a) non est compositum ex vocibus significativis quia, etsi non fuisset vox significativa, adhuc essent scientiae et modus sciendi ipsas et, per consequens, adhuc esset logica;[8] igitur, etc.

26 Nec valet dicere negando istam, quod omne quod est in intellectu est singulare, quia omne quod est in intellectu habet esse subjectum in intellectu et informat intellectum, et quodlibet tale est singulare.

27 Similiter, si syllogismus sit in intellectu, igitur ibi habet esse subjectum et, per consequens, ab illo et a quocumque alio syllogismo contingeret abstrahere in infinitum et, per consequens, non est ponere syllogismum conceptum esse subjectum hujus et quod sit in intellectu subjective.

V

28 Aliud principale: Si de syllogismo esset scientia, hoc esset per syllogismum et ille non est alius quam demonstrativus; igitur, de syllogismo in communi esset scientia per syllogismum demonstrativum et ultra; igitur, syllogismus demonstrativus esset notior quam syllogismus simpliciter; consequens est falsum quia communia sunt magis nobis nota.[9]

29 Similiter, passio notius inest communi quam alicui ejus supposito; igitur, etc.

VI

30 Praeterea, syllogismus est id per quod acquiritur scientia de aliquo; sed idem non est id per quod acquiritur scientia de aliquo et id de quo scientia

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[7] corr. MS: talem.

[8] *Posterior Analytics*, I, 10; 76b 24-27.

[9] That the demonstrative syllogism is the means to knowledge, v. *Prior Analytics*, I, 1; 24a 10-15; that the more universal is the more knowable to us, v. *Posterior Analytics*, I, 24; 86a 3-10; still, the ambiguity of the notions "prior known" and "better known" had not escaped Aristotle himself: v. *Posterior Analytics*, I, 2; 71b 33-72a 4.

acquiritur; igitur, syllogismus non est illud de quo acquiritur haec scientia; igitur, etc. Major patet quia id, de quo acquiritur scientia, est incognitum et id, per quod acquiritur scientia, oportet quod sit notum; aliter enim non duceret in cognitionem alterius.

VII

31 Similiter, syllogismus est subjectum commune totius logicae, igitur non est proprium subjectum ejus partis. Nec valet dicere quod, secundum quod diversimode abstrahit, est subjectum totius et partis quia, qualitercumque abstrahat, eadem res significatur per *syllogismum* et illa est subjectum totius; igitur, illa non est subjectum partis.

VIII

32 Similiter, syllogismus solum habet esse in anima; igitur, non est vera res de qua est scientia possibilis.

IX

33 Similiter, syllogismus est una species argumentationis; igitur, quo illud esset scientia una de syllogismo, eadem ratione esset scientia de alia ejus specie, sicut de inductione et enthymemate.

34 AD OPPOSITUM est Aristoteles determinans hic de syllogismo sicut de principali suo subjecto.[10]

35 AD QUAESTIONEM: Dicendum est quod sit cujus illud est quia, secundum Aristotelem, secundo *Posteriorum*,[11] scientia est habitus acquisitus per demonstrationem et est habitus terminans in demonstrationem; igitur, illud de quo aliquid potest concludi potest esse subjectum scientiae et syllogismus est hujusmodi.

36 Cujus probatio est quia ad demonstrationem faciendam de aliquo ista sunt omnia: subjectum de quo aliquid est concludendum, et passio quae concluditur de subjecto, et definitio quae est medium concludendi unum de altero. Sed in proposito sunt ista tria: est syllogismus, qui est subjectum, et est definitio quia Aristoteles hic definit syllogismum,[12] et habet propriam passionem, sicut habere tres terminos, quae inferius[13] ostendetur de ipso; igitur, scientia possibilis est de syllogismo et ultra; igitur, syllogismus potest esse subjectum scientiae et non alibi determinatur de syllogismo in communi; igitur, etc.

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[10] *Prior Analytics*, I, 1; 24a 10-15.

[11] *Posterior Analytics*, I, 2; 71b 17-19; the MS reading "secundo Posteriorum" may well be a slip since the text given here expresses precisely the notion that Campsall mentions whereas no line in the second book does; the subdivision into chapters is, of course, modern.

[12] For the three elements of demonstration, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 7; 75a 39-75b 2; for Aristotle's definition of syllogism, *Prior Analytics*, I, 1; 24b 18-22.

[13] *Prior Analytics*, I, 25; 42a 30-35; cf. *Posterior Analytics*, I, 19; 81b 10; "inferius" refers to the second *Question* of this series: Utrum syllogismus habeat resolvi in propositiones et propositiones in terminos?

37 Praeterea, tamen, advertendum est quod, cum syllogismus sit intentio secunda, videndum est qualiter differat ab intentione prima et quare hujusmodi dicuntur intentiones secundae; secundo, cum syllogismus et propositio sint quaedam complexa, quomodo simul intelliguntur ab intellectu simplici et habent distinctiones; et tertio, secundum quam acceptionem haec est vera: *Syllogismus est subjectum hujus.*

38 Pro primo istorum, intelligendum est quod quaedam sunt res primae intentionis et quaedam secundae. Res primae intentionis sunt res extra animam sine comparatione ad intellectum, sicut *homo*, *animal*, et hujusmodi. Res secundae intentionis dicuntur esse res quae in se claudunt rem primae intentionis cum aliquo addito secundum quod comparantur ad animam, sicut *species* et *genus* et consimilia.

39 Et primae res (77r a/b) dicuntur esse primae intentionis quia naturaliter intellectus in cognoscendo ab eis incipit et ita naturaliter primo eas intendit et ideo dicuntur esse primae intentionis.

40 Aliae dicuntur esse secundae intentionis quia secundario intellectus fertur in earum cognitionem, quod patet sic: Intellectus primo intelligit naturam significatam per *hominem* et, illa natura intellecta, intellectus percipit communitatem hujus naturae et modum communitatis quem habet ad sua supposita. Et istam naturam sub tali communitate et quamlibet consimilem dicit esse *speciem* et ita illud quod significatur per hoc nomen *species* est res secundae intentionis quia secundario intenditur. Et res significata per *hominem* est primae intentionis quia primo intenditur. Et hoc est quod dicit Avicenna in principio suae *Logicae*[14] quod intentio prima est primus intellectus rei et secunda intentio est secundus intellectus ejus.

41 Ex isto patet quod quaedam sunt nomina primae intentionis et quaedam secundae. Nomina primae intentionis sunt nomina rerum quae primo naturaliter occurrunt intellectui, sicut hoc nomen *homo*, *animal*, et sic de aliis, et universaliter nomina rerum primae intentionis. Nomina secundae intentionis sunt illa quae imponuntur rebus quae secundario occurrunt intellectui, sicut *genus*, *species*, et sic de aliis. Et istam divisionem ponit Boethius in principio commenti sui in[15] *Praedicamenta.*[16]

42 Et nomina secundae intentionis sunt duplicia: quaedam enim sunt nomina rerum et quaedam sunt nomina nominum. Nomina rerum sunt sicut *genus*, *species*, quia significant res quae sunt secundae intentionis quae res non sunt signa aliorum, et nomina nominum sicut *terminus*, *propositio*, et *syllogismus*, *nomen*, et *verbum*, et consimilia, quia omnes isti termini imponuntur ad significandum alias voces significativas, sicut hoc nomen *terminus* imponitur ad significandum unum commune cuilibet voci incomplexae.

43 Ex isto patet quae res est primae[17] intentionis et quae secundae et quare dicitur secundae intentionis vel primae et quae sunt nomina primae intentionis et secundae et propter quam rationem dicuntur sic vel sic.

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[14] Avicenna, *Logyce*, pars prima, (Venice, 1508) I, fol. 6ra: Dicemus quod verbum significans intentionem generis prius apud eos secundum primam impositionem significabat aliud et deinde per impositionem secundam translatum est ad significandum intentionem quae apud logicos vocatur genus.

[15] MS illegible: em. in.

[16] Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor* I; PL 64 159B-160A.

[17] corr. MS: secundae.

44 De rebus secundae intentionis habet logicus principaliter determinare quia non considerat naturam propriam rei nec ejus principia, sicut non considerat hominem in eo quod est animal vel rationale, sed considerat quamlibet rem secundum quod universale vel singulare, superius vel inferius, et sic de aliis, quae omnia sunt extra naturam propriam rei. Et quia voces sunt propria signa istarum rerum, ideo ex consequenti magis habet determinare de vocibus significativis.

45 Pro secundo, advertendum est quod, non obstante quod aliquid sit compositum ex partibus, tamen, si habeat sufficientem identitatem per compositionem vel ordinem partium, potest intelligi ab intellectu per unam speciem sicut, non obstante quod domus sit compositum ex diversis partibus, tamen, propter unitatem ordinis in suis partibus, facit unam speciem et simul intelligitur absque hoc quod suae partes intelliguntur et ideo, qui intelligit domum non oportet quod intelligat lapidem. Cum igitur syllogismus sit unum per unitatem ordinis inter suas partes, quamcumque componatur ex diversis partibus, totus simul potest intelligi absque hoc quod intelligatur aliqua ejus pars. Et ideo, qui intelligit syllogismum, non oportet quod intelligat propositionem; (77r b/77v a) qui tamen intelligit rem significatam per partes syllogismi, oportet quod primo intelligat unum et deinde reliquum.

46 Pro tertio, advertendum est quod suppositio triplex est: simplex, materialis, et personalis. Et est suppositio simplex quando terminus communis supponit pro re significata per ipsum, et materialis quando supponit pro ipsomet, et personalis quando supponit pro aliquo supposito illius naturae communis.

47 Exemplum primi est in ista: *Homo est species*; exemplum secundi est in ista: *Homo est terminus communis*; exemplum tertii in ista: *Aliquis homo currit*. Unde haec est vera: *Syllogismus est subjectum hujus*, accepto subjecto secundum acceptionem simplicem, ita quod iste sit intellectus: Res significata per *syllogismum* est subjectum hujus scientiae; et non est vera secundum alias acceptiones quia nec ipsa vox est subjectum hujus nec aliquis syllogismus, quia de singulari non est scientia.[18]

Ad I

48 Ad primum principale: Dicendum est quod haec est falsa de virtute sermonis: *Syllogismus, qui est subjectum hujus, est complexum.*

49 Similiter, haec est falsa: *Componitur ex propositionibus et concludit aliquam conclusionem* quia, qualitercumque capiatur praedicatum in istis, sive simpliciter sive personaliter, quaelibet istarum est falsa quia, si capiatur praedicatum simpliciter, tunc significatur quod syllogismus, qui est subjectum hujus, est res significata per hoc nomen complexum et est res significata per praedicatum alterius, et sic de aliis, quorum quodlibet est impossibile. Si praedicata capiantur personaliter, adhuc quaelibet est falsa quia tunc significatur quod syllogismus, qui est subjectum huius, sit aliquod complexum, hoc vel illud, sicut iste syllogismus vel ista propositio, et sic de aliis. Et ideo quaelibet talis est neganda de virtute sermonis; admittendi tamen tales ex usu loquendi quia quodlibet contentum sub *syllogismo* est unum complexum. Et ideo concedimus istud: *Com-*

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[18] *Metaphysics*, XI, 1; 1059b 25-26; *Posterior Analytics*, I, 31; 87b 37-39.

mune esse unum complexum. Et quando arguitur: *Non est incomplexum et est vox significativa; igitur, est vox complexa*, dicendum est quod secunda propositio, accepta de virtute sermonis, est falsa. Haec enim est falsa de virtute sermonis: *Hic communis syllogismus est vox significativa* quia non est aliqua vox significativa, sicut patet inducendo.

50 Ad aliud inquam: Dicendum est negando consequentiam quia logicus et quilibet artifex determinans de communi, ex hoc ipso determinat de suppositis illius communis et ita logicus, determinans de hoc communi *syllogismus*, determinat de ejus suppositis quae sunt voces complexae.[19] Et ita non oportet concedere quod ubicumque determinet de voce incomplexa. Et si dicatur quod si illud commune non sit complexum nec est incomplexum, igitur logicus determinans de isto communi non determinaret de complexo nec de incomplexo, dicendum est concedendo conclusionem de virtute sermonis et hoc accipiendo *determinare de aliquo* sicut *de proprio subjecto*; tamen determinat de complexo ex consequenti, sicut dictum est.

51 Ad aliud: Quod pro tanto dicitur syllogismus esse institutum logicae quia sua contenta sunt instituta quibus logicus concludit; negari tamen potest de virtute sermonis, et hoc accipiendo subjectum simpliciter. Vel potest dici aliter ad argumentum, concedendo quod subjectum hujus sit complexum et similiter accipiendo praedicatum personaliter, quia praedicatum non solum est commune ad complexum ex istis propositionibus vel illis, sed ad complexum ex propositionibus in communi, et ideo est vera pro uno supposito praedicati.

52 Et si dicatur ulterius quod syllogismus, qui est subjectum hujus, componitur ex propositionibus et hoc accipiendo secundam partem praedicati simpliciter, et quando arguitur ulterius: *Omne compositum ex propositionibus componitur ex negativis vel affirmativis, etc.*, dicendum est quod, accepta secunda parte subjecti simpliciter, haec est falsa, et isto modo alia est vera, si personaliter est vera, et isto modo alia est falsa. Et per idem potest dici ad alia quod *est institutum* et quod *concludit conclusionem* et istud, *nec affirmari nec negari*, quia prima est vera, accipiendo conclusionem simpliciter et non personaliter.

Ad II

53 Ad secundum principale: Dicendum est per dicta in positione quod syllogismus importat unam rem habentem ordinem in partibus (77v a b) et ideo facit unam speciem et simul potest intelligi et, quod plus est, aliquis syllogismus simul potest intelligi, ita quod non importet quod tunc intelligatur ejus minor et major quia possum intelligere talem complexionem absque hoc quod intelligam ejus partes, cum sit unum ens distinctum a qualibet sui parte, sicut domus potest intelligi absque hoc quod simul intelligantur partes. Et si dicatur quod syllogismus intelligitur cum discursu quia primo intelligitur major et postea minor, dicendum est quod iste est intellectus quod, si aliquis intelligat res significatas per praemissas et conclusionem, oportet quod primo intelligat rem significatam per unam et postea rem significatam per aliam; unde non oportet quod, si intelligatur syllogismus, quod propter hoc intelligantur res significatae per

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[19] *Prior Analytics*, II, 21; 67a 27; the relation is reciprocal: *Posterior Analytics*, I, 1; 71a 6-9.

praemissas, nec oporteat, cum quodlibet istorum sit una res diversa ab alia. Unde, pro tanto dicimur intelligere syllogismum et scire conclusionem quia intelligimus res significatas per partes syllogismi et scimus[20] rem significatam per conclusionem; unde res significata per conclusionem proprie scitur et conclusio non scitur nisi quia est significatum rei scitae. Et ideo conclusio scitur transumptive et res significata per conclusionem proprie.

Ad III

54 Ad aliud principale: Dicendum est quod Aristoteles, primo *Posteriorum* intelligit quod, si aliqua passio sit ostensa de aliquo subjecto, non oportet quod illud principium per quod unum de altero concluditur habeat definitionem nec de eo est praecognoscere quid est quia singulare non habet quid. Et ideo haec est vera de principio, *non est cognoscere quid est*, accipiendo subjectum personaliter; principium tamen in communi habet quidditatem et definitionem quia Aristoteles postea ipsum definit et demonstrationem et propositionem in *Metaphysicam*[21] et sic de aliis.

Ad IV

55 Ad aliud principale: Dicendum est quod syllogimus, qui est subjectum hujus, non habet esse in intellectu nisi sicut lapis est in anima[22] et hoc est *esse in* sicut cognitum in cognoscente. Et quando dicitur *componitur ex conceptibus*, dicendum est quod non, nisi abutendo syllogismo quia ex quo componitur ex propositionibus quae sunt voces significativae, non componitur ex aliquibus quae sunt in anima. Et quando quaeritur: Ex quibus componitur? dicendum est quod ex vocibus significativis quae dicuntur voces ordinatae, sicut patebit inferius.

Ad V

56 Ad aliud principale: Dicendum est quod scientia est de syllogismo in communi per unum syllogismum demonstrativum. Et quando dicitur quod tunc syllogismus demonstrativus esset magis notus, conceditur, quia magis cognoscitur veritas praemissarum in illo syllogismo quam cognoscatur veritas conclusionis in qua concluditur passio de syllogismo. Et quando dicitur quod passio syllogismi *notius inest etc.* dicendum est concedendo. Et ex hoc tantum sequitur quod illa propositio est magis nota in qua praedicatur passio syllogismi de syllogismo in communi quam illa in qua praedicatur passio syllogismi de illo syllogismo demonstrato; ex hoc tamen non sequitur quin ille syllogismus demonstrativus sit magis notus.

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[20] Corr. MS : scimur.

[21] *Metaphysics*, III, 2; 997a 5-15; IV, 3; 1005b 5-1006a 28; V, 1; 1013a 14-16; VI, 1; 1025b 3-16.

[22] *De Anima*, III, 8; 431b 29-432a 1.

Ad VI

57 Ad aliud principale: Dicendum est quod idem commune est illud per quod acquiritur scientia sicut institutum et illud de quo scientia quaeritur et ideo idem syllogismus in communi est subjectum logicae et institutum. Et quando dicitur illud quod quaeritur est ignotum, dicendum est quod uno modo est notum, alio modo est ignotum; est enim notum quia praesupponitur ante demonstrationem et de eo praecognoscitur quid est, et est ignotum pro tanto quia passio est ignota ab ipso.[23] Et eodem modo est institutum illud notum et ignotum; idem tamen singulare non est subjectum et institutum.

Ad VII

58 Ad aliud principale: Dicendum est (77v b/78r a) quod non est inconveniens idem esse subjectum totius et partis, imo hoc est necessarium in qualibet scientia cujus subjectum habet partes de quibus traditur scientia distincta, quod in aliqua parte illius scientiae traditur notitia generalis de illo subjecto, quia partes scientiae praesupponunt notitiam de subjecto communi. Aliter enim procedent ex ignotis, sicut corpus mobile est subjectum generale totius scientiae naturalis, et tamen de ipso tanquam de subjecto determinat una pars istius scientiae, sicut scientia tradita in libro *Physicorum*.

59 Vel potest dici, secundum quod dicit Albertus, principio suae *Logicae*, quod subjectum totius logicae est argumentatio quae est mentem arguens.[24] Et non est syllogismus cujus illud est quia, secundum ipsum, ex quo logica est scientia communis, docens principia quibus devenitur a noto ad notitiam incogniti in qualibet scientia, oportet quod sit de hujusmodi subjecto quod est applicabile ad quamlibet scientiam in qua quaeritur notitia ignoti; sed quaedam sunt scientiae quae procedunt per exempla et enthymemata, sicut est in rhetoricis, et quaedam per experimenta et inductiones, et ideo non omnes scientiae procedunt ex universalibus; cum igitur syllogismus procedit ex universali vel universalibus, non quaelibet scientia utitur syllogismo. Et ideo oportet ponere subjectum logicae esse aliquid communius syllogismo et hoc est argumentatio, secundum ipsum, quae est applicabile ad omnem scientiam qualitercumque procedit. Et haec est sententia tres philosophorum quos ibi recitat.[25] Ex isto patet quod argumentatio est subjectum totius et syllogismus partis.

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[23] *Posterior Analytics*, I, 1; 71a 24-26; cf. *Metaphysics*, XI, 5; 1062a 11-20.

[24] *Liber primus de praedicabilibus*, tr. 1, cap. 4, *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, A. Borgnet ed., (Paris, 1890) I, p. 6: Cum autem logica sit scientia contemplativa, docens qualiter et per quae devenitur per notum ad ignoti notitiam, oportet necessario quod logica sit de hujusmodi rationis instrumento, per quod acquiritur per notum ignoti scientia in omni eo quod de ignoto notum efficitur. Hoc autem est argumentatio, secundum quod argumentatio est ratiocinatio mentem arguens et convincens per habitudinem noti ad ignotum de ignoti scientia.

[25] Ibid., p. 8: Et haec est trium Philosophorum sententia, Avicennae scilicet, Alfarabi, et Algazelis; St Albert has found the term "argumentatio" only in Algazelis but all three of his philosophers have seen in logic the science that deals with all the ways to go from the known to the unknown and Avicenna has felt the want of just such a common term for these proce-

60 Vel potest dici quod quia logica docet principia, non solum quibus devenitur ad notitiam complexi, sed etiam incomplexi, ideo subjectum generale non est argumentatio sed aliquid commune argumento et discursui, et hujusmodi est vox significativa, vel ens rationis.

Ad VIII

61 Ad aliud principale: Patet quod subjectum hujus non habet esse in anima quia non componitur ex rebus in anima.

Ad IX

62 Ad ultimum principale: Dicendum est quod quia quaelibet alia species argumenti, alia a syllogismo, evidentiam capit et necessitatem a syllogismo, et habent reduci ad syllogismum tanquam ad principium perficiens, ideo sunt quasi privationes respectu syllogismi[26] et quia privationis et habitus est eadem disciplina,[27] ideo habita cognitione syllogismi, habetur notitia sufficiens de aliis speciebus argumenti.

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dures: Avicenna, op. cit., fol. 2va: Est ergo hic quoddam quod solet prodesse ad sciendum id cuius intellectus nescitur: non est autem usus ut intentio continens hoc (secundum hoc quod scientia eius prodest ad scientiam intelligendi) vocetur communis: aut fortasse nondum pervenit ad nos ut una. Unum enim eorum est diffinitio: et aliud descriptio: et aliud exemplum: et aliud quod est signum: et aliud est nomen sicut postea declarabitur. Sed illud in quo conveniunt non habet nomen commune; Alfarabi, *Liber Alfarabi de ortu scientiarum,* cap. 2, ed. Cl. Baeumker, (Münster i. W., 1916) *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* 19, 3, p. 22: Tertia est scientia logicae, quae est scientia ordinandi propositiones enuntiativas secundum figuras logicas ad eliciendas conclusiones, quibus pervenitur ad cognitionem incognitorum et ad iudicandum de illis an sint vera vel falsa; Algazelis, *Logica et philosophia Algazelis Arabis,* (Venice, 1506) cap. 2, no pagination, text cited on verso of first folio, left column: Quod vero inducit ad scientias credulitatis dicitur argumentatio: Argumentatio autem alia est syllogismus: alia inductio: alia exemplum...

[26] Aristotle holds that syllogism is more general than demonstration and that the most scientific syllogisms are the authentic demonstrations, v. *Prior Analytics,* I, 4; 25b 30-31; division is a "weak" approximation to syllogism, v. ibid., I, 31; 46a 32-33; rhetorical syllogisms have a structure similar to that of demonstrative ones and thus are to be measured by them, v. ibid., II, 23; 68b 8-14; although a syllogism, an enthymeme is an unscientific one because its premisses are merely probable, v. ibid., II, 27; 70a 10, and finally, induction is not equal in value to the demonstrative syllogism, *Posterior Analytics,* I, 3; 72b 31-32.

[27] *Metaphysics,* IX, 2; 1046b 7-9.

An Old Norse Translation of the "Transitus Mariae"

OLE WIDDING and HANS BEKKER-NIELSEN

Introduction

IN the Arnamagnean Collection of Old Icelandic and Old Norwegian manuscripts, bequeathed to the University of Copenhagen by the Icelandic scholar Árni Magnússon (d. 1730), it is still possible to discover texts which were not identified by Kristian Kålund, the distinguished Danish scholar, when he compiled his admirable and useful catalogue of the collection.[1] Manuscripts or fragments of texts whose existence in Old Norse has not been known, are now and again found by members of the staff of the Arnamagnean Dictionary of Old Norse, which will be ready for the press within a few years. The term Old Norse (ON) in the present context embraces both Old Norwegian and Old Icelandic. Most of the material discovered during the compilation of the dictionary will only be used in the dictionary, since it is outside the scope of the staff to publish editions of all hitherto unknown or unidentified texts in the Arnamagnean Collection. However, texts of wider interest or of special distinction have now and then been edited or analysed, especially in the case of works of a serious spiritual and devotional nature,[2] which show something of the indebtedness of ON literature to European writings of the Middle Ages.[3]

The ON translation of the *Transitus Mariae*, edited below, was discovered by Ole Widding, and we feel that it ought to be published because of its interesting lexicographical and textual features. It might have been useful to reprint the Latin source as well, but it is hardly necessary to do so since C. Tischendorff's edition of the *Transitus Mariae*[4] is available in most libraries. All references to the Latin text are to this standard edition.

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[1] *Katalog over Den Arnamagnæanske Håndskriftsamling*, udgivet af Kommissionen for Det Arnamagnæanske Legat, I-II (Copenhagen, 1889-94).

[2] See e.g. *Acta Philologica Scandinavica*, XXI (Copenhagen, 1952) 143 ff., *Mediaeval Studies*, XXI (1959) 272 ff.; *Editiones Arnamagnæanæ, Series A*, IV (Copenhagen, 1960); *Opuscula* 1 (Bibliotheca Arnamagnæana XX, Copenhagen, 1960) passim; *Opuscula* 2 (1961) passim.

[3] Cf. G. Turville-Petre, *Origins of Icelandic Literature* (Oxford, 1953), and our brief survey in *Mediaeval Studies*, XXI (1959) 272 ff.

[4] In *Apocalypses Apocryphae* (Leipzig, 1866).

Since the ON *Transitus* supplements other accounts of Our Lady's death and Assumption found in ON literature, a short survey of these seems to be in order.

It was shown by Karel Vrátný (1916) that the ON homily on the Assumption was closely related to the *Maríu saga*, the ON Life of the Blessed Virgin.[5] Vrátný believed that the saga was one of the sources used by the compiler of the homily. However, in a detailed study of the relationship between the homily and the *Maríu saga*, Gabriel Turville-Petre (1947) modified Vrátný's position, concluding that both saga and homily have a common source in an extant vernacular homily based on a letter on the feast of the Assumption, ascribed to St. Jerome.[6] This early source in Old Norse takes us back into the 12th century, since the existing homily is found in two slightly different versions in two of the oldest surviving ON manuscripts: a longer version is found in the Stockholm Homily Book, an Icelandic manuscript from about 1200 now in the Royal Library of Stockholm (*Holm 15, 4° perg.*),[7] a shorter version is found in a Norwegian manuscript from the beginning of the 13th century (c. 1220) preserved in the Arnamagnean Collection, Copenhagen (*AM 619,4°*).[8] The account of Mary's death and burial in the *Maríu saga* is probably little later than the homily; we know from fragments that the saga, at any rate, must have existed about 1250.

In the Stockholm Homily Book, which contains more homilies and sermons than the Norwegian Book of Homilies (*AM 619, 4°*), we find another and shorter homily on the Assumption,[9] in which Pseudo-Jerome's letter is quoted. In this homily the author (or compiler) does not deal with the touchy problems of Mary's death and the interpretation of the assumption. The author of the *Maríu saga*, and the homilist in the two first mentioned homilies also shy away from the question, although they express some doubt about the assumption of Mary's body.

In a miscellaneous Icelandic manuscript (*AM 624,4°*) from the 15th century we find a homily on the feast of the Assumption,[10] which has no connection with the older homilies mentioned above. It is probably a compilation, and it was suggested by the editor, Þorvaldur Bjarnarson, that it was compiled from some of Bernard's homilies with here and there a passage ultimately deriving from Gregory the Great. However, the actual sources of this homily have not yet been found, and a close study of the traditional teaching about the two lives (*vita activa* 'sýslulíf' and *vita contemplativa* 'upplitningarlíf') in this homily must be carried out, before it is safe to conclude anything about its literary relations. No reference is made to the discussion about the assumption of Mary.

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[5] Ed. C.R. Unger (Christiania, 1871).

[6] Cf. G. Turville-Petre, 'The Old-Norse Homily on the Assumption and the Maríu Saga,' *Mediaeval Studies*, IX (1947) 131 ff. The letter by Pseudo-Jerome in J. P. Migne, PL 30, 122 (126) ff. is probably written by Ambrosius Autpertus. Cf. G. Morin OSB in *Anecdota Maredsolana*, Seconde Série, I (1913), 494.

[7] Ed. Th. Wisén, *Homiliu-Bók* (Lund, 1872) 4-10.

[8] Ed. G. Indrebø, *Gamal norsk homiliebok* (Oslo, 1931) 129-24.

[9] Wisén's edition, 2-4.

[10] Ed. Þorvaldur Bjarnarson, *Leifar fornra kristinna frœða íslenzkra* (Copenhagen, 1878) 154-58.

The well known vision of Elisabeth of Schönau (1129?-1164), in which she learned about the Assumption of Mary [11], can be found in several Icelandic manuscripts. The story of Elisabeth's extraordinary visions was worked into the life of the Icelandic bishop Guðmundr the Good (d. 1237), written by an Icelandic priest, Arngrímr the Learned, in the 14th century.[12] According to the *Guðmundar saga* a letter was sent to Iceland from Norway to inform the bishop about Elisabeth's vision. Guðmundr, who believed firmly in the Assumption of Mary's body, was glad to receive the letter, which contained the story in a version closely related to the Latin text in *Viarum Dei*. The manuscripts containing this part of the *Guðmundar saga* are: *Holm 5, fol. perg.* (14th century); *AM 220, fol. IV* (a fragment from the beginning of the 15th century); *AM 398,4º* (on paper, 17th century); *AM 397,4º* (on paper, 18th century); and a recently identified fragment in *AM Dipl. Isl. fasc. LXX, 7* (c. 1400).[13] It has so far escaped notice that the same text was also found in the interesting miscellaneous manuscript *AM 764,4º* (written in Iceland in the 14th century, c. 1360-70). This version has now been published (Opuscula 2, 93-96), and a comparison with the other Icelandic texts shows clearly that the version in 764 cannot be called an extract of the *Guðmundar saga*. The compiler has obviously (quite in line with the other compilers of this manuscript) wanted to give a condensed edition of Elisabeth's visions. To fit the story into the pattern of short anecdotes in 764, the compiler has followed the editorial principles maintained in the scriptorium, and has abridged the account of the vision especially towards the end. Another typical example of the abridgement of texts in 764 can be seen in our edition of the Old Norse Debate of the Body and the Soul.[14]

Still another version of the same story is found in four manuscripts used by C. R. Unger in his edition of the *Maríu saga* (q. v. 915 ff.) among the miracles of Our Lady. Of course the version in the *Maríu saga* is ultimately derived from the same source as the version in the *Guðmundar saga* and in AM 764, but it may well be that the immediate source of the anecdote in the *Maríu saga* is the version found also in the *Speculum historiale* of Vincentius Bellovacensis. The version in the *Speculum historiale* seems to have been well known in mediaeval Iceland since the author of *Guðmundar saga* quotes Vincentius in his learned commentary on the vision. However, a thorough investigation of the relationship between the Icelandic versions and the Latin sources of the well-loved story of Elisabeth's visions cannot be undertaken here.

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[11] Ed. in *Liber Viarum Dei* (Liber trium virorum et trium spiritualium virginum (Paris, 1513) fol. 138v ff.

[12] Ed. in *Biskupa Sögur II* (Copenhagen, 1878) 1 ff.

[13] Ed. Stefán Karlsson, *Opuscula* 1 (1960) 179 ff.

[14] *Mediaeval Studies,* XXI (1959) 280 ff.

A significant detail in AM 764 shows us that the text of this manuscript in at least one instance is superior to the manuscripts of the *Guðmundar saga*, and follows the same tradition as the *Maríu saga*: it is recorded here that Mary died on August 15 (the feast of the Assumption), and that her body was caught up to heaven forty days afterwards (i.e. September 23, ix kal. Octobris), whereas all the manuscripts of the *Guðmundar saga* write Septembris instead of Octobris, and a clumsy scribal correction in *Holm 5, fol. perg.* (the principal manuscript of the group) only makes things worse. But AM 764 has its own errors, the worst being the compiler's confounding Elisabeth of Schönau with Elisabeth of Hungary (1207-1231).

Among the last books written in Iceland before the Lutheran reformation we find a very fine collection of saints' lives in *Holm 3, fol. perg.*. This manuscript has never been completely edited. Indeed, of its twenty-five legends only the *Osvalds saga* has been printed.[15] The Royal Library, Stockholm, courteously allowed us to examine *Holm 3, fol. perg.*[16] and we have found in the life of St. Anne which, of course, includes some details of Mary's life, a description of Mary's death and burial. Unfortunately there is a lacuna in the account (between foll. 160 and 161), but it is sufficiently clear that the compiler of this 16th-century manuscript has no hesitation in stating that Mary was taken body and soul into Heaven.

It must always be remembered that large numbers of mediaeval manuscripts in Old Norse have vanished, especially manuscripts containing doctrinal or devotional matters of little interest to Protestant readers. It is therefore remarkable that we have a whole group of ON texts showing the interest of clergy and laity in a special doctrinal problem. Although there is no specifically Norwegian or Icelandic contribution to the discussion of Mary's Assumption, there is, nevertheless, a fair selection of ON translations of traditional writings on the Assumption. To the texts already mentioned, we can now add the recently-discovered translation of the *Transitus Mariae*.

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[15] Ed. Jón Sigurðsson, *Annaler for nordisk Oldkyndighed og Historie* (1854) 3 ff.

[16] See our description of *Holm 3, fol. perg.*, *Maal og Minne* (Oslo, 1960) 105 ff.

The ON translation of the *Transitus Mariae* is found on two leaves (84r-85v) of the Icelandic manuscript *AM 232*. These two leaves, written in a 15th-century hand, are not as large as the leaves in the rest of the manuscript, and seem to have been inserted into the older 14th-century manuscript which contains, among other items the *Maríu saga*.

The Icelandic translation is based on a Latin original closely related to the C-version in Tischendorff's edition of the *Transitus Mariae A.* (pp. 113-23), the narrative ascribed to Joseph of Arimathaea. The Latin C-version (*Bibliotheca hagiographica latina* 5350), which "presents a very divergent text throughout" (M. R. James), is found in a late Italian manuscript (14th century?). The Icelandic translation almost certainly derives from the C-version, since it shows the characteristic features of this text, including the final statement, that he who has this writing in his house will be safe from illness, poverty, and sudden death etc., a chapter not found in the two other manuscripts of the group.

It has already been mentioned that the Icelandic translator follows the literary pattern of the C-version closely and one instance will suffice to show how he usually gives a literal translation of the Latin text. The sampling here provided also indicates a small but significant difference between Tischendorff's C-manuscript and the source of the Icelandic translation:

C (*144^{27} ff.*):	*Icelandic text* (...):
Cum autem videris angelum meum Gabrielem ad te venire cum palma quam tibi de celo mittam, scias me proximo ad te esse venturum cum meis discipulis atque angelis et archangelis atque virginibus, et ipsemet angelus Gabriel bene docebit te quoniam anima tua separabitur a corpore.	Ok þar efter þa þu sier minn eingil gabriel. komanda til þin med þann palma sem eg mun senda þier af himinriki. skaltþu vist vita ath eg koma skulande med minum lærisueinum. einglum. haufudeinglum ok med himinrikis krauptum. ok þann same gabriel eingill mvn þier kungiora nær þin aund mun vt ganga af þinvm likama.

It is safe to conclude from this passage that the Latin manuscript used by the Icelandic translator must have had *virtutibus* (line 6 in the text above) instead of *virginibus*, since the word is rendered by *himinrikis krauptum.* That ON *kraptr* is the normal translation of Latin *virtus*, is clearly demonstrated in the collections of the Arnamagnean Dictionary. Besides, the angelic Virtues seem to be more likely company for Angels and Archangels than virgins. Other instances of readings which seem to be superior to those of Tischendorff's C-manuscript, can be found in the Icelandic manuscript.

We do not know the name of the translator, or whether he was a priest or a layman. How a Latin manuscript of this version of the *Transitus Mariae*, which according to M. R. James[17] is a late Italian fiction (not earlier than the

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[17] M. R. James, *The Apocryphal New Testament* (Oxford, 1955) 209, 218.

13th century), came to Iceland, will probably never be known. However, it must be remembered that during the Middle Ages a considerable number of Icelandic and Norwegian scholars went to Germany, France, England, and Italy to study, and that it was a pious custom observed by a remarkable number of Icelanders and Norwegians to visit Rome on a pilgrimage. No doubt some returning pilgrim or scholar brought this short narrative with him as a welcome supplement to the already vast literature about Our Lady's life and miracles.

Thus far only an Icelandic translation of the *Transitus Mariae A* has been found, and only in the version printed here. It is far from impossible, however, that other translations were made since it is by no means unusual to find more than one ON translation of well known religious works. It is also probable that there was an ON translation of *Transitus Mariae B*, which M. R. James describes as "the leading Latin authority." If so, it is to be hoped that a copy of it too will one day be found.

In the following text all scribal abbreviations have been silently expanded, supplied letters and words have been placed in angular brackets, and references to the paragraphs in Tischendorff's editions are given in square brackets. Otherwise the edition is a faithful transcription of the manuscript with all its peculiarities of orthography and punctuation.

TEXT

<I> Nafne vors herra jesu christi byriazt hier miraculum af framfor uorar frv sancte marie [1]. Ath i þann sama tima sem drottin vor herra jesus christus kom til sinar pislar. Ok jmille anarra orda beidde hans dyrdligazta moder hann ath segia seir (!) af sinne framfor ok byriar sua sina bæn. Heyr þu minn sætazte son. Eg bidr þinn heilagleik ath þann tima sem min ond skal burt ganga af þessare verolldu ath þu minn elskuligazte son medtaker mic med þinum einglum ok haufudeinglum ok alla þina postola latt þv nær vera minne framfor. [2] Drottinn talade til hennar.

Heyr þu mustere eilifs guds ok enn sagde hann til hennar. Heyr faugur ok blezud drotting (!) allra bloma. heyr þu frv þu ert blezud ok vpphafin yfer allar kuinur. ok fyr en þv bart mic j þinum kuide fe̓dde eg þic af braude einglana firi tilkuomv eingils mins ok efter þinum vilia vardueitta eg þic. Huersu ma eg þic yfergiefa þar sem þu bart mic ok eg so þín briost. ok þu fluder [> flyder] med mic ok margar þrauter þo þolder firi mic þvi skaltþu vita ath sua sem minn eingell geymde þinn ok þionade þier. sua ok firi vist skal hann þin giæta ok þier þiona allt til þinnar framfarar. Ok enn ef eg þoli hier efter pisl ok dauda firi mennina. sua sem skrifat ok spad er ath eg skuli vpp risa æ þridia deg<i>. Ok þar efter þa þu sier minn eingil gabriel. komanda til þin med þann palma sem eg mun senda þier af himinriki. skaltþu vist vita ath eg koma skulande med minum lærisueinum. einglum. haufudeinglum ok med himinrikis krauptum. ok þann same gabriel eingill mvn þier kungiora nær þin aund mun vt ganga af þinvm likama. ok eg mun þa koma med flockum eingla ok haufudeingla ok

meyia ok flytia þina ond ok likama til himinrikis huar huorki er hrygd ne sorg. [3] Þa fiell hon til fota sins blezada sonar. ok kyste ꜳ hans bæde kne ok sagdi sua. Blezadr sa skapare himins ok jardar er mier gaf slika giof. firi minn son jesum cristum [4] Ok vpp fra þessu framan til pislar drottins j pislenne. efter vpprisv ok vppstigning. var himinrikis drotning guds moder maria jafnan a bænum.

<A> þridia degi adr enn blezud mær marla leid burt af verolldine kom guds engill gabriel til hennar. hafande j sinne hægri hendi palma ok heilsade henne sua segiande. Aue maria gracia plena dominus tecum. huat sua norænazt Heil maria full med nad. drottin er med þier. Hon suarade. Deo gracias. Þat norænazt sua. lof ok dyrd heidr ok æra vegur ok virding se almattigum gudi. ok enn sagde eingillinn. Med tack þv þann palma sem drottin. min en sonur þinn sende þier af himinriki. Senniliga gerde hon gudi þa þacker firi fyrsagda hluti. sua segiande. Magnificat anima mea dominum. Þat norænazt sua. Micklar ond mín drottinn.

[5] En þann man er ioseph heit (!) af þeim stad er aramattia heiter. geymde j sinum husum nott ok dag jumfrv mariam. ok þionade henne kungiorde ollum sinum vinum kyningium ok navngum. ok ollum þar saman komnum framfaur heilagrar marie. ok blezud mær maria. þuo sinn likama med miclum fagnade ok beid sua tilkuomu sins blezada sonar. ok hafde med sier. þriar. meyiar er sua heitv. Sez. Sephora. Alizota. hueriar henne þionudu. ok giættv natt ok dag. [6] ok ahinum þridia degi efter tilkvomv gabrielis. þridiu stundu dags. gerduzt miclar reidar þrumur. elldingar. regn. ok landskialfte en sialf iumfrv maria stod þa þann sama tid a bænum. j sinv bænahusi. ok johannis apostolus kom til hennar. ok heilsade henne. sua segiande. Aue maria gracia plena. dominus tecum. ok hun sanliga sua segiande. deo gracias. gieck hon þa mot honum kyssande hann. ok segiande sua. Minn kiærazti þui firileitz þv mic aþessum tima ok giætter eigi bodorda. þins meistara sem hann baud þier þa <hann> hieck akrossinum. til hialpar sinv folki. Hin heilagi johannes var fram fallande a sinn bæde kne gratande ok bad sier liknar. En hon jafnsnart var honum liknande gefande honum sina blezun. ok enn janat sinn kysti hon hann. [7] ok sua snart sem hon þeinkte sig spyria hann huadan hann kiæmi. eda firi hueria sauk hann væri kominn j ierusalem. sa hon standa guds lẻrisueina firi dyrvm hus sins. fraskildum Thoma. huer kallaz torttyggr. (!) ok aller jafnsnart jnngangande. ok sua segiande. Ave maria. gracia plena. dominus tecum. ok hon suarar. Deo gracias.

[8] Þessi voru naufn guds lerisueina er þar voro komner. Johannes ewangelista Petrus. Andreas. Jachobus [84v] zebedei. Jacobus alphei. Philiphus (!). Luchas. Bartholemeus ok Judas thaddeus. ok adrer sua marger. at vier faum alldri nofnum talit [9] Ok blezud maria talade sua til þeirra sem komner vorv. Huar firi kuomo þier hier aller. Petur postoli suarade. Heyr drotting (!) min. ok frv. himinʀikis ok jardrikis. Oss er meire naudsyn. ath spyria þess af þier. er þu spyr oss. Þui j dag var eg j anthiochia ok med sua miclum skunda var kom eg hier ok uar eg hingat leiddr ath eg matti huorke hugsa ne tala þar jmille ok eg uar hier slikt it sama saugdu aller postolar adrer af huerium stad edr ʀiki er huer var brutt numinn. þa tok huer ok einn ath vndrazt hardla miog vm sina þarkuomu [10]. Jungfrv maria sagdi til þeirra. eg bid drottins mins ok sonar þviat j dag mvn min sal skiliazt vid min likama. ok syndi þeim þann palmam sem drottin sende henne af himinriki. ok enn sua til þeirra talanda. Vake þier ok bided firi mier. ath drottin son min finne oss vakande. Þa lofudu þeir aller henne ath vaka ok vocktu þeir alla þa nott sem(!) salma song ok andaligum lofsaungum ok gudligu [<gudligum] lofi

[11] Nu ath komanda degi birtizt heilagur ande j skyi sem sinum lærisueinum Petro. Jacobo. Johanne. birtizt ok nidr ste med honum micil fiolde eingla ok med tok sal sinar elskuliguztv modr. ok þa skalf oll jordin ok lystizt med micille birte. j tilkaumv drottin<s> vors jesu christi. en aller næruerande kendu enn sæta/azta jlm. ok heyrdu eingla fagurt łofsyngiandu. ok sua latanda. Sicut lilium inter spinas sic amica mea inter filias. Huad sua norænazt. Suo sem lilia jmillum þyrna. suo er min vnnasta millum dætra jerusalems. Ok sem þessi frabærilig birte ok processio hafde yfer stadid halfa adra stund dags matti einginn þeirra sig af jordu vpp rette (!) firi micilleika birtenar. [12] En þvi liosinv burt ganganda. var sal himinrikis drottingar frv sancte marie jafsnart(!) vpphafin til himinrikis med þvi sama liose.

[13] Efter framfaur ok vpphafning andar guds modr marie gieck andskoten jnn j gydinga lyd ok toku ath hugsa amillum sin huad þeir skylldu gera af likama hennar þvi þeir saugdu ath hon væri nidrbrotzmadr gydingalyds. Þar firi villdu þeir fordiarfa hennar likama ok brenna. Þa gerdu þier(!) micil gestabod micil (!) ok aller j 'ein' stad saman kuomv ok villdu sua vm syslazt ath minning heilagrar marie væri ei lengr haufd ajardriki. þui toku þeir sin heruopn ok truduzt gera mundu nockura ohéfu aguds lærsueinum (!) en ræna medur ofurmakt <likama> blezadrar marie. þvi þeir villdu lifsgiarna hennar likama fordrifa ok vppbrenna. ok efter milldum ok reittum (!) guds dome þa þeir bivggiu sig til. ath gera þat er haufdu adr firi hugsat. Ok j þvi sama bile tok'u' þeir til ath beriazt sin athmillum med sinum vopnum. ok drapuzt nidr sua sem þeir veri ærir. baurdu þeir haufdunvm vid murueggina ok snart voro þeir nidr drepnir. ok yfer þa sialfa kom þeirra jllgirne ok jllska [14] þa yrdu(!) aller guds postolar ok lærisueinar ottaslegner. af þuilikri birting. hefiande sig vpp med miclu trauste glede ok heidre. psalmasaung ok hæstu gods lofi ok annligum lofsongum. Janfram(!) þessum lofsaungum toko þeir hennar helgazta likama af fialle syon. ok baru hann j dalen josaphat. Ok þa þeir kuomu amidian veginn þan er þeir byriudu. mætti þeim einn meistare gydinga af jerusalem. huer er villdi kasta hennar likama nidr ajord firi varga. Ok efter reittum guds dome þann tid er hann reitte sinar hendr ath hondła hennar blezada łikama visnvdv þær vpp ath aulboga suo hann matti þær eigi aftur til dragá [15] Þa bad hann guds postola med miclvm trega ok hrædzlu. ok lofade þeim staudvgliga ath ef firi þeirra bæner yrde hann heill ath an allre duol skyllde hann fullgeratz kristin. Þa fiellu aller guds postolar akne ok badu firi honum til guds ath hann skyllde frelsazt. ok aa somv stundu vard hann heill. þessi en same gydingur kyste aa fætur sællar marie ok allra postolana. ok an allre duol skirdezt hann j þeim sama stad ok predikade sidan nafn guds huar sem hann fram kom. [16] en postolarner toku likaman ok fluttu j dalinn josaphat. ok þeir sialfer setto [85r] nidr hennar likama med miclum fagnade ok virdingu gratande ok syngiande af micille ast ok sætłeika. Þa kom yfer þa lios af himinriki. ok heilagr likame guds modr marie var vpp numenn til himna.

Framfavr.

[17] Þann tid er heilagur thomas kom afialled oleueti þa sa hann likama heilagrar guds modr fram' fara efter veginum. Þa tok hann ath grata. ok kalla harri ravst. Heyr þu blezud moder eg kem til þin ath sia þic. Þui firilætur þu mic. þvi eg sie firi þina miskun þic vpphafna til himinʀikis. gled þu mic þinn þræl. Þa heyrde hin heilaga maria hann ok sende honum linda sinn. med huerium postolarner hauf<du> gyrt hana. Huern hann medtok ok kyste ok gerde gudi

þacker. [18] kom hann j dalen josaphat ok fann þar alla postolana. ok anan lyd micin beriande asin briost. firi þa miclu fagnadarsyn er þeir audluduzt ath sia. ok sua snart sem þeir sa thomam koma med miclum fagnade kysto þeir hann. Heilagur Petur hof sua sina rædu. til hins heilaga thomam med avitan. Sua segiande þv vart allan tid sanliga hardr ok tortryggr. ok þvi var gudi eigi þækiligt ath þu værir hier med oss. ath greftre heilagrar marie guds modr. Blezadr thomas slo hann sitt briost ok sagdi sua. Sanliga veit eg ok trvi ath eg er jllr madr hardr ok otrur. þvi bid eg gud. ok jungfrv mariam liknar. ok ydr alla firi mína grimd ok otrv.

Ok þeir badu aller firi honum [19] ok efter gerua bæn spyrr hann þa huar þeir hefde greftrad hennar blezada likam ok þeir syndv honum med sinum fingre graufina. Heilagr thomas suarar þeim. Eck<i> er hann hier huad sem þier segit eda trvid. Enn petrus s<egir> til hans. Fyr var þu sua tortrygr ok otrvr ath þu villder eigi trva vpprisu drottins vors jesu christi nema þu þrefader adr med þinum fingrum vm aur hans pislar sara. Huersu mattþu nv trva hennar helgazta likama hier grafin. Þa sanade hann þess meir ath hann væri þar ecki. Þessu reidduzt aller postolarner ok hlupv til grafarinar. ok toku brutt af þann stein er þar var yfer lagdur. Þa litv. þeir jnn j graufina ok sa þar ecki. vtan grofina fulla af himnamiole. ok þa spurde(!) þeir amillum sin huad þeir skyllde nv til segia. blezud thome. [20] ok sem thomas sa þa hrædda ok eigi vitande huad þeir skylldu segia honum nv af greftrudum likama guds modr Marie. Heilagur thomas taladi sua til þeirra. Heyrid guds viner ok miner brædr. J dag messade eg allt vt ajndia lande ok enn er eg j þeim saumum kennimanzklædum ok eigi veit eg med huerium hætti eg kom hier eda hingat leiddr. þvi þann tid er eg gieck jfiall oliueti. Sa ek guds modr likama hafinn til himna. ok kallade eg med micille raust. ath hon skyllde gefa mier sina blezan. Huar efter su himinrikis drotting sende mer þann sama linda sem <hon> var gyrt med ok synde þeim hann [21]. Þa sa postolarner þennan gyrdil. med huerium þeir vissu sic gyrt hafa hennar blezada likama. ok dyrckande gud ok beiddu sier liknar af blezudum thoma firi avitan ok þat þeir haufdu honum sagt ok af þvi ath þesse dyrdlige postole guds audladizt ath sia hinn helgazta likama. Jungfrv marie til himna vpp hafin. ok saumvleidis þann linda er honum var færdr af guds eingle.

Þa tock blezadur thomas med fagnade ath grata. oc miclu guds lofi. ok sagdi sua. Ecce quam bonum et quam jocundum habitare fratres in vnum Huad sua norænaz. siait bredr huad gott er ok skemtiligt ath byggia jeinum huga. [22] Ok jafnskiott aþeirri saumu tid for huer ok einn til sinna stada. þadan sem þeir foru Suo sem abbachc (!) sa er bar fæzlu danieli j babilon. er byrgdr var j dyragrof. Suo huarf blezadr thomas til jndialandz. ok somuleidis huer ok einn postola. j þvi somv skyi sem þeir voro þangat leidder. hurfv þeir aftur j sinn eiginligan stad þar sem þeir voro adr skipader. [23] Ok þier sem þetta heyrid skulut eigi vndrazt þvi sa same er byrgdr var jkuide marie huerrar er hann giætte ok geymde allan tid ospilltrar ok vppreis aþridia dag efter pisl sina. ok birtizt sinum postolum jnne verandvm jhuse ok byrgdum dyrum. þann same leit [ɔ: lét] daufa heyra. dauda vpprisa. sionliosa (!) sia. [85v] likþra hreinsade ok snere vatne juin jn (!) kana gallilæe.

[24] En eg joseph huer er tok likama vors herra jesu christi ok lagde jmina grof ok greftrade eg ok efter vpprisu. sa eg sialfan hann ok talade eg med hann. ok þar efter geymde eg hans modr jminum husum. allt 'til' þess er hon var vpphafin til himna. Ok eg heyrde marga hluti af hennar munne leyniliga. ok þann sama tid saugdumzt eg skyldu segia. ok predica þetta allre guds kristne.

huad eg giorde huar hellzt sem eg kom. Þui hefer vor herra jesus christus þa nad til gefid ath huer sa sem þetta skrif hefer jsinum husum. klerkr eda leikmadr eda kuinna ath dioful skal honum eigi granda. ok huer er skrifar eda skrifa lætur. less eda heyrer. less eda lætur læsa hann skal audlazt jngaungu himinrikis. Ok j hueriu husi sem jnne er. framfarar skrift himinrikis drottningar marie. ef þar fædizt barn skal þat eigi vera dauft. ne blint. ok eigi tungla mein hafa. eigi dioful ott. ne mallaust verda eigi bradum dauda deyia. ok j þess manz hus<i>skal eigi micil fatækt vera. Ok jhuerre naud er þeir kalla til hennar reittvisliga. mun hon þeim vidhialp veita. Suo ok sinne dauda stund mvn hon med guds einglum ok himinrikis hirdsueitvm naleg vera þeim til hialpar. Þui bidium vær þa enu millduztv drotting himins ok jardar ath se vor minnileg. ok allra sig truandum ok treystvndum firi sinum blezada syni j ollum vorum naudsynium. Ok þvi er oss megi mestv varda bædi firi lif ok sal. þann sama faugnaud virdizt oss ath veita almattigur gud med sine haleitre modr. huer er lifer ok riker. einn gud j þreningu. vm allar verallder verallda. amen.

Economic Conservatism, Papal Finance, and the Medieval Satires on Rome[1]

JOHN A. YUNCK

THE satire or diatribe on the Court of Rome and its vices is a widely recurring type in the moral-satirical literature of the Middle Ages. It has been well-known for centuries: examples were anthologized by sixteenth century Protestant reformers for their own purposes,[2] and became relatively popular among the learned in Protestant Europe. But though poems, sermons and parodies on the theme have continued to find their way into print in large numbers and have attracted the occasional notice of scholars,[3] little has been done to elucidate them or to inquire into their causes. The purpose of this paper is to show, especially in the light of Lunt's valuable studies in papal finance,[4] that these satires have their roots in phenomena more significant than mere palm-greasing and tip-scavenging on the part of minor officials. They seem rather to be clear testimony to a widespread and often angry conservative reaction to economic changes not clearly understood by the moralists and satirists who wrote them. They arose with the expanding activities of the papacy as the Hildebrandine ideal took root, and increased in numbers and intensity as the consequent papal financial requirements increased. It may be suggested too that these satires provide a kind of documentation for aspects of papal taxation in a period for which no more reliable documents are available.

One of the most widespread and popular of all satirical themes from the eleventh century to the close of the Middle Ages was the theme of human venality and fiscal corruption in general, of the power of the purse, the Almighty Denarius:

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[1] With the support of a grant from the American Philosophical Society.

[2] E.g., M. Flacius Illyricus, *Varia doctorum piorumque virorum de corrupto ecclesiae statu poemata* (Basel, 1556).

[3] P. Lehmann, *Die Parodie im Mittelalter* (München, 1922), pp. 43-85, collects and discusses a number of the satires.

[4] Esp. *Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols., (New York, 1934), and *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327* (Cambridge, Mass., 1399). These should be supplemented by K. Jordan, 'Zur päpstlichen Finanzgeschichte im 11. und 12. Jahrhundert,' *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archieven und Bibliotheken* XXV (1933-34) 61-104.

Crux est denarii potens in saeculo;
regem et principem facit de servulo;
mendicum servulum facit de regulo;
rectorem, praesulem de parvo famulo.[5]

It appears first and most widely in the clerical Latin literature, but is plentiful in the vernaculars, in German, French, English and Italian. Dante's treatment of the sins of the Wolf and his comments on venality throughout the *Comedia* are familiar.[6] A large portion of the inhabitants of his *Inferno* are drawn from among the venal. In Middle English the long episode of Lady Meed in *Piers Plowman* is only the best-known example of the theme.[7] Lady Meed, remarks R. W. Chambers, "is gifts, Rewards, this world's treasure. 'The Lady Meed is nothing more or less than the power of the purse,' says Mr. Christopher Dawson. Another *alias* (she has many) is 'The Almighty Dollar.' Langland's outlook is conservative; he believes in the old world of feudal obligations. He hates the 'cash nexus.' "[8] This view of the vanity theme as a conservative satirical device seems to touch the heart of the matter.

The theme is characteristically directed against those groups whose natural responsibilities to society were considered great, and whose income came at least in part from sources other than the usual feudal channels. Venal, sacrament-selling priests and worldly, simoniac bishops were favorite subjects as well as (later) lawyers. Physicians too were included, though less frequently than the others. But the favorite target for its venality was the papal curia, the Court of Rome, including the Roman citizens in general, the cardinals and their minions in particular, and sometimes the pope himself. *Roma caput mundi* was almost universally described by moralists and satirists as also the headquarters, the *fons et origo*, of the venality of Christendom. So widespread were these attacks on Roman venality that the *Romdiatribe* achieved almost the status of a literary genre, and by the fourteenth century had become a conventional part of almost every *cursor mundi*, every moral-satirical survey of human society, whether or not the writer had had any direct experience with his subject. Lady Meed, it will be recalled, is as familiar as Holy Church herself at the pope's palace (B Text, II, 23).

Only the smallest sampling of this rich satirical literature is possible here, but the medievalist can hardly have failed to meet with examples in his work.

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[5] T. Wright, ed., *The Latin Poems Commonly Attributed to Walter Mapes* (London, Camden Society, 1841), p. 223.

[6] Cf., e.g., *Inf.* I, 49-60, XIX, 1-117; *Purg.* XX, 73-84; *Par.* XVII, 49-51, XXVII, 40-54, 121-123.

[7] *The Vision of William Concerning Piers the Plowman*, ed. W. W. Skeat (2 vols., Oxford 1886), B Text, Passus II-IV.

[8] R. W. Chambers, *Man's Unconquerable Mind* (London, 1939), p. 112.

A mere bibliography of the printed items which touch on the theme in Latin and the vernaculars, in prose and verse, would fill many pages. Some of the satires are parodies, one of the best and earliest being the *Tractatus Garsiae* (ca. 1100), an earthy and hilarious work which pretends to be a description of the translation of the relics of St. Albinus and St. Rufinus to Rome, on the occasion of the consecration of a new Archbishop of Toledo.[9] The relics of these saints, as their names suggest, are merely silver and gold, and the author is indicating that the whole transaction was simony. Far better known is the brief "Gospel According to the Silver Mark," which appears in various forms in 13 extant manuscripts.[10] It is a pastiche of scriptural echoes set in the form of the gospel extract read in the mass, and may have been part of a lost "missa de muneribus" or "missa secundum simoniacos." Its oldest and shortest form is brief enough to translate here in full:

> The beginning of the Gospel according to the Marks of Silver: At that time, the pope said to the Romans: "When the son of man shall come to the seat of our majesty, first say to him 'Friend, whereto art thou come?' Yet if he shall continue knocking without giving you anything, cast him out into the exterior darkness." And it chanced that a certain poor man came to the court of the Lord Pope, and cried out, saying "Have mercy on me, at least you, dispensers of the pope, because the hand of poverty hath touched me. I am needy and poor; therefore I beg that you relieve my calamity and misery." And they hearing it were moved with indignation and said: "Friend, keep thy poverty to thyself, to perish with thee. Go behind me, Satan, because thou savourest not of the things that are of money. Amen Amen I say to thee, thou shalt not enter into the joy of thy lord till thou pay thy last farthing." And the poor man went his way and sold his mantle and his tunic and all that he had and gave to the cardinals and the dispensers and the treasurers. But they said: "And this, what is this among so many?" And they cast him out; and going forth he wept bitterly, and would not be consoled. But later there came to the court a certain wealthy clerk, fat and thick and gross, who in the sedition had committed murder. He first gave to the dispenser, second to the treasurer, third to the cardinals. But they thought among themselves that they should receive more. The Lord Pope, hearing that his cardinals had received many gifts, was sick, nigh unto death. But the rich man sent to him a couch of gold and silver and immediately he was made whole. Then the Lord Pope called his cardinals and ministers to him and said to them: "Brethren, look, lest anyone deceive you with vain words. For I have given you an example: as I have grasped, so you grasp also."[11]

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[9] *Tractatus Garsiae Tholetani canonici*, ed. E. Sackur; in MGH, *Libelli de lite imperatorum et pontificum* (3 vols., Hanover and Berlin, 1891-96), II, 425-435.

[10] Lehmann, *Parodie*, pp. 54-59.

[11] The original is in P. Lehmann, *Parodistische Texte* (München, 1923), p. 6.

The proverbial venality of Rome found expression, too, in other oddities, like the Rome acrostic mentioned by the sharp-tongued Walter Map:

Radix
Omnium
Malorum
Avaritia[12]

Doubtless that was commonplace, along with the derivation of *Papa* from *papare*[13] or *pavor pauperum*[14] and *Roma* from *rodo manus.*[15] This last derivation found its way frequently into satirical verse, and with many variants achieved a sort of proverbial status:

Roma manus rodit; quas rodere non valet, odit.[16]

Such satirical clichés multiplied and spread throughout Europe. The following feeble verses are a typical collection of some of the most popular:

Praesulis Albini seu martyris ossa Ruffini
Rome quisquis habet, vertere cuncta valet.
Omnipotens Marcus romanos conteret arcus,
adveniente Luca fiunt decreta caduca,
non fuit inde reus Johannes sive Matheus.
Curia romana non petit ovem sine lana.
Romanus rodit; quos rodere non valet, odit;
donantes audit, non dantibus ostia claudit.
Accusative, si Romam ceperis ire,
proficis in nullo, si veneris absque dativo.
Si venit ante fores bona vita, scientia, mores,
non exauditur; si nummus, mox aperitur.
Audito nummo, qui viso principe summo,
dissiliunt value, nichil auditur nisi salue,
occurrunt turbe, fit plausus magnus in urbe,
papa simul plaudit, quod nemo libentius audit.
Accipe, sume, cape verba placentia pape.
Papa, pater patrum, cur vis intrare baratrum?
te video lete nimis inclinare monete.
Papa premit multos, quos Christus mittit inultos;
Quosque deus punit, justis hos sepius unit.[17]

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[12] W. Map, *De nugis curialium*, ed. M. R. James (Oxford, 1914) II, XVII, p. 82.

[13] *Carmina burana*, ed. A. Hilka and O. Schumann (Heidelberg, 1930, in progress), I, 7, 76-83.

[14] I. Zingerle, 'Bericht über die Sterzinger Miscellaneen-Handschrift,' *Wien. K. Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philos.-Hist. Klass. Sitzungsberichte*, LIV (1866), 313.

[15] C.-V. Langlois, 'La littérature goliardique,' *Revue bleue* LI (1893), 177. Langlois mentions other "effroyables etymologies."

[16] J. Werner, *Lateinische Sprichwörter und Sinnspruche des Mittelalters* (Heidelberg, 1912), p. 86.

[17] Zingerle, 'Sterzinger Miscellaneen-Handschrift', *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, LIV (1866)

These commonplace witticisms tell us little about the actual difficulties which the clergy encountered at the Court of Rome when a case was to be heard or a bishop or an abbot consecrated or blessed. Other satires are more specific and more revealing. One poem, for example, opens by applying to the Romans the Pauline idea that avarice is idolatry:

> Gens Romanorum subdola antiqua colit idola,
> argentum quondam coluit et in lucris insonuit;
> adhuc suspirat hodie, aurum colens Arabiae;

This is followed by a catalogue of the riches which the imagination of the poet pictures flowing into Rome from all over the world: fine clothes from Greece, ivory and gems from India, delicacies from France, silver and gold from England, mules from Burgundy. Money is the judge at Rome:

> Scelerum pondus judicat: causam auratam praedicat.

The poor man goes unheard:

> Non audit vocem pauperis; nil intus si nil dederis.

The grasping doorkeeper (a standard feature of the *Romdiatribe*) awaits all visitors:

> Illi firmatur janua, qui venit manu vacua;
> clamat avarus janitor et portae clausae venditor:
> qui vult intrare cameram non agat mecum perperam,
> det mihi prius munera, et mox patebit camera.
> Si das, intrabis protinus: si non, stas, stabis eminus.

Neither birth nor learning can achieve their desires:

> Nulli valet scientia; nulli prosunt natalia.

Only Queen *Pecunia* reigns, supported by *Simonia* and *Giesia*:

> Sola regnat pecunia per terras et per maria.
> Jam regnat super cardines et angelorum ordines:
> jam adtemptant coelestia mundi contemptibilia
> jam regina pecunià, juncta sibi symonia
> et leprosa giesia, in altiori regia,
> Romae tenet concilium stans in conspectu omnium...

The rest of the poem is devoted to Queen Pecunia's speech, in which she catalogues with heavy irony the virtues of herself, Money:

> Qui mundi quaeret gloriam et Romanorum gratiam,
> honores in ecclesia, sedes, mitras, sandalia,
> ad fores meas vigilet, me congregatim ventilet,
> me profundat latissime, obtinebit planissime
> quidquid ipse voluerit si me large prefuderit.

314-315. A very similar poem is printed in J. Werner, *Beiträge zur Kunde der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* (Aarau, 1905), p. 14.

The catalogue continues at some length but Pecunia ends her speech by explaining how she has searched the world over and found no place where she is so hospitably received as in Rome. Here henceforth she will make her home:

> Hic erit mea requies; hic stabit mea facies;
> hic figam sedem stabilem inter plebem amabilem.[18]

Here, then, is Lady Meed, two centuries before Langland wrote *Piers Plowman.* The ideas and the manner of expression are typical. The inferior verse is also regrettably typical but occasionally a versifier of genius handles the theme brilliantly. Such a poet was Walter of Chàtillon (fl. ca. 1170), at one time a clerk in the chancery of Henry II, a friend of John of Salisbury, a teacher at Châtillon, and a student of law at Bologna. His exceptional knowledge of the classics echoes in the imagery of his satire.[19] His most brilliant poem on Roman corruption is the thirty-stanza "Propter Sion non tacebo:"

> Propter Sion non tacebo,
> set ruinas Rome flebo,
> quousque iustitia
> rursus nobis oriatur
> et ut lampas accendatur
> iustus in ecclesia.

So Walter opens, echoing Isaiah; Rome is lowered to the slime, subjected to tribute, derelict, desolate and afflicted. The poet has seen it:

> Vidi, vidi caput mundi,
> instar maris et profundi
> vorax guttur Siculi;
> ibi mundi bitalassus,
> ibi sorbet aurum Crassus
> et argentum seculi.
> Ibi latrat Scilla rapax
> et Caribdis auri capax
> potius quam navium;
> fit concursus galearum
> et conflictus piratarum,
> id est cardinalium.

The remainder of the voyage carries out more or less consistently the figure of the Homeric voyage between Scylla and Charibdis. Walter dismembers the Curia, group by group:

> Canes Scille possunt dici
> veritatis inimici,

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[18] E. Du Méril, *Poésies populaires latines antérieures au douzième siècle* (Paris, 1843), pp. 231-234. A slightly different version is printed in *Lib. de lite,* III, 706-707.

[19] F. Raby, *A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages* (2 vols., Oxford, 1934), II, 190.

advocati curie,
qui latrando falsa fingunt,
mergunt simul et confringunt
carinam pecunie.

If the hounds of Scylla are the curial advocates, Charibdis is the chancery:

Nunc rem sermo prosequatur;
his Caribdis debachatur,
id est cancellaria;
ibi nemo gratus gratis
neque datur absque datis
Gratiani gratia.

The spate of puns, incidentally, is characteristic of Walter as well as of other "goliardic" poets. The sirens, Walter continues, are the cardinals, who sing blandly in the poet's ear the song of friendship, and who boast their power. The poet castigates them:

Cardinales, ut praedixi,
novo jure crucifixi
vendunt patrimonium;
Petrus foris, intus Nero,
intus lupi, foras vero
sicut agni ovium.
Tales regunt Petri navem,
tales habent eius clavem,
ligandi potentiam;
hi nos docent, sed indocti,
hi nos docent et nox nocti
indicat scientiam.

Though they now rule Peter's ship these cardinals are pirates, whose leader is Pilate. The sea on which they sail is inhabited by no classical divinities;

Maris huius non est dea
Thetis, mater Achillea,
de qua sepe legimus,
immo mater sterlingorum,
sancta soror loculorum,
quam nos bursam dicimus.
Hec dum pregnat, ductor ratis
epulatur cum piratis
et amicos reperit;
set si bursa detumescit,
surgunt venti, mare crescit
et carina deperit.

Without the protection of Purse the ship is dashed against the rocks until the traveller loses both his money and his clothes. The rocks are the keepers of the doors, who admit the wealthy, but like fierce beasts repel the needy:

Qui sunt cautes? ianitores,
per quos, licet seviores
tigribus et beluis,
intrat dives ere plenus,
pauper autem et egenus
pellitur a ianuis.

The poem closes with some conventional praise of Pope Alexander as a friend of letters, and a hint that the Pope might provide a safe haven for the storm-tossed Walter.[20]

These few examples will suffice to indicate the tone and matter typical of the satire against the Court of Rome. Behind the irony, the classical imagery and the sheer vilification of the examples there are ideas and assumptions common to virtually all the medieval satires on Rome. The complaints center about the expenses for the consecration of bishops and mitered abbots by the pope, and about the costs of carrying a suit in canon law — or indeed any pressing clerical plea — *ad limina apostolorum.* The objection is not merely that the charges are too high (though this is mentioned frequently enough) but that there are any charges at all. Whatever the characters of the various satirists and whatever the individual or political axes they had to grind (they must have been multifarious), all at least pretend to be scandalized by the idea of cash transactions connected with the spiritual functions of the papacy. One concludes that the theme must have carried great weight with their readers. The apostolic privilege of consecration was a gift of the Holy Spirit, and in their eyes the enforced "gratuities" in connection with these rites were sheer simony. So at least the satirists claimed. Thus among many others, Peter Pictor (fl. ca. 1110);

Hic pro denario donatur pontificatus,
Quodque magis flendum, conceditur ipse papatus.
Hic abbatia prostat cum praepositura,
Hic et venalis iacet ecclesiastica cura.
Hic omnis sacer ordo iacet venalis in urbe;
Ut vendant et emant, stant hic cum Simonie turbe.[21]

The fees charged by advocates and *auditores* of the judicial divisions of the Curia were equally simony, for they constituted the sale of Justice, which is the sale of Truth, also a gift of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, "he who sells the truth for money sells Christ, who is Truth."[22] Hence the name of Judas appears beside that of Simon Magus in the moral-satirical image of Rome:

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[20] K. Strecker, *Moralisch-satirische Gedichte Walters von Chatillon* (Heidelberg, 1929), pp. 18-30. For other examples of Latin Rome satires cf. Strecker, *Chatillon*, pp. 75-76, 2-15; P. Leyser, *Historia poetarum et poematum medii aevi* (Halle, 1721), p. 484; *Analecta hymnica* (Leipzig, 1886-1922), XXI, 146, 151-152, 143; *Carmina burana*, I, i, 76-83, 87-89; and T. Wright, *Mapes.* pp. 7, 167-170, 229-230.

[21] *Lib. de lite,* III, 708-710.

> Vendre justice est Jhesum vendre,
> Per a Judas quil seit entendre
> Qui de Jhesu velt deniers prendre,
> Peis se corut au seur pendre.[23]

Men as different in temperament and stature as Chancellor Philip, Walter of Châtillon, the unknown and impecunious goliards, Étienne de Fougières, Langland, Peter Pictor, Walter Map, John Gower, and John of Salisbury, among others, sang the same song, and it rang out from the eleventh through the fifteenth century. After we allow for the attractiveness of cliché and commonplace to the medieval writer, the uniformity nevertheless suggests concrete economic realities behind the complaints, and a widespread and uniformly unfavorable reaction to those realities. Commonplace content may suggest commonplace writers; it also suggests commonplace problems.

Though the satirists are agreed that the Court of Rome should not charge fees for its services, they do not demand that the Curia subscribe to the ideal of apostolic poverty. Nor do they attack the functions and services of the Curia as an institution. They seem satisfied with complaints of abuse and charges of simony, and are in fact silent on the problem of how the Court of Rome should be supported. The most attractive hypothesis is that the moralists and satirists, conservative and feudally-minded themselves, universally assumed a feudally supported and feudally oriented Curia, a court subsidized wholly by its traditional domanial revenues rather than by charges for services rendered. The latter smacked too much of the market place, especially when applied to the apostolic functions. The satirists of the eleventh and twelfth centuries almost never attack the Hildebrandine ideal of the freedom of the Church, or the immensely expanded activities to which this ideal committed the papacy. They merely ignore the soaring expenses caused by the expansion. The papacy had burst the bonds of feudal economics in its rapid growth, but the fact went unrecognized by the satirists, or even by those who were instrumental in the development. It is tempting to see in the repeated satirical assaults on the high cost of ecclesiastical attention at the Curia the implied contrast with a feudal court supported by its own domanial revenues. Economic theory lagged notoriously behind economic fact in the Middle Ages. I suggest that this lag lies at the heart of the medieval satire on Rome.

This is not to imply that the individual satirists themselves were all men of high, if old-fashioned ideals. Undoubtedly much of the satire reflects the petty irritations of self-seeking but highly vocal clerks. It is hard, for example, to believe that Walter of Châtillon was as much interested in the moral uplift of the Curia as he was in lining his own pockets. And much more of the satire certainly resulted from the political strife which accompanied the expansion of papal activity between the pontificates of Leo IX and Innocent III. Roman venality was a common part of the charges and counter-charges in the pamphleteering which accompanied the Investiture Contest.[24] Granting the great variety of causes which might have produced satire against the Curia, the significant point is that the satirists and moralists all find the charges attractive enough to repeat with little change. The argument must have seemed to them likely to appeal to their readers.

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[22] J. Bromyard, *Summa praedicantium* (Venice, 1586), "Advocatus," 21.

[23] Estienne de Fougieres, *Livre des manières*, ed. J. Kremer (Ausgaben u. Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der romanischen Philologie, 39, Marburg, 1887), p. 124.

It seems likely, then, that the satirists are lamenting the most noteworthy and shocking example in the Christendom of their day of economic change, the defection *par excellence* from an economic way of life to which they were habituated and which they considered natural and normal. If we take the writers at their word, the fees of the Curia represented a desperate form of immorality. For the Court of Rome to finance its activities by enforced charges for services was to defile the high altar, to corrupt the very heart of Christendom. Like Langland, these early satirists too hated the "cash nexus."

It has long been commonplace that with the increasing centralization of the activities of the Church, especially after the leadership of Gregory VII, the medieval papal curia developed into incomparably the most complex court in Western Christendom. This development was in part consequence, in part cause, of the rapidly broadening activities of the papacy throughout Europe, as papal control was gradually asserted and the independent authority of the episcopacy gradually declined.[25] It is commonplace, too, that the papacy, attempting to finance this expansion of activity, found itself continually in financial difficulties, and hence was forced to resort to measures which made it a leader in the economic development of Europe. "The papacy," remarked Lunt over 50 years ago, "not only organized one of the earliest and best of the medieval financial systems, but by means of its operations influenced profoundly the general economic development of Europe... The Roman Church... with an almost modern system of taxation covering all Western Europe, furnished one of the principal sources which aided the establishment of money and credit transactions on a large scale."[26]

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[24] Most of the important literary products of this strife are printed in the three volumes of *MGH, Libelli de lite.*

[25] In the bulky literature on the development of papal policy during this period the most succinct and rewarding overview appears to be G. Tellenbach, *Church, State and Christian Society at the Time of the Investiture Contest*, tr. R. Bennett (Oxford, 1940).

[26] 'The Financial System of the Medieval Papacy,' *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XXXII (1909), 251-252.

Lunt's subsequent studies form an admirable basis for documenting the medieval satire on Rome, though they can obviously tell us little about the personalities, the petty jealousies, the element of political pamphleteering, or even the conventionality which must have provided part of the inspiration for many satires. When Walter of Châtillon describes in vitriolic measures the suave, unctuous cardinal who addresses him at the Curia, his Latin-Italian-French jargon oftened to be "sweete upon his tonge," we are in the presence of personalities beyond the province of economic history:

Dulci cantu blandiuntur
ut Sirenes et loquuntur
primo quedam dulcia:
'Frare, ben je te cognosco,
certe nichil a te posco
nam tu es de Francia.
'Terra vestra bene cepit
et benigne nos recepit
in portu concilii.
Nostri estis nostri – cuius?
sacrosancte sedis huius
speciales filii.'[27]

Such it is always with the best satire. Nevertheless, the satirical theme is most profitably approached through the larger economic realities which it reflects. "The centralization of papal power," says Lunt, "necessitated the construction of a more efficient governmental machine. Good government, it was soon discovered, was expensive. Early in the process of transformation the papacy began to look to its finances. Papal records were ransacked to discover all revenues which could be claimed, and demands for payment were pressed with vigor."[28]

We may summarize from the important recapitulations of Lunt the revenues of the papacy as they existed at the end of the eleventh century.[29] The most important were the domanial revenues from the patrimonies and states of the Church, those normal feudal revenues which the papacy had already outgrown by the middle of the eleventh century. A second source of income was the census of protected and exempt ecclesiastical foundations, which grew steadily during the centuries that followed. A third, if minor and highly irregular source, was the tribute payed by temporal rulers for papal protection. A fourth was the custom of Peter's Pence, which had begun very early in England and later spread to some other countries. There were also irregular income taxes levied on the clergy, but these were never levied for the use of the pope himself until 1228. Charitable subsidies, requested by the pope from his clergy, were also useful sources of income. Though they were at first voluntary (in the eleventh century), the element of choice seems to have disappeared during later centuries. An ancient source of papal revenue (and for some time the most profitable) was gifts and legacies to the papacy by pious individuals. But however large this income might be, it was hardly dependable. Other sources (oblations, procurations, spoils, and fruits wrongfully received) were developed during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, while many others (annates, fruits during vacancies, quindennia, indulgences, the sale of offices, and compositions) were not developed until the fourteenth century or later.

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[27] Strecker, *Chatillon*, pp. 24-25.

[28] *Financial Relations*, p. 31.

[29] *Papal Revenues*, esp. I, 57-136.

Anyone examining the documentary evidence of this income cannot fail to be struck, first with the irregularity and undependability of almost all the sources, and second with the paucity of important sources of income at the close of the eleventh century, while the papacy was taking its early, dramatic steps towards international leadership. Peter's Pence in England, for example, had quickly settled into a customary fixed annual sum just under £ 200 sterling, and all of the 23 exempt foundations in England brought, as late as 1327, just over £ 10. The result of this weakness was that the papacy began to depend very heavily on certain other revenues: services (*servitia*), visitation taxes, and chancery taxes; and these, in their rudimentary forms, are most frequently at the heart of the satirists' complaints about Roman venality.

By far the most significant and profitable of these payments was that known as *servitia*. Services are defined by Lunt as "charges paid by patriarchs, archbishops, bishops, abbots and for a period by some priors on occasion of their appointment by the pope in consistory." It should be emphasized that these payments were not established as formal taxes, prescribed, regulated and subdivided, until late in the thirteenth century,[30] but they clearly existed before that as customary gratuities from time immemorial. These gratuities (often referred to by papal sources as *servitia* long before their establishment as taxes) seem to have settled into *de facto* taxes whose imposition and even amount had the force almost of law. The custom of paying the gratuities was well established by the time of Justinian,[31] and was specifically recognized and accepted by Gregory the Great in 595.[32] Gregory, however, forbade outright charges for such services as ordinations and appointments. During the next four centuries the custom of gratuities apparently hardened into a rigid convention, which probably prescribed at least the minimum gratuity for receiving the pallium from the pope. In 1027 Canute complained of the high cost of these services to his bishops.[33]

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[30] A. Gottlob, *Die Servitientaxe im 13. Jahrhundert: eine Studie zur Geschichte des päpstlichen Gebührenwesens* (Stuttgart, 1903), pp. 69-100, places the establishment of the formal tax in the pontificate of Alexander V (1254-1261).

[31] *Papal Revenues,* II, 233-234.

[32] *Papal Revenues,* II, 234.

Probably the amount and number of such gratuities or fees increased rapidly after the pontificate of Leo IX (1049-1055), when the great expansion of papal activity was under way, and when the number of confirmations controlled by the pope was increasing. We lack documents to show the numbers of these charges, still formally gratuities, or the amounts which were paid, but what was happening is indicated by the satirical charges of simony, some of which we have quoted. These are occasionally supported by chronicles or by letters. Early in the twelfth century, for example, Bishop Ivo of Chartres replies to the papal legate, who had apparently found practices in his diocese which approached simony, that the fault lies in the example provided by Rome herself. When his deacons and cantors are accused of demanding gifts for their services, he says, they defend themselves by pointing to Rome, where the officials make exorbitant demands for consecrating bishops or abbots, which they palliate under the name of "oblations," or "benedictions." The letter suggests that Roman venality was common talk: "... cum nec calamus nec charta gratis ibi (ut aiunt) habeatur."[34]

It seems clear, then, that the *servitia* in their primitive and irregular form, were the major target of the earliest anti-Rome satires and the objections were probably the more shrill because the fees were large. Though records are lacking for the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when the Rome satires first proliferated, Lunt estimates that the total expense of the consecration of a bishop cost the new prelate almost a whole year's income, which frequently had to be borrowed, and which often placed the churchman in financial difficulties for many years in the future.[35] There are thirteenth-century records of large sums being borrowed to meet the expenses of confirmation by the pope.[36] Since the charges were still formally gratuities, though unavoidable, the satirists raised the cry of simony:

> Hoc sancivit mos Romanus,
> hoc decretum legitur;

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[33] *Papal Revenues*, II, 234-235.

[34] D. Ivo Carnotensis Episcopus, *Epistolae*, 133; in *PL* 162, 141-143. Part of Bishop Ivo's attitude seems to spring from his position in the Investiture Struggle; but John Bromyard's remarks (*Summa praedic.*, "Honor," 14-19) in the mid-fourteenth century are very similar.

[35] *Papal Revenues*, I, 87-89. The opening of one of Jacques de Vitry's exempla suggests the common impression of the normal state of a bishop returning from Rome: "Audivi de quodam prelato Anglico, cum a curia Romana exhaustus et sine pecunia rediret..." G. Frenken, *Die Exempla des Jacob von Vitry* (München, 1921), p. 140.

[36] *Papal Revenues*, II, 238-239.

Non sit presul vel decanus
is a quo nil dabitur.[37]

Visitation taxes were much lower than the *servitia* and were paid by few churchmen. The archbishops of Canterbury and York, for example, paid 300 marks once every three years. The tax provided only a minor source of income to the papal camera ; yet its existence probably helped increase the satirical cry that everything at Rome had a price. The need of the expanding papacy for the taxes was unquestionable, especially in view of the irregularity of many other sources of papal income. But to those who were hurt by the payments (and they could include all the clergy of a bishop's diocese) the gratuities represented the simple sale of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the extortion of Giezi. The satires may have reflected, too, some of the opposition by growing monarchies to the export of money from their territories.

The eleventh and twelfth century satirical attacks on Rome thus furnish us with interesting and useful — though vague — documentation of the development of the papal *servitia* during a period for which Lunt and Jordan can furnish no documents of a more substantial sort. They provide us with insights, often amusing, into the chaotic and haphazard growth of at least one form of papal taxation, into the disorganized and improvised efforts of the busiest, most complex, and most rapidly growing court in Christendom to maintain itself in solvency. They offer lively testimony to the gradual hardening of gratuity into formal tax, the settling of the customary into the prescriptive. The exact steps of the transformation are lost, but the anger and annoyance of clerk and prelate remain vividly recorded.

The chaotic development of the *servitia*, the haziness of its status on the borderland between gratuity and tax, and the whole informal nature of the Curia's tax structure during the period, suggest that the fees were difficult to control and to account for. They probably encouraged competition for revenue among the offices of the Curia, and acted as a blind for all sorts of minor extortion and tip-hunting. Even as early as the mid-eleventh century Peter Damian had attacked an unnamed bishop of the Curia, who ran about feverishly when the time for a synod approached, as if reaping time were near. "For he was girding himself to gather meed, and to reap it he was sharpening not a steel blade, but the scythe of eloquence."[38] Innocent III found the same practices and was forced to recognize them officially and take steps to stop them. One of the documents translated by Lunt suggests the practices which so irritated the satirists:

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[37] B. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits des quelques manuscrits latins de la Bibliothèque Nationale* (6 vols., Paris, 1890-93), VI, 140. The passage is from one version of a poem attributed to Philip the Chancellor.

[38] S. Petrus Damiani, *Contra philargyriam et munerum cupiditatem*; in *PL* 145, 536B.

> We, indeed, members of the school of the bearers of the papal tiara when he visits a church in the City, and of the school of the keepers of the napery and the chaplains... all alike promise by taking oath that we will not in the future exact by importunity or extort by violence from any archbishop or bishop consecrated, or abbot blessed, or any one ordained, the horse or covering or any other thing, or, on account of this, impose or cause to be imposed any injury in word or deed on any one; but we will accept with an act of thanks that which shall have been given freely to us by any of the aforesaid, or that the camerarius, having been requested, shall have been able to obtain by way of gifts...[39]

The satirists never distinguished this petty extortion from the taxes themselves. Indeed, during the eleventh and twelfth centuries there was no formally defined difference, and the complainants felt free to call their expenses simony. Their complaints increased in wrath and swelled in volume as papal demands for income increased. From the beginnings of the eleventh-century reform until the Protestant Revolution financial difficulties were the chief and constant source of embarrassment to the papacy, and the wellspring of the swelling flood of satires on the venality of Rome.

One sort of expense at the Curia not discussed by Lunt but regularly reflected in the anti-Rome satires was the charges made by the law courts. Appeals *ad limina* were encouraged to increase papal control over ecclesiastical affairs, and their cost, as we have seen, became a regular refrain among the satirists. The wealthy clerk is heard, the poor one goes unsped; so sing the satirists in unison. Some of the expenses connected with such appeals were chancery taxes; others were advocates' fees; still others were no doubt fees for the *auditores* and the petty clerks of the courts. In the absence of extant records we may surmise that these law courts were essentially self-supporting, had their own treasurers and kept their own accounts. They were clearly among the chief targets of the satirists on venality for over three centuries.

Certain conclusions emerge from a review of the moral-satirical attacks on Rome in connection with the economic problems of papal finance and the economic facts of papal taxation. Because of the expansion of its activities after the pontificate of Leo IX the Curia found itself faced with financial demands far beyond the limits imposed by its older feudal and charitable revenues. By far the most complex governmental organization of its time, and the only organization whose effects — and whose taxes — could be felt in all the corners of western Christendom, it found itself unwittingly the leader in financial innovations which were ultimately to revolutionize the economy of

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[39] *Papal Revenues*, II, 235.

Europe. The tangible instrument of these innovations was the papal system of taxation, and one of its earliest devices was the conversion of a charitable income, traditional gratuities, into a systematic tax for services. The change was gradual, perhaps not wholly conscious, and long before it was complete it had aroused a multitude of sharp reactions, echoed by the cries of the satirists. But while the satirists charged simony, the popes and their representatives still thought and spoke in the comfortable and familiar feudal categories, and in terms sanctioned by ancient Christian usage. The taxes were "gratuities," "benedictions," "subsidies," "oblations." They were not, when the satire first arose, formalized or regularized. Their purpose was undefined: they were described as applied to the personal use of the Lord Pope or the Lords Cardinals. And prelates were not "taxed:" rather they "paid their respects" with a certain amount of money.[40] Bureaucracy and the "cash nexus" had made their appearance, but their very originators knew no terms in which to speak of them, nor even the modes in which to think of them.

The satirists and moralists who bewailed the venality of Rome were clearly feudally-minded, and their work conservative in temper. However exalted or however corrupt the motives of the individual writers might be, the clerical ideal which their satire implies emerges as a rather uniform and distinct picture: a clergy freely devoted to the service of Justice and of Christ on earth, trustworthy custodians of the Patrimony of the Poor, freely dispensing the sacraments and carrying out the other apostolic functions, supported, perhaps, by domanial revenues, charitable donations, customary tithing. Significantly, most of the early clerical satire on Roman venality whose provenance can be determined was written in France, England, and the Empire — all areas where feudal organization remained strongest, and which were least touched by the commercial developments of the Italian city states. In the incipient taxes of the Curia the satirists saw a new world of cash payments for spiritual services, of marketable talent and learning, of the justification of office by wealth. They could hardly view it with equanimity.

The immediate cause of their satire (where it was not the outcry of the self-seeking benefice-hunter, or the conservative or imitative treatment of a popular subject) may have been the burdens which they or their acquaintances or ecclesiastical superiors felt from papal taxation. But the intense moral animus which lay behind much of their work could only have issued from the fear and dislike of an economic world new to them and alien to their modes of thought. The average sensitive and intelligent thinker had hardly adapted himself to that new world by the age of Elizabeth I. As a money economy spread to the royal courts and was felt by the other estates, they too fell under the condemnation of the conservative satirists, so that by the fourteenth century Langland's Lady Meed included among her followers all sorts of royal officials, justices and civil lawyers, mayors and merchants, as well as the clergy from the highest to the lowest.

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[40] *Papal Revenues*, II, 236, 238.

With the simple world (real or imaginary) of agrarian stability, personal relationship, and feudal obligation dissolving around them, these writers felt sufficiently bewildered and uneasy to echo the ancient cry of the Roman satirists that *Pecunia* was indeed Queen:[41]

> Nunc premit omnia sola pecunia, res dominatur;
> Mammona conditur, ad fora curritur, ad lucra statur.
> Stat modo Mammona, sunt onori bona, crimen honori,
> opprobria via justiciae, pia facta pudori.[42]

But what seemed worst of all was that the walls were crumbling not at the outposts of Christendom, but at its very heart in the sacred city of Rome. The highest spiritual functions seemed suddenly to be measurable in terms of cash, and the highest representatives of Christ on earth were venal, movable only by coin, idolaters, in Pauline terms, of gold. It must have seemed as if all the stable social and spiritual categories in the world were disappearing through the solvent powers of Queen Cash. In retrospect we can understand the outraged cries of simony and the Roman marketplace, as well as the problems of the papacy in attempting to create a new tax structure without any real awareness of the incipient economic revolution which it represented.

Our analysis of the mentality which produced the characteristic protests of the medieval Rome-satires is necessarily hypothetical. The nature of the evidence — the mask of objectivity and moral fervor on the part of the satirists, our lack of knowledge about the lives or even the identities of most of them, the absence of supporting documents concerning the rudimentary Curial *servitia* during the eleventh and twelfth centuries when the outcry first arose, the conflicting interests and cross-purposes of the Investiture Contest — precludes firmly established conclusions. The uniformity of the protest remains nevertheless imposing, coming as it does from a great variety of writers: *vagantes*, secular churchmen high and low, monks, and later friars and even laymen. And the early date of its origins suggests the rigor with which gratuities for papal appointments were enforced, well before they became formalized as taxes. To this extent the anti-Rome satire may be considered valuable contributory evidence to the history of one aspect of papal finance.

The difficult and ambiguous nature of the problem as it presented itself to the medieval man is reflected in some of the comments of John of Salisbury, one of the most learned and sensible men of his day. In the *Policraticus* John recounts a conversation with his friend, the English Pope Hadrian IV (1154-1159). When asked about the popular reputation of the papacy John frankly summarizes in his answer the characteristic satirical clichés about Roman avarice: "Iustitiam non tam veritati quam pretio reddunt. Omnia namque cum pretio hodie; sed nec cras aliquid sine pretio obtinebis." It would be repetitious to paraphrase them here.

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[41] For *Regina Pecunia* cf. Horace, *Epistulae*, I, vi, 36-38.

[42] Bernard of Morval, *De contemptu mundi*, ed. H. C. Hoskier (London, 1929), II, 365-368.

When asked for his own opinion John is more circumspect; but, after remarking that he fears that the Pope will hear from an imprudent friend what he does not wish to hear, he makes his own comments on the subject of Roman venality:

> Everyone praises you, and you are called the father and lord of all... If, then, you are a father, why do you demand meed and remuneration from your sons? If a lord, why do you not strike your Romans with fear, repress their impudence, and recall them to the faith? But perhaps you expect to save the city for the Church by meed (*muneribus*). Did Silvester acquire it by meed?... What you have freely received, freely give. Justice is the queen of virtues, and blushes when she is sold for a price. If she is to be gracious, let her be gratuitous.

Hadrian laughs and thanks him, but replies with the familiar fable of the stomach and the rebellious members, who after several days of rebellion were forced to admit that their own illness arose from their failure to feed the stomach, which they had branded as lazy and voracious:

> For he from whom tribute had been withdrawn, like a public dispenser in turn withdrew support from all... It is far better that he receive something to distribute than that the other members go hungry through his lack... So it is, brother, he said, in the body of the commonweal where, no matter how much the magistrate hungers, he does so not so much for himself as for others. For if he is starved he is able to give nothing to the members... Therefore do not measure the harshness of ourselves or of the secular princes, but pay heed to the utility of all.

The passage is a profound statement of both sides of the struggle between old feudal principle and new fiscal necessity.[43]

The largest part of the medieval satire on Roman venality is subliterary, and much of the rest belongs only to the realm of witticism or *jeu d'esprit*. But read in the light of the papacy's developing tax efforts it provides absorbing, and often lively and eloquent, documentation of the conservative unrest at the beginnings of an economic revolution which changed the face, and much of the thought, of the Western World.

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[43] John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, ed. C. C. J. Webb (2 vols., Oxford, 1909) II, 67-73.

SCRIPTURE IN "PIERS PLOWMAN" B

Many scholars find Skeat's list of "Quotations from the [Vulgate] Bible"[1] valuable in their work on *Piers Plowman*, and many have noticed its inaccuracies and its incompleteness. The material which follows is of two kinds. First, I have compiled a list to replace Skeat's list of scriptural usages in the B-text (since that is most often the text under study). I have corrected his errors, and have enlarged the list considerably to assimilate my own and others' findings[2] with regard to both direct quotation of and indirect reference to Scripture in many of Langland's lines.[3] An asterisk marks any suggestion which is not in Skeat's list or in his notes; I have not noted my slight changes in some of his citations. Arabic numerals are used throughout; the reference in the Vulgate is followed by the number of the passus and line in the B-text of the poem.[4] The second list corrects Skeat's specific errors, and is modelled after his format.

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[1] This list forms Part A of Index III, "Quotations Made by the Author," following Skeat's notes to the poem. See William Langland, *The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman...*, ed. Walter W. Skeat, Part IV, Sect. I, E.E.T.S., O.S. 67 (London, 1887), pp. 503-508. Hereafter referred to as *Notes.*

The lists which follow formed part of my unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Function of Scripture in *Piers Plowman*: Dramatization and Structure," which was submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School in Yale University in 1958. I have reworked the material entirely and have made a number of additions.

[2] I have assimilated the list of scriptural references in Dorothy Chadwick's book, *Social Life in the Days of Piers Plowman* (Cambridge, Eng., 1922), pp. 106-112; new suggestions by Robert Worth Frank, Jr. throughout his book *Piers Plowman and the Scheme of Salvation: an interpretation of Dowel, Dobet, and Dobest* (New Haven, 1957); and in J. F. Goodridge's notes to his translation of *Piers the Plowman* (Harmondsworth, Mddx.: Penguin Books, 1959). Also Howard Meroney's suggestions in his article "The Life and Death of Longe Wille," *ELH*, XVII (1950), 1-35; and those made by E. Talbot Donaldson in his book *Piers Plowman: The C-Text and Its Poet* (New Haven, 1949). I am grateful also to Mr. Donaldson for private suggestions.

To a lesser degree I am indebted to the work of D.W. Robertson, Jr. and Bernard F. Huppé, *Piers Plowman and Scriptural Tradition* (Princeton, 1951). I have not noted pages in these works where individual suggestions as to the source of a line may be found; general credit seems to me sufficient.

[3] I am well aware that Langland's biblical ideas may be derived from patristic and liturgical sources directly, and only indirectly from the Bible itself. It seems valid to suggest ultimate sources in Scripture nonetheless.

[4] All references to the poem are to be found in William Langland, *The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman...*: The "Crowley" Text; or Text B, ed. Walter W. Skeat, Part II, E.E.T.S., O.S. 38 (London, 1869).

A. Scriptural Quotations and References in "Piers Plowman" B.

Genesis
*1.22: 11.389
1.26: 5.494; *9.35
*1.28: 9.116
1.31: 11.388
2.12: 10.12
2.17: 18.190f.
3.3: 15.61; *18.190f.
3.19: 6.235
*3.22-24: 15.61-62
6.6-7: 9.129
*6.14f.: 9.130f.
12.2: 16.239-240
12.7-8: 16.244
13.16: 16.239
14.18: 16.244
15.5-21: 16.239-240
*17.2: 16.230f.
17.23: 16.235
18.1: 16.225
18.2: 16.227
18.7-8: 16.229
18.18: 16.239
19.32: 1.31
22.2: 16.231-232
30.23: 16.219
37.9-10: 7.159

Exodus
17.8: 3.257f.
*19.20: 11.164
*20.3-17: 5.575-593
*20.5: 9.142-143
*20.8-11: 6.80
20.12: 5.576
20.13: cf. 10.368; 19.443
20.17: 20.276
21.24: 18.337
*32.7f.: cf. 6.117-118
*32.19: 7.116
*32.34: 7.33-34; 9.142-143
*33.2: 7.33-34
*34.7: 9.142-143

Leviticus
11.3: 15.458
19.15: 15.86
19.17: 11.87, 90
20.10: 12.76

Numbers
*1.50-51: cf. 12.115
*14.18: 9.142-143
20.11: 14.64

Deuteronomy
1.17: 15.86
*5.9: 9.142-143
6.5: 1.149
8.3: 14.46
8.15: 14.64
10.12: 1.149
12.6: 15.518
16.19: 15.86
23.25: 15.558
*24.12-13: cf. 6.101
32.35: 6.228; 10.369; 19.443

I Kings
1.6: 16.219
4.11: 10.282
4.18: 10.283
13.12: 12.118
*15.32-33: 3.284
18.7: 19.131
22.2: 1.102

II Kings
6.7: 12.122
11.14-17: 10.423
*23.8-39: cf. 1.102

III Kings
*3.8-12: 10.379
*3.26-27: 10.379-382
*17.1: 14.65-66

I Chronicles
11.1-3: 1.102
12.18: 1.102
*16.22: 12.127

Tobit
3.22: 18.406

*4.7-11: 7.75
4.9: 10.86

JOB
6.5: 15.312
7.9: 18.149
10.22: 20.268
15.34: 3.95
21.7: 10.23-25

PSALMS
1.1: 5.425; 10.321; *13.53
4.3: 15.79
4.9: 15.249; 18.184-185
6.7: 15.186
7.15: 9.121
7.16: 18.358
9.2: 13.55
9.16: 18.16
10.4: 10.29
10.7: 13.331
13.1: 7.135
13.3: 4.35-36
14.1: 2.38; 3.233; 7.51; 13.126
14.2: 3.236
14.5: 3.240; 7.41
*15.1: cf. 19.290
15.5: 12.189
17.26: 5.285; 19.420
*18.6: 18.250
19.8-9: 10.322
*21.2: 16.214
*22.3-4: 9.22
22.4: 7.116; 12.13, 289
23.9: 18.259
23.10: 18.314-316
25.10: 3.247
29.6: 18.179
31.1: 5.515; 12.178; 13.53, 54; 14.93
31.2 :13.53
31.5 : 11.81; *13.55
31.6 : 13.57
33.11 : 7.123 ; 9.106 ; 11.273
33.20 : cf. 7.122
35.7 : 10.410
35.7-8: 5.516
36.3: 11.278; 15.175
36.24: 16.25
36.25: 7.88; 11.270
38.2: 13.55
39.6: 10.44
41.4: 7.123
41.6: 15.175
42.1: 11.277
*43.23: cf. 5.613
46.7-8: 11.302
49.21: 10.285; 11.91
50.3: *5.283; 13.52
50.6: 18.376
50.8: 5.283
50.19: 13.58; 15.188
*52.1: 7.135
56.5: 13.331
*60.4: 1.12
61.13: 12.213
67.19: 5.498
68.29: 6.77-78
70.20: 5.514
72.12: 10.26
72.20: 14.131
75.6: 14.130
80.13: 9.65
84.10: 18.121
*84.11: 18.112f., 421
96.7: 15.79
100.7: 13.433
104.15: 12.127
110.10: 9.93
111.1: 5.425; 13.53
111.5: 5.246
111.9: 15.320
*114.9: 3.309
118.46: 10.448-449
127.1: 5.425; 6.252
127.2: 6.254
131.1, 6: 15.482
131.6: 10.68
132.1: 18.423
134.6: cf. 12.216
137.1: 13.55
142.2: 18.397
144.9: 5.289; 11.134; 17.312
144.16: 14.62; *17.158-159
146.4: 20.255
148.5: 9.32, 41; *14.60

PROVERBS
1.7: 9.93; *cf. 10.6
3.12: 12.12
*4.23: cf. 9.55

*7.27: 9.182-183
9.10: 9.93
*10.2: 1.70
10.19: 11.406
10.26: 17.321
13.24: 5.39
*14.6: cf. 10.6
16.9: 11.36-37; 20.34
17.14: 16.43
*17.16: cf. 10.6
17.28: 11.406
*18.10: 1.12
19.13: 17.317, 319
*19.17: cf. 7.80-83
20.4: 6.238
*21.19: 17.317-318
22.1: 3.327
*22.7: cf. 5.274
22.9: 3.332, 346
22.10: 7.137
*23.9: cf. 10.6
24.16: 8.21
*24.23: 15.86
25.21, 22: 13.144-145
25.27: 15.54
27.15: 17.317, 319
30.8: 11.262

Ecclesiastes

*3.1-8: 6.80
9.1: 10.430; *cf. 15.203
10.16: Prol. 191
*11.6: 7.77

Song of Songs

*2.8: 12.141-143

Ecclesiasticus

1.16: 9.93
*4.23-24 : 11.92-93
5.5: 12.207
10.10: 10.337
*11.7-9: 11.376-377
11.9: 11.385
*29.21: cf. 1.20-25
29.28: 1.18
31.8: 15.229
*31.9: 14.103
38.2: 7.43
42.1: cf. 15.86

Isaiah

*1.21: 2.8
*1.21-23: 3.20f.
*2.2-5: cf. 3.298f.
2.4: 3.306, 322
3.7: 15.567
*5.2: 1.12
5.22: 13.61
9.2: 5.501 ; *16.251 ; * 18.321
14.4-6: 10.328
14.13-14: 1.117
14.14: 15.51
*24.2: 15.115
30.15: 14.180
*32.1: 10.318
*33.14-18: cf. 3.233
*40.12: 17.159-160
*43.6: cf. 18.113-118
45.24: 19.17
*53.2: cf. 1.150
55.1: 11.115
56.10: 10.287
58.7: 10.82

Jeremiah

*5.8: 7.91
12.1: 10.25
*17.8: cf. 15.416
*23.5, 11-12: 10.318

Ezekiel

*1.10: 6.240
16.49: 14.75-77
*18.4: 2.27
18.20: 9.144 ; 10.110
*47.12: cf. 15.416

Daniel

2.39: 7.151f.
*3.57: 5.397
5.28: 7.151f.
9.24: 18.109
9.24, 26: 15.589

Hosea

*10.12: Prol. 137-138
13.3: 5.622
13.14: 17.111 ; 18.35

Joel

3.2, 12-13: 18.367-368

MICAH
*4.8:1.12

MALACHI
3.10: 15.568

MATTHEW
*2.1f.: 19.67f.
2.1: 12.145
2.2, 9: 18.231
2.11: 19.72
3.2: 13.48
3.11: 12.282-283
*4.1-11: 11.16-25
*4.3, 6: cf. 18.295
4.4: 14.46
4.16: 18.321; *5.501; *16.251
4.18: 15.287
5.3: 14.214
5.13: 15.421, 423
5.17: 18.347
5.19: 13.117
5.21: 10.368
*5.44: 10.197-199; 11.172-176; 13.143; 19.110
5.45: 19.429
*6.2: 3.72
6.2, 5, 16: 3.252
6.3: 3.72
6.5: 3.252
6.10: 14.48; 15.174
6.12: 19.392
6.16: 15.213
6.21: 13.399; *14.101f.
6.24: *Prol. 95f.; 8.89; *11.183; 13.313
6.25: 7.126; *20.209-210
6.25, 26: 14.33
*6.25-34: 11.270f.
7.1: 11.88; 12.91; 14.290
7.2: 1.176; 11.221
7.3: 10.262
7.5: 10.264
7.6: 10.9-10
7.7: 15.420f., 494
7.12: 7.61
*7.13-14: 1.203
*7.15-20: 15.92-100
7.16, 17: 9.150
7.17: 2.27
7.21: 17.262
7.23: 5.56
8.20: 20.43
9.4: 15.194
9.12: 16.110
9.13: 5.506
*9.27: 19.129, 132
*9.36: cf. 5.521f.
*9.37-38: 6.68
*10.1-15: 11.233-239
10.10: 2.122; *5.557
10.22: 13.49, 134, 171; 14.33, 52; 15.262, 581
*10.28: 17.273, 279
11.5: 19.121
*11.12: cf. 10.454
*11.25: cf. 9.73
12.23: 19.129
12.27: 16.122
12.32: 16.47
*12.33: 16.92-100
*13.13-17: 9.20
*13.19-23: 9.20
*13.22: 1.39
*13.23: cf. 16.62
*13.24f.:4.57
*13.25: 19.309-311, 334
*13.30: 19.314-315
*13.38: Prol. 17f.
*13.44: 1.85
14.15-21: *15.581 ; 16.125-126 ; 19.122
14.28: 18.242
15.14: 10.276; 12.185
*16.18: cf. 15.206
16.19: Prol. 101; 7.175; *15.18;*19.184
*16.26: 1.39
16.27: 12.213
17.19: 11.272
18.3: 15.145
18.7: 16.157
*18.27: cf. 17.238
18.28: 19.182, 188, 254, 388; 20.306
19.21: 11.265
19.23: 14.211
19.23-24: 14.144
19.24: *14.101f., 211
19.29: 14.263-265
*20.1-16: 5.433, 558-559
20.4, 7: 10.474; 15.491
*21.1-11: 18.7-17

21.9: 18.*9, 15, 17; *19.129, 132
*21.12-30: cf. 15.115
21.13: 16.135
*21.31: cf. 10.454
*21.33: 1.12
22.1-14: 11.107, *109, *103-134; *13.23f.; *14; *15.454f.
22.4: 15.456
*22.11-12: 13.274f.; 14.329
22.21: 1.52-54; *5.469; *6.682
*22.37: 13.126; 17.11
*22.37-40: 5.572-573
22.39: *13.141-143; 17.11
22.40: 17.13
*22.42: 19.129, 132
23.2: 10.398
23.27: 15.111, *113
*24.7: 6.325
*24.29: 6.328
*24.36, 42: 11.207
*25.1-13: 1.187
25.12: 5.56; 9.65; 17.249
*25.13: 11.207
25.14f.: 6.240
25.26: 6.241f.
25.29: 6.246-248
*25.35-46: 11.179-181, 235-236; 15.177-180
*25.46: 6.81
26.7: 13.194
26.15: 16.143
*26.21: 16.142
*26.24: 16.142
26.25: 16.145
26.48: 16.147
26.49: 16.151-152; *18.50
26.57, 59: 19.136
26.60-61: 18.40-43
*27.11-66: 18.36f.
27.19: 18.36, 297-298
27.22: 18.39
27.29: 18.47-49
27.29-30: 18.50
27.40-42: 18.54-56
*27.45: 18-60
*27.46: 16.214
*27.48: 18.52
*27.50: 18.57-59
27.51: 18.61
27.52: 18.62
27.54: 18.68
27.63: 17.109
27.64-66: 19.139f.
28.2-4: 19.145-147
28.12-15: 19.149-151
28.19: 15.483

MARK
*1.12-13: 11.16-25
2.17: 16.110
3.29: 17.197-198
*4.12, 15-20: 9.20
*4.19: 1.39
*4.24: 11.221
*4.26-29: 19.314-315
*4.38: cf. 5.613
*6.7-13: 11.232-239
6.35-44: *15.581; 16.125-126; 19.122
7.32, 37: 19.126
*8.18: 9.20
8.31: 17.109
*8.36: 1.39
10.47-48: 19.129, *132
*11.1-10: 18.7-17
*11.9: 18.9, 17
11.17: 16.135
11.18: 16.136
*12.17: 5.469
12.42: 13.196
*13.8: 6.325
13.9, 11: 10.443
*13.24-25: 6.328
*13.32: 11.207
13.37: 5.450
14.3: 13.194
14.44: 16.147
14.45: 16.151-152
14.58: 16.131-132
*15: 18.36f.
15.17: 18.47-49
*15.30-32: 18.54-56
*15.33: 18.60
15.34: 16.214
15.36: 18.52
*15.38: 18.61
15.39: 18.68
*16.9-11: 19.152f.
*16.14: 19.161
16.15: 15.483
16.16: 10.346-347; 11.119
16.17, 18; 13.249

Luke
1.25: 16.219
1.26: 16.90
*1.37: 11.272
1.38: 16.99
1.52: 15.514
1.55: 16.239, 242
*2.1f.: 19.67f.
2.7: 12.148
2.14: *3.326; 12.151; 19.70
2.15: 12.143
*4.1-13: 11.16-25
5.31: 16.110
*6.20: 14.214
6.25: 13.424
*6.27-28: 10.197-199
*6.27-35: 10.197-199; 11.172-176
*6.27, 35: 13.143; 19.110
6.37: *cf. 6.82; 12.91
6.38: 1.176, 199; 11.221; 12.56
6.39: 10.276; 12.185
6.41: 10.262
6.42: 10.264
7.36, 48, 50: 11.211-212
7.37: 13.194
*7.42: cf. 5.475
*7.48: 11.211
*8.2: 10.422
8.21: cf. 1.91
*9.1-6: 11.232-239
9.12-17: *15.581; 16.125-126 ; 19.122
*9.25: 1.39
9.58: 20.43
*10.2: 6.68
*10.1-16: 11.233-239
10.7: 2.122; *5.433-435, *557; 13.39;
10.16: 13.441
*10.18: 1.113-114
*10.21: 9.73
10.27: *cf. 5.572-573; 10.357-358;
*13.126, 141-143; 15.574; 17.11
10.30-37: 17.48f.
10.40: 11.243
10.42: 11.246
11.15: cf. 16.121-122
11.17: 15.194
11.19: cf. 16.121-122
12.22: 7.126; 14.33; *20.209-210
*12.34: 14.101f.
12.38: 12.9
*12.42-43: Prol. 95f.; 6.81; 12.42-48
12.47, 48: 12.58
*13.24: 1.203
14.10: 6.49
14.12: 11.185
*14.12-14: 10.58f.; 11.185f.; 15.335-336
*14.16-24: 11.107, 109; 13
*14.18: 15.478
14.20: 14.3
16.9: 6.230; 8.89
*16.13: Prol. 95f.
16.19-31: 14.122; 17.263-268
16.22: 16.255
*16.22-23: 16.245-246
*16.25: 3.72; 14.128
*17.4: 14.187
*17.7-8: 14.134-136
18.7-8: 11.370
*18.11: cf. 8.18
*18.19: 10.441
18.20: 10.368; 19.443
18.38: 19.129
19.8: 13.195
19.22, 24: 6.241f.
19.23: 7.83
19.26: 6.246-248
19.47: 16.137
*20.25: 5.469
21.1-3: 13.196-197
*21.11 : 6.325
*21.25: 6.326, 328; 15.475
22.21-22: 16.142
*22.63-end, 23: 18.36f.
*23.37: 18.54-56
*23.39: cf. 5.484
*23.40-43: 10.414f.; 12.192
23.42: 5.474
*23.44-45: 18.60
*23.45: 18.61
*24.12: 19.158
24.13: 11.226
24.30-31: 11.229
*24.36: 19.164
*24.36-40: 19.161f.
24.46: 19.156
*24.51: 19.186-187

John
*1.3: cf. 1.148
1.14: *1.153; 5.508
1.29: 16.252
1.36: 18.322

*2.1-11: 19.104f.
2.2: 9.116
2.15: 16.218
2.19: 16.131-132
3.5: 11.82
3.8: 12.65, 71
3.11: 12.67
3.13: 10.377
6.5-13: *15.581; 16.125-126; 19.122
8.6f.: 12.80f.
8.34: 11.197
8.48, 52: 16.120
10.11: 15.489
10.20: 16.120
11.33: 16.116
11.35: 16.116
11.39: 16.114
11.43: 15.584
12.3: 13.194
*12.12-15: 18.7-17
*12.13: 18.7, 9, 17
*12.31: 9.8; 18.312
12.32: 17.149
*13.17: 15.59-60
14.6: 9.159
*14.6-7: 1.202-203
14.9-10: 10.244
14.13: 14.46
*15.1-6: cf. 1.90-91
16.11: 9.8
17.2: 12.289
18.8: 16.158-159
*18.28-end, 19: 18.36f.
19.2: 18.47-49
19.15: 18.*39, 46, *47
19.30: 18.57
19.31-33: 18.69-77
19.34: 18.79
*20.3-6: 19.158-159
20.11-18: 19.152f.
*20.19: 19.164
*20.19-29: 19.161f.
*20.22-23: 19.179, 184
20.26: 19.160, 164
20.28: 19.167
20.29: 19.176

The Acts

*1.9: 19.186-187
2.1-4: 19.196-201
2.3: 12.283
3.6: 13.255
*4.12: cf. 19.19
*7.58: 10.424-425
*8.1: 10.424-425
*9.1: 10.424-425
18.3: 15.285
23.3: 15.111, *113

Romans

*2.13-15: 12.284-289
*3.13: 5.87
*3.16-18: 4.35-36
4.11: 16.235-237
4.13: 16.239
6.9: 19.147, 155
*8.16-17: cf. 11.192
*8.35, 38-39: 13.158-163
*12.2: 1.39
12.3: 10.116; 15.67
*12.5: 11.193 f.
12.19: 6.228; 10.204, *258, 369; *15.256-257; 19.443
12.20: *11.172-176; 13.144-145
*12.20-21: 10.197-199
13.7: 5.469
*13.12-14: cf. 1.105
14.11: 19.17-18

I Corinthians

*1.24: cf. 16.187
3.19: 12.140
*4.5: cf. 11.369
*6.16-17: 11.193f.
*6.19: cf. 17.275
7.2: 9.191
7.9: 9.177-178
*7.20: Prol. 122
8.1: 12.59
10.4: 15.206
*10.12: cf. 8.47
*10.21: cf. 10.56-57
*11.29: 12.89, 92-93
*12.1-26: 19.210-249
12.4: 19.223
*12.8-10: 19.210-245
*12.12: 11.193f.
*13: 15.154-170; 16.173f.
13.1: 17.257
*13.4: 5.14-15

13.4, 5: 15.152
*13.11: 15.145
13.12: *11.8, *19 ; 15.157
13.13: 12.30
*15.9: 10.424
*15.26, 54: 16.164-165

II CORINTHIANS
*3.18: 12.97; cf. 15.555
11.19: 8.91
11.24, 25: 13.67
11.26: 13.69, *72
11.27: 13.67
12.4: 18.393
12.9: 17.335

GALATIANS
1.10: 13.313
*1.13: 10.424
2.11: 11.87
3.8: 16.247
3.8-9: 16.239
4.4: 16.93
6.2: 6.224; 11.205
6.5: 10.112
*6. 7-8: Prol. 137-138
6.10: 11.199
6.14: 15.499

EPHESIANS
*3.1: 15.168, 174
*3.9: cf. 1.148
4.8: 5.498
*4.25: 11.193 f.
*4.28: 9.21
5.4: cf. Prol. 38; *13.457
5.26-27: 10.346-347
*5.31: cf. 14.264
*6.17: 15.18

PHILIPPIANS
*2.7: 14.256
*2.9-12: 19.19
2.10: 19.17-18, 76
*3.6: 10.424
3.19: 9.60

COLOSSIANS
3.1: 10.355
3.8: cf. Prol. 38; *13.457

I THESSALONIANS
*4.11: 9.21
*5.19: cf. 17.202
5.21: 3.335, 339

II THESSALONIANS
*3.10: cf. Prol. 38
*3.12: cf. 5.274-275

I TIMOTHY
*1.5-6: 14.99-100
*1.13: 10.424
*5.18: 2.122; 5.557
5.20: 11.87
6.8: *7.86; 15.336
*6.9: 10.336

II TIMOTHY
*1.8: 14.168, 174
3.6: 20.338

TITUS
*1.10-12: Prol. 39
1.13: 11.87
2.15: 11.87

PHILEMON
*1.1, 9: 14.168, 174

HEBREWS
*2.14: 16.164-165
*4.12: 15.18
10.30: 6.228; 10.204, 369; 19.443
*12.4: cf. 16.47
*13.17: cf. 5.301

JAMES
*1.4: 10.342; 13.214
*1.12: 9.22; 13.49, 134, 171, 214; 14.33, 52; 15.262, 588
*1.19: 9.20
*1.22: 15. 59-60
*1.22-25: 9.20, 21
*1.23-24: 11.8, 19; 16.156
*1.26: 4.20-21; 9.20
*1.27: 9.67-68
2.1: 15.86
*2.1-9: 9.91; 10.56-57; 11.232-237
*2.2-3: 13.33f.
*2.2-5: cf. 10.342

2.10: 9.97; 11.301
*2.11: 10.368
*2.12-13: Prol. 137-138
*2.13: cf. 1.175-176
*2.14: 9.21
*2.15-16: 10.82
*2.17: 9.21
*2.20: 1.185; 9.21
*2.24: 9.21
2.26: 1.183, 185
*3.2: 9.20
*3.2-3: 4.20-21
*3.5: 13.303-313
*3.5-8: 5.87
*3.6, 16: Prol. 38; 13.457
*3.14, 16: 13.322, 328
*4.1: 13.322, 328
*4.4: 1.39; 14.59
*4.11: 9.20
*5.4: 5.433, 557-559
*5.7, 8, 11: 10.342
*5.7-11: 9.22; 13.49, 134, 171, 214; 14.33, 52; 15.262, 588
*5.12: 9.20
*5.17: 14.65f.

I PETER

2.2 : 11.196
2.13: 11.374
*3.20-21: 10.406
3.21: 10.346-347
4.18: 12.278; 13.19
5.8: 5.186

II PETER

*2.4: 1.113-114
3.10: 10.411

I JOHN

1.9: 11.81
*2.15: 1.39; 14.59
*2.16: 11.12-14
*2.18: cf. 19.214
*3.12: cf. 9.120
3.14: 11.170
4.8: 1.86
4.16: *1.90-91; *5.494; 9.63
4.18: 13.163
*5.19: 1.39

JUDE

*6: 1.113-114
*23: 13.275f.

APOCALYPSE

*3.3: 11.207
3.19: 12.12
*4.7: 6.240
6.10: 17.288
*6.13: 5.14-20
7.4-8: 20.268
*9.11: 1.113-114
14.13: 14.212
*17.4, 18: 2.8
*20.12, 15: 10.376
*21.2: cf. 2.31
*22.2: cf. 1.150
*22.17: cf. 2.31

B. CORRECTIONS OF SKEAT'S SPECIFIC ERRORS: THE B-TEXT.

(According to Skeat's heading, the asterisk "signifies that the quotation is *also* to be found in the corresponding line of the *B-text*,"[5] his references being to the line in C.)

Deut. xxxii. 25* — 18.235 should read Deut. xxxii.35 — 18.235.
Ps. i.6 — b.10.321 should read Ps. i.1 — b.10.321.
Ps. xiii.1 (latter part) — b.10.441 should be removed.[6]

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[5] *Notes*, p. 503.

[6] 10.441 reads, "For sothest worde þat euere god seyde · was þo he seyde, *nemo bonus*" (Skeat, *B-Text*, p. 166). In suggesting Ps. 13.1 (the text of which reads, *Dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus. Corrupti sunt, et abominabiles facti sunt in studiis suis: non est qui*

Ps. xiii.7* — 5.36 should read Ps. xiii.3* — 5.36.
Ps. xviii.1* — 19.215 should read Ps. xviii.1 — 19.215.
Ps. xxiii.11 — b.11.273 should read Ps. xxxiii.11 — b.11.273.
Ps. xxvi.10 — b.3.247 should read Ps. xxv.10 — b.3.247.
Ps. xxxi.6* — 16.61; *see also* b.13.55 should read in the latter part *see also* b.13.57.
Ps. 1.1 — b.13.52 should read Ps. 1.3 — b.13.52.
Ps. 1.9* — 17.332 should read Ps. 1.9 — 17.332.
Ps. 1.19 — 16.62; 17.333 should read Ps. 1.19* — 16.62; 17.333.
Ps. lxviii.20* — 9.77,78 should read Ps. lxviii.29* — 9.77,78.
Ps. cxiii.2* — 21.444 should read Ps. cxlii.2* — 21.444.
Ps. cxxxi.6 — a.11.55 should read Ps. cxxxi.6 — a.11.55, c.12.51*.
Ps. cxxxii.6* — 12.51 should be removed (see preceding reference).
Ps. cxxxiv.6 — 15.156 should read Ps. cxxxiv.6* — 15.156.
Ps. cxlviii.3* — 16.264 should be removed.[7]
Ps. cxlviii.5 — b.9.32,41; *and see* c.15.166 should read in the latter part *and see* c.15.166; 16.264*.
Prov. iii.12.12 should read Prov. iii.12 — b.12.12.
Isa. xiv.5,6* — 6.178 (b.10.328) should read Isa. xiv. 4,5,6* — 6.178 (b.10.328).
Matt. vii.12 — 17.306; b.5.61 should read Matt. vii.12 — 17.306; b.7.61.
Matt. xi.5* — 19.142 should read Matt. xi.5 — 19.142.
Matt. xiii.37,39* — 16.135 should read Matt. xxii. 37*,39 — 16.135.
Matt. xv.14* — 15.125 (b.10.275) should read Matt. xv.14* — 15.125, b.10.275.
Matt. xvii.20 — b.11.272 should read Matt. xvii.19 — b.11.272.
Matt. xxv.46* — 10.287 (b.7.111); *and see* c.13.118 should be removed.[8]
Matt. xxvii.54 — 21.71 should read Matt. xxvii.54* — 21.71.
Mark xvi.18* — 16.222 should read Mark xvi.17-18* — 16.222.
Luke xxi.3 — 14.98; b.13.196 should read Luke xxi.1-3 — b.13.196-197; Luke xxi.3 — 14.98.
John iii.8* — 15.27 (b.12.67,71) should read John iii. 8* — 15.27 (b.12.65,71).
John iii.15 — b.10.377 should be removed.[9]
John xiv.13* — 16.246 (b.14.47) should read John xiv.13* — 16.246 (b.14.46).
1 Cor. x.5 — b.15.206 should read 1 Cor. x.4 — b.15.206.

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faciat bonum, non est usque ad unum), Skeat suggests only an approximate source. I suggest rather Luke 18.19: *Dixit autem ei Jesus*: *Quid me dicis bonum? nemo bonus nisi solus Deus.* Not only is the speaker the same as in the Langland, but the poem's *nemo bonus* exactly reproduces Luke.

[7] Doubtless confused with the entry following.

[8] Scholars are unanimous in tracing the words of Piers's pardon to the Athanasian Creed.

[9] Doubtless an error for John iii.13 — b.10.337, and confused with the (accurate) note preceding it in Skeat's list: "John iii.13* — 12.209 (b.10.337); *and see* a. 11.255" (*Notes*, p. 507). Skeat's marginal note, *B-Text*, p. 162, gives John 3.13 accurately for 10.377.

THE TRUE TEXT OF "THE FORMER AGE"

In 1925 Brusendorff asserted that Chaucer's *The Former Age* is "clearly a fragment copied from one of the poet's drafts."[1] If this theory is true, it is hard to see how any extensive emendation of the poem can be meaningful. Unfortunately, Brusendorff offered little in support of his hypothesis, with the result that a tradition of emendation begun in the nineteenth century continues to the present day.[2]

The purpose of this paper is to examine the major discrepancies between the MSS of *The Former Age* and the modern editions of the poem in order to consider (1) the justification for emending irrespective of Brusendorff's theory and (2) whatever likelihood there is that the MSS do actually represent Chaucer's unrevised copy. The two matters are closely related, for if the draft hypothesis can be established the editor's hands will be virtually tied, emendation then becoming something dangerously resembling revision. My belief is that it can be established.

Chaucer's poem survives in only two MSS, Cambridge University Hh. 4.12 (f. 40b) and Cambridge University Ii. 3. 21 (f. 52a).[3] The second of these is considerably better, and earlier, than the first, but there is no evidence that one is a copy of the other, or descended from a copy.[4] Hence where the MSS agree the grounds for emending will need to be especially great. Below are four of five instances where editors have chosen to emend *despite the agreement of the MSS*:

3. MSS[5] *They held hem paied of the fruttes þ^t þey ete*
Skeat, *Globe* omit *the*
23. MSS *no batails trompes for the werres folk ne knewe*
Skeat, *Globe*, Robinson omit *batails*
34. MSS *no places* (Hh *place of*) *wyldnesse ne no busshes for to wynne*
Skeat, *Globe*, Robinson omit *places / place of*
42. MSS *in kaues and wodes softe and swete*
Skeat, *Globe*, Robinson insert *in*, bracketed, before *wodes*

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[1] *The Chaucer Tradition* (London and Copenhagen), 293.

[2] The poem was first printed by Morris (*Aldine Chaucer*, 1866), without emendation. But the policy of emending began shortly thereafter; cf., for example, Gilman's edition of the complete works (1879). Skeat, Heath (*Globe*), Koch, MacCracken (*College Chaucer*), and Robinson all emend. Two of these editions have appeared since Brusendorff's book.

[3] Printed by the Chaucer Society (*Parallel-Text Edition of Chaucer's Minor Poems*, part 2, 174-176). I have followed my own transcriptions, made from the MSS; these differ significantly only once, however, from the Chaucer Society's (see fn. 11 below).

[4] Editors have unanimously recognized the superiority of Ii. Ii is a very early MS., dated variously late fourteenth century (M.R. James), *c.* 1425 (Kurath and Kuhn, *Middle English Dictionary*); it is hard to date MSS of this period very precisely — my impression was *c.* 1400. Hh is clearly later in the century. But the dating need not have textual relevance. There is no evidence, however, which suggests that one MS. is a copy of the other, either directly (impossible for Ii) or through intermediaries now lost. On the other hand, there is evidence that they are not: Ii's numerous seemingly "right" readings; Hh's "right" reading in l. 44; the reversal readings cited near the end of this article.

[5] Ii's reading has been given; this does not mean, however, that the two MSS are necessarily in absolute agreement throughout the line —only on the point in question. The edi-

The last example is perhaps trivial except from the standpoint of principle, the principle being the right of the editor to improve upon the meter of his authorities. Since in all instances the difficulty is never with the sense, the assumption underlying the emendations must be that the metrical irregularity is due to a scribe (in other words, that Chaucer would not write hyper- or hypometrical lines).[6] But in ll.23 and 34 a strange kind of scribe must be imagined, one who finds it necessary to insert words like *batails* and *place*(*s*), unrequired by the meaning and harmful to the meter. Finally, it is observable that the search for metrical regularity has robbed the poem of one of its most graphic lines, *No trompes for the werres folk ne knewe* being pallid in comparison with the reading of the MSS, *no batails trompes...*

The next passage is treated separately because of its complexity, but the same observation can be made of it: the difficulty is not with the sense but only with the meter.

44. MSS *Or* (Hh *on*) *gras or leues in perfyt ioye reste*
(Hh lacks *reste*) *and quiete*
Globe reads as in Hh; Skeat, Robinson adopt Hh's *on* (clearly right), omit *ioye reste and*

There is no question, of course, that the MSS are especially unmetrical here and could not possibly represent Chaucer's final intention, whatever that may have been. Yet it is puzzling why a scribe should spoil the meter by piling up virtual synonyms (*in perfyt ioye reste and quiete*). In his disregard of metrics the Ii copyist has even inserted one of the words (*reste*) above the line, indicating the insertion with a caret. The possible significance of this insertion for Brusendorff's hypothesis will be discussed below.

The one remaining instance of agreement is in the last line of stanza 7, which is missing in both MSS. Koch and Robinson represent the defect by a row of dots, thus indicating an acceptance of the MSS here. But earlier editors have attempted a remedy by composing lines of their own.[7]

It is not agreement but the absence of it, perhaps, which has produced the final set of emendations. The MSS offer the following versions of the concluding lines (61-63) of the poem:

Hh *ffor in owre days is not* [= *nought*[8]] *but couetyse*
dowblenesse treson and enuye
poysoune manslawtyr mordre in sondre wyse
Ii *ffor in owre dayes nis but couetyse*
dowblenesse and tresoun and enuye
poyson and manslawtre and mordre in sondry wyse

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tions referred to are: Skeat = *Oxford Chaucer* 1 (1894) 380-382; *Globe* = Pollard *et al.*, *Globe Chaucer* (1898) 627-628; Robinson = *Complete Works*, 2nd ed. (1957) 534. The remaining major edition, J. Koch's *Geoffrey Chaucers Kleinere Dichtungen* (1928) 204-205, is better handled in this note. Koch's solution is to print the Ii reading which others excise in square brackets; e.g., *No* [*batails*] *trompes for the werres* (l. 23). It is questionable whether an editor should sit upon a fence in this fashion. Skeat's omissions and Koch's bracketed readings coincide.

[6] "Both MSS are poor, and omit a whole line..., which has to be supplied by conjecture; as we have no other authority" (Skeat, 1, 539). This kind of reasoning obviously underlies all the emendations.

[7] Robinson conveniently collects these (2nd ed., 860, 917).

[8] Presumably; but *NED* does not list *not* as spelling for *nought*.

The editors vary widely in their handling of these lines; none prints either MS. exactly. The latest (Robinson's) is:

> For in oure dayes nis but covetyse,
> Doublenesse, and tresoun, and envye,
> Poyson, manslauhtre, and mordre in sondry wyse.

As one can see, Ii is followed for ll. 61-62, but for the last line the two MSS are combined.

Why? Once more the emendation can only be for metrical reasons. But here I believe it is beyond question a mistake to emend. In l. 62 the generally better MS. (Ii) presents a series of abstract nouns each connected to its predecessor by *and*, and in l. 63 a parallel series, the effect of the repeated conjunctions being to weight equally, as though by the ruffle of a drum, the items in Chaucer's terrible indictment. The emendation damages this effect and accomplishes only a theoretical metrical improvement in return; that is, it reduces a fourteen-syllable line to thirteen.[9] True, we do not know that Chaucer wrote the line as it appears in the Ii version, since we have only the one MS. in its support. But it is simpler to assume that he did than that the Hh scribe managed to copy the first half of the line correctly, but failed in the second, whereas the Ii scribe blundered in the first half and succeeded in the second. And a gain, literarily.

As remarked in the beginning, the justification for the emendations is a question closely related to Brusendorff's belief that the MSS are copied fromo ne of the poet's drafts. Even so, the examination has so far revealed that in each case the reason for emending is only a metrical one, the sense always remaining unaltered, and that with one exception (l. 42) the method of emendation is excision. The assumption underlying this treatment of the text must be that the excised words are the addition of scribes, and below this assumption must lie another: that Chaucer would not write unmetrically. However, the unusual character of the "additions" has been pointed out. The second assumption, dubious at best, is of course untenable under Brusendorff's theory.

Brusendorff's support for his hypothesis is so brief that it can be given in full:

> It [*The Former Age*]is not only unfinished but several lines are imperfect (superfluous syllables in 23 & 34; see Skeat I. 541 f.). Possibly, then, the last line of Stanza VII, now wanting, was never written...[10]

I shall take up these points in order and then add evidence of my own. But first I should remark that there is no evidence against Brusendorff's theory.

(1) The belief that the poem is unfinished apparently arises from the abruptness of the ending, the last stanza being cut from the same pattern as the preceding ones. An additional stanza of summation would, I feel, give a greater effect of completeness. However, Brusendorff's contention seems undemon-

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[9] The meter is iambic pentameter. Chaucer's verse was certainly syllable counting, but there is more involved in metrics than the number of syllables (cf. for example, my article, "The Two Domains: Meter and Rhythm," *PMLA*, LXXVI (1961), 413-419); a 13-syllable unmetrical line is as unmetrical as a 14-syllable one. There is something to be said for the point of view that an emendation, if it is to be done at all, should be carried to the point where it is successful.

[10] *Chaucer Tradition*, 293.

strable because of its subjectivity; it hence must be regarded as the weakest argument in favor of his theory. (2) The "imperfect" lines have already been discussed and supplemented. Ii's rendering of l. 44 is probably the most interesting, where *reste* is inserted with a caret into the already overly long line.[11] Ii's scribe is a professional, and a careful workman, as is shown by the fact that he produced one of the "best" copies of Chaucer's translation of Boethius and the unique "best" copy of Chaucer's *Fortune*.[12] Since Hh omits — more objectively speaking, lacks — *reste*, it is at least permissable to suppose that the word was inserted with a caret in the exemplar but in such a fashion that only a careful scribe like Ii's would notice it. It is unthinkable that this producer of "best" copies deliberately made up the reading. This does not prove, of course, that Ii's copy was Chaucer's draft, but careted insertions are characteristic of drafts. (3) Since the last line of stanza 7 is missing in both MSS, it was obviously not present in their exemplar(s). Unfinished stanzas are of course to be expected in drafts.[13]

The additional evidence is as follows:

First, there is a peculiar series of readings in which the MSS agree generally as to the wording but not as to the order, suggesting the kind of minor adjustments frequently made in drafts (Hh's reading is given first, Ii's second):

13. *no man ȝit fier*: *no man the fyr... yit*
15. *in the morter ȝit*: *yit in the morter*
28. *dyd fyrst*: *first dide*
36. *eke is*: *is ek*
48. *to odyr his feyth kept*: *his feith to oother kepte*
61. *is not*: *nis*

This kind of variation can be paralleled, of course, in other MSS, but perhaps not in such quantity in so short a space.[14]

Second, there is nothing to suggest that the poem was published, in Root's sense,[15] and hence more reason to believe that it never reached final form. This observation is supported not merely by the survival of the poem in only two copies, but also by the coincidence of the Ii copy being accompanied by the unique "best" copy of *Fortune*. The latter work survives in ten MSS (plus two early printed versions), of which the Ii copy forms a group by itself. Robinson comments: "MS. Ii is decidedly the best and contains a number of superior unique readings."[16] Clearly the Ii scribe had access to copies of these poems which were not generally available. The copy of *Fortune* was probably a revision.[17]

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[11] The Chaucer Society's transcription does not show this, nor is it mentioned by Brusendorff; the insertion is in the same hand as the rest of the text.

[12] Ii is principally a MS. of the Boethius; however, following the meter of which *The Former Age* is a partial paraphrase the scribe has copied that poem and also *Fortune*. Skeat based his text of the Boethius on Ii and remarked, "I take it to be, for all practical purposes, *the authentic copy*" (2, xxxviii; the italics are Skeat's). Ii is a most elaborate MS., containing besides Chaucer's translation the Latin text and commentaries. For the textual significance of the Ii *Fortune* see below.

[13] Admittedly, it is difficult to conjecture about drafts. However, we do have knowledge of the drafts of some poets (e.g., Milton, Keats, Yeats), and these share similarities.

[14] There are also minor variations in phrasing, which in any other context would be without significance but which may be meaningful here. I cite representative samples: *wt þe frutes*: *of the fruttes* (3); *no*: *ne* (19-23); *all our cursidnesse*: *al the cursydnesse* (31); *wyll*: *wol* (39); *were... no*: *was... non* (41),

[15] "Publication before Printing," *PMLA*, XXVIII (1913), 417-431.

To summarize the evidence for Brusendorff's theory: *The Former Age* as we have it in the MSS gives an overall unfinished appearance, partly because it lacks a definite conclusion, partly because it has an uncompleted stanza, and partly because it contains unmetrical lines. The lines, moreover, are not of the sort usually associated with scribes (misreadings of the sense, eyeskips, and the like) but rather with an author who is still seeking his phrasing. These features, plus the reversal readings cited above and the probability that the poem was never published, force one, I feel, to accord serious status to Brusendorff's theory. The MSS are either from a draft or they are not. Such evidence as there is indicates that they are.

There was perhaps never any justification for emending where the MSS are in agreement. But what now, in the light of Brusendorff's hypothesis, is to be regarded as the true text of *The Former Age*? To recover all the details of a draft with its cancellations, adjustments, and additions would be an impossibility. The Ii scribe, however, has shown his competence in two works, and there is at least a chance that he had Chaucer's MS., or something very close to it, before him for this one. He is quite possibly more trustworthy in this matter than we. At any rate, the evidence allows us little choice other than to regard his copy — his unemended copy — as being as near to the true text of Chaucer's poem as we are likely to get.[18]

George B. PACE.

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[16] Page 917. The strangeness of the situation here needs emphasizing and explaining (the occurrence in the same MS. of the two most authoritative copies of these poems, the text of one, however, being regarded as poor, that of the other as good — yet both the best available). I intend to deal with *Fortune* in another article. It is sufficient to say here, however, that Brusendorff has convincingly shown (*Chaucer Tradition*, 198-200) the original of all the *Fortune* MSS to have been a draft. But there are still other difficulties. Skeat commented on "the curious fact that, *in this MS. only* [Skeat's italics], the two poems by Chaucer that are closely related to Boethius, viz. The Former Age, and Fortune, are actually inserted into the very body of it" and offered the following explanation: "this place was of course chosen because The Former Age is, to some extent, a verse translation of that metre [ii, 5]; and Fortune was added because, being founded upon scraps from several chapters, it had no definite claim to any specific place of its own" (2, xli). This implies that a scribe, or someone, hunted among Chaucerian poems for those on Boethian themes and recognizeed, down to the exact meter for one of them, their reference in the translation—hardly the most plausible of explanations, unless the person was Chaucer himself. Skeat believed that Ii was copied from Chaucer's own copy ("But I believe it to be copied from Chaucer's copy, all the same"— 2, xxxviii, fn. 1). A possible inference from this belief is that Chaucer, working on the two poems, left drafts of them in his copy and that the Ii scribe simply followed what he found before him. Perhaps this inference is too bold, but, as noted above, the whole situation here is strange and needs explaining. (Against the inference is the fact that both Liddell in the *Globe* and Robinson based their texts of the Boethius on another MS. But a definitive edition of the Boethius remains to be done).

[17] There is no other way to explain Ii's having "superior unique readings" and also sharing patent errors with the other MSS, these being demonstrably not descended from it.

[18] This is to be found, except for minor adjustments, in the Chaucer Society's transcription (see fn. 3 above); hence I feel no need to offer my own text here.

REPORT OF A THESIS DEFENDED AT THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

The Last Will in England from the Conversion to the End of the Thirteenth Century

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The last will or testament in English common law provides an interesting example of the meeting of the three great cultural streams of medieval Europe. The Christian desire to give alms at death, and legal notions derived from Roman law, gradually modified the Germanic customs of succession in use among the Anglo-Saxons and their Norman conquerors; but certain Germanic qualities survived to produce the unique legal institution that still plays an important role in contemporary society.

The present thesis undertakes to study the rather long historical evolution that produced the last will of English law. It follows the development of this institution from the time when the Anglo-Saxons first came under the influence of Christian missionaries, until the last years of the thirteenth century, and considers the legal nature of the will, its enforcement, the persons who were allowed to use it, and the property of which it disposed.

As the distribution of wealth at death developed among the Anglo-Saxons, it followed a pattern common to the invading peoples in northern Europe. The Germans were already accustomed, in some areas at least, to provide for the future needs of the deceased by burying or destroying part of his property with his body. When a family was threatened by extinction, the estate of the owner could be bequeathed by a legal process similar to adoption. With the coming of Christianity another and more general motive for asserting a right of bequest appeared. It was already an established Christian practice that a dying man should give part of his property in alms for the good of his soul. This practice came to England with the Christian missionaries and remained the chief motive for exercising a power of bequest throughout the period treated in this dissertation. There were other motives as well: for example, the expression of affection, the reward of service, the rectification of past injustice.

Bequests were made by three different legal acts, namely, the *post obit* gift, the death-bed gift, and the *cwide*. In the completion of these gifts a third party was sometimes used to deliver the testator's property to the legatee. The first two forms of the will were contractual, irrevocable donations, but the *cwide*, though most of its elements were possessed of these qualities, included some legacies that were not contractual and could be revoked. The *cwide* was a special form of will, limited to members of the upper class, and usually dependent on the support of a protector for its completion. In external appearance, though not in effect, it was similar to the canonical will that developed late in the twelfth century.

These acts were performed in accord with the demands of Germanic law. They were formal, oral transactions, and often included the delivery of a token or a *wedd*. Though a written witness of wills was often made, the preparation and signing of the document were not part of the formalities of the donation. The written wills of Anglo-Saxon England are unique in western Europe at that time. Most are in the vernacular and, when they relate to *cwides*, they sometimes provide a remarkably detailed account of the possessions of the deceased.

By Cnut's day, the notion was already current that it was a crime to die intestate. Male freemen were expected to make a will; bishops, priests, widows and unmarried women were also free to bequeath their property. Of other members of society there is less information: married women could own property and they made wills, but in all surviving examples their husbands were associated with them in the act; religious were not normally allowed to bequeath property, though superiors sometimes did so as a means of protecting the endowment of the house of which they were head.

Of the types of property bequeathed, chattels, including slaves, farm-stock and rights of every description, were the most common legacies. There were also many donations of land by will, but these bequests were privileged; they were either donations of bookland, or land whose bequest was permitted by the lord or by the heir. The bequest of land was probably introduced as a means of protecting the endowment of churches and monasteries from the families of deceased bishops and abbots.

The Norman Conquest produced many changes in English political and social institutions, but did not cause a profound modification in the theory and practice of the will. The most important change was the disappearance of the *cwide* and of the vernacular English will. But the persons who exercised a power of bequest remained much as before, and the *post obit* gift and the death-bed gift continued in use until late in the second half of the twelfth century. Then a new theory of the will came to the fore.

This important change is related to the renaissance of Roman law that occurred during the twelfth century. Included within the Roman legal system were a theory and jurisprudence of the testament, an act disposing of property at death that possessed several advantages over the different forms of will that were in use throughout northern Europe. This Roman testament influenced the English will; the special quality of that influence was determined by the fact that it came to England by way of canon law.

The essential purpose of the Roman testament was the appointment of an heir, although it could include the donation of legacies and usually did so. The canonists, on the other hand, were interested in the testament as an instrument whereby donations were made in alms; the legacy was their chief concern. The testament found a place in the developing canon law of the twelfth century, but it was a testament seen from a special point of view, one that ignored the appointment of an heir and concentrated on the legacies it included. This was called *ultima voluntas* and was similar to the codicil of Roman law. It was revocable, unilateral and ambulatory, as was the Roman testament. It could be made either orally or in writing, and required the presence of only two or three witnesses. Late in the twelfth century this simplified testament began to be used in England. In the following years it almost completely replaced the older forms of donation at the time of death. The executor, named by the testator in his will and empowered to act in his place, grew in importance until, by 1285, he was considered to be the ordinary representative of the deceased.

The most important stages in this development occurred during the years when the supervision of the will in England passed to the courts of the Church.

Glanvill (*ca.* 1187) tells us that where there was question of the validity of a will or of its contents, decisions were to be obtained in the courts Christian. Thus these courts were able to fix the rules for the validity of the will and establish its revocability. In addition to this internal jurisdiction over the will, the Church courts acquired an external jurisdiction as well. This power to enforce bequests was obtained during the last years of the reign of King John. By the middle of the thirteenth century, probate, the taking of inventory and the rendering of an account by the executor, had become regular procedure. In the boroughs, probate of wills bequeathing land developed at about the same time. The courts Christian enforced the delivery of legacies, and began to assist in collecting the debts owed the deceased and in the acquittal of claims against his estate. Early in the reign of Edward I the executor was recognized as the representative of the deceased by the courts of common law, so that all cases rising from the collection or payment of debts passed to this jurisdiction.

The religious motive for the making of wills continued to be a powerful force after the Conquest and was one of the causes of an effort to extend the right of bequest to a larger portion of the population. According to the theory of common law, the married woman and the villein owned no chattels, and therefore could not dispose of them by will without the consent of the husband or the lord. But both groups were accustomed to use possessions as though they were their own, and both were as anxious to provide for their souls as were other members of society. Many forces in thirteenth-century England sought to extend a testamentary right to the wife and the villein. These pressures were successfully resisted by the common lawyers, but it is evident that, in practice, many members of both groups made wills which were successfully executed.

The distinction between movable and immovable property, already evident in Anglo-Saxon wills, became even more clear in the period after the Conquest. The bequest of land did not become a general practice. In spite of a tendency to remove obstacles to the alienation of land during the lifetime of the owner, the development of a similar freedom of alienation by will was prevented. There were many motives for this decision, but it seems best to conclude that the most enduring cause of the restriction was a procedural one: the requirements for livery of seisin, as developed by common law, made the transfer of land by will technically impossible. In the boroughs and other areas not subject to common law, a right of devise of land slowly developed, so that by the second half of the thirteenth century the bequest of land was of common occurrence.

Wills were especially concerned with legacies of movable property. Chattels of every sort were included. By the early years of the reign of Henry III, grain growing in the field, the right to marriages and wardships, and even leased land were freely distributed by will. Except in a few cases, the villein did not appear in post-Conquest wills either as a bequest or as a legatee to whom freedom was given.

The Anglo-Saxon testator seems to have made reasonable provision for the future needs of his wife and children, but, so far as can be seen, the part of his property over which he had full right of alienation was not limited to a precise portion. After the Conquest it became a general, though not universal, custom that the testator with dependents could dispose of one third of his chattels. The remaining two thirds were reserved to his wife and children. Those who died without dependents were free to dispose of all their chattels except those claimed as a mortuary or as a heriot.

As was remarked at the beginning of this report, all the wills of the period under consideration were characterized by a profound concern for the good of the testator's soul. Thus the donation in alms was of prime importance. However, in this medieval context, 'alms' must be understood in a very wide sense. It included offerings for liturgical services, gifts to churches, hospitals and the poor, as would be expected. But education, the building of roads and bridges, and equipment for the defense of a country or of Christendom, found a place there as well. The will thus provided a voluntary source of income for the well-developed social services of medieval England.

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